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I. Introduction 
Federal statutes often invoke the word “property” without 
defining it. For example, according to the Internal Revenue Code, 
“[I]f any person liable to pay any tax neglects . . . to pay . . . the 
amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all 
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging 
to such person.”1 
                                                                                                     
 1. I.R.C. § 6321 (2012) (emphasis added). I shall occasionally refer to 
federal criminal forfeiture provisions which invoke the undefined term “property”: 
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or 
subchapter II of this chapter punishable by imprisonment for 
more than one year shall forfeit to the United States, 
irrespective of any provision of State law— 
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any 
proceeds of the person obtained, directly or indirectly, 
as the result of such violation; 
(2) any of the person’s property used, or intended to be 
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The Bankruptcy Code often invokes the word “property.” A 
very prominent example: 
The commencement of a case under [the Bankruptcy Code] 
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following 
property, wherever located and by whomever held: 
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this 
section, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case.2 
My thesis is that there exists a federal law of property which 
must be understood as natural law.3 When federal law encounters 
the word “property” in a statute, it is unable to define the word 
except by reference to non-federal law.4 Yet this non-federal law 
must ultimately stand judgment in the docket of natural law.5 
                                                                                                     
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate 
the commission of, such violation; and 
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a 
continuing criminal enterprise in violation of section 
408 of this title, the person shall forfeit, in addition to 
any property described in paragraph (1) or (2), any of 
his interest in, claims against, and property or 
contractual rights affording a source of control over, the 
continuing criminal enterprise. 
21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2012) (emphasis added). Section 853(b) goes on to state that 
property includes real property and personal property both tangible and 
intangible. In criminal drug cases, we have this pronouncement: 
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no 
property right shall exist in them: 
. . .  
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest 
(including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of 
land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or 
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or facilitate 
the commission of, a violation of this [title] punishable by more than 
one year’s imprisonment. 
21 U.S.C. § 881 (emphasis added). 
 2. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (emphasis added). 
 3. Infra Parts II–III. 
 4. See William H. Baker, Drye and Craft—How Two Wrongs Can Make a 
Property Right, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 745, 759 (2003) (noting that the Supreme Court 
and other courts first acknowledge the proposition that state law determines the 
nature of the property interest before turning to federal law).  
 5. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 103–
06 (1985) (describing the state-federal dialectic). 
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Natural law bears a specific psychoanalytic structure—the 
structure of the superego.6 All common law (state or federal) is 
superegoic in nature. In common law reasoning, settled rules are 
susceptible to destruction and obliteration from within. Under the 
common law, positive law is never settled.7 It always quakes in fear 
before its natural law master, which can in an instant release 
destructive horror upon its subservient head.8 The destruction of 
positive law is traumatic and disturbing.9 The only therapy for this 
trauma is for the bystanders to positivize what just happened, 
integrating the trauma back into a new positivist symbolic order.10 
Thus is the positive federal law of property born—as the 
obliteration and correction of state law.11 
In this vision, state law stands for positive law—the symbolic 
realm, without which the superego remains forever silent. The 
destructive power of natural law presupposes something that can 
be destroyed.12 Thus, natural law can be observed only in the 
negation of positive law.13 So initially state law must propose what 
property is. But just because state law proclaims that interest 
“property” does not make it so. Natural law negates state law and 
re-issues it in federal form.14 The horror of destruction (that’s all 
the superego is)15 is cabined by a reformulated symbolic realm that 
                                                                                                     
 6. See David Gray Carlson, The Traumatic Dimension in Law, 24 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2287, 2295 (2003) [hereinafter Carlson, Traumatic Dimension] (“The 
element of law that the superego exploits to the hilt is the requirement that action 
is to be judged according to pre-existing rules.”). 
 7. See id. (noting that the system reworks to justify or condemn earlier 
acts). 
 8. Id. at 2296. 
 9. See id. at 2288 (stating that every judicial decision is traumatic—
providing causal narrative after the fact). 
 10. Id. at 2306. 
 11. Infra Parts II.B–C. 
 12. See Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Right 
and the Essence of Wrong, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2481, 2485 (2013) (arguing that a 
concept must exist to be negated).  
 13. See id. (discussing the relationship between existence and negation). 
 14. See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (noting that federal law 
defeats state law interpretation). 
 15. See Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Kenneth Starr: 
Diabolically Evil?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 653, 671 (2000)  
[T]he preontological law is the Freudian superego as rewritten by 
Lacan. In ordinary Freudian understanding, the “superego” is the 
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is distinctly federal in nature. To be sure, sometimes the federal 
intuition replicates the state law result and seems to repeat it and 
uphold it.16 In truth, every repetition is a creative act.17 By 
repeating the state law result, a court is actually creating a new 
federal result. And, on the other hand, perhaps state law will not 
be reissued in federal form. Rather, a federal court will discover 
that the federal law of property was and always has been 
something at odds with the state law result. Federal law discovers 
that which always was. It does not just invent something new—
that would be mere heteronomous legislation.18 In discovering 
what it presupposes, federal law always speaks in a future anterior 
tense.19 It discovers what “will have been” the federal law all along. 
Positivists will bristle at this and say that property has no 
existence beyond what positive legislation claims it to be. Property 
is entirely “conventional,” the objection goes.20 But purely 
conventional law is contradictory. The rules cannot possibly 
account full for the concept of “property” (or any other concept).21 
This is the lesson of Russell’s Paradox in set theory, and because 
of this lesson, mathematics itself cannot entirely be reduced to 
rules.22 If mathematics is not entirely captured by rules, how much 
less so can we expect this of property law? It is the highest paradox 
                                                                                                     
internalization of law as prohibition . . . roughly equivalent to what is 
commonly called “conscience” . . . . It chastises the subject for “doing 
evil.” But the Lacanian superego has a “diabolical” side as well. This is 
the side that requires the possibility of its own transgression. 
Consequently, the Lacanian superego, as the condition of law, must 
sadistically cause the possibility of the very evil it condemns.  
 16. See generally Steve R. Johnson, Why Craft Isn’t Scary, 37 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 439, 448–49 (2002) [hereinafter Johnson, Why Craft Isn’t Scary].  
 17. See generally ARTHUR J. JACOBSON, HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY 97 
(Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1991). 
 18. See infra notes 46–48 and accompanying text (discussing the 
heteronomous judicial process). 
 19. See Carlson, Traumatic Dimension, supra note 6, at 2287 (explaining 
that natural and positive law work in tandem to discover the truth). 
 20. See David Gray Carlson, Legal Positivism and Russell’s Paradox, 5 
WASH. U. JUR. REV. 257, 259 (2013) [hereinafter Carlson, Russell’s Paradox] 
(arguing that positivism defines law as the set of all primary and secondary rules 
selected according to conventional rules of recognition). 
 21. See id. (emphasizing that legal positivism is contradictory). 
 22. See id. (“[L]aw cannot be reduced to a closed set of rules by which law 
can be recognized.”).  
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in mathematics that, thanks to Bertrand Russell, set theory has 
no theory of the set.23 Defining a set is legislatively forbidden24 
because it leads to contradiction. Similarly, the rules that describe 
the natural law of property generally—and especially federal 
property, for our purposes—can never be fully set forth.25 There is 
no “rule of recognition.”26 There is only recognition simpliciter.27 
The rules are manufactured after the fact to make sense of the 
recognition.28 
That property law is natural is to say that the concept exceeds 
the conventions that describe it. Practice precedes theory—in law 
as in any other discourse. Hilary Putnam, in his famous 
antitheoretic essay, The Meaning of Meaning,29 shows that the 
definition of a word cannot reduce to conventional rules of usage. 
There is always an “indexical” moment of dumb pointing, where 
the speaker finally points at an object (in Putnam’s example, at 
H20) and says, “That’s what I mean!” As with Russell’s paradox, it 
is impossible to reduce the meaning of any word to the rules of its 
usage. Indexicality is the stumbling block that establishes the 
truth that practice always exceeds our ability to theorize it.30 The 
surplus of practice over theory is precisely what I mean by natural 
law. Positive law is, but natural law does.31 And what it does is to 
destroy.32 
                                                                                                     
 23. See id. (stating that legal positivism is a set that does not belong to itself 
and so suffers from contradiction).  
 24. See id. at 281 (explaining that the axiom scheme of separation prevents 
contradiction). 
 25. See id. (“But the price of this banishment is that set theory has no 
criterial theory of what a set is.”). 
 26. See id. at 259 (noting that primary rules cannot be reduced to a 
determinate rule of recognition). 
 27. See id. (stating that there is no rule of recognition, only incomplete set of 
individual laws). 
 28. See id. (noting that, under the Paradox, it is impossible to say in advance 
what the law is).  
 29. See 2 HILARY PUTNAM, MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS 215 (1975) (introducing how meaning may depart from syntax of natural 
languages). 
 30. Id. at 229.  
 31. See Carlson, Traumatic Dimension, supra note 6, at 2296 (describing the 
interaction between positive and natural law).  
 32. See id. at 2288 (noting the inherent trauma in judicial decisions). 
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Now how is a federal judge to intuit whether some property 
interest, as defined by state law, is or is not really federal property 
after all? The process is ably described by the United States 
Supreme Court in United States v. Craft.33 In her analysis of the 
Michigan tenancy by the entirety, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
uses a “common idiom”—property is a “bundle of sticks.”34 The 
bundle of sticks is the traditional categories of right to use, right 
to possess (i.e., the right to exclude others),35 and the right to 
alienate. “State law determines only which sticks are in a person’s 
bundle. Whether those sticks qualify as ‘property’ for purposes of 
the federal tax lien statute is a question of federal law.”36 Labels 
assigned to the bundle by state law are to be ignored.37 Labels are 
“form,” but federal law is “substance.”38 State law is guilty of 
“fictions.”39 The federal courts are not blinded by state law 
fictions.40 The federal law manifests what is real.41 
Justice O’Connor’s procedure for separating real wheat from 
fictional chaff depends on a faith that federal courts can be in touch 
with the substance, not merely the form, of the bundle of sticks to 
determine whether the bundle rises to the dignity of natural 
property.42 The procedure works as follows: The federal judge sits 
in judgment of a claim by a litigant that it has a property interest 
(or perhaps that it has no property interest).43 The judge must 
consult the natural law of property to see if the claim of the litigant 
                                                                                                     
 33. United States v. Craft (Craft V), 535 U.S. 274, 276 (2002). 
 34. Id. at 278. 
 35. See id. at 283 (stating that “the right to exclude others” is “one of the 
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as 
property” (citations omitted)). 
 36. Id. at 278. 
 37. See Johnson, supra note 16, at 444 (arguing that state-created labels are 
not controlling or relevant).  
 38. See id. (emphasizing that substance trumps form in federal taxation).  
 39. See id. (“Fictions [are] labels that diverge from underlying substance or 
reality . . . .”). 
 40. See United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224, 240 (1994) (“Absent such a 
legal fiction, the federal gift tax is not struck blind by a disclaimer.”). 
 41. See Hannon v. City of Newton, 820 F. Supp. 2d 254, 259 (D. Mass. 2011) 
(noting that Craft saw what Michigan law was “in reality”). 
 42. See Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 276 (2002) (noting that, despite the state law 
fiction, the individual rights in the estate constitute federal property). 
 43. See id. (delaing with  a litigant’s claim that  no property interest existed). 
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is correct.44 This is done by entering into the state of rational 
autonomy.45 The judge must purge herself of all heteronomy—
defined as any emotion, inclination, fear, awe of the litigant’s 
counsel, or hope for praise in the law reviews.46 All of these things 
are imposed from the outside of the rational autonomous self. If 
the judge successfully purges herself of all heteronomy, then the 
judge will correctly intuit whether the litigant has a natural 
property right or not.47 
The difficulty the judge faces is that, like all humans, she is 
doomed to the realm of appearances. She has an intuition that the 
litigant has (or has not) a property interest. But perhaps this is not 
natural law speaking through the oracle of the autonomous judge. 
Perhaps it is a hallucination—a mere appearance. The devil hath 
power to assume the pleasing shape of federal law. The judge never 
knows whether she has peered into the sublime abyss of natural 
law or whether she has succumbed to evil, heteronomous forces 
that merely assume the pleasing guise of natural reason.48 The 
undecidable issue for the judge is whether her intuition is an 
autonomous vision of property law itself (proceeding from Homer’s 
gate of horn),49 or whether her intuition emanates from 
heteronomy (the gate of ivory). Her intuition may only be the 
product of what the judge had for breakfast—for legal realism, 
                                                                                                     
 44. See Carlson, Russell’s Paradox, supra note 20, at 277 (discussing natural 
law as independent from arbitrary human will).  
 45. See Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 12, at 2494 (noting the autonomous 
person is not objective to itself). 
 46. See David Gray Carlson, Hart avec Kant: On The Inseparability of Law 
and Morality, 1 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 21, 38 (2009) [hereinafter Carlson, Hart avec 
Kant] (defining heteronomy to include inclination and emotion).  
 47. See David Gray Carlson, Dworkin in the Desert of the Real, 60 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 505, 517 (2006) [hereinafter Carlson, Desert of the Real] (emphasizing that 
moral legal interpretation requires a practitioner to suppress her heteronomy). 
 48. See id. (“It is the state of the interpreter that she never knows for sure 
what the status of her own interpretation is.”). 
 49. See HOMER, ODYSSEY 19.560–19.565 (1758) 
Stranger, dreams verily are baffling and unclear of meaning, and in no 
wise do they find fulfillment in all things for men. For two are the gates 
of shadowy dreams, and one is fashioned of horn and one of ivory. 
Those dreams that pass through the gate of sawn ivory deceive men, 
bringing words that find no fulfillment. But those that can forth 
through the gate of polished horn bring true issues to pass, when any 
mortal sees them.  
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that’s all intuition ever is.50 But for psychoanalysis, it is equally 
possible that the judge has communed directly with the natural 
law of property.51 Morality may be smeared with pathology,52 but 
it is equally true that pathology is reciprocally smeared with 
morality.53 
A judge can never know for certain whether her intuition is a 
mere illusion of natural law or is the real thing. The only therapy 
for the judge is legal research. The judge can consult the historic 
intuitions that other judges, in the similar dilemmas, have in fact 
reached. If the precedents can be pieced together to justify the 
intuition, then the judge can have some degree of confidence 
(though never any certainty) that her intuition conforms with the 
natural law of property.54 
Of course, she may find that her research contradicts her 
intuition. Intuition says that the litigant’s claim to property law is 
a sham, but the research says otherwise. In that case, the judge 
has the option of proclaiming the previous case law as “wrong”—
i.e., not in conformity with natural law.55 This was the option 
Justice O’Connor chose in Craft.56 Or the judge has the option of 
concluding that the fault is with her intuition.57 Perhaps the past 
precedents are in touch with natural law, in which case her 
intuition has proven to be a false impression proceeding from a 
heat-oppressed brain. The judge realizes after the fact that, for 
breakfast, she has eaten on the insane root that takes reason 
prisoner. In that case, intuition must be set aside, and federal law 
must (creatively) repeat state law.58 Whatever the judge decides, 
                                                                                                     
 50. See Carlson, Desert of the Real, supra note 47, at 516 (defining intuition 
in the practice of law). 
 51. See id. (noting that interpretation may occur in either an autonomous or 
heteronomous manner).  
 52. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Stumbling Block: Freedom, Rationality, 
and Legal Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 319 (2002) (stating the theory 
that all practical action is necessarily smeared with pathology). 
 53. Carlson, Hart avec Kant, supra note 46, at 40. 
 54. See Carlson, Traumatic Dimension, supra note 6, at 2293 (noting that 
precedent may justify the present decision).  
 55. Id.  
 56. Infra Part II.D. 
 57. Carlson, Desert of the Real, supra note 47, at 516.  
 58. Carlson, Traumatic Dimension, supra note 6, at 2293. 
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she can never really be certain that her intuition was right or 
wrong.59 
Eventually, the judge writes an opinion giving reasons for her 
intuition. This opinion is designed to convince the litigant that the 
reliance on state law is contrary to (or conforms with) natural law, 
and also to convince the judge herself that her judgment is indeed 
the child of integrity, rather than the spawn of heteronomy.60 The 
opinion sets forth what appears to be the pre-existing federal law 
of property—the major premise of a syllogism. The state law is the 
minor premise, and the intuition either condemns or upholds state 
law. But the opinion that positivizes federal law is misleading. 
Natural law can never be successfully positived, once and for all. 
Natural law is pure destruction of the positive law and nothing 
more than that. The opinion is an attempt to contain the 
monstrosity of natural law by integrating it within a familiar 
symbolic universe.61 But that therapeutic opinion is itself just 
positive law, which must stand in the docket against future 
superegoic confrontations.62 Natural law is incapable of being 
saturated by positive descriptions of it.63 
In the following three sections, I will review two empirical 
examples of natural law judgements about state law.64 The 
examples initially appear in federal tax law, with occasional 
illustrations from the closely aligned law of criminal forfeiture.65 
The examples concern the right of an heir to disclaim an 
inheritance.66 In Drye v. United States,67 the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
 59. See Carlson, Desert of the Real, supra note 47, at 516 (noting it is 
typically unclear if a judicial decision is made with autonomy or heteronomy). 
 60. See id. (describing the pronouncement of an opinion as unreasoned, 
instinctual, and revelatory).  
 61. See id. (describing the opinion as post-hoc rationalization).  
 62. See Carlson, Traumatic Dimension, supra note 6, at 2293 (noting that 
common law is subject to natural law later justifying or condemning earlier acts). 
 63. In mathematics, a saturated model is one in which every formula’s 
variables is realized by a constant in the language in which the model is 
expressed. C.C. CHANG & JEROME KEISLER, MODEL THEORY 100 (3d ed. 1990).  
 64. See infra Parts II.B–C (demonstrating natural law in federal tax 
decisions). 
 65. Infra Part II.D.2. 
 66. Infra Part II.C. 
 67. 528 U.S. 49 (1999); see Thomas Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional 
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 916 (2000) (finding that Drye created a clear 
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renounced state disclaimer law as an illusion, thereby permitting 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to claim a lien on an 
inheritance the taxpayer had validly (under state law) disclaimed. 
The second concerns the tenancy by the entirety.68 In Craft,69 the 
Supreme Court ignored a Michigan fiction that a husband and wife 
do not own any interest in the tenancy, thereby allowing the IRS 
to encumber the husband’s individual interest in the tenancy. 
The Thesean thread picked up in tax law is then followed into 
federal bankruptcy law. First, I rehearse the career of Drye in the 
bankruptcy labyrinth.70 Then the career of Craft is pursued at very 
considerable length.71 The conclusion I reach is that the 
Bankruptcy Code itself is superegoic. The Drye-Craft technique is 
embedded in the Bankruptcy Code itself avant la lettre. 
In each section, we observe a litigant denying a positive 
property claim based on state law, only to have a judge, under the 
delirium of federal law, decree that the claim to the property 
interest exists as a matter of federal law. State law is revealed to 
be an illusion.72 
                                                                                                     
relationship between state and federal law in determining the existence of 
property). Professor Merrill criticizes constitutional law for not developing a 
definition of property. He finds in Drye a model that could be imported into 
questions of due process, eminent domain, etc. Merrill, supra, at 893, 895. “Drye 
comes as a breath of fresh air after the three previous decisions [concerning 
takings or due process].” Id. at 916. Professor Merrill finds the Drye opinion “to 
be mercifully free of any ulterior jurisprudential objectives. But it bears the marks 
of being rushed into print with considerable haste. Barely one month elapsed 
between argument and decision.” Id. at 997. 
 68. Infra Part II.D. 
 69. See Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 276 (2002) (dismissing the state law’s 
characterization of property); infra Part II.D.  
 70. Infra Part III.A. 
 71. Infra Part III.B.   
 72. This Article deliberately evades what “property” means for the United 
States Constitution—the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause. See generally 
Merrill, supra note 67 (analyzing property under the Takings and Due Process 
Clauses). On Professor Merrill’s article, I could not presume to make any 
improvement. For the record, Professor Merrill mentions, but ultimately evades 
a confrontation with natural law and chooses to see that state law is positivist 
law and federal is another competing (on unequal terms) positive law. I maintain 
that federal law is a natural concept. In fact, so is state law, to the extent it deeply 
ponders the category of “property” to determine answers to legal disputes. 
Nevertheless, I take state law as having formulated a positive vision of what 
property is, a vision which has been submitted to the judgment of the superegoic 
federal courts. 
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II. Tax Law 
Taxes are for little people, and pay we little people must. The 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) authorizes the government to sue for 
the unpaid tax and, upon getting a judgment, exercise the usual 
rights of a judgment creditor.73 But the IRC does not consign the 
Secretary of the Treasury to obtainment of a money judgment.74 
This would immerse that Secretary in a dismal world governed 
entirely at state law. Even though a federal court would have 
“federal question” jurisdiction over the taxpayer,75 all that a 
federal court could do is issue a money judgment, which then could 
only be collected according to local rules.76 
The IRC profoundly strengthens the Secretary’s hand. It 
creates for the tax claim a lien that is more powerful than any mere 
state law lien arising from a money judgment.77 According to I.R.C. 
§ 6321, a lien attaches to all of a taxpayer’s “property” and “rights 
in property.”78 According to § 6322, this lien arises as soon as the 
tax is assessed.79 
“Property” in the first instance means that which state law 
proposes to be property. But federal judges do not take this 
judgment at face value. Rather, the claim of the litigant to have 
property must be tested against the natural law concept that 
overrides anything positive state law says it is.80 
                                                                                                     
 73. See I.R.C. §§ 7401, 7402(a) (2012) (outlining authorization and 
jurisdiction for collection); United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 682 (1983) 
(detailing the process of collecting unpaid taxes). 
 74. See I.R.C. § 7403 (authorizing the Secretary to file a civil action in 
district court). 
 75. See id. (describing enforcement procedures). 
 76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(1) (deferring to state law as to  the procedure for 
enforcing a money judgement). 
 77. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 683 (“The common purpose of this formidable 
arsenal of collection tools is to ensure the prompt and certain enforcement of the 
tax laws in a system relying primarily on self-reporting.”). 
 78. See I.R.C. § 6321 (defining the federal tax lien).  
 79. See id. § 6322 (noting the period of a lien). Assessment is notation of a 
tax liability in records maintained in the office of the IRS district director; id. 
§ 6203; Hefti v. I.R.S., 8 F.3d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that assessment 
occurs when an assessment officer signs a summary record of assessment). 
 80. Infra Parts II.C–D. 
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A. Ancient History 
The history of the present superegoic practice within tax law 
goes way back. In 1866, Congress created for the Treasury 
Department a lien on a debtor’s “property.”81 The lien was 
designated to be a “first in time first in right” style.82 
Meanwhile, in the early 20th century, state law began to 
experiment with security interests in personal property.83 Starting 
in 1929, however, the Supreme Court84 ruled, in effect, that 
inchoate liens were not really liens. Inchoate liens were uncertain 
as to “(1) the identity of the lienor, (2) the property subject to the 
lien, and (3) the amount payable were fixed beyond possibility of 
change or dispute.”85 Any creditor with a prior “floating” security 
interest found it could not claim to have a lien at all, insofar as the 
tax lien was concerned.86 Thus, at an early stage, federal law felt 
entitled to call the bluff of state law.87 Just because state law called 
the inchoate lien “property” did not make it so.88 Inchoate liens 
were not liens at all, as far as the federal courts are concerned.89 
                                                                                                     
 81. See Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 107 (creating the initial 
federal tax lien). 
 82. See id. (determining priority by beneficial use). 
 83. See generally GRANT GILMORE & DAVID GRAY CARLSON, GILMORE AND 
CARLSON ON SECURED LENDING: CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 2000) (detailing the 
evolution of personal property security interests). 
 84. See Spokane Cty. v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 94 (1929) (determining 
that inchoate lien rights were wholly different from other lien rights); Frank 
Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The Campaign of the Federal 
Government Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 IOWA L. REV. 724, 725–27 (1965) 
(discussing Supreme Court’s inchoate lien doctrine). 
 85. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86 (1954) (stating 
that inchoate liens may become certain as to amount, identity of the lienor, or the 
property subject thereto only after the date the federal liens attach); William T. 
Plumb, Jr., Federal Liens and Priorities—Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE 
L.J. 228, 230 (1967) (describing the Supreme Court’s evaluation for designating a 
federal inchoate lien). 
 86. See Baker, supra note 4, at 748–57 (analyzing the role of  state  law in 
determining  tax lien priority). 
 87. See id. at 759 (noting that federal law then determines the priority 
between state property interests and the federal tax lien). 
 88. See id. at 760 (emphasizing that after Craft, state law merely determines 
which “sticks” are in a person’s bundle, but federal law determines if those sticks 
are property for the purposes of federal tax liens). 
 89. See id. at 752 (noting the Supreme Court’s indication that a 
state-determined inchoate lien could not operate to defeat a federal tax lien). 
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As is too well known to be recounted here, the drafters of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) were keen to create a fully 
effective floating lien on personal property. This could not be 
accomplished at the level of state law.90 Federal legislation was 
required to overrule Supreme Court intuitions.91 The natural law 
insight that inchoate liens are not liens at all had to be tamed by 
positive legislation. Under the 1966 amendments to the IRC,92 a 
very limited set of floating liens was given priority over the federal 
tax lien. Thus, did Athena imprison the Furies under Areopagus, 
if only for forty-five days.93 
Since 1966, two leading Supreme Court cases have established 
beyond doubt the superegoic procedure that now governs the 
federal common law of property.94 But we need a preliminary visit 
with a case that is less overtly superegoic than the other two.95 
B. Rodgers 
In United States v. Rodgers,96 the Supreme Court pondered the 
meaning of I.R.C. § 7403(a), which gives the federal courts 
                                                                                                     
 90. See Patricia Nassif Fetzer, The Purchase Money Security Interest and the 
Federal Tax Lien: A Proposal for Legislative Change, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 873, 888–
89 (1985) (noting that the vulnerability of floating liens under the Uniform 
Commercial Code fomented federal legislation). 
 91. See id. at 886–92 (outlining the legislative history of the Federal Tax 
Lien Act). See generally AESCHYLUS, THE EUMENIDES.  
 92. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125. 
 93. See I.R.C. § 6323(c)(2)(B), (d) (2012) (requiring that, on the forty-sixth 
day, U.C.C. floating liens turn inchoate again). 
 94. See infra Part II.C–D (discussing Drye and Craft). 
 95. Omitted from this Article is a line of cases that allow tax liens to attach 
to beneficial interests in spendthrift trusts. See Lauschner v. First W. Bank & Tr. 
Co., 261 F.2d 705, 708 (9th Cir. 1958) (stating that, so long as the taxpayer has a 
property interest in these payments, the government has the power to seize 
them); United States v. Dall. Nat’l Bank, 164 F.2d 489, 489 (5th Cir. 1947) 
(determining that a lien could be enforced by requiring a trustee to pay over all 
money held belonging to taxpayer); Bank One Ohio Tr. Co. v. United States, 80 
F.3d 173, 176 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that a state-law restraint on alienation 
would not defeat a federal tax lien). Bank One Ohio Trust Co. v. United States 
was cited favorably in Drye. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 n.5 (1999); see 
Robert T. Danforth, The Role of Federalism in Administering a National System 
of Taxation, 57 TAX LAW. 625, 648–55 (2013) (exploring the common law of federal 
tax liens and spendthrift trusts). 
 96. 461 U.S. 677, 693–94 (1983).  
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jurisdiction “to subject any property, of whatever nature, of the 
[tax] delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest to 
the payment of [a] tax or liability.”97 This garbled phrase98 
authorizes federal courts to order the sale of property encumbered 
by the tax lien. 
In Rodgers, the Supreme Court had to decide what the 
statutory word “property” means.99 To illustrate the definitional 
choice, suppose a taxpayer is a 50% cotenant of Blackacre. There 
are two things § 7403(a) could mean. The taxpayer’s “property” 
could be the 50% cotenancy, which the IRS may then sell. Or the 
“property” is Blackacre itself, in which case the IRS can sell 100% 
of Blackacre.100 Of course, the IRS can only keep 50% of the 
proceeds, as the nontaxpayer cotenant is not liable for the tax.101 
This was the issue in Rodgers.102 The Supreme Court decided that 
“property” means Blackacre and not the taxpayer’s interest in 
Blackacre.103 
In effect, the Supreme Court granted to federal courts the 
power to order “partition sales of the whole,” whereby the fee 
                                                                                                     
 97. I.R.C. § 7403(a) (emphasis added). 
 98. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 692 n.18 (noting the obtuseness of the phrase). 
 99. See id. at 691 (discussing the difference between an interest in the 
property and the physical property).  
 100. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 21 (1913)  
Both with lawyers and with laymen [the term “property”] has no 
definite or stable connotation. Sometimes it is employed to indicate the 
physical object to which various legal rights, privileges, etc., relate; 
then again—with far greater discrimination and accuracy—the word 
is used to denote the legal interest (or aggregate of legal relations) 
appertaining to such physical object. 
 101. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 691 (“We also agree that the Government may 
not ultimately collect . . .  more than the value of the property interests that are 
actually liable for that debt.”). 
 102. See id. (noting the issue of the nonliable interest). 
 103. See id. at 693–94 (defining “property” as the entire thing, not just the 
taxpayer’s interest). In the same year, the Supreme Court reached an identical 
conclusion in the context of bankruptcy. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 
462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (viewing the interests of the debtor in property as an 
example of what is included in the estate, rather than a limitation). One year 
later, however, the Supreme Court said: “[P]roperty is more than just the physical 
thing—the land, the bricks, the mortar—it is also the sum of all the rights and 
powers incident to ownership of the physical thing. It is the tangible and the 
intangible. Property is composed of constituent elements.” Dickman v. Comm’r, 
465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984). 
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simple absolute could be put up for sale, not just the taxpayer’s 
50% share.104 This ruling is not quite superegoic.105 According to 
Justice Brennan, “it has long been an axiom of our tax collection 
scheme that, although the definition of underlying property 
interests is left to state law, the consequences that attach to those 
interests is a matter left to federal law.”106 So far, ostensibly, state 
law is not being erased. It is being procedurally enhanced. State 
law is not being destroyed. Its consequences are only being 
examined. 
In Rodgers, Lucille and Philip Bosco owned a residence in 
Dallas and occupied it as a homestead.107 Phillip, an accomplished 
gambler, garnered enough winnings to generate a $900,000 
gambling tax liability between 1966 and 1971.108 By 1972, these 
taxes were formally assessed against Philip, creating a lien on 
Philip’s share of the residence.109 The residence was exempt under 
Texas law, but the IRC has its own exemptions, which, in 1982, did 
not include any real property.110 Philip died in 1974.111 In 1977, the 
government filed suit against Lucille (now surnamed Rodgers).112 
The trial court awarded Lucille summary judgment on the issue of 
whether the tax lien could affect her homestead rights.113 These 
                                                                                                     
 104. See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 702 (1983) (stating that, after 
payment of compensation for the property interest, no further deference is 
required to the Texas homestead law).  
 105. See Carlson, Traumatic Dimension, supra note 6, at 2323 (explaining 
superegoic law as law that is rewritten to judge prior acts). 
 106. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 683; see also Steve R. Johnson, The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly in Post-Drye Tax Lien Analysis, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 415, 426–30 (2002) 
(providing a history of this tax scheme sentiment). 
 107. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 687 (discussing the acquisition of the homestead 
property). Rodgers was a consolidated case. Also before the Court was a second 
set of facts concerning Donald and Joerene Ingram. See id. at 689 (providing how 
the Ingrams were brought into the suit). I save the Ingram story for later to make 
an important point in the context of Kentucky law. Infra notes 275–286 and 
accompanying text. 
 108. Id. at 687. 
 109. Id.  
 110. See United States v. Rogers, 649 F.2d 1117, 1121 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(“Homestead property is not listed in [I.R.C.] § 6334(a) as exempt property.”), 
rev’d sub nom. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 667 (1983). 
 111. Id. at 1119.  
 112. See id. (stating that Phillip’s children and estate executor were made 
parties). 
 113. See id. (detailing the summary judgement on the grounds that the 
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included the right to live in the homestead for life,114 plus the right 
to veto any sale of her late husband’s interest.115 “The [trial] court 
implied that the Government had the choice of either waiting until 
Mrs. Rodgers’ homestead interest lapsed, or satisfying itself with 
a forced sale of only Philip Bosco’s interest in the property.”116 The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that: 
[W]hen a delinquent taxpayer shares his ownership interest in 
property jointly with other persons rather than being the sole 
owner, his “property” and “rights to property” to which the 
federal tax lien attaches under 26 U.S.C. § 6321 . . . involve only 
his interest in the property, and not the entire property.117 
The Court of Appeals made clear that, had Lucille claimed a 
mere state law exemption against a federal tax lien, Lucille would 
have lost.118 But Texas gives homesteaders something more—the 
right of the non-debtor spouse to a life estate, and against this the 
IRS could not foreclose.119 
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the IRS could indeed 
foreclose upon the nontaxpayer’s life estate.120 True, the IRS could 
                                                                                                     
federal lien would not defeat her interest in the property). 
 114. See TEX. CONST. ART. XVI, § 52 (proscribing the treatment of the 
homestead upon the death of a husband or wife). The life estate determined if 
Lucille were to cease residing at the homestead. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 686 
(“[H]omestead laws have the effect of reducing the underlying ownership rights 
in a homestead property to something akin to . . .  life estate in the property.”). 
Justice Brennan, therefore, was not quite correct when he opined “that a 
homestead estate is the exact economic equivalent of a life estate.” Id. at 698. 
 115. See TEX. CONST. ART. XVI, § 50 (“An owner or claimant of the property 
claimed as homestead may not sell or abandon the homestead without the consent 
of each owner and the spouse of each owner . . . .”). 
 116. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 688. 
 117. Rogers, 649 F.2d at 1125. 
 118. See id. at 1121 (“[W]e note at the outset that the homestead interest of a 
taxpayer spouse, i. e., that of one who himself has tax liability, clearly cannot by 
itself defeat a federal tax lien.”).   
 119. See id. at 1125 
If, on the other hand, a homestead interest is, under state law, a 
property right possessed by the nontaxpayer spouse at the time the 
lien attaches to the taxpayer’s interest, then the federal tax lien may 
not be foreclosed against the homestead property for as long as the 
nontaxpayer spouse maintains his or her homestead interest under 
state law. 
 120. See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 694 (1983) (recognizing of 
third-party interests through judicial valuation and distribution). 
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not collect Philip’s tax liability from the proceeds of Lucille’s 
property,121 but a federal court could liquidate Lucille’s property, 
contrary to Texas law, in order to maximize the total value of the 
property to which the tax lien attached.122 In short, the Court found 
that the word “property,” in § 7403(a), means Blackacre, not 
Philip’s interest in Blackacre.123 Thus, a federal court could subject 
“any property . . . in which [the taxpayer] has any . . . interest” to 
sale.124 
Although not yet fully superegoic, there is still a monster 
lurking in the bowels of this holding. The government no doubt felt 
that sale of a fee simple absolute estate (which would foreclose 
                                                                                                     
 121. Id. at 691.  
 122. Id. at 694.  
 123. See id. (stating that this interpretation is consistent with the policy in 
favor of the prompt collection of delinquent taxes). 
 124. Id. at 692 (citing I.R.C. § 7403(a) (2012)). Other parts of § 7403 were 
found supportive, or at least not in contradiction, with this view. According to 
§ 7403(b): “All persons having liens upon or claiming any interest in the property 
involved in such action shall be made parties thereto.” Why must all persons 
claiming an interest in Blackacre be made parties? It must be that they are 
foreclosable by a junior IRS lien! See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 693 (“Obviously, no 
joinder of persons claiming independent interests in the property would be 
necessary if the Government were only authorized to seek the sale of the 
delinquent taxpayer’s own interests.”); I.R.C. § 7403(c) 
The court shall . . . proceed to adjudicate all matters involved therein 
and finally determine the merits of all claims to and liens upon the 
property . . . and may decree a sale of such property . . . and a 
distribution of the proceeds of such sale according to the findings of the 
court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the United 
States . . . . 
The order to distribute proceeds must mean that persons senior to the IRS are 
foreclosable. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 694 
Again, we must read the statute to contemplate, not merely the sale of 
the delinquent taxpayer’s own interest, but the sale of the entire 
property (as long as the United States has any “claim or interest” in 
it), and the recognition of third-party interests through the mechanism 
of judicial valuation and distribution. 
One could make sense of these provisions as not giving the federal 
government a powerful right to force nontaxpayers into partition sales. 
For instance, a tax lien might be senior to nontaxpayer interests, and 
these this priority would have to be adjudicated in a foreclosure action 
in which the junior interest holders must be made parties. Senior 
parties need not be made parties. This would explain both provisions 
without indicating a powerful right to sell out parties senior to the IRS, 
Nevertheless, the majority chose to find these statutes as authorizing 
the right to force nontaxpayers into partition sales. 
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Lucille) would enhance the value of the tax lien on Philip’s 
interest.125 In real estate, the whole is equal to more than the sum 
of the parts, as is well known.126 But suppose the IRS were to 
decide that its position would be enhanced even more if the entire 
city block on which Lucille’s house was located could be sold in fee 
simple absolute? That way Lucille and her neighbors would 
succumb to the IRS power of her sale. What prevents this 
monstrous result? Why is Blackacre limited to precisely the real 
property in which the taxpayer has an interest and not 
neighboring plots of land? If the point is to maximize the value the 
IRS is entitled to keep, why shouldn’t the entire city block be sold? 
Here is how Justice Brennan describes the monster: 
Admittedly, if § 7403 allowed for the gratuitous confiscation of 
one person’s property interests in order to satisfy another 
person’s tax indebtedness, such a provision might pose 
significant difficulty under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. But . . . § 7403 makes no further use of third-party 
property interests than to facilitate the extraction of value from 
those concurrent property interests that are properly liable for 
the taxpayer’s debt. To the extent that third-party property 
interests are ‘taken’ in the process, § 7403 provides 
compensation for that ‘taking’ by requiring that the court 
distribute the proceeds of the sale ‘according to the findings of 
the court in respect to the . . . interests of the parties and of the 
United States.127 
These remarks are fully consistent with sacrificing the 
neighbors’ property (along with that of the taxpayer’s cotenants).128 
                                                                                                     
 125. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 694 (expressing that interests sold separately 
may have a different value from the sum of their parts). 
 126. Prospective buyers of the part face holdout power from the owners of the 
other parts, who can abstract economic rents from the part buyer. They will 
therefore reduce their bid for the part in anticipation of these expenses. See In re 
Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 815 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004) (noting that it is preferable 
for a bankruptcy trustee to sell the entire fee than sell only the undivided 
interest), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 B.R. 
212 (W.D. Mich. 2004). 
 127. Rodgers, 461 U.S at 697–98 (citation omitted). 
 128. Justice Blackmun raised this possibility. See id. at 724 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting)  
First, the Court claims that its construction is consistent with the 
policy favoring “the prompt and certain collection of delinquent taxes.” 
This rationale would support any exercise of governmental power to 
secure tax payments. . . . But when one interpretation contravenes 
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Of course, what I suggest is monstrous, but until the Supreme 
Court speaks, the monster inhabits I.R.C. § 7403(a), and neighbors 
may not sleep in spite of thunder or tell pale-hearted fear that it 
lies. 
The neighbors may tell themselves that partition sales ought 
to be limited between cotenants with a right of possession, or 
between present and future interest holders, where the future 
interest portends a right to possess the same territory as the 
present possessor. But, as articulated by the Supreme Court, the 
goal is to increase the value of what the IRS may keep, and the 
suggested containment is merely externally imposed on this 
principle to prevent this goal from consuming whole 
neighborhoods.129 It is a mere legislative solution that purports to 
contain natural law monstrosity. 
Another check against the monstrosity of Rodgers is the fact 
that I.R.C. § 7403(c) ultimately says that a federal court “may 
decree a sale of such property.”130 “May” implies judicial 
discretion.131 Justice Brennan therefore gives advice as to when a 
court may use its discretion and refuse to sell the whole of 
Blackacre just because the IRS claims a lien on some small part of 
it.132 One of the factors in the balancing test speaks to the 
monstrosity just described: 
[W]hether the third party with a nonliable separate interest in 
the property would, in the normal course of events (leaving 
aside § 7403 and eminent domain proceedings, of course), have 
a legally recognized expectation that the separate property 
                                                                                                     
both traditional rules of law and common sense and common values on 
which they are built, the fact that it favors the Government’s interest 
cannot be dispositive.  
(citation and footnote omitted) 
 129. See id. at 694 (majority opinion) (noting that it is more logical for the 
Government to sell the whole, not the part). 
 130. I.R.C. § 7403(c) (2012) (emphasis added). “May” replaced “shall” in 1936. 
See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983) (examining how the change 
in language impacts congressional intent). Of this change, Justice Brennan 
remarks: “[T]here is support in our prior cases for the proposition that an 
explained change in statutory wording from ‘shall’ to ‘may’ is best construed as 
indicating a congressional belief that equitable discretion existed all along.” Id. 
at 708. 
 131. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 708–09 (noting that judicial sales have 
traditionally been accompanied by a degree of discretion).  
 132. See id. at 710–11 (listing four factors to govern judicial discretion). 
THE FEDERAL LAW OF PROPERTY 23 
would not be subject to forced sale by the delinquent taxpayer 
or his or her creditors.133 
It is fair to say that a homeowner expects that the government 
will not devour her home because her neighbor is a tax cheat. 
Therefore, the homeowner has a claim on court discretion to 
prevent the sale.134 Expectation is but one factor, however, in a 
more complicated balancing test prescribed by Justice Brennan.135 
Rodgers may be compared with United States v. National 
Bank of Commerce,136 where a taxpayer had a joint deposit account 
with two nontaxpayers.137 Any one of them could withdraw 100% 
(although to do so would be a wrong against the other two).138 
Under Arkansas law, a levying creditor could not step into the 
shoes of a debtor and withdraw all funds (like the debtor could).139 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that the IRS, by levy,140 
could have all the funds because the very right of the taxpayer to 
withdraw all was a property right in all the funds.141 The wronged 
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. Careful readers of this passage will note that the words “the property” 
reflect an assumption that the IRS might attack cotenants but not out-and-out 
neighbors. Nevertheless, the attack on neighbors is not flatly precluded in 
Rodgers. 
 134. See id. at 711 (noting the third factor for consideration of prejudice to the 
third party). 
 135. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (detailing the balancing test).  
 136. 472 U.S. 713 (1985). 
 137. Id. at 716. 
 138. See id. (noting that the three individuals were authorized by contract 
with the bank to make withdrawals from the account). 
 139. See id. at 726 (“[U]nder Arkansas garnishment law, a creditor of a 
depositor is not subrogated to the depositor’s power to withdraw the 
account . . . .”). 
 140. See id. at 719 (discussing the relevant I.R.C. provision). The case 
construes I.R.C. § 6331(a) as follows: 
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects . . . to pay the same within 
10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to 
collect such tax . . . by levy upon all property and rights to 
property . . . belonging to such person or on which there is a lien . . . for 
payment of such tax.  
Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 6331(a) (2012)). “[P]roperty and rights to property” mimic the 
phraseology under which the tax lien is created. See id. § 6321 (creating the 
federal tax lien on all property and rights to property. 
 141. See National Bank, 472 U.S. at 724 (“Roy, then, had the absolute right 
under state law and under his contract with the bank to compel the payment of 
the outstanding balances in the two accounts . . . . [S]uch a state-law right 
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innocent parties could ask the IRS to refund the (pardon the 
expression) stolen money after the fact.142 The case is not quite 
superegoic in that it purports to follow state law.143 Because the 
debtor could withdraw all, so could the IRS.144 Local immunity 
from ordinary creditors was set aside, as taxpayers only get the 
exemptions that the IRC chooses to give.145 The case is therefore 
an extension of Rodgers in the context of deposit accounts. 
C. Drye 
The first genuinely superegoic opinion within the scope of our 
attention is Drye. In the case, Rohn Drye was heir apparent to his 
mother’s estate.146 When his mother died,147 the taxpayer 
                                                                                                     
constituted ‘property [or] rights to property . . . belonging to’ [the taxpayer].”). 
 142. See id. at 728 (“[O]ne claiming an interest in property seized for another’s 
taxes may bring a civil action against the United States to have the property or 
the proceeds of its sale returned.” (citing I.R.C. § 7426)). Justice Powell dissented 
and quoted Rodgers against the result in National Bank. Justice Powell claimed 
high significance for the fact that the IRS asserted its power of levy under I.R.C. 
§ 6331(a), rather than under I.R.C. § 7403, which Rodgers newly interpreted as a 
super-partition sale provision. See id. at 739 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
Under § 6331(a), the Government may sell for the collection of unpaid 
taxes all nonexempt ‘property and rights to property . . . belonging to 
[the delinquent taxpayer]. . . .’ Section 6331, unlike § 7403, does not 
require notice and hearing for third parties, because no rights of third 
parties are intended to be implicated by § 6331. Indeed, third parties 
whose property or interests in property have been seized inadvertently 
are entitled to claim that the property has been ‘wrongfully levied 
upon,’ and may apply for its return . . . . 
(quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 696 (1983)). 
The use of this quote can be criticized because the majority had already described 
the taxpayer’s power to steal from his account partners as the taxpayer’s own 
property right. For what it is worth, Justice Powell was with the majority in 
Rodgers, and Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Rodgers, joined 
in Justice Powell’s dissent. 
 143. See Carlson, Traumatic Dimension, supra note 6, at 2322 (noting that a 
superegoic common law system is constantly reworked to justify or condemn 
earlier acts). 
 144. See United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 725 (1985) 
(stating that in a levy proceeding, the IRS steps into the taxpayer’s role). 
 145. See I.R.C. § 6334(a) (setting forth exemptions). 
 146. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 49 (1999). 
 147. Apparently on the day of her death, Drye’s mother was to meet with 
lawyers to write a will bypassing Drye in favor of Drye’s daughter. If she had 
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disclaimed his inheritance.148 Under Arkansas law, the effect of the 
disclaimer was to impose upon the inheritance the fiction that the 
disclaiming party had predeceased the decedent.149 As a result of 
this disclaimer, the taxpayer’s daughter was the heir.150 She 
immediately took her inheritance and used it to fund a spendthrift 
trust for the benefit of her parents and herself.151 The IRS claimed 
that a tax lien attached to the daughter’s property and therefore 
followed it into the spendthrift trust.152 
The courts at all levels supported the IRS.153 For the Supreme 
Court, Justice Ginsburg articulated the superegoic principle: “[W]e 
look initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer 
has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal 
law to determine whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights 
qualify as ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ within the compass of 
the federal tax lien legislation.”154 The claim of the IRS was that 
Drye owned the inheritance before he disclaimed it.155 Before 
                                                                                                     
signed a will on that day, the IRS would have been defeated. See Adam J. Hirsch, 
Disclaimers and Federalism, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1894 (2014) [hereinafter 
Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism] (“Here, Ginsburg adverted to the issue of 
testamentary intent, which pertains to any and all disclaimers, including those 
confounding federal creditors.”); Sargent v. Sargent (In re Sargent), 337 B.R. 661, 
665 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006) (“[A] debtor’s mere expectancy interest does not rise 
to the level to be included within the bankruptcy estate . . . .”). 
 148. Drye, 528 U.S. at 52–53. 
 149. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-2-108(a)(1), repealed by Acts of 2003, Act 610, 
§ 20 (providing that a disclaimer effected under the provision relates back for all 
purposes to the date of death of the decedent); Drye, 528 U.S. at 53–54 (“The 
disclaimer creates the legal fiction that the disclaimant predeceased the 
decedent . . . .”). Arkansas had enacted the Uniform Probate Code, which allows 
relation back of disclaimers. Some states do not permit heirs to defeat creditors 
in this way. See In re Estate of Clark, 410 A.2d 795, 798–800 (Pa. 1980) 
(“Pennsylvania’s long-standing rule . . . precludes a beneficiary’s renunciation of 
an interest ‘where that interest has been attached . . . .’” (quoting Buckius Estate, 
4 Dist. Rep. 755 (Orphans’ Ct. Phila. 1895))). 
 150. Drye, 528 U.S. at 53. 
 151. Id.; Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, supra note 147, at 1893–94 
(suggesting that the disclaimer was collusive and therefore (as a matter of state 
law) ineffective). 
 152. Drye, 528 U.S. at 53. 
 153. See generally Brett A. Bluestein, Disclaimers and Federal Tax Liens’ 
Effect on Inheritances, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 291 (2001) (discussing the 
state of the law prior to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Drye). 
 154. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 57 (1999). 
 155. Drye Family 1995 Tr. v. United States, 152 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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disclaimer, the IRS lien attached to the inheritance156 and, as 
against this lien, the disclaimer was ineffective. If so, the tax lien 
followed the inheritance into the possession of Drye’s daughter.157 
When she created the trust, she conveyed encumbered property 
into it. Being encumbered, the IRS could sell this property to pay 
Drye’s tax debt. 
Drye’s claim was that he never had property. The inheritance 
was tendered as a gift, and gifts need not be accepted.158 Just 
because he was tendered a gift does not mean that he was the 
transferee of property.159 But, Justice Ginsburg thought, Drye had 
property immediately upon his mother’s death because of his 
control over the inheritance.160 Control is property. The assets in 
question had pecuniary value and were transferable. But neither 
of these factors was dispositive. The critical question was “breadth 
of control.”161 “[T]he heir inevitably exercises dominion over the 
property. He determines who will receive the property—himself if 
he does not disclaim, a known other if he does. This power to 
channel the estate’s assets warrants the conclusion that Drye held 
‘property’ . . . subject to the Government’s liens.”162 
To emphasize Drye’s control, Justice Ginsburg borrowed a 
point from Professor Adam Hirsch163: 
Drye overlooks this crucial distinction. A donee who declines an 
inter vivos gift generally restores the status quo ante, leaving 
the donor to do with the gift what she will. The disclaiming heir 
or devisee, in contrast, does not restore the status quo, for the 
                                                                                                     
 156. See id. at 896 (noting the government’s argument that the federal tax 
liens attached at the time of the decedent’s death). 
 157. See id. at 893 (stating that Drye disclaimed all interests to the estate, 
then shortly after named his daughter Administratrix of the estate). 
 158. See Legett v. United States, 120 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 1997), abrogated 
by Drye v. United States 528 U.S. 49 (1999) (describing the theory that there is 
no property right if a taxpayer does not accept the inheritance). 
 159. See Drye, 528 U.S. at 57 (discussing Drye’s argument that under state 
law, the disclaimer served to eliminate his interest). 
 160. See id. at 60–61 (distinguishing the inter vivos gift disclaimer, which 
restores the status quo, from an inheritance disclaimer which does not). 
 161. Id. (citing Morgan v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 78, 83 (1940)). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. 
REV. 587, 607–08 (1989) [hereinafter Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir] 
(arguing the difference between dominion over an inter vivos gift and an 
inheritance). 
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decedent cannot be revived. Thus, the heir inevitably exercises 
dominion over the property. He determines who will receive the 
property—himself if he does not disclaim, a known other if he 
does.164 
If natural law is destruction of positive law, the question 
arises: can the destructive principle be contained? Can we get the 
genie back in the bottle? What keeps the IRS from claiming a lien 
on Drye’s mother’s estate even before she dies? This is something 
Justice Ginsburg feared. Quoting the lower court, Justice Ginsburg 
noted that “a prospective heir may effectively assign his 
expectancy in an estate under Arkansas law, and the assignment 
will be enforced when the expectancy ripens into a present 
estate.”165 If that is so, does the IRS have a lien on the expectancy 
before any such attempted assignment? Justice Ginsburg assumed 
not: “Nor do we mean to suggest that an expectancy that has 
pecuniary value and is transferable under state law would fall 
within § 6321 prior to the time it ripens into a present estate.”166 
But one may question whether the fear is entirely dissipated. 
Under Arkansas law, Drye could have “released” his inheritance to 
his mother before she died.167 Would that release be valid against 
the IRS? Perhaps not. At the moment of his mother’s surcease, the 
inheritance instantly transfers to Drye, at which point the IRS lien 
attaches. Only simultaneously therewith does the “release” 
constitute a conveyance back to the estate. But this is too late. The 
IRS already has its lien.168 Likewise, if Drye were to attempt an 
assignment of his prospective intestate rights, the assignment is 
                                                                                                     
 164. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 61 (1999). 
 165. Id. at 60. 
 166. Id. at 60 n.7. 
 167. See Leggett v. Martin, 156 S.W.2d 71, 95 (Ark. 1941) (allowing an 
expectant heir to release any claim to inheritance if it is supported by 
consideration and  there is no fraud). Some states do not permit this. See, e.g., In 
re Estate of Baird, 933 P.2d 1031, 1035 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) (finding that a 
disclaimer of interest is not possible when the interest is through intestate 
succession, because the interest does not exist until the death of the successor). 
On releases and assignments by heirs apparent, see Katheleen R. Guzman, 
Releasing the Expectancy, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 775, 778–780 (2002) (stating that 
releases prior to death are honored but only for fair consideration). 
 168. This exact theory would be followed by the district court in Craft v. 
United States ex rel. I.R.S. (Craft I), No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13310, at *10 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 1994). Infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
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only enforceable when Drye’s mother dies.169 By then the IRS lien 
will have attached. In both cases, we would be faced with an 
inscrutable case of simultaneous attachment—the IRS lien and the 
rights of the assignee-releasee will have come into existence at the 
same time.170 This is very close to saying that the IRS has a lien on 
the estate of the decedent even before she dies—the very 
proposition that Justice Ginsburg denied. 
Other fears, worse than horrible imaginings, may be 
mentioned. Suppose, in a will, Drye was given an estate in land 
that was subject to a condition subsequent. For instance, “testator 
to Drye so long as Drye does not serve alcohol on the premises.” An 
IRS lien attaches to Drye’s fee simple determinable. Thereafter, 
Drye serves alcohol. Does the land revert back to the testator’s 
estate? Perhaps not. Drye was in control of serving alcohol, and so 
perhaps the condition subsequent cannot be asserted against the 
IRS. Monsters lurk under the surface of the Drye case.171 
                                                                                                     
 169. See Bradley Lumber Co. of Ark. v. Burbridge, 210 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Ark. 
1948) (“[A]n assignment of a future interest, or expectancy, though unenforceable 
at law, is valid in equity and may be enforced in the latter forum when such 
expectancy ripens into a present and enjoyable estate.”). 
 170. On the jurisprudence of simultaneous attachment of liens, see David 
Gray Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment of Liens on After-Acquired Property, 6 
CARDOZO L. REV. 505 (1985). 
 171. Professor Hirsch criticizes the Drye opinion for failing to provide any 
materials by which the scope of the rule can be extended or restricted. Hirsch, 
Disclaimers and Federalism, supra note 147, at 1892–95. Hirsch notes that 
disclaimers are not taxable events. Id.; I.R.C. § 2518 (2012). “Why, then, does the 
disclaimant’s degree of dominion applicable to the collection of back taxes differ 
from the degree of dominion applicable to the assessment of front taxes?” Hirsch, 
Disclaimers and Federalism, supra note 147, at 1893. Hirsch also wonders 
whether, in case of a will, a disclaimer that enriches some person that is not a 
blood relative should be given the Drye treatment. Id. Professor Hirsch remarks: 
[T]he diligence of the Justices often appears to flag when they depart 
from the lofty issues of constitutional law upon which they lavish so 
much effort. . . . In a word, the Justices find cases like Drye too dry. 
They bore the Justices. The instant opinion offers a stark reminder 
that judicial attention is a scarce resource, which courts may or may 
not allocate optimally. 
Id. at 1895. 
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D. Craft 
[T]he individual interest of the husband or wife in an estate by 
the entirety is, like a rainbow in the sky or the morning fog 
rising from the valley, not such an estate as may be subjected 
to the grasp of an attaching creditor . . . .172 
Our second superegoic case on “property” in tax cases is United 
States v. Craft,173 where the Supreme Court, in order to impose a 
tax lien on an interest in a tenancy by the entirety, saw past the 
“fiction[s]” that the state of Michigan had concocted.174 
By way of background, on May 26, 1972, Don and Sandra Craft 
acquired a tenancy by the entirety at 2656 Berwyck Road in Grand 
Rapids, Michigan, for $48,000.175 To finance this purchase, Don 
and Sandra conveyed a mortgage deed for $37,000. 
A few words about the tenancy by the entirety are needed to 
grasp the radical import of the Craft case. Michigan recognizes the 
marriage as a legal person separate from the personhood of the 
husband and wife individually.176 It is to this entity that land was 
conveyed in 1972.177 The marriage is like a partnership in this 
regard, as Justice Clarence Thomas pointed out.178 Indeed, Justice 
Scalia’s dissent referred directly to Michigan’s “decision to treat 
the marital partnership as a separate legal entity, whose property 
                                                                                                     
 172. United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1951). 
 173. Craft V, 535 U.S. 274 (2002).  
 174. See id. at 276 (concluding that the tenants possess “rights to property” 
despite the fiction). 
 175. See Craft v. United States ex rel. Comm’r (Craft II), 140 F.3d 638, 639 
(6th Cir. 1998) (discussing the purchase of the “Berwyck Property”). A view from 
Google Maps reveals a modest dwelling on a corner lot with a smaller backyard 
than many of the neighboring houses enjoy. Many of the neighbors have 
swimming pools, but the Crafts had none. 
 176. See LADNER ON CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA, § 1.15 at 18 (3d ed. 
1961)  
[H]usband and wife are looked upon, together, as a single entity, like 
a corporation. The single entity is the owner of the whole estate. When 
the husband or wife dies, the entity continues, although it is now 
composed of only one natural person rather than two . . . . [N]either 
tenant by the entirety owns any undivided share at all . . . . 
 177. See Craft II, 140 F.3d at 639 (describing the purchase of the property). 
 178. Craft V, 535 U.S. at 292 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 301 
(“Ownership by ‘the marriage’ is admittedly a fiction of sorts, but so is a 
partnership or a corporation.”). 
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cannot be encumbered by the debts of its individual members.”179 
Partners do not own an interest in real property held in the name 
of the partnership.180 By analogy, neither did Don or Sandra. 
Because the husband owns nothing, the husband is unable to 
convey any ownership interest in the tenancy by the entirety.181 
This is because the husband owns, in Blackstone’s oft-quoted 
words, per tout, et non per my.182 
If, however, the wife joins in the deed, the act of husband and 
wife together is the act of the marital entity. For this reason, Don 
and Sandra joined in the mortgage deed to the purchase money 
lender, which successfully obtained a mortgage lien on the tenancy 
by the entirety. For similar reasons, the husband’s individual 
creditors are unable to place a lien on the husband’s real property 
for the reason that the husband has none; the marital entity is the 
owner.183 Where the husband and wife are jointly liable on a debt, 
however, the marital entity owes the debt, and the joint creditor is 
able to obtain a judicial lien on the tenancy by the entirety.184 
                                                                                                     
 179. Id. at 289 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 180. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 701, 6B U.L.A. 394 (2001) (“[T]he only interest 
of a partner which is transferable is the partner’s transferable interest. A 
transferrable interest is personal property.”). One hears the confusing term 
“tenancy in partnership,” which is not a tenancy at all. “Partnership law is 
admittedly misleading in this respect . . . . But this peculiar tenancy 
systematically negates all individual rights, including possession, transferability, 
rights of inheritance, and so forth, so that the partner’s individual rights are 
nominal only.” Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 
191–92 (2004). Thankfully, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act abolishes the 
concept. Jeanne M. Rickert, Ohio’s New Partnership Law, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
783, 785 (2009). 
 181. See Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 281 (2002) (noting the inability to unilaterally 
alienate interest in a tenancy by the entirety). 
 182. Per my means “by the moiety.” According to Blackstone: 
[I]f an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are neither 
properly joint-tenants, nor tenants in common: for husband and wife 
being considered as one person in law, they cannot take the estate by 
moieties, but both are seised of the entirety, per tout, et non per my: the 
consequence of which is, that neither the husband nor the wife can 
dispose of any part without the assent of the other, but the whole must 
remain to the survivor. 
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *182 (1753). 
 183. See Lawrence Kalevitch, Some Thoughts on Entireties in Bankruptcy, 60 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 141, 143 (1986) (addressing the general exemption of entireties 
properties from bankruptcy in most states). 
 184. See Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re Sumy), 777 F.2d 921, 925 (4th Cir. 1985) 
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The Michigan pattern may be compared to the New York 
version of the tenancy by the entirety. In New York, each 
individual spouse owns his or her requisite share.185 The marriage 
is not considered a separate legal person capable of owning 
property, as is the case in Michigan.186 Thus, the New York 
husband is able to convey his 50% possessory right plus his right 
of survivorship.187 He may not, however, compel his spouse to sell 
the whole in a partition proceeding188 (as would be true if they were 
tenants in common or joint tenants with the right of survivorship). 
Because an individual spouse owns something in a New York 
tenancy by the entirety, individual creditors can obtain judicial 
liens on the debtor’s share of the tenancy by the entirety. In an 
execution sale, the buyer becomes a cotenant with the nondebtor 
spouse.189 
Back to the Craft saga, starting in 1977, Don saw no reason to 
file further income tax returns. Accordingly, the IRS assessed 
taxes for $482,446 covering the period of 1979 to 1986.190 
Assessment of a tax creates a lien on any property Don may have 
                                                                                                     
(“[I]f both spouses filed for bankruptcy, ‘courts would consolidate the cases and 
consider the tenants by entirety property as an asset of their joint estates and 
permit liquidation of that property . . . .’” (quoting Martin v. Martin (In re 
Martin), 20 B.R. 374, 376 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982))). What makes a creditor a joint 
creditor? This is a subtle question of state law. In re Holler, 463 B.R. 733, 743 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011). I will omit this issue from this already-too-long Article 
and will simply assume that joint creditors can be distinguished from the 
individual creditors of a debtor spouse. 
 185. Goldman v. Goldman, 733 N.E.2d 200, 202 (N.Y. 2000). 
 186. Supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 187. Goldman, 733 N.E.2d at 202. 
 188. See id. (addressing that the ability to sell is subject to the continuing 
rights of the spouse). 
 189. See In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 810 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004) (discussing 
how New York law differs from Michigan), rev’d sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re 
Spears), 313 B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 2004); David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money 
Judgment Part One: Liens on New York Real Property, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1291, 
1392–96 (2008) (addressing New York law on tenancies by the entirety). There is 
a third type: the tenancy by the entirety in Kentucky and Tennessee. Here, the 
marital entity owns the possessory right, but the individual spouses separately 
own the survivorship right. Infra notes 262–263, 1023–1048 and accompanying 
text. In our later discussion concerning bankruptcy cases, we shall see that there 
are other varieties as well. Infra notes 1023–1124 and accompanying text. 
 190. Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 276 (2002). 
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had.191 The issue in Craft would be whether a lien attached to any 
part of the tenancy by the entirety, where Don owed tax debt and 
Sandra did not.192 
After the assessment of taxes, Don used his personal funds to 
pay interest and principal on the mortgage.193 It can be observed 
that the funds used by Don for this purpose were already IRS 
property by virtue of the lien that attached to them.194 Although 
Don intended to pay down the mortgage debt, he was using IRS 
money to achieve this goal.195 Accordingly, the IRS was entitled to 
insist that Don “bought” (and did not merely “pay”) the mortgage. 
The “bought” mortgage would then belong to the IRS.196 The same 
can be said about Don’s payment of local property taxes.197 
Property taxes generate super priority liens, senior to the lien of 
the IRS.198 Don did not pay this tax but rather bought it on behalf 
of the IRS. The IRS would be subrogated to this tax lien, as Don 
was paying these taxes with money the IRS owned in advance.199 
On March 30, 1989, the IRS filed notice of its tax lien in the 
Michigan real estate records.200 On August 28, 1989, Don and 
                                                                                                     
 191. See I.R.C. § 6322 (2012) (“[T]he lien imposed by section 6321 shall arise 
at the time the assessment is made . . . .”). 
 192. See Craft V, 535 U.S. at 278 (“We granted certiorari to consider the 
Government’s claim that respondent’s husband had a separate interest in the 
entireties property to which the federal tax lien attached.”). 
 193. Id. at 277. 
 194. See id. at 276 (noting the tax lien attached to all of his personal property). 
 195. See Craft v. United States ex rel. Comm’r (Craft IV), 233 F.3d 358, 373 
(6th Cir. 2000) (“Don essentially hid funds to which the IRS was entitled (by 
virtue of its lien) by investing them in a property to which the lien could not 
attach.”). 
 196. What I express here is not a fraudulent conveyance theory, but is based 
on the fact that the IRS, through its tax lien, owned Don’s funds even before Don 
paid the mortgage lender. See Hatchett v. United States, 330 F.3d 875, 888 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (describing this theory). 
 197. See Craft v. United States ex rel. I.R.S. (Craft III), 65 F. Supp. 2d 651, 
653 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (mentioning that Don and Sandra also paid property taxes 
during the relevant period). 
 198. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(b)(6) (2012). 
 199. See Hatchett, 330 F.3d at 888 (“Under the lien tracing theory, the 
Government argues that since it had a lien on Elbert’s money, it is entitled to 
place a lien on properties improved or purchased with that money.”). 
 200. Craft I, No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13310, at *1 (W.D. Mich. 
Sept. 12, 1994). “The lien imposed by section 6321 [of the I.R.C.] shall not be valid 
as against any purchaser . . . or judgment lien creditor until notice thereof which 
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Sandra jointly deeded the tenancy by the entirety to Sandra, who 
became the sole owner.201 Sandra’s title was of course encumbered 
by the outstanding mortgage of the purchase money lender, but it 
was also encumbered (or should be regarded as encumbered) by 
the IRS’s mortgage and tax liens which Don, in effect, had bought 
with encumbered funds for the benefit of the IRS. 
In January 1992, Don sought refuge in the bankruptcy 
courts.202 He did not list any interest in the tenancy by the entirety 
on his schedule of assets. Indeed, the Michigan “fiction” is that he 
did not own any real property interest.203 Bankruptcy law says 
otherwise, however.204 Don should have listed the tenancy by the 
entirety as an asset. In any case, the bankruptcy case closed in 
June 1992 and ended with Don’s general discharge.205 The IRS, 
however, was (presumably) not discharged; tax claims are 
generally not dischargeable, especially in cases where no tax 
returns were filed.206 
                                                                                                     
meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been filed by the Secretary.” I.R.C. 
§ 6323(a) (2012). With regard to real estate, the notice must be filed “in one office 
within the state (or the county, or other governmental subdivision), as designated 
by the laws of such State, in which the property subject to the lien is situated . . . .” 
Id. § 6323(f)(1)(A)(i). 
 201. Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 267–76 (2002). But see Craft III, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 
652 (“Don terminated the entireties estate by delivering a quitclaim deed to 
Sandra on August 28, 1989.”). 
 202. Craft I, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13310, at *1. 
 203. Supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 204. See Napotnik v. Equibank & Parkvale Sav. Ass’n, 679 F.2d 316, 318 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (defining the “debtor’s estate” as broad enough to include any interest 
in a tenancy by the entirety); infra notes 477–537 and accompanying text. 
 205. Craft I, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13310, at *1.  
 206. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B) (2012) (stating that a tax claim is not 
discharged if no return is filed). Where nonfraudulent tax returns are timely filed, 
a taxpayer who files for bankruptcy is entitled to a discharge of “stale” tax claims, 
as that concept is defined in Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A), describing 
as a priority claim:  
[T]ax on . . . income . . . for . . . a tax year ending on or measured by 
income . . . for a taxable year ending on or before the date of the filing 
of the petition—(i) for which a return, if required, is last due, including 
extensions, after three years before the date of the filing of the 
petition . . . . 
Id. § 507(a)(8)(A). Section 507(a)(8) becomes relevant by virtue of the reference in 
Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A). 
34 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2018) 
In 1992, Sandra sought to sell her encumbered fee simple 
absolute.207 The prospective buyer discovered the notice of tax liens 
against Don. The buyer balked, uncertain as to whether the 
buyer’s title would be sullied by a continuing tax lien for Don’s 
taxes.208 Sandra at first moved to open Don’s bankruptcy in order 
to bring an adversary proceeding against the IRS “to force it to 
release the lien.”209 The bankruptcy case was reopened but the 
court reclosed the case upon determining that the bankruptcy 
court had no jurisdiction: Don had never listed the house as 
property of the bankruptcy estate.210 
Failing on that score, Sandra was able to convince the IRS to 
waive its tax lien (if any), so that title granted to the buyer would 
be free of any IRS claims.211 In exchange for this waiver, Sandra 
agreed to pay half the purchase price into a non-interest-bearing 
escrow account. Mollified by this waiver, the buyer paid the agreed 
price of just under $120,000.212 Half of this went to the escrow fund 
and half went to Sandra.213 
Sandra then brought suit to “quiet title” to the escrowed funds 
in favor of herself.214 The IRS defended itself by asserting that a 
                                                                                                     
 207. See Craft II, 140 F.3d 638, 640 (6th Cir. 1998) (addressing the contract 
Sandra entered into to sell the property). 
 208. See id. (stating that the discovery of the lien ended the sale). 
 209. Craft I, No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13310, *1 n.1 (W.D. 
Mich. Sept. 12, 1994).  
 210. See Craft II, 140 F.3d at 640 (discussing the decision of the bankruptcy 
court to close the case the second time). Later, Sandra moved in the district court 
that, to the extent the IRS had a fraudulent conveyance theory, the matter should 
be remanded to the bankruptcy court. Id. at 638. The court denied the motion, 
but it indeed had merit. Id. If fraudulent conveyance was the IRS’s theory, then 
the recovery belonged to Don’s bankruptcy estate, not to the IRS. In fact, the IRS 
did not have a proper fraudulent conveyance theory but rather one based on 
subrogation. Infra notes 232–239 and accompanying text. 
 211. See Craft II, 140 F.3d at 640 (“The IRS subsequently agreed to release 
its lien on the property to enable Sandra to sell it.”). 
 212. See id. (“Sandra finally sold the property in June 1992 and received half 
the proceeds, amounting to $59,944.10.”). 
 213. See id. (noting the condition of the escrow account). 
 214. See id. (mentioning Sandra’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)). 
When Sandra sold to the buyer, $19,412 of the price was paid to the purchase 
money mortgagee. Id. at 641. The parties agreed that this paydown should be 
apportioned on a 50-50 basis between the 50% cotenancy that Sandra took free of 
the IRS tax lien and to 50% which was allegedly encumbered by the tax lien. Id. 
at 640. Therefore, although just under $60,000 was paid into escrow, it was agreed 
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tax lien attached to Don’s share of the tenancy by the entireties.215 
If this were true, then the IRS could have all of the escrowed funds. 
In the alternative, the IRS claimed that the conveyance from the 
marital entity to Sandra was fraudulent.216 
Several times the case traveled up and down Jacob’s ladder of 
appellate review. The District Court for the Western District of 
Michigan began by awarding summary judgment to the IRS.217 Judge 
Gordon J. Quist’s theory of the case was that, when the house was still 
owned in the entirety by the marital entity, Don had no interest in it. 
Therefore, a lien based on Don’s taxes could not affix itself to the 
tenancy by the entirety. But, thought Judge Quist, the conveyance 
by the marital entity did not go directly to Sandra. First, it must 
have been the case that Don and Sandra bilaterally ended the 
tenancy by the entirety, creating in each a tenancy in common. An 
instant later, Don, as a tenant in common, conveyed to Sandra.218 
In this instant, the IRS lien attached, so that Sandra took title to 
Don’s 50% cotenancy as encumbered by the IRS lien.219 So far, the 
IRS was victorious. 
                                                                                                     
that the maximum share of the IRS to this fund was $50,293. Id. at 641. 
 215. See id. (describing the grounds for the government’s motion for summary 
judgment).  
 216. See id. at 640 (“The government further asserted that Don’s conveyance 
to his wife was fraudulent.”). 
 217. Craft I, No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13310, at *10 (W.D. 
Mich. Sept. 12, 1994). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. at *10 (“[E]ach spouse took an equal half interest in the estate 
and the government’s lien attached to Mr. Craft’s interest.”). This was precisely 
the “monstrous” theory that lurks in the Drye opinion. In so ruling, Judge Quist 
declined to follow a seemingly binding precedent against his theory. Id. at *4–5. 
See generally Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1971). Judge Quist felt 
compelled to do so by a subsequent criminal forfeiture case. See generally United 
States v. 2525 Leroy Lane (Leroy Lane I), 910 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 
sub nom. Marks v. United States, 499 U.S. 947 (1991). In Leroy Lane I, an 
individual spouse used the tenancy by the entirety in the sale of illegal drugs. Id. 
at 345. The spouse’s land (if any) was therefore deemed forfeit to the federal 
government. Id. The federal government agreed to the sale of the house “and the 
proceeds of the sale were designated as a substitute res in which the parties were 
deemed to have the same interest as they had in the real estate.” Id. In Leroy 
Lane I, the federal government advocated the natural law thesis being 
investigated here. See id. at 347 (“The government argues that state property law 
should not be determinative, but rather that the federal courts should develop a 
federal common law of forfeiture to govern the treatment of property interests.”). 
The Leroy court, in effect, agreed and held that the federal courts could pierce 
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The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.220 It denied 
the general notion that there is a natural law of property operating 
at the federal level.221 “In Michigan,” said the court, “it is well 
established that one spouse does not possess a separate interest in 
an entireties property.”222 The Sixth Circuit specifically rejected the 
district court’s theory of instantaneous seizin in Don by which the 
IRS tax lien encumbered the 50% share Sandra allegedly took from 
Don directly.223 The court of appeals remanded as to whether the 
                                                                                                     
through Michigan fictions to hold that the guilty spouse had a future interest (but 
not a present interest) in the tenancy by the entirety. See id. at 352 (leaving the 
determination of the scope of the government’s interest to the district court, but 
acknowledging that Michigan law does not preclude attachment of a lien to any 
interest that the spouse does have at termination of the entirety). This future 
interest belonged to the government. The Leroy I court ruled that the funds 
should be invested and that the innocent spouse should receive half the interest 
income. Id. She would receive the whole fund if she were to survive her husband. 
Id. In United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane (Leroy Lane II), the court of appeals 
learned that subsequently the spouses divorced and the state court had awarded 
the “house” entirely to the wife. 972 F.2d 136, 137 (6th Cir. 1992). The wife then 
persuaded the district court to release all the escrowed funds to her. Id. The court 
of appeals ruled that the state court action was entitled to res judicata respect, 
but that perhaps the state court had been tricked by failure of the spouses to 
disclose the forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 138. If the state court were to reconsider, 
possibly the state court would have ruled that, upon divorce, the guilty spouse 
would instantaneously be seized, which would allow the government to take half 
the funds in criminal forfeiture. Because a joint conveyance by husband and wife 
also ends the tenancy by the entirety, Judge Quist reasoned that the conveyance 
was like a divorce: each spouse was instantly seized of a cotenancy. See Craft I, 1994 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13310, at *9. This instantaneous seizin was enough for the IRS tax 
lien to attach to Don’s share before the conveyance to Sandra, individually. Id. at *10.  
Professor Johnson suggests that Judge Quist “followed” Leroy I. See generally Steve 
R. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc: Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests and 
the Federal Tax Lien, 60 MO. L. REV. 839 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Fog]. But, in fact, 
Judge Quist traveled well beyond a lien on the future interest to a lien on the present 
possessory interest. 
 220. Craft II, 140 F.3d 638, 644–45 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 221. See id. at 641 (“Federal tax law ‘creates no property rights but merely attaches 
consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law.’” (citing United States 
v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958))). The court rejected the suggestion that two Supreme 
Court cases had ushered in natural law at the federal level. See id. at 643 (stating that 
United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224 (1994), and Rodgers have no effect on the present 
case). Said the court: “[T]hese cases do not alter the basic tenet that state law governs 
the issue of whether any property interests exist in the first place.” Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See id. at 644 (“We are unaware of any precedent indicating that an entireties 
estate is automatically transformed into a tenancy in common as an intermediary step 
in the conveyance of the property. . . . Don never held an interest in the Berwyck 
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IRS had a fraudulent transfer theory to the escrowed funds.224 
Shortly after the remand, Don Craft died.225 
Back in the district court,226 Judge Quist ruled that the IRS 
owned a lien on the escrowed funds by virtue of fraudulent 
conveyance law.227 The conveyance of the tenancy by the entirety 
(for $1) was held not to be a fraudulent conveyance because Don’s 
“share” was exempt property, and a conveyance of exempt property 
is never fraudulent as to creditors.228 But Don had used assets to 
                                                                                                     
property to which the United States’ lien could attach.”).  
 224. See id. (“[T]here remains an issue of whether a fraudulent conveyance 
occurred in this case, an issue that the district court did not address.”). Judge James L. 
Ryan filed a concurring opinion. He thought, prior to conveying to Sandra, Don had a 
“contingent remainder” to which the tax lien could attach. Id. at 645 (Ryan, J., 
concurring). By this, Judge Ryan meant that:  
[Don] had a right to the entire Berwyck property if his wife predeceased him, 
and he had a right to half the proceeds of the sale or lease of the home if the 
property were ever sold or leased. Although Don Craft did not have the 
whole bundle of property rights, it cannot be denied that he had some of 
them. And, most assuredly, the IRS could attach these rights. 
Id. Although Michigan dicta said that Don had no future interest in the marital estate, 
no case ever turned on this and so Judge Ryan thought the question was still open. Id. 
at 646. 
 225. See Craft IV, 233 F.3d 358, 373 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing the issue of whether 
Don’s death in August 1998 makes the issue moot). 
 226. Craft III, 65 F. Supp. 2d 651 (W.D. Mich. 1999). 
 227. See id. at 662 ([P]ayments made by Don . . . did constitute a fraudulent 
conveyance. Therefore, the Government is entitled to recover that amount from 
the escrowed funds . . . .”). The government raised its fraudulent transfer 
assertions as a defense to Sandra’s quiet title action to the escrowed funds. Id. at 
654. Sandra claimed the matter could not be asserted as a defense. Id. On this 
point, the court decreed Sandra was wrong. Sandra asserted ownership of the 
funds. Id. The IRS asserted ownership (by virtue of fraudulent transfer theory). 
Id. Because the fraudulent transfer theory was defensive, Sandra was unable to 
plead the statute of limitations on an independent fraudulent conveyance action. 
Id. at 654 n.4; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(2) (“If a party mistakenly designates a 
defense as a counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court must, if 
justice requires, treat the pleading as though it were correctly designated, and 
may impose terms for doing so.”). 
The court rejected Sandra’s claim that Don’s bankruptcy discharge barred the 
IRS’s fraudulent conveyance theory. Craft III, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 660. This is 
undoubtedly correct. First, because Don had not filed returns at all, Craft IV, 233 
F.3d at 358, Don’s obligation to the IRS was not discharged. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012). Second, even if it were, the IRS’s action was directed at 
Sandra. Sandra is not permitted to assert Don’s bankruptcy as a reason why she 
should not be sued. Id. § 524(e); Dixon v. Bennett, 531 A.2d 1318, 1326 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1987). 
 228. Craft III, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 657–68. This goes under the name of “no harm 
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pay down liens that had attached to the tenancy by the entirety.229 
These assets were in effect fraudulently conveyed.230 Thus “the 
Government [was] entitled to a lien on Don’s share of the proceeds 
of the sale of the Berwyck property equal to the amount by which 
the value of the entireties property was enhanced by payments 
made by Don during the period of insolvency.”231 
In fact, the fraudulent conveyance theory does not work at all 
for the IRS. Suppose Don owned unencumbered dollars and paid 
them to a creditor like the mortgage lender. The mortgage lender 
is surely a good faith purchaser for value, and such purchasers 
cannot be made liable for receiving unencumbered assets on a 
fraudulent conveyance theory.232 True, payments enhanced the 
value of Don’s equity in a tenancy by the entirety. But it is 
impossible to show that any part of the entireties was transferred 
to any third party. There being no transfer, there could be no 
fraudulent transfer. Michigan does, however, have a home-grown 
                                                                                                     
no foul.” Nino v. Moyer (In re Nino), 437 B.R. 230, 235 (W.D. Mich. 2009). The 
court had distinguished the interesting case of Lasich v. Estate of Wickstrom (In 
re Wickstrom), 113 B.R. 339 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990), in which “no harm no foul” 
was not followed. Craft III, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 658. In Wickstrom, a married couple 
gave away their tenancy by the entirety to relatives. In re Wickstrom, 113 B.R. at 
341–42. A bankruptcy trustee was held able to avoid the transfer as a fraudulent 
conveyance. Id. at 352. Judge Quist distinguished Wickstrom on the ground that 
it was a bankruptcy case. Craft III, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 658. A tenancy by the 
entirety enters into the bankruptcy estate. Infra notes 512–532 and 
accompanying text. Once there, the debtors lost the ability to exempt the tenancy 
by the entirety because they had voluntarily conveyed it away. Craft III, 65 F. 
Supp. 2d at 658; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1)(A) (stating that a debtor may not claim 
proceeds of a fraudulent conveyance as exempt where the debtor voluntarily 
conveyed the claimed exempt property). Cases like Wickstrom are further 
discussed infra notes 832–844 and accompanying text. For criticism of 
§ 552(g)(1)(A) and an attempt to reason around it, see generally Alyssa Pompei, 
Note, “No Harm, Still Foul”: Unharmed Creditors and Avoidance of a Debtor’s 
Pre-Petition Transfer of Exemptible Property, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 967 (2015). 
 229. See Craft III, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 659 (discussing Don’s “enhancements” of 
the property while insolvent). 
 230. See id. at 658 (addressing how payments to enhance an estate while 
insolvent is fraudulent, regardless of the intent). 
 231. Id. at 659. 
 232. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1884) 
(proclaiming not voidable transfers to “a person who took in good faith and for a 
reasonably equivalent value”); UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9 (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1918) (allowing a claim by a creditor against anyone except an 
unknowing purchaser for fair consideration). 
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doctrine that says, where an insolvent owner of a tenancy by the 
entirety pays down a mortgage and thereby enhances the value of 
the immune tenancy, an unsecured creditor is subrogated to the 
mortgage to the extent of the payment.233 This the IRS could plead, 
though it is not strictly speaking a fraudulent conveyance theory. 
In either case, the fraudulent conveyance or fraudulent 
enhancement theory belonged to Don’s bankruptcy estate.234 True, 
Don’s case was closed.235 But bankruptcy cases can be re-opened. 
Indeed, Don’s case was re-opened.236 The bankruptcy court erred 
in not taking jurisdiction of the recovery—if indeed the fraudulent 
conveyance theory is valid at all. 
What the IRS should have pleaded was a theory based on its 
tax lien. By virtue of the tax lien, the IRS owned in advance the 
                                                                                                     
 233. McCaslin v. Schouten, 292 N.W. 696, 700 (Mich. 1940). A subrogation 
theory suggests that the creditor bringing the action has a mortgage on the 
entireties itself. This was overlooked in Lewis v. Harlin (In re Harlin), 325 B.R. 
184 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005), where a debtor had paid a mortgage on the 
entireties just prior to the bankruptcy. In an action against the nondebtor spouse, 
the bankruptcy trustee had established that the paydown was a fraudulent 
conveyance, for which she was 100% liable (though only a 50% owner of the 
entireties). Id. at 191–92. Properly, the trustee was subrogated to a mortgage on 
the entireties itself, which could then be realized for the benefit of the bankruptcy 
estate. Id. at 192; see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) (2012) (providing that a debtor may 
not exempt property voluntarily conveyed away); id. § 551 (stating that avoided 
conveyances are preserved for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate). 
The In re Harlin court seemed to think that all the trustee had was a money 
judgment against the nondebtor spouse. In re Harlin, 325 B.R. at 186. This part 
of the case is also questionable. The debtor had used his own funds ($146,861) to 
retire a mortgage on the tenancy by the entirety. Id. Why should the nondebtor 
spouse be liable for this? The answer is that she was not personally liable, but the 
trustee could subrogate to the mortgage to the extent of the fraudulent payment, 
and the mortgage encumbered her share as well as the debtor’s share of the 
tenancy. 
In the end, the trustee was denied the right to sell the entireties, and the 
trustee was limited to an in personam judgment against the nondebtor spouse. 
Id. at 192. Furthermore, she seemed (inappropriately) to be entirely liable, even 
though she received only 50% of the gain from payment of the mortgage. Id. at 
192–93. 
 234. See Craft III, 65 F. Supp. 2d 651, 658 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (discussing the 
difference between the fraudulent conveyance theory when under the bankruptcy 
code as opposed to Michigan law). 
 235. Craft I, No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13310, at *1 (W.D. Mich. 
Sept. 12, 1994). 
 236. Craft II, 140 F.3d 638, 640 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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funds Don used to pay the mortgage lender.237 The IRS was 
therefore entitled to articulate a constructive trust theory whereby 
Don, as fiduciary for the IRS, bought a mortgage lien from the 
mortgage lender, which Don held in trust for the IRS. This was the 
best theory for the IRS,238 and one that Don’s bankruptcy trustee 
could never expropriate from the IRS in a re-opened bankruptcy 
case. A use of a constructive trust theory would also allow the IRS 
to receive all the payments Don made on local tax and mortgage 
interest. Under fraudulent conveyance law, the court felt 
constrained to limit the IRS to retirement of principal with regard 
to the mortgage.239 
Up once more to the court of appeals on cross-appeals, the IRS 
claimed that it held a tax lien directly on the tenancy by the 
entirety.240 This was rejected on the ground of “law of the case.”241 
                                                                                                     
 237.  See Craft IV, 233 F.3d 358, 362 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that the IRS 
placed a lien on all of Don’s personal property). 
 238. There is a moment in Craft IV where this alternative theory is arguably 
recognized: 
Rather, the district court found that the IRS could recover the value of 
mortgage payments Don made on behalf of the entireties property 
under a fraudulent enhancement theory. In other words, Don 
essentially hid funds to which the IRS was entitled (by virtue of its lien) 
by investing them in a property to which the lien could not attach. 
Id. at 373 (emphasis added). The emphasized language is couched in the language 
of statutory lien, not fraudulent conveyance. 
 239. See Craft III, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (limiting the government to a recovery 
of $6.693, the amount by which “Don’s funds reduced the outstanding balance of 
the mortgage”). Don’s payment of mortgage interest and local property tax was 
held not to enhance value. Id. at 661. This is wrong. If Don had not paid mortgage 
interest or local tax, the value of the tenancy by the entirety would have radically 
plunged. Therefore, paying these amounts enhanced value just as much as paying 
down mortgage principal. As the court put it: 
To this Court’s knowledge, no Michigan court has ever held that the 
interest component of mortgage payments or property tax payments 
enhance entireties property to the detriment of creditors. The reason 
is obvious: such payment do not increase a debtor’s equity or constitute 
a fraud on creditors. Rather, payments of interest and property taxes 
are no more than payments made by the debtor to certain creditors in 
preference over other creditors, which the law allows debtors to do. 
Id. The court’s last remark completely undercuts every part of the fraudulent 
conveyance theory. All that happened when Don paid the mortgage lender was 
that a creditor was preferred, “which the law allows [the] debtor[] to do.” Id. 
 240. Craft IV, 233 F.3d at 363. 
 241. Id. at 363–64. According to the Sixth Circuit, a prior ruling in the same 
case will be reconsidered “where a subsequent contrary view of the law is decided 
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Sandra’s appeal from the fraudulent conveyance holdings was also 
rejected.242 So far, the IRS had only a partial victory on its 
fraudulent conveyance theory. 
The case finally arrived on the doorstep of the Supreme Court 
in 2001.243 
1. The Federal Bundle of State Sticks 
The Supreme Court reversed and ruled for the IRS—the IRS 
had a lien on Don’s full 50% share.244 
                                                                                                     
by the controlling authority.” Id. at 364. One such subsequent authority was Drye, 
which I have discussed in detail. Supra Part I.C. The Sixth Circuit found that 
“Drye has not so fundamentally changed the legal landscape as to overrule Craft 
I.” Craft IV, 233 F.3d at 369. 
 242. Craft IV, 233 F.3d at 369–75. Sandra had claimed that the earlier 
remand had encompassed only the theory that the conveyance of the entireties 
was fraudulent, and that the “enhanced value” theory was beyond this scope. Id. 
at 370. The court rejected this claim. Id. at 370–71. She also claimed that the IRS 
did not plead this theory and therefore it could not be raised at trial. Id. at 371. 
The court rejected this claim as well. Id. The pretrial order of the district court 
listed the issue as one to be tried and Sandra did not object to the pretrial order. 
Id. Sandra also claimed that the IRS claim was barred by the statute of 
limitations. Id. at 372. But, since the IRS answer to Sandra’s complaint raised 
fraudulent conveyance issues, the matter was pleaded within the relevant IRC 
time limit. Id. at 373. 
Sandra also claimed that Don’s death in August 1998 rendered the IRS claim 
moot. Id. Her theory was that the IRS lien was on Don’s share that was subject 
to survivorship, so that when Don died, the tax lien died also. Id. The court 
rejected this claim because the lien was based on “fraudulent enhancement” of 
the tenancy by the entirety, which survived both the conveyance to Sandra and 
Don’s subsequent death. Id. 
The court also rejected Sandra’s demand for interest compensation on that part 
of the escrowed funds not awarded to the IRS. Id. at 375. 
 243. See Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (granting certiorari to consider if 
the tax lien could attach to the property). 
 244. See id. at 288 (concluding that Don’s interest constituted “rights to 
property,” and that the state interpretation does not bind when there is a federal 
question). In so ruling, the Supreme Court may have reversed a prior dictum in 
National Bank, where the Court ruled that the IRS could levy a joint deposit 
account because the taxpayer had a unilateral right to withdraw (even though 
doing so was wrongful where a nontaxpayer actually owned the funds). United 
States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 726 (1985). Justice Powell 
dissented and cited Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952), as contrary 
to the majority opinion. National Bank, 472 U.S. at 743 n.8 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). In Raffaele, the IRS attempted to levy a deposit account held by a 
taxpayer and his spouse as tenants by the entirety. See Raffaele, 196 F.2d at 622. 
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In her opinion for the Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
strongly staked out for federal courts a natural law of property that 
simply looks past what state law proposes: 
Whether the interests of respondent’s husband in the property 
he held as a tenant by the entirety constitutes “property and 
rights to property” for the purposes of the federal tax lien 
statute is ultimately a question of federal law. The answer to 
this federal question, however, largely depends upon state law. 
The federal tax lien statute itself “creates no property rights but 
merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights 
created under state law.” Accordingly, “[w]e look initially to 
state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the 
property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to 
determine whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights 
qualify as ‘property’ or ‘right to property’ within the compass of 
the federal tax lien legislation.”245 
Here we see the superegoic structure. Federal law is speechless on 
its own. State law must speak first. Federal law then passes 
judgment on the state-law proposition that its citizen has or does 
not have “property.” 
In her analysis, Justice O’Connor used a “common idiom”—
property is a “bundle of sticks.”246 “State law determines only 
which sticks are in a person’s bundle. Whether those sticks qualify 
                                                                                                     
The taxpayer moved to quash the levy. Id. Although the taxpayer had a unilateral 
right against the bank to withdraw 100% of the funds, such a withdrawal was 
wrongful as against the marital entity that owned the proceeds. Id. at 622–23. 
The Third Circuit quashed the levy. Id. at 624. Justice Blackmun retorted that 
the majority had not transgressed Raffaele: 
The decision there did not concern the propriety of a provisional 
remedy, but the final ownership of the property in question. The court 
held that under Pennsylvania law a husband and wife’s joint bank 
account was held by them together as tenants by the entirety, and that 
therefore the Government could not use the money in the account to 
satisfy the tax obligations of one spouse. 
National Bank, 472 U.S. at 728 n.11. Here, the Supreme Court seems to assume 
that the IRS had no lien on the taxpayer’s share of the account held in the 
entirety. I.R.S. v. Gaster, 42 F.3d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 1994). The exchange between 
Justices Blackmun and Powell was cited by the court of appeals in Craft IV to 
justify the ruling of no lien on Don’s share. Craft IV, 233 F.3d at 364 n.7. 
 245. Craft V, 535 U.S. at 278 (citations omitted). 
 246. Id. 
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as ‘property’ for purposes of the federal tax lien statute is a 
question of federal law.”247 
The idea is that Michigan law creates “sticks”—relations 
between persons with regard to a thing. Michigan supplies the 
sticks but is disabled from labelling a given set of sticks as a 
bundle. This could be done only by the federal courts. The sticks 
located by the Court include “the right to use, to exclude, and to 
enjoy a share of the property’s income.”248 
Usually the right to alienate is an important stick in the 
bundle. With regard to the Michigan tenancy by the entirety, 
“[n]either spouse may unilaterally alienate or encumber the 
property.”249 There was, to be sure, an alienation right, but it could 
only be exercised with the consent of the other spouse.250 A stick, 
Justice O’Connor admitted, was missing from the bundle. But no 
matter. “There is no reason to believe, however, that this one 
stick—the right of unilateral alienation—is essential to the 
category of ‘property.’”251 
                                                                                                     
 247. Id. at 278–79. 
 248. Id. at 280. These “sticks” are drawn from Professor Steve R. Johnson. 
Steve R. Johnson, After Drye: The Likely Attachment of the Federal Tax Lien to 
the Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests, 75 IND. L.J. 1163, 1178 (2000) [hereinafter 
Johnson, After Drye]. In my view, the listing of the right to receive income is 
redundant. It is simply a subset within “right to use and/or alienate.” The right 
to income is actually a composite of different ideas. Suppose H and W own by the 
entirety in Michigan and W enters into a lease to T, promising T exclusive 
possession of Blackacre in exchange for an agreed rent. If H does not ratify the 
lease, T has no possessory right at all as W has no unilateral right to convey 
anything. Here W has purported to act for H without authority to do so. Under 
the law of agency, however, H may ratify W’s unauthorized act after the fact. If 
he does, H and W have joined in the lease to T. T has the exclusive right of 
possession, and H and W have an equal share to the agreed rent from T. What we 
witness is merely the right to use and alienate. 
 249. Craft V, 535 U.S. at 282. 
 250. See id. at 283–84 (discussing the ability to alienate or encumber with his 
wife’s consent). According to Professor Johnson, there is a unilateral power to 
convey without consent of the other spouse—when the taxpayer spouse conveys 
precisely to the nontaxpayer spouse. See Johnson, Why Craft Isn’t Scary, supra 
note 16, at 450. But deeds of gift must be accepted. Shepard v. Shepard, 129 N.W. 
201, 208 (Mich. 1910). If the spouse refuses the deed, the property is not conveyed. 
Id. So it is sounder to think there is no unilateral power to convey. 
 251. Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 284 (2002); see also Drye v. United States, 528 
U.S. 49, 60 n.7 (1999) (“[W]e do not mean to suggest that transferability is 
essential to the existence of ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ . . . .”). 
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2. The Partnership Analogy 
The problem with natural law theories is that they turn 
monstrous. The dissent in Craft pointedly found that Justice 
O’Connor’s property intuitions threatened major collateral damage 
on the relation of the federal tax lien to partnership property.252 
In Michigan, the marital entity (not the individuals) owns the 
tenancy by the entirety.253 What the Supreme Court did was to 
pierce the marital veil, as it were. The marriage was proclaimed a 
fiction—a sham.254 The dissent interpreted the majority opinion as 
licensing the piercing of any “fictional” entity whenever doing so 
facilitates collecting a tax.255 According to Justice Thomas: 
                                                                                                     
 252. See Craft V, 535 U.S. at 301 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the 
court’s policy will lead to “wholesale tax fraud”). 
 253. Supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 254. See Craft V, 535 U.S. at 281 (discussing how the separate legal person 
theory of marriage is a state law “fiction”). Craft, therefore, could be read as one 
that makes veil piercing, or “alter ego” doctrine, a matter of federal property law. 
One case, however, expressly denies this. See Old W. Annuity & Life Ins. Co. v. 
Apollo Grp., 605 F.3d 856, 861–62 (11th Cir. 2010); Johnson, Why Craft Isn’t 
Scary, supra note 16, at 445 (“[T]his tenancy was based on a fiction: the notion 
that, by virtue of marriage, the husband and especially, the wife had lost their 
separate identities and became one person in law.”). Professor Johnson elsewhere 
refers to the marital entity as “metaphysical,” whereas his veil piercing instincts 
are based on substance and reality. See Johnson, Fog, supra note 219, at 858. This 
overlooks the Kantian point that reality itself is a metaphysical assumption. See 
Christian Onof, Thinking the In-itself and its Relation to Appearances, in KANT’S 
IDEALISM: NEW INTERPRETATIONS OF A CONTROVERSIAL DOCTRINE 211, 213 (Dennis 
Schulting & Jacco Verburgt eds., 2011) (noting that Kant’s theory relies on this 
assumption). 
Professor Johnson also falls into syllogistic error in concluding that marital 
entities are fictions but partnership entities are not. Id. at 862. The defective 
syllogism goes like this: (1) Partnerships are entities. (2) Partnerships must file 
information returns. Id.; I.R.C. § 6031(a) (2012).  (3) Marital entities need not file 
information returns. Therefore (4) marital entities are not entities. Johnson, Fog, 
supra note 219, at 862.  The flaw is the illegitimate introduction of the principle 
that all legal entities have to file information returns. The argument falls apart 
if not all legal entities must file information returns. Professor Johnson’s error 
has a name: quaternion terminorm, which has the following form: (A) all stars are 
in heaven. (B) Angelina Jolie is a star. (C) Angelina Jolie is in heaven. IRVING M. 
COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 234 (11th ed. 2002). The ambiguity 
is in the definition of the word “star.” 
 255. See Craft V, 535 U.S. at 301 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting dismissal 
of state law fictions). 
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[U]nder the logic of the Court’s opinion partnership property 
could be attached for the tax liability of an individual partner. 
Like a tenant in a tenancy by the entirety, the partner has 
significant rights to use, enjoy, and control the partnership 
property in conjunction with his partners. I see no principled 
way to distinguish between the propriety of attaching the 
federal tax lien to partnership property to satisfy the tax 
liability of a partner, in contravention of current practice, and 
the propriety of attaching the federal tax lien to the tenancy by 
the entirety property in order to satisfy the tax liability of one 
spouse, also in contravention of current practice.256 
Stung by this criticism, Justice O’Connor responded directly to it, 
assuring that no IRS lien would attach to partnership property 
when an individual partner owed a tax.257 
What kills the monster, in the mind of Justice O’Connor, is 
that the IRS can get at partnership assets indirectly—by levying 
the partnership interest of the taxpayer.258 But in the case of the 
tenancy by the entirety, there is no way of levying against the 
taxpayer’s individual interest in the marital entity, because (says 
Michigan) this interest supposedly does not exist.259 This inability 
of the IRS to reach anything directly or indirectly showed that 
Michigan law was “absurd.”260 Michigan “would also allow spouses 
to shield their property from federal taxation by classifying it as 
entireties property, facilitating abuse of the federal tax system.”261 
This particular line of argument leads one to think that, if 
Michigan had provided for something resembling a partnership 
interest in the marital entity, then only that individual interest 
                                                                                                     
 256. Id. at 295 n.4. 
 257. See id. at 286 (“The Federal Government may not compel the sale of 
partnership assets (although it may foreclose on the partner’s interest).” (internal 
citations omitted)).  
 258. Id. at 286; cf. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5201(c)(3) (McKinney 2007) (“Where 
property consists of an interest in a partnership, any partner other than the 
judgment debtor, on behalf of the partnership, shall be the garnishee.”). 
 259. Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 281–82 (2002). 
 260. Id. at 285. 
 261. Id. (citing Johnson, After Drye, supra note 248, at 1171). An early 
bankruptcy case illustrates the potential of the entireties to flummox the 
creditors. In Michigan National Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett), 14 B.R. 85, 86 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981), the debtors exempted entireties property valued at 
$3,701,314.50 (in 1981 dollars, mind you). Total debts were $2,400,375.55. Id.; see 
also In re Ginn, 186 B.R. 898, 900 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (stating that the entireties 
exemption was worth $2,900,000). 
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could be levied; the real property owned by the marital entity could 
not be reached directly. In fact, Kentucky reaches this precise 
conclusion. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has ruled that a 
creditor of the husband could presently sell the husband’s 
individual right of survivorship, which was his individual 
property262 (as opposed to property of the marital entity).263 In 
Kentucky, the “absurdity” of no individual interests does not exist 
and therefore, I suggest, Craft is not binding precedent for 
Kentucky entireties. Rather, the Kentucky entireties are directly 
analogous to a partnership, where the tax lien reaches the private 
interest of the taxpayer spouse but not the underlying real 
estate.264 
But if Craft does not apply in Kentucky, Rodgers still does. The 
question arises whether the IRS has a partition privilege, even if 
the IRS lien attaches only to the taxpayer’s “contingent remainder” 
in the entireties.  In considering this question, we view the marital 
entity as owning the present right of possession for the joint lives 
of the spouses. The taxpayer spouse and the innocent spouse each 
have a future interest, in case one survives the other. Could a 
Rodgers-style sale eliminate the interests of the marital entity and 
of the innocent spouse? Although we commonly think of partition 
sales as occurring between present possessors, they can also occur 
between a present possessor and future interests.265 
                                                                                                     
 262. See Hoffman v. Newell, 60 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Ky. 1932) (determining that 
the lower court erred in holding that the creditor was without the right to present 
sale). The Hoffman court referred to the husband’s individual property as a 
“contingent remainder.” Id. at 609. This is an abuse of notation. A remainder is 
an interest of a third-party grantee that follows a fee tail, life estate or leasehold 
interest. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 156 (AM. LAW INST. 1936) (“[A] 
remainder is any future interest limited in favor of a transferee in such manner 
that it can become a present interest upon the expiration of all prior interests 
simultaneously created, and cannot divest any interest except an interest in the 
transferor.”). A better term would be “executory interest.” Id. § 158. 
 263. Tennessee also follows the Kentucky model. See generally Arango v. 
Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville (In re Arango), 992 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1993); 
Cole Mfg. Co. v. Collier, 31 S.W. 1000, 1002 (Tenn. 1895); Oval A. Phipps, Tenancy 
by Entireties, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 24, 35 (1951). 
 264. But see United States v. Winsper, 680 F.3d 482, 488 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(assuming, apparently, that Craft governs a Kentucky tenancy by the entirety). 
 265. See Candler S. Rogers, Removal of Future Interest Encumbrances—Sale 
of the Fee Simple Estate, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1437, 1439 (1964) (describing laws that 
allow for partition by sales of land encumbered by future interests under 
particular circumstances).    
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In United States v. Winsper,266 the Winspers held by the 
entireties in Kentucky.267 Malcolm, but not Barbara, was the 
taxpayer.268 The court of appeals assumed too quickly that Craft 
applied, but it also considered whether Rodgers applied—
particularly whether the court had discretion to refuse to sell the 
whole.269 In the discussion that follows, we will assume that Craft 
is out of bounds. Otherwise, all of partnership law yields to the 
exigency of the tax man, as Justice Thomas predicted. 
In Winsper, the district court refused to order the sale because 
it thought the IRS (not the court) had discretion to sell or not to 
sell.270 “This confusion appears to have infected the decision.”271 
The court of appeals held that the IRS was entitled to a sale of the 
whole unless the district court could justify otherwise by means of 
a balancing test set forth in Rodgers.272 This balancing test 
consisted of four factors. 
(1) Financial prejudice to the government. The first of four 
points in the Rodgers balancing test was the “extent to which the 
Government’s financial interests would be prejudiced if it were 
relegated to a forced sale of the partial interest actually liable for 
the delinquent taxes.”273 For instance, if the IRS could garner the 
same amount by selling the taxpayer’s private interest without 
selling the whole, the government would not be prejudiced if the 
court refused to order a sale of the whole. Or if a sale of the 
taxpayer’s interests in other, different property raised enough cash 
to pay the tax, the court could prevent the sale of the whole of 
Blackacre on “marshaling of assets” grounds. 
The district court held that prejudice to the government was 
small because the sale was sure to garner a small percentage of the 
taxpayer’s total debt and because the tax debt was already a 
                                                                                                     
 266. 680 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 267. See id. at 486–87 (discussing Malcolm’s tax liability and the effect of the 
individual tax lien against Malcolm on his property interest). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 488.  
 270. See Johnson, Why Craft Isn’t Scary, supra note 16, at 475 (predicting that 
district courts will have sympathy for the non-debtor spouse). 
 271. Winsper, 680 F.3d at 489. 
 272. Id.  
 273. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 710 (1983). 
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decade old at the time of the motion for a sale.274 The court of 
appeals ruled that the percentage could not be considered; such an 
item was not mentioned in Rodgers.275 Where the IRS had not been 
dilatory in pursuit of collection, the length of time required to 
collect could not be considered.276 
Rather, it was obvious that the IRS would be prejudiced 
because the sale of the taxpayer’s contingent remainder would 
have minimal value if sold separately. Here, the court of appeals 
neglects to observe that a feedback loop exists in the argument. If 
the IRS could sell the whole, then the tenancy by the entirety 
would end and the taxpayer could get not just the value of the 
contingent remainder but the taxpayer’s 50% of the proceeds in 
cash, which the IRS could then take. Thus, a sale of the whole has 
the effect of vastly increasing the IRS take, not just because the 
contingent remainder in isolation would be more valuable. 
There is something of a cheat in considering such a factor. The 
IRS is supposed to be increasing the ratio of the taxpayer’s 
contingent remainder over the fee simple absolute value. But, in 
fact, the sale itself transforms the remainder into the cash 
equivalent of a present possessory interest, all to the great benefit 
of the IRS. 
Remembering our assumption that Craft does not apply to 
Kentucky entireties, but only Rodgers does, there is support in 
Rodgers for the IRS. This is Justice Brennan’s “broken dam” point. 
In order to grasp this point, we must visit the other fact pattern 
that had been consolidated with the case involving Lucille Rodgers. 
The Rodgers case also concerned Joerene Ingram, ex-wife of 
Donald. The two held a homestead as community property.277 
“Community property” signified that Donald’s creditors could 
reach the wife’s share of property obtained during the marriage.278 
As part of their divorce, Donald conveyed all his interest in the 
homestead to Joerene.279 Joerene tried to sell the house, but the 
                                                                                                     
 274. United States v. Winsper, 680 F.3d 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 275. Also, such a factor “would tend to favor delinquent taxpayers with the 
largest tax liability (i.e., the greater the debt, the smaller the percentage of that 
debt would be satisfied in most cases by a forced sale.” Id. at 490–91. 
 276. Id. at 490. 
 277. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 712. 
 278. Id. at 683. 
 279. See id. at 688 (detailing provisions of the divorce property settlement 
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docketed tax assessment scared off the buyers.280 Joerene then 
brought suit to have the tax lien removed.281 The IRS 
counterclaimed for a sale of the whole.282 The parties agreed that 
the property could be sold for cash and “that their rights, claims 
and priorities would be determined as if the sale had not taken 
place, and that the proceeds would be divided according to their 
respective interests.”283 The district court then granted summary 
judgment to the government (even though the property was 
already sold).284 
The court of appeals reversed. The IRS could take from the 
fund the small amount of tax ($283) Joerene and Donald owed 
jointly to the IRS.285 But, it denied the IRS access to any other part 
of the funds. It remanded to the district court, however, to 
determine whether Joerene had “abandoned” the homestead by 
attempting to sell even before the stipulation entered into with the 
IRS.286 
The Supreme Court first announced that it was “constrained 
to treat the escrow fund now sitting in the registry of the District 
Court as if it were a house.”287 It noted that, because the IRS had 
a direct claim against Joerene, the IRS could sell her half of the 
house.288 That is, her right to veto a sale was with regard to 
creditors of her husband. As to her own creditors, she owned 
exempt property, insofar as state law was concerned, but her 
property was not exempt from tax liens within the meaning of 
I.R.C. § 6334(a).289 The IRS could therefore sell her half to reach 
this small amount. “Moreover, once the dam is broken, there is no 
                                                                                                     
where in exchange for $1,500, Donald would convey his interest in the real 
property to Joerene). 
 280. See id. (hypothesizing that efforts to sell the property were unsuccessful 
because of federal tax lien encumbrances).  
 281. See id. (noting efforts by Joerene to secure quiet title to the property and 
removal of the federal tax liens in Texas state court). 
 282. See id. at 689 (discussing the government’s prayer for relief which 
included in part a judicial sale of the property). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 689–90. 
 287. Id. at 712. 
 288. See id. (noting that Joerene was not a “third party” as to joint liability).  
 289. Id. at 700. 
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reason . . . not to allow the Government also to collect on the 
individual debt of Donald Ingram out of that portion of the proceeds 
of the sale representing property interests properly liable for the 
debt.”290 
The “broken dam” in Rodgers supports the idea in Winsper 
that, once the IRS is able to sell the whole, the tenancy by the 
entirety is presumably at an end. Half the cash must be accorded 
to the taxpayer in Winsper, and this the IRS may take in 
satisfaction of the tax debt. If a sale of the whole were not to occur, 
the dam would not be broken and the IRS would not be able to cash 
in. The inability to sell is therefore prejudicial to the IRS. 
So far, in Winsper, the IRS leads as to the first factor in the 
balance test. We have four balancing factors to consider. 
(2) Expectations under state law. The second point is:  
[W]hether the third party with a nonliable separate interest in 
the property would, in the normal course of events (leaving 
aside § 7403 and eminent domain proceedings, of course), have 
a legally recognized expectation that the separate property 
would not be subject to forced sale by the delinquent taxpayer 
or his or her creditors.291 
In Winsper, the district court ruled that this factor favored the 
innocent spouse, and the court of appeals could not disagree.292 In 
Kentucky, ordinary creditors cannot sell a present possessory 
estate.293 “Accordingly, the district court properly found that this 
factor weighed in favor of Barbara Winsper and the exercise of 
discretion not to foreclose the lien and force the sale of the entire 
property.”294 So far, Barbara and the IRS were in a tie. 
(3) Prejudice to third parties. The third balancing factor 
concerned “the likely prejudice to the third party, both in personal 
dislocation costs”295 and in the risk of “practical 
                                                                                                     
 290. Id. (emphasis added). 
 291. Id. 710–11. 
 292. See United States v. Winsper, 680 F.3d 482, 491 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Once 
she was no longer a delinquent taxpayer herself, Barbara Winsper had a legally 
recognized expectation that the entire property would not be subject to forced sale 
to satisfy her husband’s separate tax liability.”). 
 293. See id. (describing Kentucky law as disallowing forced sales of property 
interests in order to satisfy the debts of one of the spouses). 
 294. Id. 
 295. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 710–11 (1983). 
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undercompensation.”296 By this, the Supreme Court meant the 
possibility that actuarial tables would assign to the third party a 
specific life span, but the third party might live longer and 
therefore be undercompensated.297 
The district court in Winsper found that this factor favored 
Barbara.298 The court of appeals, however, complained that there 
was no evidence on the record that Barbara might live longer than 
predicted.299 The court of appeals also found that Barbara’s claim 
of sentimental value of her home could not be counted.300 And 
whereas the district court ruled that Barbara’s expected share 
($71,500) was insufficient to allow for other housing, this was mere 
speculation and could not be upheld.301 What Barbara had to show 
was that her dislocation costs in this instance were higher than 
what was usually encountered in a lien foreclosure.302 
After three factors, Barbara and the IRS were still in a dead 
heat. 
(4) The character of third-party interests. The final factor from 
Rodgers is that: 
[A] court should consider the relative character and value of the 
non-liable and liable interests held in the property: if, for 
example, in the case of real property, the third party has no 
present possessory interest or fee interest in the property, there 
may be little reason not to allow the sale; if, on the other hand, 
the third party not only has a possessory interest or fee interest, 
but that interest is worth 99% of the value of the property, then 
                                                                                                     
 296. Id. 
 297. See id. at 704 (“[A]ny calculation of the cash value of a homestead 
interest must of necessity be based on actuarial statistics, and will unavoidably 
undercompensate persons who end up living longer that the average.” (citation 
omitted)). Imagine the chagrin of a life tenant at finding she is still alive when 
the actuarial table had promised sleep after life’s fitful fever. 
 298. Winsper, 680 F.3d at 491–92. 
 299. Id.  
 300. See id. at 492 (noting that consideration of this factor would render the 
Government’s foreclosure process of any property impossible because this factor 
would always tip in favor of the person dislocated). 
 301. Id.  
 302. See id. (concluding that, if Barbara were able to show this, sentimental 
factors could be considered but otherwise a sentimental argument would be too 
speculative). 
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there might well be virtually no reason to allow the sale to 
proceed.303 
In Winsper, who were the non-liable third parties? Recall our 
premise is that Craft does not apply in Kentucky; otherwise, 
partnership property law is destroyed. If that is the case, then the 
third party is the marital entity, which had the possessory right, 
and also Barbara, who had a contingent remainder. Under our 
premise, we are not piercing the marital veil. 
The Winsper court, however, assumed that Craft did apply 
and that the marital entity had to be viewed as an impermissible 
fiction.304 That meant that the taxpayer had a 50% share of the 
tenancy.305 Yet, thought the court of appeals, only persons with 
over 50% of the value could win the fourth balancing factor.306 
Given the 50-50 split, the fourth factor favored neither side.307 
Keeping score, the government won on prejudice grounds (thanks 
to the dam-breaking argument) and Barbara won on 
state-expectation grounds (Kentucky creditors could not force the 
sale of a possessory right to the home). On remand, the factors 
were exactly tied. 
If, however, we recognize that Craft does not apply in 
Kentucky, and if we recognize that the dam-breaking point is an 
illegitimate self-referential trick, the balance shifts in Barbara’s 
direction.308 
                                                                                                     
 303. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 711 (1983). 
 304. United States v. Winsper, 680 F.3d 482, 488 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 305. Does this not assume that Malcolm and Barbara have precisely the same 
life expectancy? Yes, it does, but an earlier Sixth Circuit precedent mandated that 
valuations of an individual share of a tenancy by the entirety exclude actuarial 
estimates. United States v. Barr, 617 F.3d 370, 374 (6th Cir. 2010) (one judge 
dissenting), cert. denied 562 U.S. 1287 (2011). 
 306. Winsper, 680 F.3d at 492–93. 
 307. See id. at 493 (ruling that the defendants failed to offer a compelling 
reason to ignore the assumption that the spouses held equal interests in the 
property). 
 308. For bankruptcy cases refusing a sale of the whole where the bankruptcy 
trustee claimed the contingent remainder, see Geddes v. Livingston (In re 
Livingston), 804 F.2d 1219, 1220 (11th Cir. 1986) (involving joint life estates with 
a contingent remainder to the survivor); Kovacs v. Sargent (In re Sargent), 337 
B.R. 661, 665 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006); Waldschmidt v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 5 B.R. 
107, 112 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980). In these cases, the trustee had asked for a 
partition sale pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 363(h), which requires that the 
debtor and a non-debtor have “an undivided interest as a tenant in common, joint 
THE FEDERAL LAW OF PROPERTY 53 
But, our remarks on the Kentucky situation give reason to 
criticize the Michigan result in Craft. Michigan authorities state 
that a deed by Don Craft would not convey his survivorship 
rights309 (as it would in Kentucky). Yet the Sixth Circuit had 
already held (in the context of criminal forfeiture) that the 
government takes the criminal spouse’s future interest—the 
individual right to 100% ownership if the criminal spouse were the 
survivor of his wife.310 As Judge James L. Ryan remarked in his 
dissenting opinion in Craft II: 
In effect, then, the government in Leroy I had a lien on the 
debtor spouse’s contingent remainder. Thus, regardless 
whether Don Craft could alienate his contingent remainder 
pursuant to Michigan law, under federal tax law the IRS lien 
attached to it in 1989. This future interest was a “right[] to 
property” as defined by Michigan law, and attachable as 
provided by federal law.311 
So, the Sixth Circuit had already looked past a fiction—a very 
limited fiction. The fiction that the marital entity was a separate 
person was honored. But the lesser fiction that the guilty spouse 
had no individual interest was overridden. Furthermore, in 
Fischre v. United States,312 the court assumed that the meaning of 
Leroy Lane I was that, as a matter of Michigan law, the husband 
had an individual contingent remainder interest to which ordinary 
                                                                                                     
tenant, or tenant by the entirety.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (2012). The Shaw court 
rightly pointed out that the debtor and the non-debtor were not cotenants insofar 
as the contingent remainder was concerned. Therefore, where the tenancy by the 
entirety was completely exempt in the bankruptcy, there could be no sale of the 
whole. This case is a good reading of § 363(h). The Winsper court, however, was 
bound by the Rodgers reading of I.R.C. § 7403(a), which exceeds the narrow Shaw 
reading of Bankruptcy Code § 363(h). 
 309. Rogers v. Rogers, 356 N.W.2d 288, 292–93 (Mich. 1984). 
 310. United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 350 (6th Cir. 1990). 
Professor Johnson wrongly claims that the forfeiture cases show that the 
individuals—not the marital entity—own the possessory right. Johnson, Fog, 
supra note 219, at 863–64. One of the cases he cites is the aforementioned Leroy 
Lane I case. Another is United States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue, 949 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 
1991) (Alito, J.), which agrees with Leroy I. See also United States v. Lee, 232 
F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the government could not take criminal 
spouse’s share of a Florida tenancy by the entirety). 
 311. Craft II, 140 F.3d 638, 643 (1998). Judge Ryan also observed that “the 
proposition that a spouse’s future interest is inalienable does not appear to have 
ever been the rule of decision in any case decided by Michigan courts.” Id. at 646.  
 312. 852 F. Supp. 628 (W.D. Mich. 1994).  
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judicial liens could attach.313 If this is true, Justice O’Connor’s 
reasoning falls apart. The individual does have a private interest 
in the marital entity, just as a partner has an interest in the 
partnership.314 
One can go further to claim that the tenancy by the entirety 
that Justice O’Connor assumed to exist in Michigan does not exist 
there or anywhere. Pennsylvania is supposed to be a state that 
resembles the Michigan pattern. Yet in United States v. 1500 
Lincoln Avenue,315 then-Judge Samuel Alito reached the same 
result as in Leroy Lane I. Judge Alito upheld a federal complaint 
for forfeiture of the drug-dealing husband’s contingent remainder 
“but preserv[ed] Mrs. Bernstein’s right to full and exclusive use 
and possession of the property, during her life, her protection 
against conveyance of or execution by third parties upon her 
husband’s former interest, and survivorship right.”316 The fact that 
the government got anything suggested that the drug dealer had 
something. Thus, Judge Alito treated Pennsylvania as following 
the Kentucky pattern. 
The Florida case of United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th 
Avenue317 is to the same effect. The court cited Florida authority to 
the effect that “[n]either spouse can sell, forfeit or encumber any 
part of the estate without the consent of the other”318 and on the 
basis of this, the court dismissed the forfeiture action against the 
tenancy by the entirety used in drug transactions. But then, 
contrary to this logic, the court remarked: 
Nothing would prevent the government from attempting to 
execute or levy on its interest should the entireties estate be 
altered by changes in circumstances or by court order. That is, 
we do not rule out the possibility that if the United States filed 
a lis pendens against the property, the government might 
acquire in later forfeiture proceeding Mr. Aguilera’s interest in 
the property should he divorce his spouse, should Mrs. Aguilera 
predecease him, or should their interests be transmuted into 
                                                                                                     
 313. Id. at 629. 
 314. See id. at 630 (describing each spousal interest as distinct and therefore 
sufficient to support the attachment of a creditor’s lien).  
 315. 949 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 316. Id. at 78. 
 317. 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 318. Parrish v. Swearington, 379 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
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some divisible form by their actions or by law. In such case, their 
interests would become distinct and separable so that forfeiture 
of his interest in the property would not affect her rights.319 
This passage confesses that the husband had a future interest in 
the tenancy by the entirety. To see why, suppose the husband were 
to acquire a new house that was completely unconnected with the 
drug trade. The husband would not forfeit the new house because 
it is causally unconnected with any crime. The government can 
have only “real property . . . which is used, or intended to be used, 
in any manner or part, to commit, or facilitate the commission of, 
a violation of this [title].”320 But, with regard to the house from 
which the drugs were dealt, should the husband be the survivor of 
his innocent spouse, that house likewise would not be forfeit 
because it was not the husband’s house when drugs were being 
dealt there. If the Eleventh Circuit thinks the house is forfeitable, 
then it must be because the husband owned a piece of the house 
when he was dealing drugs. So, the court’s comment makes sense 
if and only if the husband already had an individual interest—a 
contingent remainder—in the house at the time of drug dealing.321 
Ergo, it is not clear that the Michigan style of the tenancy by the 
entirety exists in Florida or anywhere—at least as a federal matter. 
Rather, we have the Kentucky pattern or the New York pattern, 
and that’s it. 
Consider this possibility: Suppose in Michigan a husband 
deeds the marital home to X. X gets precisely nothing, according to 
the Michigan fiction. But suppose soon thereafter the wife dies and 
the husband takes fee simple absolute by survivorship. Would not 
X be able to claim the home under the doctrine of estoppel by deed? 
Probably so.322 This supports the idea that, under the federal law 
                                                                                                     
 319. See United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1516 n.6 
(11th Cir. 1990). 
 320. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (2012). 
 321. For a case finding that the debtor’s survivorship right in the Florida 
tenancy by the entirety (in personal property) is the debtor’s individual property, 
see In re Tharp, 237 B.R. 213, 216 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999). The court’s use of 
precedent, however, is shaky. The court relies on a case involving a joint bank 
account with right of survivorship (not exempt at all) and a New York real estate 
case (also not exempt property). Id. at 216–17. 
 322. According to the Supreme Court: 
[W]hatever may be the form or nature of the conveyance used to pass 
real property, if the grantor sets forth on the face of the instrument, by 
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of property, the husband has an individual right in the tenancy by 
the entirety in the nature of a future interest, which the husband 
can sell today, much like an Arkansas heir apparent can enter into 
a binding sale of his expectancy to inherit from some aspiring 
decedent.323 
Digging deeply into the law of tenancy by the entirety one 
finds anything but clarity. In Beihl v. Martin,324 husband and wife 
owned Pennsylvania real property by the entireties.325 An 
individual creditor then obtained a judgment against the husband 
alone.326 Later, the spouses contracted with X for the sale of the 
entireties.327 X claimed that a judgment lien encumbered at least 
a contingent remainder in the real property, which constituted a 
breach of the duty to convey marketable title.328 The husband and 
wife successfully petitioned for specific performance against X 
because there was indeed no lien against the real property to spoil 
the marketable title.329 
Beihl, however, had to deal with a prior case. In Fleek v. 
Zillhaver,330 the husband’s individual creditor had a judgment 
against the husband. Thereafter, the couple granted a mortgage to 
                                                                                                     
way of recital or averment, that he is seized or possessed of a particular 
estate in the premises, and which estate the deed purports to convey; 
or, what is the same thing, if the seizin or possession of a particular 
estate is affirmed in the deed, either in express terms or by necessary 
implication, the grantor, and all persons in privity with him, shall be 
estopped from ever afterwards denying that he was so seized and 
possessed at the time he made the conveyance. 
Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 297, 326 (1850). 
 323. See supra notes 146–152 and accompanying text (discussing Drye). 
 324. 84 A. 953 (Pa. 1912). 
 325. Id. at 955.  
 326. Id.  
 327. Id.  
 328. Id.  
 329. See id. at 956 (“A little reflection upon the nature of the estate by 
entireties should make it apparent, we think, that while the estate continues it is 
utterly impossible for either party, without the other joining, to sell or assign his 
or her interest therein, even the expectancy of survivorship.”); see also Jordan v. 
Reynolds, 66 A. 37, 38 (Md. 1907) (“The right of survivorship . . . can not be 
destroyed except by the joint act of the two; and upon the death of either the other 
succeeds to the entire property . . . .”). 
 330. 12 A. 420 (Pa. 1887). 
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some lender.331 And after that, the wife predeceased her 
husband.332 In a later priority contest, the judgment was held 
senior to the mortgage: 
As against the husband, the judgment was the first lien and the 
mortgage the second, simply because the judgment was 
obtained before the mortgage was given. Had the wife survived, 
the mortgage would certainly have had precedence to the 
exclusion of the judgment because the estate bound by the lien 
of the judgment was defeasible by the death of the husband 
before the wife. For the same reason if the husband survived 
the wife, the estate of the later was divested, and the mortgage 
only became operative against the husband because he had 
joined in its execution. But as to him it was not the first lien, he 
having become subject to a judgment at the time anterior to the 
giving of the mortgage.333 
The Beihl court dealt with Fleek by admitting that the creditor had 
a lien on the debtor’s contingent remainder but that the debtor had 
power (exercisable jointly with his wife) to convey a good title free 
and clear of the existing lien.334 This seems to me a contradiction. 
If there is a lien on the contingent remainder, it should survive any 
inter vivos conveyance of the whole. Nevertheless, it appears that, 
in Pennsylvania, a defeasible lien does attach to the contingent 
remainder.335 The Pennsylvania tenancy begins to resemble the 
Kentucky version after all. 
Under the federal common law of property, an individual 
spouse may have—perhaps always has—a contingent remainder 
that can be attached by a tax lien or be deemed forfeited in a 
criminal action. If so, then the Supreme Court in Craft could have 
characterized Don’s individual interest as a contingent remainder 
in the tenancy by the entirety. Because the “absurdity” of no 
ownership would not exist, the marital veil need not have been 
pierced. The tax lien would attach to the individual contingent 
remainder but not to any property that the marital entity owned. 
                                                                                                     
 331. Id. at 421. 
 332. Id.  
 333. Id.  
 334. Beihl v. Martin, 84 A. 953, 954 (Pa. 1912). Similarly, in Ross v. Maryland 
(In re Ross), 475 B.R. 279, 283 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2012), the court imagines that the 
spouses can convey marketable title in an inter vivos deal but also that liens might 
exist on the contingent remainder of each spouse. 
 335. See Beihl, 84 A. at 965. 
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Under this more limited “setting aside of fictions,” there would be 
no need to label Don’s “sticks in the bundle” as a present possessory 
right, just as there would be no such exercise with regard to 
partnership property. These observations suggest that by 
economizing on the smashing of fictions, Craft could have come out 
differently in Michigan. If Don Craft individually had a contingent 
remainder, then there is no distinction between partnership law 
and tenancies by the entirety. Because partnership assets cannot 
be levied, according to Justice O’Connor, then assets of the marital 
entity cannot be levied either, where Don has an individual 
interest in the contingent remainder. 
But, as long as we are brushing up against partnership law, a 
few words should be dedicated to straight partnership cases, where 
the taxpayer is an individual and the partnership owns real 
property.336 Justice O’Connor hints that the IRS cannot sell the 
real estate, but that the IRS can reach the partnership interest of 
the taxpayer—an interest that counts as personal—not real—
property. As to the individual’s property, Justice O’Connor writes: 
[T]he federal tax lien does attach to an individual partner’s 
interest in the partnership, that is, to the fair market value of 
his or her share in the partnership assets. As a holder of this 
lien, the Federal Government is entitled to “receive . . . the 
profits to which the assigning partner would otherwise be 
entitled,” including predissolution distributions and the 
proceeds from the dissolution.337 
Notice that Justice O’Connor assumes that the IRS could collect 
dividends from the partnership, but she does not mention the sale 
of the partnership itself. In fact, under the Uniform Partnership 
Act (UPA), there could be a sale of the partnership interest. 
Suppose Cravath, Swaine and Moore (CSM) are partners, and 
Moore is a tax deadbeat. The IRS could sell Moore’s partnership to 
X,338 who would then be what the UPA calls a “transferee.”339 X 
                                                                                                     
 336. A partner is not a co-owner of partnership property. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT 
§ 501 (NAT’L CONF. COMM’R UNIF. STATE LAWS 1997). 
 337. Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 286 (2002) (citation omitted). 
 338. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 503. 
 339. A transferee is “a person to which all or part of a transferable interest 
has been transferred, whether or not the transferor is a partner.” Id. § 102(24). A 
transferable interest is “the right, as initially owned by a person in the person’s 
capacity as a partner, to receive distributions from a partnership, whether or not 
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would be entitled to dividends (if any) that CSM chooses to issue,340 
and if CSM decides to dissolve,341 X would be entitled to the 
liquidation dividend. But X is not entitled to participate in 
management342 and may not insist that the partnership dissolve in 
order to generate a dividend.343 In short, CSM can fit it so that X 
obtains absolutely nothing of value. If X receives nothing, X pays 
the IRS nothing. 
One of the reasons that Justice O’Connor distinguishes 
between entireties and partnerships is that, if the IRS cannot 
reach the real property owned by the marital entity, then valuable 
real property can be put beyond the reach of the IRS.344 But this is 
equally true of partnerships, where the IRS may collect dividends 
from the partnership or sell the right to collect dividends, but the 
IRS may not contrive to force the sale of partnership assets. The 
partnership form is just as much a mode for cheating the IRS as is 
the tenancy by the entirety.345 For example, suppose Don and 
Sandra had formed the partnership of D&S. In 1972, D&S 
purchases a home on Berwyck Avenue. Don and Sandra live in the 
house. Don fails to file tax returns and so the IRS garnishes D&S 
for Don’s tax assessment. D&S fails to vote any dividends for 
decades, while Don continues to live comfortably in the house. 
Under Justice O’Connor’s reasoning, the partnership “facilitat[es] 
                                                                                                     
the person remains a partner or continues to own any part of the right. Id. 
§ 102(23). 
 340. Id. § 503(b). 
 341. A partner dissociates from a partnership by becoming a debtor in 
bankruptcy or by executing an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Id. § 601(6). 
If dissociation results in a dissolution and winding up of the partnership’s 
business, Article 8 applies. Id. § 603(a). Otherwise Article 7 applies. Id. Under 
Article 8, a partnership is dissolved and its business must be wound up if: (i) 
within 90 days after a partner’s dissociation a majority of the remaining partners 
vote to wind up the partnership business. Id. § 801(2). If dissociation does not 
result in a dissolution and a winding up, Article 7 applies, and the partnership 
shall cause the dissociated partner’s interest in the partnership to be purchased 
for a buyout price. Id. § 701(a). Under Article 7, CSM may either jointly or 
unilaterally dissolve the partnership. The transfer, however, is liable to a judicial 
termination that it is equitable to wind up the partnership business. Id. § 801(6). 
 342. Id. § 503(3). 
 343. Id. § 801(6). 
 344. See Craft V, 535 U.S. at 286 (analyzing the differences between interests 
in the entirety and partnership interests). 
 345. See id. (analyzing potential abuse stemming from property held by the 
entirety). 
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abuse of the federal tax system.”346 Accordingly, the fiction of 
partnership personhood should be disregarded and the 
partnership’s real property would be encumbered by the tax lien. 
Being superegoic in nature, the Craft opinion allows for such a 
conclusion. Logically, the monster foretold by Justice Thomas 
slouches toward Grand Rapids to be born.347 
III. Bankruptcy Law 
The superegoic position has emerged in tax lien cases, where 
the IRC gives the IRS a lien on taxpayer “property.”348 The other 
great federal statutory regime where statutes invoke the word 
“property” is bankruptcy law.349 
The touchstone of interpreting the word in bankruptcy is the 
old warhorse, Butner v. United States,350 which holds: “Unless 
some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason 
why such interests [i.e., property interest created under state law] 
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party 
is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”351 
This tired remark is brimming with psychoanalytic content. 
First, it leads with an invitation to superegoic intervention.352 Only 
thereafter is the safe banality of state law asserted.353 And, it may 
be added, the remark is made in a case where the Supreme Court 
actually upheld a federal override of state law.354 Butner is a 
                                                                                                     
 346. Id. at 285. 
 347. See id. at 289 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (discussing the potential 
problems with the majority decision in nullifying a form of property ownership). 
 348. See 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2012) (outlining lien for taxes). 
 349. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (establishing what property comprises an estate in 
bankruptcy).  
 350. 440 U.S. 48 (1979), superseded by statute 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532. 
 351. Id. at 55. 
 352. See BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 546 (1994) (stating that 
when the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code is clear, “its operation is unimpeded 
by contrary state law or prior practice”). 
 353. For a defense of the safe banality of state law, see Charles W. Mooney, 
Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 996 (2004). 
 354. Compare David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy: The Logic and 
Limits of Bankruptcy Law, 85 MICH L. REV. 1341, 1377–78 n.117 (1987) 
(concluding that Butner upheld a federal override of state law), with In re Spears, 
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superegoic monster, disguised in the sheep’s clothing of ordinary 
deference to state law.355 
For the remainder of this Article, I follow the lead of the 
Supreme Court in the tax cases. First, I briefly review the career 
of Drye v. United States356 in the bankruptcy courts. In the main, 
the bankruptcy courts withdraw with horror from the implications 
of Drye and will have none of it, where the disclaimer occurs before 
the bankruptcy petition is filed. But, contradictorily, post-petition 
disclaimers are dishonored. In the docket of logical consistency, 
Drye is the law in bankruptcy cases. There is no principled 
distinction between prepetition and post-petition disclaimers. 
                                                                                                     
308 B.R. 793, 805 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004) (stating that the court in Butner 
upheld state law), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears) 
313 B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 2004). 
 355. The superegoic instinct long predates Butner. In Board of Trade of City 
of Chicago v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924), the debtor owned a seat on the Chicago 
Board of Trade. According to the rules of the board, the debtor could sell this seat 
to a buyer approved by the board, and then only if the debtor or the debtor’s 
corporation owed no obligations to other members of the board. Id. at 7. If the 
debtor wanted to sell the seat, any creditor who was a member of the board could 
block the transfer until that creditor was duly paid. Id. The debtor filed for 
bankruptcy. Id. The trustee wanted a court order requiring the board to recognize 
the trustee as owner of the seat. Id. In response, the board asserted that the seat 
was not “property,” within the meaning of § 70(a)(5) of the 1898 Act. Id. at 9. In 
support of that position, the board could cite an Illinois Supreme Court opinion 
proclaiming that a seat on that very board was not “property.” Id. at 8–9 (citing 
Barclay v. Smith, 107 Ill. 349, 349 (1883)). The United States Supreme Court 
articulated the superegoic position: 
Of course, where the bankrupt law deals with property rights which 
are regulated by the state law, the federal courts in bankruptcy will 
follow the state courts; but when the language of Congress indicates a 
policy requiring a broader construction of the statute than the state 
decisions would give it, federal courts cannot be concluded by them. 
Id. at 10 (citing Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Weston, 243 Fed. 332 (1917)). On the 
merits, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court, which had ruled that the 
debtor had obtained the right to sell prior to bankruptcy because all blocking 
positions had been withdrawn. Id. at 16. Two post-bankruptcy objectors were too 
late, under the rule of the board. Id. at 14–15. The Supreme Court read the rules 
differently and held that the late-objecting creditors were still timely. Id. at 15. 
Furthermore, the seat did not pass to the trustee free and clear of blocking rights. 
Id. Rather, the trustee took the seat subject to any blocking rights that were still 
timely under board rules. Id. 
 356. Drye v.United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999).  
62 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2018) 
Second, we examine the career of United States v. Craft357 in 
the bankruptcy courts. Here we discover that, avant la lettre, the 
Bankruptcy Code encoded Craft within the Bankruptcy Code. The 
trustee’s hypothetical judicial lien in bankruptcy is precisely the 
IRS tax lien outside of bankruptcy—with one key difference. In the 
tax cases, the tenancy by the entirety is not exempt from the tax 
lien because I.R.C. § 6334(a) makes no reference to it. But 
Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(3)(B) invites debtors to claim the 
tenancy by the entirety as an exemption.358 Where the debtor 
declines the invitation, preferring, say, the federal homestead 
exemption over the state-law exemptions, the trustee’s 
hypothetical judicial lien is precisely identical to the Craft-style 
IRS lien. It pierces the marital veil and treats the marital entity 
as a fiction. Several courts have declared Craft to be a monster 
imprisoned in a tax cage, but, in fact, the monster is unloosed and 
has ravaged bankruptcy law for nearly forty years. 
A. Disclaimers 
Many states359 permit disclaimer of inheritance as a means of 
flummoxing creditors. We have seen that Arkansas permitted it, 
and that the Arkansas “fiction” was blown up on behalf of the IRS 
by the Drye Court.360 
                                                                                                     
 357. Craft V, 535 U.S. 274 (2002). 
 358. See In re Knapp, 285 B.R. 176, 182 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2002) 
(“Nonetheless, the power of the federal tax collector to disregard state exemptions 
has not been expanded to other creditors and the Bankruptcy Code explicitly 
incorporates exemptions allowable under state law.”). In Musolino v. Sinnreich 
(In re Musolino), 391 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2004), a creditor tried to argue that 
Craft means that a tenancy by the entirety may not be exempted from the 
trustee’s hypothetical judicial lien. The claim was properly rejected. Id. at 1297. 
The hypothetical judicial lien initially attaches to the tenancy by the entirety, just 
as in Craft. Id. But Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(2)(b) expressly invites the tenancy 
by the entirety to be exempted after the fact. Id. In contrast, the IRS tax lien in 
Craft attached, but the IRS never invites an exemption of the tenancy by the 
entirety. Id. at 1298.  
 359. See Wood v. Bright (In re Bright), 241 B.R. 664, 671 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) 
(“The vast majority of state courts which have addressed the issue of whether a 
disclaimer can constitute a fraudulent conveyance under state law have held it 
cannot.”). 
 360. See supra Part II.B (discussing Drye).  
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In a few states,361 however, the disclaimer does not relate back 
to the time of the gift in order to erase it. Rather, the inheritance 
is an unconditional (“vested”) conveyance to the debtor and the 
disclaimer is conceived as a conveyance back to the estate of the 
donor.362 Under this state law theory of disclaimer, bankruptcy 
trustees will have no trouble recovering the conveyance back to the 
decedent estate as a fraudulent conveyance. 
What about states like Arkansas? Can bankruptcy trustees 
rely on Drye to pierce the Arkansas fiction? If so, the inheritance 
is a conveyance to an insolvent debtor and the disclaimer is a 
(fraudulent) conveyance back. 
1. Prepetition Disclaimers 
In the United States, “neither statutes nor decisions in 
America have uprooted the basic tenet of the common law that title 
to a decedent’s realty passes at once on his death to his heirs or 
devisees and not to his personal representatives.”363 Statutes have 
emerged, however, to make land liable for debts of the decedent 
                                                                                                     
 361. Parker counts six such states. See Stephen E. Parker, Can Debtors 
Disclaim Inheritances to the Detriment of Their Creditors?, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
31, 48 (1993). Two states declare that fraudulent conveyance law applies to 
disclaimers without declaring that the disclaimer is indeed a transfer back to the 
decedent estate. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B § 2-801(b)(2) (2012); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 60, § 756 (1984). Other states claim that disclaimer by an insolvent heir is 
“ineffective,” “annulled.” FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 739.402(2)(d), (5) (2009); LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN., art. 967 (1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.2-1106(b)(4), (f) (2012). 
 362. See N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Halkin, 68 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406–07 (1936) (stating that 
the debtor was entitled under his spouse’s will to the remainder of her estate); 
Stein v. Brown, 480 N.E.2d 1121 (Ohio 1985) (holding a disclaimer to be a 
fraudlent conveyance “where a will beneficiary sought to disclaim an inheritance” 
under state law with the intent to defraud a creditor, the conveyance was 
fraudulent); Pennington v. Bigham, 512 So. 2d 1344, 1347 (Ala. 1987) (concluding 
a disclaimer of interest void when the sole purpose to disclaim the interest was to 
place “the estate out of the claimant’s reach.”); Christian Marius Lauritzen II, 
Only God Can Make an Heir, 48 NW. U. L. REV. 568, 576 (1953-1954); Mary Moers 
Wenig, Disclaimer: Handle with Care, 25 TAX MGMT. EST. GIFTS & TR. J. 275, 277 
(2000) (noting that few cases preceding Drye departed from the long-standing rule 
allowing a debtor to disclaim testamentary gifts); see also Hirsch, The Problem of 
the Insolvent Heir, supra note 163, at 591–601 (analyzing the historical backdrop 
for the rejection of disclaimers). 
 363. Thomas E. Atkinson, Title After Probate Action, in 3 AMERICAN LAW OF 
PROPERTY § 14.7, at 576 (A. James Casner ed. 1952). 
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and to empower the executor or administrator to sell both land and 
chattels in order to satisfy creditor claims.364 The executor or 
administrator thus represents the unsecured creditors of the 
decedent. Only after the creditor claims are satisfied may the 
legatees or heirs obtain distributions.365 
The common law rule is thus, in effect, abrogated or is almost a 
mere empty shell. Still it is the principle upon which American 
courts must proceed and they depart therefrom only to the 
extent that there is statutory authority. Very important 
manifestations of the common law rule remain, notably the 
right of the heir or devisee to enjoy immediate possessory rights 
unless or until the person has exercised his statutory powers.366 
The best way of viewing a probate proceeding is that it is, 
essentially, bankruptcy for the dead.367 The executor or 
administrator supervises an estate for the benefit of unsecured 
creditors of the decedent.368 Heirs own a residual interest in the 
probate estate, but the executor, in effect, has a lien on this 
residual interest and may sell what is necessary to satisfy the 
unsecured creditors.369 
In light of the probate estate, it is very hard to figure out, 
strictly as a matter of state law, whether the disclaiming devisee 
at first has something and then gives it back, or whether the 
devisee never has anything because the gift is not final until the 
gift is accepted. If the disclaimer is a gift back, it is a fraudulent 
conveyance if made when the debtor is insolvent. If the disclaimer 
is simply the refusal of heir to accept the gift, then the debtor never 
had property in the first place, and the disclaimer is not a 
conveyance at all. 
A challenging attempt to puzzle out the metaphysics of 
disclaimer occurs in Lowe v. Brajkovic (In re Brajkovic).370 In his 
                                                                                                     
 364. Id. at 567. 
 365. Id.  
 366. Id. at 578. 
 367. See generally David B. Young, The Intersection of Bankruptcy and 
Probate, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 351, 353 (2007). 
 368. Id. at 372. 
 369. See id. (stating that beneficiaries acquire rights to the decedent’s estate 
upon the decedent’s death but subject to creditor claims against the estate). 
 370. Lowe v. Brajkovic (In re Brajkovic), 151 B.R. 402 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
1993). 
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provocative analysis, Judge Leif Clark assumed that state law 
provides the content of the concept “property.”371 But federal law 
defines the concept of “transfer,” because the Bankruptcy Code 
expressly defines “transfer” in § 101(54).372 Thus, Brajkovic, 
antedating Drye, has a slightly different approach than the one we 
witness in Drye. 
In Brajkovic, the decedent died slightly before the legatee’s 
eventual bankruptcy, and the legatee disclaimed the inheritance 
under Missouri law.373 The beneficiaries of the disclaimer were the 
debtor’s own children, for whom the debtor was guardian.374 As 
guardian, the debtor-as-fiduciary argued that the 
debtor-as-individual never did have any property interest in the 
inheritance and so she could hardly have “transferred” debtor 
property.375 
In Judge Clark’s view, prior to disclaimer, there was no 
decedent estate.376 Rather, upon the death of the decedent, all real 
                                                                                                     
 371. Id. at 405. 
 372. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (2012) 
The term “transfer” means— 
(A) the creation of a lien; 
(B) the retention of title as a security interest; 
(C) the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption; or  
(D) each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or 
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with— 
 (i) property; or 
 (ii) an interest in property. 
 373. Brajkovic, 151 B.R. at 404; see also Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, 
supra note 147, at 1923 (“[T]he universal conflicts rule is that the law of the 
domicile of the benefactor at the time of his or her death governs disclaimers of 
property distributed out of the benefactor’s probate estate.”). But see Parker, 
supra note 361, at 48 (“[R]eal property generally passes under the law of the 
estate in which the property is located. This disclaimer’s effectiveness, therefore, 
may depend upon the laws of more than one state.”). 
 374. See Brajkovic, 151 B.R. at 404 (noting that, upon the legatee’s valid 
disclaimer, her interest automatically transferred to her minor children as if she 
had preceded them in death). 
 375. See id. at 404 
The defendant argues that, by virtue of the “relation back” provisions 
of the Missouri disclaimer statute, whatever interest she might have 
had in the property . . . was erased. . . . Thus, she maintains, . . . the 
property . . . never was property of the defendant . . . . 
 376. See id. at 406 (“[E]quitable title to a decedent’s real estate passes 
immediately to the heirs of devisees.”). 
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and personal property was instantly transferred to the debtor—as 
a matter of Missouri law.377 In support, he quoted a Missouri 
statute that reiterated the ancient formula described above. 
According to a Missouri statute: 
When a person dies, his . . . property . . . passes to persons to 
whom it is devised by his last will, or . . . to the persons who 
succeed to his estate as his heirs; but it is subject to the 
possession of the executor or administrator and to the election 
of the surviving spouse and is chargeable with the expenses of 
administering the estate, the payment of other claims and 
allows to the family . . . .378  
The lesson that Judge Clark draws from this provision: 
A probate estate is itself not a legal entity that can own 
property. A probate estate is the property, not the possessor or 
owner of the property. The probate estate cannot possess or 
own; it can only be possessed or owned.379 
When the debtor disclaimed, the debtor made a conveyance—to 
whom? In Judge Clark’s view, because in Missouri there is no such 
entity as a decedent’s estate, the debtor had property initially and 
then conveyed her interest directly to her children—not back to the 
probate estate.380 Accordingly, the disclaimer was a fraudulent 
transfer, and the trustee could state a valid cause of action against 
the children381 under § 548(a)(1), which provides:  
The trustee may avoid any . . . transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property . . . that was made . . . within 2 years before 
the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily . . .   
(a)(1)(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value 
in exchange for such transfer; and 
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was 
made . . . .382 
                                                                                                     
 377. Id. 
 378. MO. REV. STAT. § 473.260 (2017). 
 379. Lowe v. Brajkovic (In re Brajkovic), 151 B.R. 402, 406–07 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tex. 1993). 
 380. See id. at 411 (claiming that the Missouri statutory scheme codifies 
automatic transfer to heirs upon a valid disclaimer).  
 381. The debtor and her husband, also a bankrupt, were guardians, and so 
the trustee sued the children by suing the guardians. Id. at 411. 
 382. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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Judge Clark placed heavy emphasis on the fact that “transfer” is a 
federally defined term. According to Bankruptcy Code § 101(54), a 
transfer includes, inter alia, each mode, “direct or indirect, 
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or 
parting with—(i) property; or (ii) an interest in property.”383 Judge 
Clark had no trouble finding that disclaiming is a mode of “parting 
with property.”384 
What is the point of this emphasis on the federality of the 
“transfer?” The problem was that the debtor never deeded her 
property directly to her children. 
It is not important that a disclaimer does not purport to transfer 
property to someone, for the definition of ‘transfer’ in the 
Bankruptcy Code focuses on property leaving the debtor, 
without regard to where it goes . . . .385 
Key to Judge Clark’s opinion is that the debtor had inherited the 
property (state law) and then she “transferred” it (federal law) 
directly to her children. Use of state-law notions of “relation back” 
erase the federal fact that property was transferred by the 
disclaiming debtor to the next best legatee or heir.386 Such an 
erasure was an affront to federalism.387 
Thus, Judge Clark388 was highly critical of the Seventh 
Circuit’s use of “relation back” in Jones v. Atchison (In re 
Atchison)389 to erase the federal transfer. There, the trustee argued 
that disclaimer of property meant “there had to be some property 
interest which the beneficiary disclaimed.”390 Such an argument, 
said the Atchison court, “ignores the express language of the 
Illinois disclaimer statute which says for all purposes there was 
                                                                                                     
 383. Id. § 101(54)(D). 
 384. Brajkovic, 151 B.R. at 405. 
 385. Id. at 406 n.7. 
 386. See id. at 409 (“[E]ven though state law confers an interest in property 
as of the date of death, a disclaimer is not a transfer of that interest because, after 
the disclaimer is executed, the relation back doctrine erases that interest.”); see 
also Casciato v. Stevens (In re Casciato), 112 B.R. 175, 177 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989) 
(reaching the same conclusion under Texas law). 
 387. Id. at 409. 
 388. Lowe v. Brajkovic (In re Brajkovic), 151 B.R. 402, 40709 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tex. 1993). 
 389. 925 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 860 (1991). 
 390. Id. at 211. 
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not.”391 A disclaimer “retroactively erases any interest in the 
beneficiary disclaiming.”392 According to the Atchison court: 
Although a testamentary gift passes directly to a beneficiary 
upon the testator’s death, a valid disclaimer under [Illinois law] 
relates back to the testator’s death for all purposes and 
eliminates any interest of the beneficiary has in the property 
disclaimed. Therefore, we hold that the disclaimer does not 
constitute a transfer of an interest in property which the trustee 
may avoid under Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.393 
In Judge Clark’s view, Atchison uses the state law notion of 
“relation back” to “erase” a federal transfer of the decedent estate 
to the debtor.394 According to Judge Clark, “this courts are not free 
to do.”395 The proper function of “relation back” is to identify who 
the next proper legatee or heir is, once the disclaimer is given 
effect.396 “Relation back” could not overrule the Bankruptcy Code’s 
definition of “transfer.”397 
                                                                                                     
 391. Id. 
 392. Id.  
 393. Id. at 212. 
 394. Brajkovic, 151 B.R. at 409. 
 395. Id. Judge Clark accused the Atchison court of circular reasoning—
begging the question: 
In Atchison, the court recognizes that, immediately prior to the 
execution of a disclaimer, there resides in the debtor/beneficiary 
an interest in property, and that the debtor disposes of that 
interest by executing a disclaimer. The court further recognizes 
that this analysis would bring the execution of the disclaimer 
within the ambit of section 548(a). The court then seeks to avoid 
that consequence by announcing that the debtor did not dispose 
of an interest of the debtor in property, because the debtor did 
not have an interest in property. How does the court reach this 
conclusion? By presuming that, immediately after the execution 
of the disclaimer, the property interest that existed prior to the 
disclaimer disappears, by virtue of the relation back doctrine. 
Therefore, the argument concludes, nothing existed before the 
transaction, so nothing was transferred, Of course, the transfer 
has to be executed in order for nothing to be transferred, and 
that is the faulty premise in Atchison’s logic. 
Id. at 409 n.15. 
 396. See id. at 410 (describing the proper role of the relation back doctrine). 
 397. See id. (“[S]tate law may not define the transfer away is, as of the 
moment of execution, all the requisites for transfer under the Bankruptcy Code 
are present.”). 
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In Drye, however, the Supreme Court read an analogous 
Arkansas statute in a way that differs from Judge Clark’s 
interpretation.398 According to this view, there is such a thing as a 
decedent’s estate. Evidence of this is that an executor or 
administrator may sell real or personal property for the benefit of 
the decedent’s creditors or to pay administrative costs.399 On this 
view, the estate owns the property until a legatee or heir elects to 
receive it. As one commentator put it, “[u]nder the relation-back 
doctrine, a testator’s estate does not automatically vest in a 
disclaiming beneficiary at the time of the testator’s death.”400 If 
this is true, the vested ownership must be somewhere. That place 
must be in the decedent estate over which the executor presides. 
Judge Clark denied this. He claimed the executor is not an 
“owner”: 
These persons merely take custody of the property, to discharge 
whatever debts burden the property before distribution; it is the 
beneficiary who has the real interest in the property. In fact, 
real property cannot even be sold through the probate court 
without making the named beneficiaries party to the action.401 
At each turn, this characterization can be challenged. The power 
to take custody is an interest in the property concerned. The 
unsecured claims against the decedent do not “burden” the 
property except that the executor is charged with the task of 
liquidating sufficient property. This would be like saying that 
unsecured claims “burden” the bankruptcy estate. This is true only 
in the loosest sense. The bankruptcy trustee has a hypothetical 
judicial lien on the debtor’s property for the benefit of the 
unsecured creditors. It is the bankruptcy trustee’s hypothetical 
lien that burdens property of the estate. The same can be said of 
                                                                                                     
 398. See Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 60 (1999) (emphasizing that the 
Arkansas law is not “a mere ‘personal right . . . to accept or reject [a] gift’”). 
 399. See id. at 61 (“Drye had the unqualified right to receive the entire value 
of his mother’s estate (less administrative expenses) . . . .”). This implies that the 
administrator has a property claim prior to acceptance or disclaimer of the 
inheritance. 
 400. Kevin A. White, Note, A Clash of Expectations: Debtors’ Disclaimers of 
Property in Advance of Bankruptcy, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1053 (2003).  
 401. Lowe v. Brajkovic (In re Brajkovic), 151 B.R. 402, 407 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
1993). 
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an executor of a probate estate. The executor likewise has a lien as 
representative of the unsecured creditors. 
Meanwhile, when a debtor files for bankruptcy, “[w]hat the 
bankruptcy estate acquires is the debtor’s claim or chose in action 
against the decedent’s estate.”402 Thus, executors can be sued.403 
Likewise, executors typically have authority to sue tortfeasors that 
have looted the probate estate.404 Finally, the fact that the devisees 
must be joined if the property is to be sold is not probative. It 
means that the legatees have some property. Due process requires 
that they have notice and a hearing before they are deprived of 
that property. The executor, though, has a senior property 
interest—a lien on behalf of the administrative expenses and 
unpaid unsecured claims against the decedent.405 
Continuing with the alternative reading, the decedent’s estate 
owns the property prior to its acceptance by the legatee or heir. 
During that time, the power to accept or disclaim406 is the debtor’s 
                                                                                                     
 402. Young, supra note 367, at 374. 
 403. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Enron Corp. v. Whalen (In 
re Enron Corp.), 357 B.R. 32, 35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing suit against 
the executrix of a decedent’s estate). 
 404. See Drummond v. Freeland (In re Freeland), 360 B.R. 108, 129 (Bankr. 
D. Md. 2006) (determining that defendants were jointly liable to the plaintiffs to 
compensate damage to the plaintiff’s property). 
 405. A probate estate is an “entity” within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code, 
11 U.S.C. § 101(15), though not a “person” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(33). In re Estate of Patterson, 64 B.R. 807, 808 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986). 
 406. The ability to accept (or disclaim) has been analogized to a power. 
Parker, supra note 361, at 4243. Bankruptcy Code § 541(b)(1) provides that the 
bankruptcy estate does not include “any power that the debtor may exercise solely 
for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (2012). 
The negative pregnant of § 541(b) is that powers exercisable for the debtor’s 
benefit do enter the bankruptcy estate. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.6 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1986) (“The bankruptcy estate 
does include the general powers of the bankrupt that are presently exercisable 
because they inherently are exercisable for the benefit of the bankrupt.”). 
One commentator thinks that the power to disclaim is not a power that goes 
into the bankruptcy estate because it is exercisable only for the benefit of someone 
else. See Young, supra note 367, at 391 (“The power no longer belongs to the 
debtor personally, and, if anyone may exercise it, it is the trustee.”). The power to 
disclaim is, however, the opposite side of the coin to the power to accept, which is 
exercisable for the benefit of the debtor alone. Young further comments: 
If the trustee could exercise a state law right to disclaim, this would 
circumvent the Bankruptcy Code procedure for abandoning estate 
property . . . . If a trustee could simply execute a disclaimer in 
accordance with state law, this would allow the trustee to evade the 
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interest in property of anotherthe property of the decedent 
estate. The power to accept is the property in question. When this 
power is disclaimed, this power is transferred back to and merges 
with the decedent estate, where (by the relation-back fiction) the 
next best legatee or heir is ascertained.407 
This alternative characterization sustains a recovery under 
§ 548(a)(1), which provides:  
The trustee may avoid any . . . transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property . . . that was made . . . within 2 years before 
the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor 
voluntarily . . .   
(B)(1) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for such transfer . . . .”408 
Note that the issue under § 548(a) is whether the debtor has an 
interest in property—perhaps an interest in property of another. If 
a right to disclaim is an “interest” in the property of the decedent 
estate, and if exercising the right is a “transfer,” then the trustee 
has a valid cause of action to “avoid” the transfer.409 
                                                                                                     
statutory requirements for notice and a hearing [that abandonment 
entails]. It could also be highly offensive and prejudicial to the debtor, 
as by depriving the debtor of property of great sentimental value, while 
providing no benefit whatsoever to creditors. 
Id. at 391; see also 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (requiring notice and hearing for 
abandonment). This overlooks the point that the trustee needs court authority to 
use, sell or lease property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1). To 
exercise the power to accept or disclaim is to use property of the estate, and this 
can be done only “after notice and a hearing.” Id. 
 407. See Hoecker v. United Bank of Boulder, 476 F.2d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 
1973) 
We think . . . that the Colorado legislature intended that where a 
beneficiary filed a disclaimer within the six-month period, none of the 
property disclaimed would pass to or be vested in the disclaiming 
beneficiary, or would pass from him to his children, but rather such 
property would pass directly from the testator to the children. 
 408. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 409. This characterization better fits a remark by Judge Clark: If the 
disappointed heirs are deprived by the trustee’s fraudulent transfer theory, “they 
also have the defenses of section 550(b)(1), which should, in the usual case, be 
more than adequate to preserve legitimate expectations.” Lowe v. Brajkovic (In 
re Brajkovic), 151 B.R. 402, 411 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993). Section 550(b) which 
states, “[t]he trustee may not recover under section (a)(2),” creates a “good faith 
transferee” defense for transferees of a transferee. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (emphasis 
added). In Judge Clark’s theory, the heirs would be “initial transferees” under 
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Even before Drye, Judge Clark, in Brajkovic,410 anticipated 
Drye by holding that a prepetition disclaimer within a year of 
bankruptcy (then the applicable statute of limitations)411 was a 
fraudulent transfer under § 548(a).412 The Fifth Circuit expressly 
took Judge Clark to the woodshed in Simpson v. Penner (In re 
Simpson).413 Judge Clark, however, noted that Simpson was 
pre-Drye and boldly predicted that the Fifth Circuit would reverse 
Simpson on Drye grounds.414 
The prediction, however, turned out to be incorrect. In 
Laughlin v. Nouveau Body & Tan, L.L.C. (In re Laughlin),415 a 
debtor lost a business tort action to a creditor,416 executed a 
prepetition disclaimer, and then was forced into bankruptcy.417 
The creditor that forced the debtor into bankruptcy then sought to 
deny a discharge on the ground that prepetition disclaimers are 
fraudulent conveyances, and fraudulent conveyances within a year 
of bankruptcy are grounds to deny the debtor any discharge.418 The 
                                                                                                     
§ 550(a)(1), not transferees of a transferee. Brajkovic, 151 B.R. at 411. Under 
what I have suggested, the decedent estate is the initial transferee and the heirs 
are transferees of the initial transferee. Admittedly, Judge Clark could easily 
respond that, as initial transferees, the disappointed heirs have a good faith 
transferee defense under § 548(c), and that I am just quibbling about which 
section supplies the good faith transferee defense for the disappointed heirs. 
 410. Supra notes 370–401 and accompanying text. 
 411. At the time of Brajkovic, the look-back period in § 548(a) was one year. 
Congress would extend this period to two years in 2005. Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1098, 119 Stat 23, 
§ 1402(1) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
 412. Lowe v. Brajkovic (In re Brajkovic), 151 B.R. 402, 412 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
1993). 
 413. See Simpson v. Penner (In re Simpson) 36 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(“The Brajkovic court . . . does not give state law its full effect.”). 
 414. See Lowe v. Sanflippo (In re Schmidt), 362 B.R. 318, 322 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tex. 2007) (“The Fifth Circuit has not had occasion to revisit Simpson since Drye, 
and if it does so, there is a strong argument that the court would rule Simpson to 
no longer be good law.”). 
 415. 602 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 416. The debtor had been sued for product disparagement by a business 
competitor and had been visited with a ruinous jury verdict. Id. at 419. 
 417. Id. at 41920. 
 418. Id. According to Bankruptcy Code § 727(a)(2), the court must grant the 
debtor a discharge, unless “the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a 
creditor . . . has transferred . . . (A) property of the debtor, within one year before 
the date of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (2012). For a case 
denying a discharge because of a disclaimer within a year of bankruptcy, see 
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court of appeals reversed the lower courts and allowed the debtor 
to have his discharge.419 It may be noted that, in Laughlin, the 
debtor disclaimed under color of Simpson, and the trustee sought 
to deny a discharge for an act directly endorsed by a Fifth Circuit 
precedent.420 Whereas a fraudulent conveyance action would have 
deprived the alternate legatee’s happy windfall, the lower courts 
would have imposed a lifelong obligation to pay a business tort 
debt for what, at the time, appeared to be a lawful act of disclaimer 
directly authorized by Fifth Circuit precedent. Laughlin illustrates 
the adage that hard cases make bad law.421 
Judge Clark’s view and the version induced from Drye has 
been rejected by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gaughan v. 
Edward Dittlof Revocable Trust (In re Costas),422 where the court, 
“struck blind by a disclaimer,”423 refused to give it the Drye 
treatment.424 Shortly before filing for bankruptcy, the debtor 
                                                                                                     
Nashville City Bank & Trust Co. v. Peery (In re Peery), 40 B.R. 811, 813 (Bankr. 
M.D. Tenn. 1984). See also Flanigan v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 45 B.R. 27, 31 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding open the possibility that following advice of counsel 
might justify a discharge in spite of a disclaimer). 
 419. Laughlin, 602 F.3d at 430. 
 420. See id. at 422 (describing that the debtor disclaimed under Simpson, but 
the trustee argued that the transfer was fraudulent). 
 421. The issue in Laughlin was whether the debtor, “with intent to hinder, 
delay or defraud a creditor,” transferred property within a year of bankruptcy. 
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2). Perhaps the Fifth Circuit could have proclaimed following 
a Fifth Circuit precedent, though harmful to the creditor, was not fraudulent for 
the purposes of § 727(a)(2), but it was a “constructive fraud” under § 548(a)(1)(B). 
Id. § 548(a)(1)(B). This would have permitted the discharge while allowing the 
court to be in line with Drye. See Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 52 (1999) 
(holding that state law disclaimers do not defeat federal tax liens). 
 422. See generally 555 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Arizona law). 
 423. United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224, 225 (1994). 
 424. See In re Costas, 555 F.3d at 797 (“[W]e find that Drye is distinguishable 
and we refuse to extend its logic to the bankruptcy context.”). The only other 
post-Drye court of appeals case to consider this issue agrees. Laughlin v. Nouveau 
Body & Tan, L.L.C. (In re Laughlin), 602 F.3d 417, 426 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(emphasizing “the particularities and structure of the IRC”). 
Professor Hirsch praises such holdings: 
This conclusion appears technically sound: Although the relevant 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the tax code display linguistic 
similarities, the two cover separate problems and hence can support 
conflicting outcomes. 
Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, supra note 147, at 1913 (footnote omitted). 
With respect, I differ with this view. As the subsequent lengthy treatment of 
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disclaimed a modest inheritance.425 The trustee sued the 
decedent’s estate under § 548(a)(1).426 The court ruled that 
“Arizona law says that [the debtor] had no property interest in the 
disclaimed property.”427 If the debtor never had any property, 
disclaimer cannot be a fraudulent transfer under § 548(a)(1).428 
The Costas court thought the issue was whether the debtor 
ever had any “property,” not whether the debtor’s right to disclaim 
was an interest in someone else’s property.429 Indeed, the court 
assumes that “interest” and “property” are precisely the same 
thing.430 The court also assumes that “property” means the debtor’s 
property—not the property of some other.431 In fact, § 548(a)(1) 
plausibly refers to the debtor’s interest in someone else’s property. 
The Costas assumption is faulty. The power to accept the 
inheritance is a power over property of another. It is an option in 
property. A contractually created option to buy real property is an 
interest in the property itself.432 If an insolvent debtor owned a 
                                                                                                     
tenancies by the entirety makes clear, the Bankruptcy Code deliberately invokes 
the superegoic approach to that form of ownership. Infra notes 517–539 and 
accompanying text. If the Craft result is commanded by the text of § 541(a), as 
courts have uniformly recognized, so is the Drye result. 
Professor Hirsch, however, contradicting his above-quoted remark, suggests that 
bankruptcy courts: 
[C]ould make an argument similar to the one that appeared in that 
opinion . . . that a right of disclaimer is both an attribute of property 
and a species of transfer. This duality frees courts to consideror 
demands that they considerthe policy implications of focusing on one 
or the other feature of a disclaimer when applying section 548. 
Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, supra note 147, at 1913. This second passage 
articulates the position I wish to defend. 
 425. In re Costas, 555 F.3d at 792. 
 426. Id.; 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1) (2012). 
 427. In re Costas, 555 F.3d at 794. 
 428. See id. (“Arizona’s relation-back rule says that a disclaimant neither 
transfers or possesses an interest in disclaimed property . . . .”).  
 429. See id. (focusing the discussion on whether disclaimer “retroactively 
eliminates” any property interest). 
 430. See id. at 792 (“We begin with the two relevant and disputed terms from 
§ 548: ‘transfer’ and ‘property’ (or, more broadly, ‘an interest . . . in property’).”); 
id. at 795 (“The Trustee urges us to extend Drye to the bankruptcy context and 
recognize that ‘right to channel’ as an ‘interest . . . in property’ for purposes of the 
[Bankruptcy] Code.”). 
 431. Id. at 794. 
 432. See Daniels v. Anderson, 642 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ill. 1994) (describing a 
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valuable option against a third party and then released it, surely 
such a release is a transfer of the option in someone else’s property 
back to that someone else.433 In this case, the power to buy is the 
property, and its release is the transfer. 
Similarly, in the case of a disclaimer, the insolvent debtor has 
a power to accept the inheritance,434 and disclaiming this power is 
like releasing a valuable option for less than a reasonably 
equivalent value. 
The Costas court devastatingly undermines its own pro-debtor 
position in stating: 
Drye is distinguishable based on timing issues. Although Drye, 
like this case, involved a collision between federal law and state 
relation back doctrines, the impact between the two occurred at 
a different time. In Drye, the tax lien was already in place prior 
to the execution of the disclaimer. Thus, before the taxpayer 
attempted to execute his disclaimer, the federal government 
already had an interest in the subject property. Application of 
the state law fiction would have stripped the government of this 
interest. 
In contrast, the disclaimer here occurred pre-petition, meaning 
that the retroactive divestment of property interests occurred 
prior to the bankruptcy estate gaining any interests in the right 
to disclaim. Therefore, the state law did not operate to defeat 
any pre-existing interests. Rather, the situation in Drye is more 
analogous to a post-petition disclaimer, where a debtor invokes 
the disclaimer protections of state law only after the creation of 
the bankruptcy estate. In cases of post-petition disclaimers, 
courts have generally included disclaimed property in the 
estate, reasoning that the right to disclaim itself belongs to the 
estate as of the time of filing. This context mirrors Drye because 
                                                                                                     
right of first refusal). 
 433. In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Hayes (In re Hannover Corp.), 310 F.3d 
796 (5th Cir. 2002), the alleged fraudulent conveyance was cash, but the 
transferee claimed it gave value in the form of real estate options. Id. at 789–99. 
The court considered whether this “property” was valuable for the purpose of the 
bona fide transferee defense of Bankruptcy Code § 548(c). 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) 
(2012). Ultimately the court concluded that the options were valueless. In re 
Hannover Corp., 310 F.3d at 805. If creation of the option is a transfer of property, 
surely the release of it is. 
 434. See Kalt v. Youngworth (In re Kalt’s Estate), 108 P.2d 401, 403 (Cal. 
1940) (“[W]hen a testator dies, the legatee obtains a power, in itself a limited right 
of ownership . . . to determine the ultimate disposition of the property . . . .”). But 
see CAL. PROB. CODE § 283 (West 2016) (“A disclaimer is not a voidable transfer 
by the beneficiary . . . .”). 
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in both situations full deference to the state’s disclaimer rules 
would strip parties of pre-existing interests. Thus, Drye accords 
well with the post-petition situation, but not with pre-petition 
disclaimers where no prior interests exist.435 
Here, the court admits Drye does applywhen the disclaimer 
is postpetition. Thus, the trustee’s hypothetical judicial lien 
attaches to the inheritance on the day of the bankruptcy petition 
before any disclaimer is exercised, and the very power to disclaim 
is property of the bankruptcy estate. Now, if the power to disclaim 
is property of the estate, it must be that power came into the 
bankruptcy estate via § 541(a)(1).436 That is, the court admits that 
the power to disclaim is an interest of the debtor in property.437 
If (as a matter of federal property law) the power to accept or 
disclaim the inheritance is debtor property at the moment of the 
bankruptcy petition, the property is also debtor property (as a 
federal matter) in the prepetition period as well. It cannot be the 
case that the debtor is devoid of an interest in property until just 
before bankruptcy, in which case the debtor’s property interest 
springs up instantaneously just a nanosecond before it enters the 
bankruptcy estate under § 541(a)(1). Rather, it must be the case 
that the Bankruptcy Code federalizes state property law in the 
prepetition period. 
Highly relevant here is Justice Thurgood Marshall’s remark 
in Begier v. Internal Revenue Service.438 Writing in the context of 
voidable preference law under § 547,439 Justice Marshall stated 
something that should equally apply to avoidance under § 548(a): 
Because the purpose of the avoidance provision is to preserve 
the property includable in the bankruptcy estate—the property 
available for distribution to creditors“property of the debtor” 
subject to the preferential provision is best understood as that 
property that would have been part of the estate had it not been 
                                                                                                     
 435. Gaughan v. Edward Dittlof Revocable Tr. (In re Costas), 555 F.3d 790, 
79596 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 
 436. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012) (stating that the bankruptcy estate is 
comprised of “all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of 
commencement of the [bankruptcy] case”). 
 437. See In re Costas, 555 F.3d at 796 (“In cases of post-petition disclaimers, 
courts have generally included disclaimed property in the estate, reasoning that 
the right to disclaim itself belongs to the estate at the time of filing.”). 
 438. Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53 (1990). 
 439. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (defining the concept of voidable preference). 
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transferred before the commencement of the bankruptcy 
proceeding.440 
On the view described here, the right to accept an inheritance 
is a property interest. Disclaimer of it is a transfer of this power. 
Therefore, the trustee does have a valid cause of action to avoid the 
use of the disclaimer power in the prepetition period. Once the 
disclaimer is avoided, the trustee is free to accept the inheritance 
for the benefit of the unsecured creditors. 
As every bankruptcy theorist knows, upon the commencement 
of the case, the trustee is deemed to have a judicial lien.441 This 
point is established by Bankruptcy Code § 544(a) which states that 
the trustee has: 
[A]s of the commencement of the case . . . the rights and powers 
of . . .   
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of 
the commencement of the case and that obtains at such time 
and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property 
on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained 
such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor 
exists . . . .442 
In the above-quoted passage, the Costas court admits that the 
trustee’s judicial lien is exactly like the IRS tax lien. The 
bankruptcy trustee has the weird monstrous power to penetrate 
the fictions of state law. 
We must pause and consider the very function of a fraudulent 
conveyance law, such as that given directly to the trustee under 
§ 548(a). Where a creditor can successfully establish a judicial lien 
                                                                                                     
 440. Begier, 496 U.S. at 58; see Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd, 275 B.R. 
190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying Begier in a § 548(a) case). Begier is, however, 
theoretically suspect on different grounds. For criticism, see David Gray Carlson, 
Voidable Preferences and Proceeds: A Reconceptualization, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
517, 54043 (1997) [hereinafter Carlson, Voidable Preferences]. 
 441. I have described this hypothetical judicial lien as bankruptcy’s 
“organizing principle.” See generally David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy’s 
Organizing Principle, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 549 (1999). See also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(54) (“The term ‘transfer’ means(A) the creation of a lien . . . .”). 
 442. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2012). There is much peculiarity in the way that the 
trustee’s hypothetical judicial lien is described. For a history of how this 
description became so contorted, see 1 GRANT GILMORE & DAVID GRAY CARLSON, 
CARLSON AND GILMORE ON SECURED LENDING: CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY § 1.04 (2d 
ed. 2000). 
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on property, fraudulent conveyance is superfluous. Who needs the 
concept if the creditor’s lien has already attached before the 
conveyance? But where the debtor has given away the property 
before the lien can be created, fraudulent conveyance law 
empowers the creditor to place a lien on the transferred property 
now in the hands of the third party.443 
If it is true, as the Costas court admits, that the trustee’s 
hypothetical judicial lien is “superegoic,” and if it is true that 
fraudulent conveyance law is designed to permit judicial liens to 
attach to property the debtor has craftily conveyed before the 
judicial lien could accrue, then fraudulent conveyance law, as 
articulated in § 548(a),444 should be read in a superegoic fashion, 
just as the Costas court has read the trustee’s hypothetical judicial 
lien under § 544(a)(1)445 in a superegoic fashion. That is, § 548(a)446 
should be read in such a way as to permit the hypothetical judicial 
lien to attach to that which, if not transferred away, would have 
entered into the bankruptcy estate. This fits precisely with the 
theory of avoidance described by Justice Marshall in Begier.447 
If I am right, a distinction must be noted between the trustee’s 
subrogation right under § 544(b)(1) and the trustee’s direct right 
to avoid a fraudulent conveyance under § 548(a). According to 
§ 544(b)(1): 
[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property . . . is voidable under applicable law by 
                                                                                                     
 443. See David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers 
and Equitable Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 168 (2003) [hereinafter 
Carlson, Fraudulent Transfers] (“[F]raudulent transfer law stands for the 
proposition that creditors may impose judicial liens on the property of 
non-debtors, when such property . . . was fraudulently conveyed . . . by a 
debtor.”). 
 444. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (“The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an 
interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation . . . incurred by the debtor, 
that was made or incurred on within 2 years before the date of filing of the 
petition . . .” that is an actual or constructive fraud). 
 445. See id. § 544(a)(1) (“The trustee shall have . . . the rights and powers 
of . . . a creditor . . . that obtains . . . a judicial lien.”). 
 446. See id. § 548(a) (describing the fraudulent transfers the trustee may 
avoid). 
 447. See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) (“[T]he property available for 
distribution to creditors . . . is best understood as that property that would have 
been part of the estate had it not been transferred before the commencement of 
bankruptcy proceedings.”). 
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a creditor holding an unsecured claim . . . .448 
This provision requires the trustee to locate a live, existing 
creditor (no hypothetical creditor will do!) who has a right to avoid 
a transfer under state law.449 Here there can be no question of 
superegoic federal law supplementing the trustee’s power to avoid 
conveyances. The trustee may only rely on the state law of 
property.450 Section 548(a), however, is different; it is superegoic in 
nature.451 The Drye principle works to recast the debtor’s right to 
accept the inheritance as a federal property right that the debtor 
must not (within two years of bankruptcy) transfer away. Thus, we 
must revise Professor Hirsch’s witticism that, when it comes to 
fraudulent conveyances, the trustee can kill “one bird with two 
stones.”452 With most fraudulent conveyances (if within two years 
of bankruptcy) the trustee indeed has two stones. But there are 
also two birds. The stone of § 544(b)(1) cannot kill the disclaimer 
bird.453 Only the § 548(a) stone can do that.454 
We should make express what the real argument is in Costas: 
Drye is a monster and it must be locked in a dungeon and not be 
allowed to maraud about the neighborhood of private law.455 The 
tax statute uses the same language as the Bankruptcy Codeboth 
refer to “property” without defining the concept.456 The Costas 
                                                                                                     
 448. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2012). 
 449. See, e.g., In re PWS Holding Corp., 303 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2002) (“In 
other words, § 544(b) places the debtor in possession in the shoes of its creditors, 
giving it the right to prosecute individual creditors’ fraudulent transfer claims for 
the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.”). 
 450. See Blackwell v. Lurie (In re Popkin & Stern), 223 F.3d 764, 768–69 
nn.11–12 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that Drye did not apply because the trustee 
proceeded under Missouri fraudulent conveyance law only). 
 451. For a skillful elaboration of this argument, see Jon Finelli, Comment, In 
re Costas: The Misapplication of Section 548(a) to Disclaimer Law, 14 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 567, 59197 (2006). 
 452. Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, supra note 147, at 1915. 
 453. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (explaining the trustee’s right to avoid “any 
transfer of an interest of a debtor in property . . . that is voidable . . . by a creditor 
holding an unsecured claim”). 
 454. See id. § 548(a) (providing that the trustee may avoid any transfer of a 
property interest of the debtor that was made within two years before the date of 
filing). 
 455. See generally Gaughan v. Edward Dittlof Revocable Tr. (In re Costas), 
555 F.3d. 790, 797 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 456. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012) (referring to property for the purposes 
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court said, “[a]dmittedly, similarities exist between the tax lien 
statute and the [Bankruptcy] Code, as both broadly rely on state 
law to define ‘property.’”457 But tax law is simply different from 
bankruptcy law, the Costas court opined: 
In the tax lien context, collection is the primary focus. This vital 
function often “justifies the extraordinary priority accorded 
federal tax liens.” Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
construed tax lien provisions to permit the government to reach 
property beyond the grasp of other creditors.458 
In other words, the tax lien is a vicious, insatiable beast, governed 
only by the imperative to collect. It should be quarantined. 
Meanwhile, Butner counsels the safe haven of state law. 
Following state law “serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage 
forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving ‘a windfall 
merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’”459 
Maybe so. But Butner is king in the old regime. Drye and Craft 
are the French revolution, overthrowing the discredited king. The 
Costas legislative instinct is a Thermidorian betrayal of the 
revolution. Besides, the Costas court has already admitted that 
Drye applies as of the day of the bankruptcy opinion.460 The camel’s 
nose is in the tent of bankruptcy, and, if logic holds sway, the camel 
will not be denied total access to the ground on which the tent is 
pitched.461 
Note should be taken of the penultimate sentence of Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion in Craft. In that sentence, Justice O’Connor 
referred to the lower courts’ ruling that the conveyance by Don and 
Sandra was not fraudulent on the “no harm no foul”462 principle: 
                                                                                                     
of the bankruptcy proceeding), with 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (referring to property for the 
purposes of the tax code). 
 457. In re Costas, 555 F.3d at 796. 
 458. Id. (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 734 (1979)). 
 459. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v. 
Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)). 
 460. See In re Costas, 555 F.3d at 79697 (distinguishing the case from Drye 
because of timing issues). 
 461. See In re Kloubec, 247 B.R. 246, 256 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000) (“There is 
nothing in the [Drye] opinion to suggest that its clearly articulated ruling is 
limited to a tax lien application. To the contrary, the opinion broadly suggests 
that, in all contexts, the result would be the same.”). 
 462. See supra note 228 (discussing further the application of the “no harm no 
foul” principle). 
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because the individual creditors could not reach the tenancy by the 
entirety, conveyance by the marital entity could not possibly be a 
fraudulent conveyance. Here is the sentence: 
Since the District Court’s judgment was based on the notion 
that, because the federal tax lien could not attach to the 
property, transferring it could not constitute an attempt to 
evade the Government creditor . . . [but] in future cases, the 
fraudulent conveyance question will no doubt be answered 
differently.463 
The background assumption that motivates this remark is 
that, where a tax lien does not yet exist and where a 
Michigan-style tenancy by the entirety is conveyed to defraud the 
IRS, the IRS will have a fraudulent conveyance rightthe right to 
attach a lien to third-party property. Costas precedes Craft. Costas 
admits Drye applies to the bankruptcy trustee’s hypothetical 
judicial lien. Putting all this together, Craft therefore preempts 
Costas. Craft implies that the bankruptcy trustee has a cause of 
action against the decedent estate for exercise of the disclaimer 
within two years of bankruptcy. If the IRS has this fraudulent 
transfer right, then so does the bankruptcy trustee. 
2. Postpetition Disclaimers 
As for postpetition disclaimers, they arise in two 
circumstances. (1) The inheritance is prepetition, but the 
disclaimer is postpetition. (2) Both the inheritance and the 
disclaimer are postpetition. Here, the great weight of authority is 
that, in the postpetition period, the debtor may disclaim neither a 
prepetition inheritance nor a postpetition inheritance that accrues 
within 180 days of bankruptcy and thus enters the bankruptcy 
estate under § 541(a)(5). 
Lowe v. Sanflippo (In re Schmidt)464 is perhaps the leading 
modern case465 on postpetition disclaimer of a prepetition 
                                                                                                     
 463. Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 289 (2002). 
 464. 362 B.R. 318 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).  
 465. An early exemplar is Justice Story’s opinion in Ex parte Fuller, 9 F. Cas. 
976, 977 (C.C.D. Mass 1842) (“[A bankrupt debtor has] no right to disclaim . . . . It 
would be a fraud upon his creditors . . . . As an honest debtor, he must desire, that 
his creditors should derive as much benefit from all his ‘rights of property,’ as is 
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inheritance. In Schmidt, Judge Leif Clark (again) held that a 
debtor may not disclaim an inheritance in the postpetition period, 
once the inheritance as already entered into the bankruptcy 
estate.466 Judge Clark drew this rule from Burgess v. Sikes (In re 
Burgess):467 “[T]he [Bankruptcy] Code also provides a temporal 
limitation: property of the estate is determined at ‘[t]he 
commencement of the case.’”468 Burgess holds that a government 
reimbursement for a prepetition lossone legislatively created 
after the debtor’s bankruptcy petitionwas postpetition property 
of the debtor, not prepetition property of the bankruptcy estate.469 
Judge Leif Clark analogized exercise of the disclaimer to the act of 
Congress in Burgessit was a postpetition event that must be 
ignored in calculating property of the bankruptcy estate.470 Judge 
Clark went on to proclaim that Drye applies directly to postpetition 
disclaimers in bankruptcy cases.471 
With regard to postpetition disclaimers, does § 546(b) save the 
debtor who wishes to disclaim the inheritance? According to 
§ 546(b): 
The rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544, 545, and 
549 of this title are subject to any generally applicable law 
that 
(A) permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective 
against an entity that acquires rights in such property before 
the date of perfection . . . .472 
In Schmidt, Judge Clark explained that, while § 546(b) permits 
state-law grace periods with regard to “perfection of an interest in 
property,” a disclaimer is not an act of perfection.473 A disclaimer 
                                                                                                     
possible.”). 
 466. See Schmidt, 362 B.R. at 325 (concluding that the debtor’s post-petition 
disclaimer is unauthorized and avoidable by the trustee). 
 467. 438 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 468. Id. at 496 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012)). 
 469. Id. at 507. 
 470. Schmidt, 362 B.R. at 323. 
 471. See id. at 324 (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Drye also supports this 
conclusion. . . . [T]he logic employed by the court applies with equal force in the 
bankruptcy context.”). 
 472. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (2012). 
 473. Lowe v. Sanflippo (In re Schmidt), 362 B.R. 318, 325 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
2007). 
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is, rather, “a mechanism with which to refuse or redirect an interest 
in property.”474 This seems correct to me. First, the legislative 
history to § 546(b) certainly takes for granted that perfection is 
something lien creditors often have to do: 
The trustee’s rights and powers under [§ 544(a)(1)] are limited 
by section 546. First, if an interest holder against whom the 
trustee would have rights still has, under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law, and as of the date of the petition, the 
opportunity to perfect his lien against an intervening 
interest hold, then he may perfect his interest against the 
trustee . . . .475 
The grace period for purchase money security interests under the 
UCC is an example that the legislative history explicitly gives.476 
Furthermore, § 547(e)(1) defines perfection as something a lien 
creditor does to best a subsequent hypothetical judicial lien 
creditor (personal property) or bona fide purchaser (real 
property).477 Although this definition is said to be “[f]or purposes of 
this section,”478 we may with fairness liberate it from the confines 
of § 547 and set to work on § 546(b).479 If so, it becomes clear that 
perfection is something that transferees (not debtors) do.480 
Indeed, one hears in the verb “to perfect” a requirement that 
someone has a property interest and does something that makes it 
better. As a result of perfecting, a property right, previously feeble, 
is greatly energized. Before perfection, the transferee had 
something flawed. After perfection, he still has that lien, now much 
improved. But disclaimer, in contrast, does not leave the debtor in 
possession of anything. It obliterates or cancels his property, just 
as Judge Clark suggested.481 Disclaimer is therefore the opposite 
of perfection. It is obliteration. 
                                                                                                     
 474. Id. 
 475. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, § 546, at 371 (1977). 
 476. Id. 
 477. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1). 
 478. Id. § 547(e)(1) (preamble). That is, for the purposes of voidable preference 
law, as it is set forth in § 547. 
 479. Id. § 546(b). 
 480. See Global Dist. Network, Inc. v. Star Expansion Co., 949 F.2d 910, 913 
(7th Cir. 1991) (“Debtors transfer assets; creditors perfect security interests.”). 
 481. See Lowe v. Brajkovic (In re Brajkovic), 151 B.R. 402, 410 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tex. 1993) (“[I]n disclaiming, the beneficiary ridded herself of an interest in 
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There is a second reason to believe that disclaiming is not 
perfecting within the meaning of § 546(b). Judge Clark imagined 
the disclaimer power to be something the debtor retains in spite of 
the bankruptcy petition.482 In his view, the power becomes useless 
(a disability, Hohfeld would say)483 because the bankruptcy estate 
is determined on the day of the bankruptcy petition, and 
postpetition events cannot be brought to bear on the matter.484 
But a better way to conceive of a disclaimer is that it is a power 
over property of anotherthe decedent estate.485 Thus, a debtor 
can accept the gift or decline it. As a power over property of 
another, it is an “interest” in this property. According to 
§ 541(a)(1), the disclaimer right is a “legal . . . interest[] of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”486 
Therefore, the disclaimer right is an interest in property that goes 
into the bankruptcy estate itself and is exercisable by the trustee 
alone.487 After bankruptcy, the power to disclaim continues to 
                                                                                                     
property.”). 
 482. See Lowe v. Sanflippo (In re Schmidt), 362 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tex. 2007) (remarking that the debtor did not execute the disclaimer prior to filing 
the bankruptcy petition and therefore should have reported her interest in the 
disclaimer in her schedules). 
 483. Hohfeld, supra note 100, at 30. According to Hohfeld’s famous system of 
opposites and correlatives, all law can be described by eight terms. Arranged by 
correlatives, any legal relationship between A and B can be described as follows: 
If A has a right, privilege, power, or immunity, then B has a no-right, duty, 
disability, liability. Id. 
 484. See In re Schmidt, 362 B.R. at 323 (“[S]ubsequent events . . . [can] not be 
used to revise the state of affairs as they existed as of the date of the bankruptcy 
filing.”). 
 485. Judge Clark wanted the inheritance to be property of the debtor. See 
Brajkovic, 151 B.R. at 406 (“Thus, there seems to be some interest in property 
residing in the debtor at the moment the disclaimer is executed just by virtue of 
the fact that it takes a written disclaimer to get rid of it.”). But this is not 
necessary. The decedent estate could own the property and the debtor could have 
the right to accept or disclaim the gift. As Judge Clark noted, the act of acceptance 
is passive. If enough time passes, acceptance is presumed. Id. (citing MO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 473.260, 474.490 (1992)). 
 486. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012). 
 487. See In re Scott, 385 B.R. 709, 71112 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2008) (“[O]nce [the 
debtor] became entitled to the inheritance, the entitlement became property of 
the bankruptcy estate and she had the duties of the trustee to preserve that 
property for the benefit of creditors.”); Wolfe v. Farrior (In re Farrior), 344 B.R. 
483, 486 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2006) (“The right to disclaim after the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition became property of the estate and only the trustee could 
administer that legal interest of the debtor. To hold otherwise would permit state 
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exist, but it belongs to the trustee. Therefore, § 546(b) does not 
apply because the debtor has already been divested of the power to 
disclaim. In contrast, the power of a lien creditor to perfect does 
not go into the bankruptcy estate, because the power to perfect, 
though an interest in property, is not an interest of the debtor in 
property. It is the power of the creditor. Accordingly, § 541(a)(1) 
leaves the creditor’s right to perfect intact.488 For this reason, lien 
creditors can have access to § 546(b) grace periods, but the debtor 
cannot. 
As for postpetition disclaimers of postpetition inheritances, 
there is an additional consideration that warrants ignoring 
debtor’s exercise of the disclaimer. 
Postpetition inheritances do not enter the bankruptcy estate 
through § 541(a)(1), which applies to “interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case.”489 In the case of a 
postpetition inheritance, the property in question belongs to the 
still-living legator, still breathing at the commencement of the 
case. Rather, the inheritance enters the bankruptcy estate through 
the postern gate of § 541(a)(5), which swings open for: 
Any interest in property that would have been property of the 
estate if such had been an interest of the debtor on the date of 
the filing of the petition, and that the debtor acquires or becomes 
entitled to acquire within 180 days after such date— 
                                                                                                     
law to preempt the Federal Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 488. Judge Clark was certainly aware of this alternate conception and at one 
point remarked, “[i]f anyone had the authority to execute a disclaimer, it was the 
chapter 7 trustee.” In re Schmidt, 362 B.R. at 325. Somewhat inconsistently, 
Judge Clark asserted that § 549 avoids the transfer. Cornelius v. Cornell (In re 
Cornell), 95 B.R. 219, 222 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989). In fact, § 549 should be left 
out of the analysis. The point is that the right to disclaim has passed to the 
bankruptcy trustee and the debtor no longer has it. End of matter. Section 549 
avoidance requires an adversary proceeding by the trustee. FED. R. BANKR. P. 
7001. The trustee can simply ignore the attempt to disclaim as an exercise of a 
power that the debtor no longer has. See In re Stambaugh, No. 04-00679, 2010 
Bankr. LEXIS 3141, at *11 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Sept. 17, 2010) (“Trustee also 
certainly would have the authority to set the post-petition transfer of property of 
the estate aside under § 549.”). I have argued for the superfluity of § 549(a) in 
most alleged cases of postpetition transfer in, David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy’s 
Acephalous Moment: Postpetition Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Code, 21 
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 113, 11522 (2004) [hereinafter Carlson, Bankruptcy’s 
Acephalous Moment]. 
 489. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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 (A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance . . . .490 
The italicized language indicates that, not acquisition itself, but 
entitlement to acquisition is the desideratum.491 Section 541(a)(5) 
therefore indicates that the disclaimer is irrelevant in deciding 
whether the inheritance comes into the estate through this postern 
gate.492 
To conclude, it is illogical for courts to proclaim that 
prepetition disclaimers are never transfers that can be avoided and 
that postpetition disclaimers are always transfers that can be 
avoided. The postpetition cases have federalized the property 
aspects of the disclaimer, so that the trustee’s hypothetical judicial 
lien attaches to the power to accept or disclaim.493 Taking a cue 
from Justice Marshall in Begier,494 the federal definition should 
extend to the prepetition period as well. That is to say, the Drye 
reasoning should apply fully in the bankruptcy context. 
As it stands, disclaimer law is capricious. In Geekie v. Watson 
(In re Watson),495 the debtor was unaware she was a legatee on the 
day of bankruptcy.496 She tried to exercise a post-petition 
disclaimer to flummox the creditors but was denied the 
                                                                                                     
 490. Id. § 541(a)(5) (emphasis added). 
 491. See Parker, supra note 361, at 3435 (making this point). 
 492. See In re Chenoweth, 3 F.3d 1111, 1113 (7th Cir. 1993) (assuming sub 
silentio that postpetition disclaimer of a postpetition inheritance is ineffective); 
In re Scott, 385 B.R. at 711. Michelson v. Detlefsen (In re Detlefsen), 610 F.2d 512 
(8th Cir. 1979), is a case under the 1898 Act. For our purposes, the court assumed 
that, under the Bankruptcy Code (which had just become effective), postpetition 
disclaimers cannot prejudice the bankruptcy trustee. Id. at 517. For the record, 
Detlefsen is mystifying in its interpretation of the 1898 Act. In the case, the debtor 
filed for bankruptcy at a time when he had a contingent remainder in an estate. 
Id. at 513. This contingent remainder should have gone into the bankruptcy 
estate and that should have been the end of the matter. After bankruptcy, the life 
tenant died, and the debtor only then disclaimed the gift. Id. at 514. The court 
seemed to think that a prepetition right to disclaim went into the bankruptcy 
estate but a postpetition disclaimer did not (the opposite of what one might 
suppose). Id. at 517. 
 493. See In re Scott, 385 B.R. at 711–12 (stating that once the inheritor 
became entitled to the inheritance, that entitlement became property of the 
bankruptcy estate and she may not disclaim that property to the detriment of the 
creditors). 
 494. Supra notes 440–441 and accompanying text. 
 495. 65 B.R. 9 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986). 
 496. Id. at 10.  
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opportunity.497 Yet this same scheme would be upheld if she had, 
like a Dickensian vulture, kept watch at the deathbed so as to 
execute a prepetition disclaimer, which would have been upheld. 
Better for the federal courts to rule that disclaimers two years 
before bankruptcy are fraudulent conveyances under § 548(a) 
because Drye has articulated the generally applicable federal law 
of property. 
B. Tenancy by the Entireties 
Administering the tenancy by the entirety is a “bedeviling 
issue in bankruptcy law.”498 To beat it into submission, we shall 
now pound a great many round pegs into some very square holes, 
during the course of which we shall wear out several hammers. 
Our problem is mostly with the Michigan-style tenancy by the 
entirety.499 The New York-style entireties, in contrast, poses no 
problem at all. In New York, the individual spouse owns a 
co-tenancy, which goes into the bankruptcy estate when the 
individual files for bankruptcy.500 Against this individual’s interest 
the debtor may apply the standard homestead exemption (if the 
entireties is the spouse’s principal residence).501 Assuming there is 
a valuable equity for the unsecured creditors after the exemption 
is applied, this individual interest can be sold. Under New York 
law, the buyer of the debtor’s interest takes a 50% present 
possessory right and the debtor’s survivorship right.502 The 
nondebtor spouse also has a survivorship right if he survives the 
debtor.503 Also, under New York law, the nondebtor spouse has an 
                                                                                                     
 497. Id. at 12.  
 498. Bunker v. Peyton (In re Bunker), 312 F.3d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 499. We shall also struggle with the statutory tenancies by the entirety in 
Tennessee, Illinois, and Massachusetts. Infra Part III.B.10. 
 500. See Cmty. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of New York v. Persky (In re Persky), 893 
F.2d 15, 18–19 (2d Cir. 1989) (asserting that the debtor’s interests are alienable). 
 501. Debtors in New York tried to claim that the tenancy by the entirety was 
exempt because a few lower courts had used their discretion, N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW 
§ 5240 (McKinney 2017), to delay execution sales of the debtor’s interest in a 
tenancy by the entirety. In In re Persky, 893 F.2d at 15, the Second Circuit ruled 
that, just because courts had discretion to delay an execution sale, did not make 
the entireties exempt in New York. 
 502. Lover v. Fennell, 179 N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1020 (1958). 
 503. Hammond v. Econo-Car of the N. Shore, Inc., 336 N.Y.S.2d 493, 496 
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immunity against partition by sale,504 but the Bankruptcy Code 
overrides this immunity.505 According to Bankruptcy Code 
§ 363(h): 
[T]he trustee may sell both the estate’s interest . . . and the 
interest of any co-owner in property in which the debtor had, at 
the time of the commencement of the case, an undivided interest 
as a tenancy by the entirety, only if: 
(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and 
such co-owners is impracticable; 
(2) sale of the estate’s undivided interest in such property 
would realize significantly less for the estate than sale of 
such property free of the interests of such co-owners; [and] 
 (3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of 
the interests of co-owners outweighs the detriment, if any, to 
such co-owners . . . .506 
The nondebtor spouse is given the right of first refusal to buy 
the debtor spouse’s tenancy507 and, if he does not exercise this 
option, he must submit to the trustee’s power of sale and receive 
his share of the ultimate sales proceeds.508 Here, we have a 
straightforward federal preemption of a state anti-partition rule, 
similar to the tax rule interpreted in United States v. Rodgers.509 
                                                                                                     
(1972).  
 504. See id. at 494–95 (“[T]he sale of the husband’s interest in the real 
property would convey a hybrid tenancy in common, with survivorship but no 
partition rights, to a third-party . . . .”).  
 505. See In re Persky, 893 F.2d at 16 (“[The Bankruptcy Code] permit[s] a 
trustee to realize fully on a debtor’s interest in property owned as a tenant by the 
entirety by granting the trustee the authority to sell it without the consent of the 
non-debtor spouse.”). 
 506. This section does not apply if the tenancy by the entirety is used in the 
production, transmission, or distribution of electric energy of natural gas. 11 
U.S.C. § 363(h)(4) (2012). According to the legislative history, Congress feared 
that “public utilities [might be] deprived of power sources because of the 
bankruptcy of a joint owner.” 124 Cong. Rec. H11,093 (Sept. 28, 1978). 
 507. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(i) (“Before the consummation of a sale of 
property . . . the debtor’s spouse, or a co-owner of such property . . . may purchase 
such property at the price at which such sale is to be consummated.”). 
 508. See id. § 363(j) (“After a sale of property . . . the trustee shall distribute 
to the debtor’s spouse or the co-owners of such property . . . the proceeds of such 
sale . . . according to the interest of such spouse or co-owners, and of the estate.”). 
 509. See generally United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983). 
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The New York-style tenancy by the entirety is compatible with 
the Bankruptcy Code, but compatibility dissolves when we 
consider the Michigan-style entireties. In Michigan, the marital 
entity owns the entireties (not the individual spouses).510 This and 
other assumptions will cause endless doctrinal headaches. 
For the moment, we assume (unless otherwise indicated) that 
one spouse has filed for bankruptcy and the other spouse has 
not.511 
1. Into the Estate and Out 
Under the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898,512 exempt property513 
was never part of the bankruptcy estate. According to § 70(a)(5) of 
the 1898 Act (repealed in 1978), only debtor property “which might 
have been levied on and sold under judicial process” entered the 
bankruptcy estate.514 
In contrast, Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(1) brings “all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case” into the bankruptcy estate.515 This 
includes the debtor’s exempt property.516 Thereafter, the debtor (or 
a dependent of the debtor) must fetch out the property by claiming 
exemptions on Schedule C.517 That the Michigan-style tenancies by 
                                                                                                     
 510. See In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 802–03 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004) (stating 
that Michigan law “characterizes its tenancy by the entirety as creating no 
individual rights”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 
313 B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 2004). 
 511. Joint bankruptcy petitions by spouses under 11 U.S.C. § 302 are 
discussed infra in notes 1195–1218 and the accompanying text. 
 512. Bankruptcy Act, chs. 540–41, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).  
 513. “Exempt” is basically not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. One does read 
that the tenancy by the entirety must be “exempt from process.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(b)(3) (2012). Classically, “[e]xempt property is that which is free from 
liability to processes such as seizure and sale, or attachment, to satisfy debts.” In 
re Marriage of Logston, 469 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Ill. 1984). 
 514. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5).  
 515. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012). 
 516. See Chippenham Hosp., Inc. v. Bondurant, 716 F.2d 1057, 1058 (4th Cir. 
1983) (“Section 541 has been construed logically to include the debtor’s interest 
in entireties property.”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 368 (1977). 
 517. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991) (“No 
property can be exempted (and thereby immunized), however, unless it first falls 
within the bankruptcy.”). See generally David Gray Carlson, The Role of 
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the entirety enter into the bankruptcy estate (and may never come 
back out) is extremely significant in my argument that Craft was 
baked into the Bankruptcy Code from the beginning. 
Once exempt property goes into the bankruptcy estate, the 
Bankruptcy Code invites debtors to choose state-law exemptions 
(in lieu of the federal exemptions provided for in § 522(d)(2)).518 
According to § 522(b)(1): 
Notwithstanding section 541 . . . , an individual debtor may 
exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either 
paragraph (2) or, in the alternative, paragraph (3) of this 
subsection.519 
Paragraph (3) refers to the state-law exemptions. These 
exemptions include: 
[A]ny interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately 
before the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenancy 
by the entirety . . . to the extent such interest as a tenant by the 
entirety . . . is exempt from process under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.520 
Where the debtor chooses the federal exemptions, the Michigan 
entireties goes into the bankruptcy estate and never comes back 
out. The federal exemption in § 522(d) includes a homestead 
exemption521 but no exemption for the entireties. 
At first thought, one is tempted to think that § 541(a)(1) does 
not bring the Michigan-style tenancy by the entirety into the 
                                                                                                     
Valuation in the Federal Bankruptcy Exemption Process: The Supreme Court 
Reads Schedule C, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 461 (2010) [hereinafter Carlson, 
Role of Valuation]. Form B-206C became effective in December 2015. Most of the 
authorities reviewed here involve old Schedule C. So, shedding a tear, I shall 
nostalgically refer to Schedule C instead of B-206C. 
 518. Congress also invites state legislatures to prohibit its citizens from 
choosing the federal exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2). About two-thirds of the 
states have done so. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 522.02 n.5 (Alan N. Resnick & 
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009). 
 519. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). 
 520. Id. § 522(b)(3)(B). 
 521. See id. § 522(d)(1) 
The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $23,675 in value, in real 
property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the 
debtor uses as a residence in a cooperative that owns property that the 
debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, or in a burial 
plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. 
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bankruptcy estate because the debtor has no property interest in 
the tenancy. Rather, the marital entity owns all. The individual 
debtor owns nothing. Indeed, this was precisely the result under 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.522 
For that matter, it is distinctly odd even to say that the 
tenancy by the entirety is considered the debtor’s exempt property 
when it is not the debtor’s property at all. The property belongs to 
a separate person—the marital entity.523 When it comes to exempt 
property, one typically expects that (i) the debtor actually owns 
something and (ii) a statute says the creditors of the debtor can’t 
have it. Usually,524 no state statute says that the debtor’s 50% 
entireties share is immune from process issued on behalf of some 
creditors—the individual creditors of an individual spouse.525 
Rather, the entireties theory is usually from the common law and 
holds that the marital entity is the owner.526 It is not, precisely 
                                                                                                     
 522. See generally Dioguardi v. Curran (In re Dioguardi), 35 F.2d 431, 432 
(4th Cir. 1929); Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett), 14 B.R. 85, 88 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981). This was so, even if selected creditors had access to 
that property. Lockwood v. Exch. Bank of Fort Valley, 190 U.S. 294, 299–300 
(1903); In re Hunter, 970 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 523. See Grosslight v. Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 775 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Michigan 
is among the minority of states retaining the common law tenancy by the entirety. 
Tenants by the entirety, who must be a husband and wife, hold under a single 
title with right of survivorship.”). 
 524. We shall encounter statutory entireties in Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. The Michigan statute seems merely to 
restate preexisting common law notions. Infra note 567 and accompanying text. 
 525.  See In re Amici, 99 B.R. 100, 101 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (“Nowhere in 
the Constitution of [Florida] or in any Statute is there any reference to any 
exemption based on tenancy by the entireties.”). The trustee in In re Ford, 3 B.R. 
559, 574–75 (Bankr D. Md. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Greenblatt v. Ford, 638 F.2d 14 
(4th Cir. 1981), tried to argue “exemption” means “statutory” exemption, not the 
common law in general. This was dispatched with a citation to Eaton v. Boston 
Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427 (1916), where the Supreme Court upheld the common law 
spendthrift trust as exempt property, even though no statute said so. See also In 
re Allard, 196 B.R. 402, 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (“Fairly applying the practical 
function of the relevant statute is more important than using some bright line 
test hinging upon the statute’s use or non-use of the words “exempt” or 
“exemption” to determine whether or not a state exemption exists for purposes of 
[§ 522(b)(3)(B)] in a bankruptcy case.”), aff’d 202 B.R. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 526. See Grosslight, 757 F.2d at 775 (“Neither husband nor wife acting alone 
can alienate any interest in the property . . . .”); In re Trickett, 14 B.R. at 86 (“At 
common law, the individual creditors of neither the husband or wife could reach 
entireties property by judicial process nor could either spouse transfer any 
interest in the property.”).  
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speaking, debtor property that is being exempted. Shall we also say 
that when a debtor files for bankruptcy, property of “other persons” 
is exempt? That would imply that all the property of all other 
persons goes into the bankruptcy estate under §541(a)(1), where 
the debtor must trouble to bail it out again under § 522(l). Needless 
to say, this is absurd, but it is the underlying assumption when we 
say that the Michigan-style entireties is exempt property. 
On the contrary, we must recognize that the Bankruptcy Code 
simply denies the Michigan fiction, just as the Supreme Court did 
in Craft.527 Contrary to the Michigan “fiction” that the debtor is 
propertyless, courts have held that § 541(a) is “certainly broad 
enough to include an individual debtor’s interest in property held 
as a tenant by the entirety.”528 Such holdings anticipate the 
reasoning in Craft, which sets aside the Michigan “fiction” of 
marital entity ownership.529 Obviously this is precisely what 
Congress intended. The tenancy by the entirety appears in 
§ 522(b)(3)530 as exempt property, implying that the debtor must 
have a property interest in the tenancy for § 541(a) purposes.531 
Indeed, the very fact that § 522(b)(3) refers to the debtor’s interest 
in a tenancy by the entirety proves that the marital veil has 
already been pierced by the Bankruptcy Code. This implies that 
Congress intended for the Michigan tenancy by the entirety to 
come in to the bankruptcy estate via § 541(a), so that the debtor (if 
she chooses) could fetch it out again as a § 522(l) exemption.532 In 
                                                                                                     
 527. Supra Parts II—III.   
 528. Napotnik v. Equibank & Parkvale Sav. Ass’n, 679 F.2d 316, 318 (3d Cir. 
1982); see also In re Paeplow, 972 F.2d 730, 737 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[C]ongress 
intended entirety property to enter the bankruptcy estate and to pass out of the 
estate if subject to an exemption, and if claimed by the debtor on his or her 
bankruptcy schedules.”). 
 529. Thus, the tenancy by the entirety proves that “the Bankruptcy Code does 
not always incorporate a state’s definition of property into section 541(a)(1).” 
Arango v. Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville (In re Arango), 992 F.2d 611, 614 (6th 
Cir. 1993). 
 530. Prior to BAPCPA, this section bore the number § 522(b)(2)(B). 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109–8, 119 Stat. 23. 
 531. An earlier Bankruptcy Commission had specifically recommended that 
the tenancy by the entirety become part of the bankruptcy estate. Report of the 
Commission on Bankruptcy Law of the United States, H.R. Doc. 93–137, 93rd 
Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. I at 194 (1973). 
 532. See Garner v. Strauss (In re Garner), 952 F.2d 232, 234 (8th Cir. 1991) 
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short, by implication, Congress legislated a piercing of the marital 
veil in the same fashion that Justice O’Connor pierced the fiction 
in Craft.533 
2. Severance of the Tenancy 
In Craft-like fashion, the trustee’s hypothetical judicial lien 
attaches to the Michigan-style entireties even though state law 
says that the individual spouse owns nothing.534 Unlike the IRC, 
the Bankruptcy Code invites the entireties to be exempted.535 If the 
debtor spouse so elects, the entireties is expelled from the 
                                                                                                     
(“[I]t is at least clear that by allowing an individual debtor to exempt certain 
interests as a tenant by the entirety, Congress intended that such interests be 
included in the estate in the first place.”). 
 533. Also relevant here is Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(1)(A), which holds: 
[A]n interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the estate 
under subsection (a)(1) . . . notwithstanding any provision 
in . . . applicable nonbankruptcy law— 
(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the 
debtor . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(A) (2012). State law restricts the ability of an individual 
spouse to convey the tenancy by the entirety. Indeed, it denies that the individual 
spouse has any interest in the tenancy by the entirety. But the Craft-like move in 
§ 541(a)(1) and § 522(b)(3) guarantees that the debtor does have an interest, and 
therefore § 541(c)(1) facilitates the concept of the tenancy by the entirety entering 
the bankruptcy estate. 
Judge Jeffrey Hughes argues that § 541(c) is absolutely necessary to the tenancy 
by the entirety entering into the estate. It is no mere facilitator. See In re Spears, 
308 B.R. 793, 805 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004) 
If Section 541(c)(1) did not exist, a debtor’s interest in property held as 
a tenant by the entirety with a non-debtor spouse could not become 
property of the estate, for Butner directs that the void which would be 
left by the absence of Section 541(c)(1) is to be filled by state law and 
applicable law in Michigan clearly prohibits a debtor from transferring 
his interest in the entireties property without the consent of his spouse.  
Rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 B.R. 212 (W.D. 
Mich. 2004). I think “facilitate” is more accurate, because § 522(b)(3) presupposes 
that the debtor has an interest in the Michigan-style tenancy by the entirety. 
From this, we can deduce straight out that § 541(a)(1) brings the entireties into 
the bankruptcy estate. 
 534. See Grosslight v. Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 775 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Michigan 
is among the minority of states retaining the common law tenancy by the entirety. 
Tenants by the entirety, who must be a husband and wife, hold under a single 
title with right of survivorship.”). 
 535. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B). 
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bankruptcy estate.536 The two spouses continue to be tenants by 
the entirety going forward. 
If the debtor chooses not to exempt tenancy by the entirety, 
then the debtor’s tenancy stays in the estate.537 The trustee can 
then sell the debtor’s 50% share to some buyer,538 who becomes a 
tenant in common with the nondebtor spouse.539 Because the sale 
destroys the traditional five unities of the entireties,540 the 
nondebtor spouse’s share likewise becomes a tenancy in 
common.541 The nondebtor spouse loses the state-law expectation 
that the individual creditors of the debtor cannot cause the 
liquidation of the estate.542 Severance is achieved—when the 
debtor never exempts the property and when the trustee achieves 
the sale, if ever. 
A different conclusion was drawn by Judge Jeffrey Hughes in 
In re Spears.543 In an impressive (though flawed) opinion, Judge 
Hughes concluded that, when the entireties enters the bankruptcy 
estate, the trustee and the nondebtor spouse are co-owners.544 As a 
matter of Michigan law, Judge Hughes reasoned, the five required 
unities are disrupted and so the entireties instantly becomes a 
tenancy in common.545 Nevertheless, the debtor may still exempt 
                                                                                                     
 536. Id. § 522(l). 
 537. See id. § 541(c)(1) (providing that “an interest of the debtor in property 
becomes property of the [bankruptcy] estate”). 
 538. See Grosslight, 757 F.2d at 776 (“If not specifically exempted, the debtor’s 
interest in the entireties property may be sold pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(h)–
(i).”). 
 539.  See In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 807 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004) (stating 
these unities to be time, title, interest, possession, and marriage), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 2004). 
 540. See id. at 812 (stating that these unities are time, title, interest, 
possession, and marriage). 
 541. See id. at 816 (“[T]he commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding severs 
a tenancy by the entirety between a debtor and his spouse in Michigan and 
replaces it with a tenancy in common between the bankruptcy estate and the 
debtor’s spouse.”).  
 542. See Waldschmidt v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 32 B.R. 337, 341 (Bankr. 
M.D. Tenn. 1983) (stating that the debtor who elects the federal exemptions and 
the non-debtor spouse are exposed to the risk of losing possession of the family 
house). 
 543. In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 807 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 2004). 
 544. Id. at 814–16. 
 545. See id. at 813 (“[I]f there were such a severance, the tenancy by the 
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her newly-transformed tenancy in common because this cotenancy 
was a share in the entireties “immediately before the 
commencement of the case.”546 That is, exemptibility is determined 
by prepetition criteria, but severance occurs instantly upon the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition.547 Thus, even when the nondebtor 
spouse chooses to exempt the entireties, the debtor’s bankruptcy 
destroys that immunity for the non-debtor spouse and “breaks the 
dam”—Rodgers-style—for the benefit of the nondebtor spouse’s 
individual creditors. 
This conclusion, however, is based on a theoretical error. The 
error is that the bankruptcy trustee becomes the fee simple owner 
of whatever goes into the estate. If that were so, then the severance 
theory of Judge Hughes follows.548 
In fact, the transfer from the debtor to the bankruptcy estate 
is not a conveyance of fee simple. Rather, the creation of the 
bankruptcy estate is the creation of a lien.549 The trustee is a 
creditor representative, and so the trustee’s ownership is not 
qualitatively absolute but is, rather, quantitatively limited. 
Beyond that limit, the debtor owns an equity interest, as the 
Bankruptcy Code makes clear.550 True, according to Bankruptcy 
Code § 544(a)(3), the trustee has: 
[A]s of the commencement of the case . . . the rights and powers 
of . . .  
                                                                                                     
entireties, would become a tenancy of a different kind.”). 
 546. See id. at 813–14 (“Section 522(b)(2)(B) does not require that the interest 
of the bankruptcy estate that the debtor claims as exempt actually be owned by 
the bankruptcy estate as a tenant by the entirety.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) 
(2012) (requiring only that the debtor have owned the claimed interest as a 
tenancy by the entirety “immediately before the commencement of the case”). 
 547. See In re Spears, 308 B.R. at 816 (“[T]he commencement of a bankruptcy 
proceeding severs a tenancy by the entirety between a debtor and his spouse in 
Michigan and replaces it with a tenancy in common between the bankruptcy 
estate and the debtor’s spouse.”). 
 548. Cf. In re Szekely, 936 F.2d 897, 897 (7th Cir. 1991) (making this same 
assumption of the bankruptcy estate). 
 549. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (“[A] creditor that extends credit to the debtor 
at the time of the commencement of the case, and that obtains . . . a judicial lien 
on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such 
a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists.”). See generally Carlson, 
Fraudulent Transfers, supra note 443. 
 550. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) (“[P]roperty of the estate shall be 
distributed . . . (6) sixth, to the debtor.”). 
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(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, 
from the debtor. against whom applicable law permits such 
transfer to be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide 
purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the time of the 
commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser 
exists.551 
A “purchase,” admittedly, is not inconsistent with a fee simple 
absolute transfer to the bankruptcy trustee, but because the 
trustee is a creditor representative, there must be a quantitative 
limit here too. In effect, bankruptcy constitutes the creation of a 
mortgage for the benefit of the unsecured creditors.552 This 
mortgage, however, is superegoic. It attaches to the debtor’s 
entireties interest until such time as the tenancy is exempted and 
expelled from the estate.553 Exemption should be understood as the 
dissolution or release of the trustee’s hypothetical lien. 
Accordingly, when the individual spouse files for bankruptcy, 
the superegoic lien of the trustee attaches to the tenancy by the 
entirety. Underneath that lien, the tenancy by the entirety 
remains unsevered. The unities remain intact.554 If the entireties 
exemption is chosen, the debtor’s 50% share is exonerated from the 
trustee’s lien, and no severance ever does occur.555 
                                                                                                     
 551. Id. § 544(a)(3). 
 552. See Vladimir Elgort, Note, Do Debtors Owe Rent to Their Bankruptcy 
Trustee for Remaining in the Home After Filing and Prior to Foreclosure, 
Notwithstanding a Homestead Exemption?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2253, 2263, 2274 
(2002) (stating that the trustee holds the status of mortgagor rather than a fee 
simple absolute owner). 
 553. Supra notes 511–520 and accompanying text. 
 554. This was recognized in an influential early case in In re Ford, 3 B.R. 559 
(Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Greenblatt v. Ford, 638 F.2d 14 
(4th Cir. 1981): 
The trustee merely obtains and retains custody of the debtor’s 
undivided interest consisting of the same unities, intact and unaltered, 
as they existed immediately prior to the filing of the petition, until such 
time as that interest, still intact and unaltered is exempted from the 
estate under [§] 522[(b)(3)]. 
Id. at 570. 
 555. See id. at 575 (stating that “what . . . became an asset of the [bankruptcy] 
estate was Mr. Ford’s individual undivided interest as a tenant by the entirety” 
and no severance occurred as a result of Mr. Ford’s interest becoming an asset of 
the bankruptcy estate). 
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Judge Hughes found himself reversed556 on the severance 
question, but on inscrutable reasoning. According to the district 
court, Judge Hughes applied Craft to the Bankruptcy Code.557 
Craft, thought Judge Enslen, is a tax case, and tax law cannot be 
applied to bankruptcy cases: 
The Bankruptcy Court then concludes that section 541 of the 
Bankruptcy Code and other code sections, like the tax law 
sections in Craft, operate to sever property held by the 
entireties when a bankruptcy petition by a single spouse if filed. 
This conclusion is not supported by any explicit language in 
those code sections . . . . While the notion that there is no escape 
from the tax man, which wins the day in Craft, is well 
understood as part of federal law, the Bankruptcy Code’s 
treatment of the entireties is not supported by any established 
or new found Congressional policy. It runs directly contrary to 
the central premise of the bankruptcy system—that relief from 
debts is available and is to be liberally construed in favor of 
debtors and in accordance with both state law and the laws of 
Congress.558 
Here we see the standard move: Craft is a monster and must be 
contained to tax cases. But, as we have seen, the Bankruptcy Code 
is Craft avant la lettre. Judge Hughes is quite right that Craft was 
baked into the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. Craft is no tax monster. 
In fact, Justice O’Connor borrowed the bankruptcy principle for 
tax cases—just the opposite of what Judge Enslen supposed. 
Nevertheless, as often happens in bankruptcy appeals, Judge 
Enslen was right for the wrong reasons. Justice was achieved by 
dumb accident. Because the trustee is only a lien creditor and 
never a co-owner with the nondebtor spouse, no severance of the 
unities occurs until a sale is achieved. Properly, severance requires 
(1) a failure by the debtor to elect the entireties exemption and (2) 
sale of the debtor’s 50% share by the trustee to some buyer. After 
such a sale, the buyer and the nondebtor spouse are cotenants.559 
                                                                                                     
 556. See Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 B.R. 212, 218 (W.D. Mich. 2004) 
(“In short, the Court will apply the traditional approach approved by the Sixth 
Circuit in Grosslight . . . .”). 
 557. Id. at 217.  
 558. Id. at 218.  
 559. Technically, Spears was not ripe for appeal. The issue before Judge 
Hughes was the debtor’s claim that a tenancy by the entirety was totally exempt. 
The trustee objected to the exemption on the ground that bankruptcy constituted 
severance and that the debtor’s interest was changed into a tenancy in common. 
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3. Wholly or Partially Exempt? 
Often, exemption of a specific thing applies to certain creditors 
but not to others. In New York, for example, items listed in CPLR 
§ 5205(a)—wedding rings, stoves, family bibles, domestic animals 
worth less than $1,000, among other items—are exempt,560 except 
from judgments “for the purchase price of the exempt property” or 
judgments “recovered by a domestic, laboring person or 
mechanic.”561 These items listed seem to qualify as “exempt” under 
§ 522(b)(3), even though these items are not purely exempt. 
Rather, they are partially exempt—exempt from some creditors but 
not others. 
Tenancies by the entirety are the classic and by far the most 
important example of partially exempt property. The individual 
creditors of the debtor may not place liens on the tenancy by the 
entirety, but a creditor with a “joint” claim against both spouses 
may do so.562 Suppose at least one joint creditor has a claim against 
                                                                                                     
In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 798 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. 313 B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 2004). Judge Hughes neither sustained nor 
denied the trustee’s objection, but rather ordered Spears to state which of her 
creditors were individual and which were joint. Id. at 836. The exemption could 
not be adjudicated until the court determined whether joint creditors existed. 
Because this determination had not been made, the appeal seemed to have been 
most unripe and should never have been entertained by Judge Ensler. 
In any case, whatever Judge Hughes said about severance was dictum. The 
severance theory he presents was not necessary to the issue at hand (whether the 
trustee’s objection to the exemption had merit). The state of ownership following 
the exemption could have been left for the state courts to figure out. Being just a 
dictum, it seems unnecessary for the district court to have expressed its own 
opinion on the matter, much less entertain an appeal at all.  
Upon remand, Judge Hughes analogized the Michigan tenancy by the entirety 
with the solar system, himself with Galileo, and the higher court playing the role 
of the Catholic Church. See In re Spears, 314 B.R. 360, 361–62 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
2004) (“[Galileo] had hoped, perhaps naively, that its attack would be confined to 
logic and reasoned argument. The Church instead chose other tools, including 
insult and sarcasm.”). Judge Hughes does concede that “issues concerning 
bankruptcy law and tenancy by the entirety are insignificant motes next to the 
cosmological issues debated by Galileo and the Church.” Id. at 362. 
 560. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 5205(a) (McKinney 2011) (listing personal 
property exempt from application to the satisfaction of monetary judgments). 
 561. Id.; see also William T. Vukowich, Debtors’ Exemption Rights Under the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REV. 769, 805–06 (1980) (“The most common 
additional exceptions [from exemptions] are debts owed to laborers, debts for 
necessaries, and tort liabilities.”). 
 562. See Grosslight v. Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 776–77 (6th Cir. 1985) 
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the bankruptcy estate. Once inside the belly of the bankruptcy 
beast, is the tenancy by the entirety totally exemptible or partly 
exemptible or not exemptible at all, given the datum that joint 
creditors can obtain liens on the tenancy outside bankruptcy? How 
much of the entireties can the bankruptcy estate digest and how 
much must be expelled? Authority can be found for each of these 
positions. Only a few scattered lower court opinions assert that 
there is no exemption at all when a joint creditor exists.563 We 
ignore this outlier view for the moment and focus on the choice 
between total and partial exemption. 
Very early in the career of the Bankruptcy Code, the Fourth 
Circuit took the position that, if the tenancy by the entirety was 
exempt against an individual creditor of the spouse, it was also 
exempt against joint creditors as well.564 In other words, the 
tenancy by the entirety was totally, not partially, exempt. This rule 
was established in the Fourth Circuit’s affirmance of In re Ford,565 
an opinion that still remains influential today. The Ford court 
reasoned that, while the entireties was in the bankruptcy estate, 
the tenancy was exempt even from joint creditors.566 Although the 
                                                                                                     
(stating that joint creditors can reach entireties interests); Napotnik v. Equibank 
& Parkvale Sav. Ass’n, 679 F.2d 316, 320–21 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that a tenancy 
by the entirety was not exempt from  joint creditors).  
 563. See In re Anderson, 132 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (“If there 
is such a [joint] judgment creditor, there is a sufficient basis upon which this 
Court should sustain the objection to the claimed exemption of the jointly held 
property.”); In re Amici, 99 B.R. 100 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (sustaining objection 
to exemption where joint creditors were present). 
 564. In re Ford, 3 B.R. 559, 576 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (en banc) 
In order for joint creditors to execute upon entireties property, the 
husband’s interests must be joined with the interests of the co-tenant 
wife. As a result, the debtor’s interest in entireties property, standing 
alone, is unavailable to the joint creditor. Therefore, the interest of the 
debtor in tenancy by the entireties property which became an asset of 
the estate is exempt from process under Maryland law. Since the 
debtor’s interest in entireties property is exempt from process by both 
his individual and joint creditors under Maryland law, the debtor’s 
interest in property which he holds as a tenant by the entirety may be 
exempted from the estate by Mr. Ford under § 522(b)(2)(B). 
Aff’d sub nom. Greenblatt v. Ford, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 565. 3 B.R. 559 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Greenblatt v. 
Ford, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 566. Id. at 576. Judge Jeffrey Hughes reads Michigan’s 2004 legislation as 
aiming to achieve the Ford result in Michigan bankruptcy cases. The statute in 
question is a set of “bankruptcy only” exemptions which include “real property, 
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Ford opinion is in many respects a scholarly gem deserving close 
study,567 the metaphysics by which this particular deduction was 
achieved is peculiar and, eventually, overruled in subsequent 
Fourth Circuit opinions. 
The Ford argument for exemption against joint creditors 
depends on five premises. 
(1) Not the whole of the tenancy by the entirety but only the 
debtor’s 50% interest was property of the estate because it is 
property of the debtor (contrary to the Michigan fiction).568 This 
first point is proven by the full Craft-like treatment on a Maryland 
tenancy to find that the individual spouse (not the marital entity) 
had a future interest, as well as a present right of possession.569 
Most courts would come to disagree; they would find, explicitly or 
implicitly, that the whole of the entireties comes into the 
bankruptcy estate—not just 50%. The very coherence of entireties 
administration depends on the whole of the entireties coming into 
the bankruptcy estate.570 
                                                                                                     
held jointly by a husband and wife as a tenancy by the entirety, except that this 
exemption does not apply with regard to a claim based on a joint debt of the 
husband and wife.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5451(1)(o) (2012), invalidated by In 
re Raynard, 327 B.R. 623 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005). To my eye, this statute simply 
repeats the nonstatutory tenancy by the entirety exemption. But Judge Hughes 
seemed to assume that the Michigan legislature would not stoop to mere imbecilic 
repetition. According to Judges Hughes: 
The only logical interpretation of . . . § 600.5451(1)(o) is that it exempts 
all interests in property owned by the debtor as entireties property 
regardless of whether the debtor files for bankruptcy relief individually 
or jointly with his or her spouse but that the interest, once exempted, 
remains subject to execution by a pre-petition creditor if that creditor 
had a joint claim against both spouses. 
In re Raynard, 327 B.R. at 642 n.26, rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Raynard v. 
Rogers (In re Raynard), 354 B.R. 834 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2006). Judge Hughes ruled 
this to be an unconstitutional attempt of Michigan to overrule the effect of 
Bankruptcy Code § 522(c). On the meaning of § 522(c), see infra notes 620–625 
and accompanying text. 
 567. See Shaw v. Waldschmidt (In re Shaw), 5 B.R. 107, 109 (Bankr. M.D. 
Tenn. 1980) (“This court . . . commends the Maryland judges for what appears to 
be the definitive opinion . . . on entireties property.”). 
 568. See Ford, 3 B.R. at 575 (stating that only the debtor’s individual interest 
in the tenancy by the entirety became an asset of the bankruptcy estate). 
 569. See id. at 566 (“In addition to the debtor’s present right of survivorship, 
the court finds that the debtor has an undivided, indivisible present right to use, 
possession, and income from his tenants by the entireties property.”). 
 570. Infra notes 691–728 and accompanying text. 
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(2) This individual interest of the debtor could not be reached 
by the debtor’s individual creditors.571 
(3) But to joint creditors could levy on the whole of the 
entireties.572 
(4) If the joint creditors are to realize cash from the entireties, 
the individual interest of the debtor spouse “must be joined with 
the interests of the co-tenant wife.”573 That is to say, there must be 
a lawsuit by the joint creditor against the spouses jointly. 
(5) Because a joint creditor may not join the debtor in a lawsuit 
against the nondebtor spouse (thanks to bankruptcy’s automatic 
stay),574 “the debtor’s interest in entireties property, standing 
alone, is unavailable to the joint creditor.”575 
Ergo, the Ford court concludes, “[s]ince the debtor’s interest in 
entireties property is exempt from process by both his individual 
and joint creditors under Maryland law, the debtor’s interest in 
property . . . may be exempted from the estate” by the debtor.576 
Point (1) would seem to violate United States v. Rodgers,577 
and United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,578 both of which imply 
that property is the “whole thing,” not just the debtor’s interest in 
the thing. Because point (1) falls, point (5) falls as well. That is, the 
debtor’s individual interest and the non-debtor spouse’s interest 
can be joined—inside the bankruptcy proceeding. This is a point 
that the Fourth Circuit would soon assert, in contravention of 
Ford.579 The Ford court also unconvincingly grounded its point 
(5) in Maryland law when it is strictly bankruptcy’s automatic stay 
that prevents joinder of the husband to the foreclosure of wife’s 
                                                                                                     
 571. See Ford, 3 B.R at 575 (stating that “property held by the entirety is not 
subject to the claims of individual creditors of either spouse”).  
 572. See id. at 575 (“[I]n order for a joint creditor to execute upon entireties 
property to satisfy obligations due him from both spouses, the husband’s interest 
must be joined with his wife’s interest in entireties property.”). 
 573. Id. at 576.  
 574. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting “the commencement . . . of a 
judicial . . . proceeding against the debtor that . . . could have been commenced 
before the commencement of the case”). 
 575. In re Ford, 3 B.R. 559, 576 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. 
Greenblatt v. Ford, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1981).  
 576. Id. (emphasis added). 
 577. 461 U.S. 677 (1983). 
 578. 462 U.S. 198 (1983). 
 579. Infra notes 652–654 and accompanying text. 
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share under Maryland law. Inability to join is a federal, not a 
Maryland, result. We are strictly on the superegoic side of the 
Butner principle. 
In any case, the Ford court thought that the joint creditors 
were entitled to relief from the automatic stay. Once the stay was 
lifted, joint creditors could obtain liens under state law against the 
tenancy by the entirety.580 For this reason, Ford was a 
disappointment to individual debtors. Joint creditors had full 
access to the tenancy by the entirety after all, so long as the 
debtor’s discharge had not yet transformed the joint creditor into 
an individual creditor.581 According to Ford, only in bankruptcy 
was the tenancy by the entirety exempt against the joint 
creditors.582 
Ford was soon overruled sub silentio in Ragsdale v. Genesco, 
Inc.583 In this case, prior to bankruptcy, a joint creditor had 
succeeded in latching a judicial lien onto the entireties.584 
Thereafter, the husband and wife filed jointly for bankruptcy.585 In 
the bankruptcy, the debtors moved to avoid the judicial lien 
pursuant to § 522(f)(1).586 This adversary proceeding had merit, if 
Ford was good law. The judicial lien impaired an exemption, and 
therefore it should have been entirely avoided.587 But the Ragsdale 
                                                                                                     
 580. See Ford, 3 B.R. at 576 (“As in the past, a joint creditor may, prior to the 
discharge of the bankrupt spouse from the debt of such creditor and upon lifting 
of the stay, proceed to obtain judgment, execute or foreclose upon property 
owned . . . as tenancy by the entireties.”).  
 581. On the effect of discharge on joint creditors, see infra notes 604–653 and 
accompanying text. 
 582. See Ford, 3 B.R. at 576 (providing that the debtor’s interest in entireties 
property, standing alone, is unavailable to joint creditors).  
 583. Ragsdale v. Genesco, Inc., 674 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1982). 
 584. Id. at 278.  
 585. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) 
(a) A joint case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing 
with the bankruptcy court of a single petition under such chapter by 
an individual that may be a debtor under such chapter and such 
individual spouse . . . .    
(b) After commencement of a joint case, the court shall determine the 
extent, if any, to which the debtors’ estates shall be consolidated. 
 586. Ragsdale, 674 F.2d at 278. 
 587. See Lashley v. Fuhrer (In re Lashley), 206 B.R. 950, 953 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mo. 1997) (“In those instances when a creditor’s joint debt is secured by a security 
interest that is based on a judicial lien, the lien may be avoided to the extent that 
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court ruled that the judicial lien could not be avoided.588 This result 
contradicts (and overrules) the metaphysics of Ford. 
By way of background, § 522(f)(1) was added to the 
Bankruptcy Code because the Bankruptcy Code also added 
optional federal exemptions into the bankruptcy mix.589 Because 
these federal exemptions might be nonexempt under state law, the 
danger arose that federally exempt property would arrive in 
bankruptcy already encumbered by a judicial lien.590 In such a 
case, a choice of the federal exemption would seem to be defeated. 
Section 522(f)(1) allows the prepetition lien to be removed, thereby 
vindicating the federal exemption.591 But § 522(f) potentially 
applies to state exemptions as well. For example, in some states, a 
debtor must file notice of a homestead in the local real estate 
records.592 Section 522(f)(1) permits a homestead to be exempted if 
a joint creditor has obtained a lien before any such declaration 
could be filed by the debtor.593 
According to § 522(f)(1) (in its current version)594: 
[T]he debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the 
debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an 
                                                                                                     
it impairs a debtor’s allowed exemption.”). 
 588. Ragsdale, 674 F.2d at 279; accord Napotnik v. Equibank & Parkvale Sav. 
Ass’n, 679 F.2d 316, 316 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that a joint creditor’s pre-existing 
lien not avoidable); Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett), 14 B.R. 85, 85 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981) (same). But see In re Lashley, 206 B.R. at 950 (holding 
inexplicably that a joint creditor’s lien always impairs an exempt tenancy by the 
entirety). 
 589. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2), (d) (adding an enumerated list of exemptions). 
As is well known, § 522(b)(2) invites state legislatures to “opt out” of the federal 
exemption. 
 590 See generally Margaret Howard, Multiple Judicial Liens in Bankruptcy: 
Section 522(f)(1) Simplified, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 151, 152 (1993). 
 591. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (2012) (providing that “the debtor may avoid the 
fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien 
impairs an exemption”). 
 592. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.950(a)(1) (West 2018); see also Paul Epstein, 
Note, First-to-File, Last-in-Line: After Jones v. Haskett, Creditors Dragged Into 
Bankruptcy Lose the State Law Race of the Diligent, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 285 (1999) 
(discussing the required declaration of homestead in California). 
 593. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 298 (1991). 
 594. Section 522(f) was substantially amended in 1994 in ways not pertinent 
to the current discussion. On these amendments, see generally David Gray 
Carlson, Security Interests on Exempt Property After the 1994 Amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 57 (1996). 
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exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under 
subsection (b) . . .  if such lien is— 
 (A) a judicial lien . . . .595 
Under Ford, the avoidance theory was straightforward. The 
tenancy by the entirety was exempt from joint creditors.596 The 
joint creditor’s lien impaired the exemption that would have 
existed had there been no lien.597 Of course, once the lien was 
avoided, the joint creditor was entitled to relief from the automatic 
stay, so that the joint creditor could get a new lien. (This 
implication constitutes a major embarrassment for Ford’s logic: 
The judicial lien impairs the entireties exemption, but, once 
avoided, the lien can be re-established, so long as no discharge has 
intervened to change the joint creditor into an individual 
creditor.)598 
The Ragsdale court upheld the joint creditor’s prepetition 
lien.599 This implies either that (1) Ford is overruled or (2) the fact 
that the Ragsdales filed a joint petition under § 302 somehow 
                                                                                                     
 595. Section 522(f)(1) states that “the debtor may avoid the fixing of a 
lien . . . to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) 
(emphasis added). Yet, § 551 states: “Any transfer avoided under section 
522 . . . of this title . . . is preserved for the benefit of the estate but only with 
respect to property of the estate.” Id. § 551 (emphasis added). Does § 551 take away 
from the debtor what § 522(f)(1) gives? If so, § 522(f)(1) is a dead letter. Clearly, 
this is not the case. The lien avoided under § 522(f) encumbers exempt property—
property that is not in the bankruptcy estate. The italicized portion of § 551 
prevents the trustee from arguing that the trustee inherits the avoided lien from 
an individual creditor. 
 596. See In re Ford, 3 B.R. 559, 576 (Bankr D. Md. 1980) (en banc) (providing 
that the debtor’s interest in entireties property, standing alone, is unavailable to 
joint creditors), aff’d sub nom. Greenblatt v. Ford, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 597. See Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 310–11 (1991) (“To determine the 
application of § 522(f), they ask not whether the lien impairs an exemption to 
which the debtor is in fact entitled, but whether it impairs an exemption to which 
he would have been entitled but for the lien itself.”). 
 598. We may add that, in addition to the uselessness of total exemption, the 
Ford court overlooked the effects of Bankruptcy Code § 522(c), which prohibits 
most creditors from pursuing even partially exempt property after the bankruptcy 
proceeding ends. Infra notes 618–643 and accompanying text. 
 599. See Ragsdale v. Genesco, Inc., 674 F.2d 277, 279 (4th Cir. 1982) (“It is 
fundamental that a creditor holding a judgment against two or more persons 
jointly and severally may execute against real property owned by those same 
persons jointly or held by them as tenants by the entirety.”). 
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means that the tenancy by the entirety was not exempt.600 As we 
shall see, a subsequent Fourth Circuit ruling eliminated (2)601 and 
so, on modus tolens grounds, we are left with the conclusion that 
Ragsdale overrules Ford.602 The entireties is not entirely exempt in 
the bankruptcy proceeding from the claims of joint creditors.603 It 
is only partly exempt—where joint creditors exist. 
Partial exemption is the near universal assumption of the 
courts today. 
4. Cases Where Joint Creditors Are Present 
Outside of bankruptcy, joint creditors can place a lien on the 
Michigan-style entireties by obtaining a money judgment against 
both spouses. In a bankruptcy case, however, the joint creditors 
are automatically stayed from doing so.604 The stay might be 
lifted,605 but still the joint creditor faces two obstacles to this goal. 
First, should the debtor receive a discharge of the joint claim, the 
                                                                                                     
 600. See Napotnik v. Equibank & Parkvale Sav. Ass’n, 679 F.2d 316, 320–21 
(3d Cir. 1982) (disapproving Ford).  
 601. See Bunker v. Peyton (In re Bunker), 312 F.3d 145, 153 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(“[T]he presence of individual claims against either or both of the spouses in a 
joint case does not prevent the debtor spouses from exempting their interests in 
entireties property.”); infra notes 1181–1218 and accompanying text. 
 602. The court in Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re Sumy), 777 F.2d 921, 926 (4th 
Cir. 1985) observed that there is no indication in Ford that joint creditors existed. 
Therefore, Ford’s holding that the tenancy by the entirety is exempt from joint 
creditors was dictum. See id. (“[W]e decline to adopt this dicta [sic] from Ford.”). 
Ford draws praise in Sovran Bank, N.A. v. Anderson, 743 F.2d 223, 224 (4th Cir. 
1984) (finding Ford “persuasive, if not controlling”), but the case deals with lifting 
the stay for mortgage lenders, not with exemptions against joint unsecured 
creditors. 
 603. According to the Ragsdale court: 
[T]he Ragsdales assert that as joint debtors, they were entitled to claim 
as exempt from creditors, under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B), the equity in 
the residence held by them as tenants by the entirety . . . . The phrase 
“to the extent that such interest . . . is exempt from process under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law” is of decisive importance. If the 
Ragsdales’ residential real property could be reached to satisfy a state 
court judgment in Virginia, it could not be successfully claimed as 
exempt under Section 522(b)(2)(B). 
Ragsdale, 674 F.2d at 278–79. 
 604. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (2), (4), (5) (2012). 
 605. See id. § 362(d) (enumerating criteria for  granting relief from the stay). 
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joint claim becomes an individual claim against the nondebtor 
spouse.606 As an individual claim against the debtor spouse, the 
formerly-joint creditor loses the ability to obtain a lien against the 
marital estate.607 
It seems unfair that, because the debtor spouse gets a 
discharge, the nondebtor spouse suddenly enjoys immunity from 
suit. Bankruptcy Code § 524(e) states that “discharge of a debt of 
the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or 
property of any other entity for, such debt.”608 Yet, courts assume, 
nevertheless, that discharge of the joint debt turns the debt into 
an individual debt, which is unable to generate a lien on the 
tenancy by the entirety. 
Courts have gone so far as to refer to the discharge as a “legal 
fraud against the joint creditors.”609 Indeed, Michigan courts had 
ruled that a joint creditor was still a joint creditor even if the 
debtor spouse had earlier received a bankruptcy discharge. A Sixth 
Circuit panel in Harris v. Manufacturer’s National Bank of 
                                                                                                     
 606. To evade this conclusion, joint creditors following the debtor’s discharge 
tried to claim that the right of a joint creditor against the tenancy by the entirety 
is an in rem right against the tenancy by the entirety, in which case the joint 
claims were not discharged. This was soundly rejected in In re Paeplow, 972 F.2d 
730, 738 (7th Cir. 1992), though pre-Code law supported it. See generally First 
Nat’l Bank of Goodland v. Pothuisje, 25 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. 1940); William G. Craig, 
Jr., An Analysis of Estates by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 48 AM. BANK. L.J. 255, 
286–87 (1974); Note, The Effect of Bankruptcy on Estates by Entireties, 89 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1073, 1079–81 (1941) [hereinafter Note, Effect of Bankruptcy on Estates 
by Entireties]. 
 607. See generally Van Der Heide v. LaBarge (In re Van Der Heide), 164 F.3d 
1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 1999); Munos v. Dembs (In re Dembs), 757 F.2d 777, 781 (6th 
Cir. 1985); Craig, supra note 606, at 284–86. In addition, a discharge “operates as 
an injunction against the commencement . . . of an action . . . to collect any 
[discharged] debt as a personal liability of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). 
 608. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e).  
 609. In re Hunter, 970 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Sumy, 777 F.2d 
at 929 (“[I]f [the debtor] were to make full use of the code’s broad powers and 
protections for debtors, he might be able to commit the very ‘legal fraud’ that we 
have repeated condemned.”); In re James, 498 B.R. 813, 823–25 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 2013) (preventing legal fraud justified bringing entireties into the 
bankruptcy estate for the benefit of joint creditors); In re Townsend, 72 B.R. 960, 
967–68 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) (“A review of the inequitable consequences of 
exempting entireties property from the claims of joint creditors and the 
opportunity such an exemption creates for legal fraud only reinforces this Court’s 
conclusions.”). 
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Detroit610 found such holdings to be an unconstitutional assault on 
the federal concept of discharge. 
A discharge is defined in Bankruptcy Code § 524 as “an 
injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, 
the employment of process, or an act, to collect . . . any such debt 
as a personal liability of the debtor.”611 A few courts have suggested 
that, just as the automatic stay can be lifted, so the discharge stay 
can be lifted for the limited purpose of permitting the joint creditor 
to join the debtor spouse to a suit against the nondebtor spouse.612 
Hendrix v. Page (In re Hendrix)613 constitutes solid ground for 
such a practice. In Hendrix, the Seventh Circuit allowed a personal 
injury creditor to join a discharged debtor in a law suit for the 
technical purpose of impleading the debtor’s insurance company, 
which was obliged to cover any judgment the debtor might incur. 
The proviso was that the creditor could not collect from the 
discharged debtor—only from the insurance company.614 Indeed, 
Judge Posner suggested that the creditor could sue the debtor 
utterly without permission from a bankruptcy court, so long as the 
insurance company was only the ultimate payer.615 
 The nondebtor spouse is directly analogous to the insurance 
company. Neither the insurance company nor the nondebtor 
                                                                                                     
 610. 457 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 885 (1972). 
 611. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (a)(2) (2012).  
 612. See Grant v. Himmelstein (In re Himmelstein), 203 B.R. 1009, 1014 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (confirming the power to modify a discharge injunction); 
In re Snow, 38 B.R. 19, 21 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (same); Frank J. Spirak, Note, 
Estates by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 399, 414–19 
(1982) (describing the procedure for reopening a bankruptcy case for this 
purpose). 
 613. 986 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 614. See id. at 197 (stating that “because only the insurance company would 
be asked to pay anything, and hence such a suit would not infringe the 
discharge”). 
 615. See id. at 195 
But as to whether such an injunction extends to a suit only nominally 
against the debtor because the only relief sought is against his insurer, 
the cases are pretty nearly unanimous that it does not. . . . The 
reasoning is that a suit to collect merely the insurance proceeds and 
not the plaintiff’s full damages (should they exceed the insurance 
coverage) would not create a “personal liability of the debtor,” because 
only the insurance company would be asked to pay anything, and hence 
such a suit would not infringe the discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). 
(citations omitted). 
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spouse should be permitted to hide behind the debtor’s discharge 
to gain an advantage outside the bankruptcy proceeding. If this 
analogy were to be recognized, the “legal fraud” could easily be 
cured.616 Of course, this implies that Harris was wrongly 
decided.617 Application of Hendrix, therefore, authorizes the 
joinder of the discharged debtor without impinging on the debtor’s 
discharge, provided that the joint creditor never collects from the 
debtor beyond the amount of the (nonexempt) tenancy by the 
entirety.618 
Aside from the discharge, joint creditors in the bankruptcy 
have a second, independent difficulty. Once the tenancy by the 
entirety becomes exempt, § 522(c) of the Bankruptcy Code 
prevents the joint creditors from pursuing the tenancy by the 
entirety.619 According to § 522(c), “property exempted under this 
section is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the 
debtor that arose . . . before the commencement of the case.”620 
There follows a list of “liabilities” that retain the right to pursue 
exempt property in spite of § 522(c).621 Debts for taxes and 
domestic support obligations are excepted.622 So are secured 
                                                                                                     
 616. See In re Hunter, 970 F.2d at 302 (explaining that, prior to the 
Bankruptcy Code, “there was a potential for legal fraud against joint creditors of 
a husband and wife”).  
 617. See Harris, 457 F.2d at 631 (holding “that . . . satisfaction of joint 
judgment notwithstanding fact that husband’s provable debts have been 
discharged in bankruptcy directly conflicted with provisions and purpose of 
Bankruptcy Act”).  
 618. In re Hunter seems to agree with Harris, but the opinion is based on 
legislation in Indiana (now amended) that made the tenancy by the entirety 
exempt from joint creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding. See In re Hunter, 970 
F.2d 299, 299 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the Bankruptcy Code and Indiana 
state law, together, “ensure that no creditor—including a joint creditor—can 
reach any part of the entirety property exempted under the Indiana provision”). 
Today, the Indiana tenancy by the entirety is merely partially exempt, and so In 
re Hunter is no longer good law. See IND. CODE § 34-55-10-2(c)(5) (2012) (“The 
exemption under this subdivision does not apply to a debt for which the debtor 
and the debtor’s spouse are jointly liable.”); In re Cross, 255 B.R. 25, 37 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ind. 2000) (declaring the bankruptcy-only aspect of the Indiana exemption 
unconstitutional). 
 619. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(3)(B) (2012) (“[A]n interest as a tenant by the 
entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety 
or joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.”). 
 620. Id. § 522(c). 
 621. See id. § 522(c)(1)–(4) (providing a list of exemptions). 
 622. See id. § 522(c)(1) (explaining that “a debt as specified in paragraph (1)–
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claims,623 and claims for embezzlement and malicious torts where 
the victim is a federal depository institution’s regulatory agency 
acting as a receiver.624 The dog that does not bark here is the joint 
claim against a Michigan-style tenancy by the entirety. Joint 
creditors will find that they are not included on this list. 
Accordingly, per § 522(c), if exempt property is ever expelled from 
the bankruptcy estate, it is immune from all unsecured creditors, 
even if, under state law the creditor is invited to levy on the exempt 
asset. 
The leading case on the meaning of § 522(c) is Patriot Portfolio, 
LLC v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein).625 In Weinstein, the debtor 
claimed an ordinary homestead exemption (not a tenancy by the 
entirety).626 A creditor with a claim predating the acquisition of 
this real property obtained a judicial lien.627 Later, the debtor filed 
a homestead declaration and then filed for bankruptcy.628 The 
debtor successfully avoided the lien under § 522(f)(1), which was 
not controversial.629 More to our point, the creditor also complained 
that the Massachusetts homestead was not valid “for a debt 
                                                                                                     
(5) of section 523(a)” is exempt). The purpose of this exception is to preempt state 
law and to allow domestic creditors to levy on assets, even when state law says 
they cannot. Alan M. Ahart, The Liability of Property Exempted in Bankruptcy for 
Pre-Petition Domestic Support Obligations after BAPCPA: Debtors Beware, 81 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 233, 235–36 (2007). 
 623. The lien must escape avoidance by the trustee, however, under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(c)(2). 
 624. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(3) (explaining that debts “owed by an 
institution-affiliated party of an insured depository institution to a Federal 
depository institutions regulatory agency acting in its capacity as conservator, 
receiver, or liquidating agent for such institution” are also exempt). 
 625. Patriot Portfolio, LLC v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 164 F.3d 677, 682–
83 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 626. Id.  
 627. Id. 
 628. Id.  
 629. Id. The lien was voidable under the direct holding of Owen. Id. at 680. In 
Owen, the Supreme Court explained that one should wish away the lien and ask 
if, absent the lien, the property would be exempt. If the answer is “yes,” then the 
lien impairs the exemption and can be avoided under § 522(f)(1). See id. at 680 
(explaining the “two requirements” for avoiding a lien “under § 522(f)”). Dictum 
in Farrey also supports avoidance. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 298 
(1991) (stating that § 522(f)(1) “cannot be concerned with liens that fixed on an 
interest before the debtor acquired that interest”). 
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contracted prior to the acquisition of said estate of homestead.”630 
The First Circuit held that § 522(c) preempts Massachusetts 
law.631 Once the homestead was exempted, only those debts 
specifically listed as exceptions to § 522(c) may proceed against the 
property.632 Applying Weinstein, if a tenancy by the entirety is 
exempt and joint creditors have not been paid, joint creditors are 
barred from pursuing the entireties even if the debtor does not 
qualify for a discharge. 
The court in Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re Sumy)633 took this to 
be the meaning of § 522(c) in the context of a tenancy by the 
entirety.634 In effect, this means that Ford (the tenancy by the 
entirety is purely exempt) is overruled so long as the tenancy by 
the entirety remains in the bankruptcy estate, but once the 
tenancy is expelled from the estate under § 522(l), the Ford holding 
is resurrected.635 The exemption becomes absolutely good, even 
against the joint creditors. 
Thus, even if we apply Hendrix636 to solve the discharge 
problem, § 522(c) constitutes a separate insurmountable obstacle. 
Where joint creditors exist in a bankruptcy case, courts have 
developed two extra-statutory schemes for administering the 
tenancy by the entirety, both designed to vindicate joint creditor 
rights. But whether they succeed logically can be disputed. 
First, bankruptcy courts have entertained motions from joint 
creditors to lift the automatic stay, thereby permitting them to 
establish judicial liens under state law.637 This procedure works 
                                                                                                     
 630. Weinstein, 164 F.3d at 680; accord MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2011). 
 631. See Weinstein, 164 F.3d at 687 (“[W]e hold that Bankruptcy Code 
§§ 522(f) and 522(c) preempt the Massachusetts provision excepting preexisting 
liens and prior contracted debts from homestead protection.”). 
 632. See id. at 683 (explaining that state laws “yield to the overriding policies 
of § 522(c)”). 
 633. 777 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 634. See id. at 928 (“A debtor does not lose all benefits of § 522(b)(2)(B) when 
joint creditors are present.”). 
 635. See supra notes 565–576 and accompanying text (explaining the holding 
of Ford). 
 636. Hendrix v. Page (In re Hendrix), 986 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1993). Hendrix 
authorizes lifting the discharge injunction if not prejudicial to debtors. Supra 
notes 613–615 and accompanying text. 
 637. See Chippenham Hosp., Inc. v. Bondurant (In re Bondurant), 716 F.2d 
1057, 1057 (4th Cir. 1983) (affirming the lifting of the stay for a joint creditor). 
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only if it is accomplished prior to the discharge of the joint debt.638 
To prevent “legal fraud,” courts are authorized by the Supreme 
Court itself to delay the discharge until such time as the joint 
creditor has successively established a judicial lien on the tenancy 
by the entirety.639 This practice of delaying the discharge, highly 
developed under the 1898 Act,640 continues to be authorized in 
modern times,641 with some dissents.642 The trouble with lifting the 
stay is that § 522(c) still independently prevents the joint creditors 
from pursuing the exempt property.643 Indeed, lifting the 
automatic stay seems to be useless if § 522(c) prevents joint 
creditors from pursuing the property. 
Second, courts starting with Sumy644 (and with scant support 
from the Bankruptcy Code)645 permitted trustees, within the 
                                                                                                     
 638. See id. at 1058 (explaining that “when one spouse filed for bankruptcy, a 
joint creditor could, before discharge and on lifting of the stay, seek a judgment 
against the debtor and his spouse”). 
 639. See Lockwood v. Exch. Bank of Fort Valley, 190 U.S. 294, 294 (1903) 
(“Judgment of the District Court reversed and proceeding remanded, with 
direction to sustain the exemption and to withhold discharge to permit 
proceedings to be taken in the state court to subject the exempt property to the 
claims of the creditors.” (emphasis added)); Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765 
(4th Cir. 1931) (affirming “an order suspending the discharge in bankruptcy until” 
the creditor “had an opportunity to obtain judgement . . . against property held 
by . . . tenants by the entireties”). 
 640. See Benjamin C. Ackerly, Tenants by the Entirety Property and the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 706–09 (1980) (“Under the 
1898 Act,” in order to prevent unfairness “courts . . . delayed the bankrupt’s 
discharge until a joint judgment and lien could be obtained”). 
 641. See In re Bondurant, 716 F.2d at 1057 (affirming the lifting of the stay 
for a joint creditor); In re Oberlies, 94 B.R. 916, 922 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) 
(endorsing the “prior practice” which “was to timely move the bankruptcy court 
for an order staying the entry of discharge and for an order for relief from the stay 
for the purpose of levying execution on the entireties assets”). 
 642. See Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett), 14 B.R. 85, 90 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 1981) (“Therefore, it should no longer be the case that only those joint 
creditors who apply for a lift of stay be entitled to proceed against entireties 
property as was the case under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.”). 
 643. Supra notes 619–625 and accompanying text. 
 644. Sumy may have recently been undermined by Alvarez v. HSBC Bank 
USA, Natl. Assoc. (In re Alvarez), 733 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 2012). On this possibility, 
see infra notes 862–871 and accompanying text. 
 645. See Oberlies, 94 B.R. at 918–20 (“The trustee is obviously correct that no 
statutory basis exists for requiring the bankruptcy trustee to administer a 
separate estate within the context of the overall bankruptcy case for the benefit 
of joint creditors.”). Typically, courts like to plead, “Butner made me do it!” See In 
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bankruptcy proceeding, to sell the tenancy by the entirety for the 
sole benefit of the joint creditors.646 This innovation, not pursued 
under the 1898 Act,647 bypasses the problem of discharge, since the 
discharge affects collection activity outside bankruptcy.648 Does it 
bypass the obstacle of § 522(c)? The courts so assume § 522(c) says 
that “property exempted under this section is not liable 
during . . . the case.”649 An unstated assumption is that § 522(c) 
must be speaking of liability for claims during the case but outside 
bankruptcy.650 Within the bankruptcy proceeding, evidently, 
                                                                                                     
re Monzon, 214 B.R. 38, 46–47 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997) (relying on Butner and 
holding “that since the Debtor’s individual creditors could have never reached the 
TBE Property under state law, they cannot obtain a different and more favorable 
result in bankruptcy by sharing the distribution of these assets”). 
 646. See Williams v. Peyton (In re Williams), 104 F.3d 688, 688 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(stating that the “trustee had [the] right to sell property for benefit of joint 
creditors, despite debtor’s claimed exemption”); Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re Sumy), 
777 F.2d 921, 932 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that “the trustee may administer such 
property for the benefit of the joint creditors”); In re McRae, 308 B.R. 572, 572 
(N.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that “debtor’s non-exempt entireties property could be 
distributed only to the joint creditors of both spouses, and not to individual 
creditors”); Oberlies, 94 B.R. at 916 (“Thus, state law, which gives joint creditors, 
but only joint creditors, rights in entireties property, should prevail in this 
context.”). Oberlies documents occasions on which bankruptcy courts have 
preferred suppliers entitled to trust property “under the Perishable Agricultural 
Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a–499s.” Id. at 922. But these suppliers had in 
rem rights in the proceeds of vegetables, which the trustee could distribute under 
§ 725 directly to the supplier. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 725 (repealed 1936). These 
occasions do not seem analogous, in that joint creditor have no in rem rights 
against the tenancy by the entirety. Meanwhile, the court in Monzon documents 
preferences given to the proceeds of seats on the Chicago Board of Exchange. See 
Monzon, 214 B.R. at 47 (citing a Supreme Court decision which “held that 
distribution of the proceeds was governed by the CBOE Rules, despites the 
conflict with the” Bankruptcy Code). These creditors also had in rem rights—the 
ability to block alienation of the seat until they were paid in full. See Bd. of Trade 
of Chi. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 15 (1924) (ruling that “[t]he claims of the 
petitioners . . . must be satisfied before the trustee can realize anything on the 
transfer of the seat to the estate”). 
 647. Nor was it possible under the Ford holding. Supra notes 565–582 and 
accompanying text. 
 648. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012) (injunction against collections). 
 649. Id. § 522(c) (emphasis added).  
 650. See Cadle Co. v. Banner (In re Banner), 394 B.R. 292, 299 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 2008) (“[T]o the extent set forth in Section 522(c), the exempt property is 
placed beyond the reach of the debtor’s prepetition creditors outside of 
bankruptcy.” (emphasis added)). 
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§ 522(c) does not apply, and so the tenancy by the entirety can be 
made liable to joint claims.651 
Courts that permit administration of the entireties for the 
joint creditor contradict Ford, which held that the entireties was 
entirely (not partially) exempt. The effect of the Ford holding is to 
preclude selling the tenancy by the entirety within the bankruptcy 
estate. For the Michigan-style tenancy by the entirety, Ford made 
§ 363(h) a dead letter.652 Entireties administration therefore 
entails the view that these tenancies are partially (not wholly) 
exempt when joint creditors exist. 
5. The Trustee’s Subrogation to Joint Claims 
Under Sumy,653 a trustee must subrogate herself to the claims 
of the joint creditors and sell the entireties for their benefit; 
otherwise, the debtor’s discharge and/or § 522(c) forever prohibit 
the joint creditors from obtaining liens on the tenancy by the 
entirety.654 
                                                                                                     
 651. The Sumy court feared that an individual debtor will use § 522(f)(1) to 
flummox the joint creditors unless the trustee sells the tenancy by the entirety 
during the bankruptcy proceeding. Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re Sumy), 777 F.2d 
921, 930 (4th Cir. 1985). This does not seem a risk, however, if Ford is good law. 
To see why not, suppose the tenancy by the entirety is worth $100 if sold as a fee 
simple absolute. The debtor and his non-debtor spouse have sustained $80 in debt 
to a joint creditor. Suppose the creditor obtains relief from the stay and obtains a 
judgment against the tenancy by the entirety for $80. At this point, the debtor 
draws no benefit from § 522(f)(1) because the lien does not “impair the 
exemption.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). According to the formula of § 522(f)(2), we add 
the lien ($40, as prorated to the debtor’s interest), all other liens (which we 
assume to be none), and the amount the debtor’s exemption ($10) to get $50. See 
id. § 522(f)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (providing the method for calculating when “a lien shall 
be considered to impair and exemption”). We compare this to the value of the 
debtor’s 50% interest in the absence of any liens ($50). This calculation shows 
that there is no impairment of the exemption. Meanwhile, the joint creditor sells 
the tenancy by the entirety under state law and obtains $80. The debtor and his 
spouse each receive $10. See Raskin v. Susquehanna Bank (In re Raskin), 505 
B.R. 684, 689 (Bankr. D. Md. 2014) (explaining “the mandatory arithmetic for 
determining impairment”). 
 652. See In re Ford, 3 B.R. 559, 578 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (en banc) (explaining 
that “under Maryland common law, sections 363(h) and (j) do not become 
applicable or operative”), aff’d sub nom. Greenblatt v. Ford, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 
1981). 
 653. Supra notes 633–652 and accompanying text. 
 654. For a case denying that a trustee subrogates herself to claims of the joint 
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In general, the trustee subrogates to all the claims of a debtor’s 
unsecured creditors. On their behalf, § 544(a) states that the 
trustee has:  
[A]s of the commencement of the case . . . the rights and powers 
of . . .  
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time 
of the commencement of the case and that obtains at such 
time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all 
property on which a creditor on a simple contract could 
have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a 
creditor exists . . . .655 
Bankruptcy constitutes a transfer from the debtor to a 
bankruptcy trustee, but what kind of transfer? Section 544(a)(1) 
makes clear that the transfer is in the nature of the creation of a 
judicial lien.656 Liens are quantitative in nature.657 That is to say, 
the trustee’s hypothetical judicial lien is measured by the amount 
of unsecured claims that the trustee represents in the bankruptcy 
proceeding. Beyond this quantitative limit, the debtor owns the 
surplus (if any).658 
                                                                                                     
creditors, see Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Rodriguez), 402 
B.R. 299, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2009)  
But what of the joint creditors of Rodriguez, one might ask? There are 
existing joint creditors, and the interests of both Rodriguez and her 
spouse in the subject real estate are subject to their interests, aren’t 
they, by operation of I.C. 34-55-10-2(c)(5)? First, again, there cannot be 
a hypothetical bona fide purchaser from Rodriguez alone, necessary for 
the utilization of section 544(a)(3). Next, even if one were to 
hypothesize the use of 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1)—which allows the trustee 
to avoid a fiduciary of an interest of the debtor in property that is 
voidable by a creditor actually holding an allowed unsecured claim—
the result would be the same. . . .  [T]he mere holding of a joint debt 
does not a BFP make. A joint unsecured creditor could not avoid 
Countrywide’s mortgage under Indiana law. 
In fact, if Sumy is good law, the trustee can indeed subrogate to the unsecured 
claims of the joint creditors of the bankruptcy. 
 655. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2012). 
 656. See id. § 101(54)(A) (“The term ‘transfer’ means—(A) the creation of a 
lien . . . .”). 
 657. See id. § 101(37) (“The term ‘lien’ means charge against or interest in 
property to secure payment of a debt performance of an obligation.”). 
 658. See id. § 726(a)(6) (“Except as provided in section 510 of this title, 
property of the estate shall be distributed . . . to the debtor.”). 
THE FEDERAL LAW OF PROPERTY 115 
The way the hypothetical judicial lien works for exempt 
property is that, if the exemption is absolute and the debtor claims 
an item as exempt, the trustee’s judicial lien initially attaches to 
the exempt item (even though it never attaches under state law). 
The trustee’s hypothetical judicial lien is superegoic and Craft-like. 
If and when the exemption is successfully asserted, the lien ceases 
to encumber the item. Subrogation is useless, in such a case. For 
example, in Illinois, the family bible is entirely exempt—even if it 
has great value in the rare book market.659 The hypothetical 
judicial lien attaches but then is scrubbed clean from the pages of 
the Good Book—once the debtor, pursuant to § 522(l), fetches it out 
of bankruptcy’s hellfire.660 
The matter is different with regard to monetarily-limited 
exemptions. For example, suppose a New York debtor has a pet 
dog worth $1,100. Immediately upon filing a bankruptcy petition, 
Fido goes into the bankruptcy estate, pursuant to Bankruptcy 
Code § 541(a). There, leashlike, the trustee’s lien attaches to Fido. 
The debtor must fetch his pet back out pursuant to § 522(l), but 
Fido’s exemption is monetarily limited to $1,000.661 Only 10/11 of 
Fido comes bounding out of the bankruptcy estate and into the 
arms of his doting master. A 1/11 share stays within the 
bankruptcy estate, and by virtue of this 1/11 share, the trustee, 
subrogated to the unsecured creditors, has a judicial lien on the 
whole of Fido. Fido then may be sold by the bankruptcy trustee 
pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 363(b). The trustee must therefore 
give the debtor 10/11 of the cash, because 10/11 is proceeds of 
                                                                                                     
 659. See In re Robinson, 811 F.3d 267, 268 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that a first 
edition Book of Mormon worth $10,000 is exempt under Illinois law). 
 660. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (providing that the “[t]he debtor shall file a list of 
property that the debtor claims as exempt” and “[u]nless a party in interest 
objects, the property claimed as exempt of such a list is exempt”). 
 661. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 5205(a)(4) (2011) (providing that “domestic 
animals” are “exempt from application to the satisfaction of a money 
judgement . . . provided that the total value . . . does not exceed one thousand 
dollars”). 
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non-estate property.662 The trustee may realize 1/11 for the 
unsecured creditors, as this part of Fido is not exempt.663 
The tenancy by the entirety enjoys attributes of both the 
absolute exemption and the quantitatively limited exemption. The 
tenancy by the entirety is absolutely exempt from the claims of the 
individual creditors.664 Simultaneously, if joint creditors exist, the 
tenancy by the entirety is a limited exemption.665 Therefore, in 
cases where there are joint creditors, the trustee has a judicial lien 
on the tenancy by the entirety. The trustee may therefore sell to a 
buyer in fee simple absolute.666 
                                                                                                     
 662. See 11 U.S.C. § 725 (2012) (“[B]efore final distribution of property of the 
estate under section 726 . . . the trustee . . . shall dispose of any property in which 
an entity other than the estate has an interest . . . and that has not been disposed 
of under another section of this title”); Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 792 (2010) 
(“[T]he debtor will be guaranteed a payment in the dollar amount of the 
exemption.”). 
 663. See C.P.L.R. § 5205(A)(4) (exempting $1,000 interest in a domestic 
animal). 
 664. See In re McRae, 308 B.R. 572, 572 (N.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that 
“debtor’s non-exempt entireties property could be distributed only to the joint 
creditors of both spouses, and not to individual creditors”). 
 665. Supra notes 648–652. 
 666. Shall we then say that, pursuant to § 544(a)(1), the trustee may imagine 
that all the creditors are joint creditors? After all, it is a hypothetical lien we are 
imagining. It should be apparent that this move, if authorized, completely 
prevents the exemption of the Michigan-style tenancy by the entirety, because 
such tenancies are not exempt from joint creditors. See In re Eichhorn, 338 B.R. 
793, 796 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2006) (rejecting this move); see also Schlossberg v. 
Barney, 380 F.3d 174, 182 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a trustee could not 
hypothesize a tax debt to exploit the Craft opinion). The Schlossberg case 
emphasizes that Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)(1) and (2) require the bankruptcy 
trustee to imagine that she “extends credit to the debtor at the time of the 
commencement of the case,” 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(2), an odd restriction based on a 
congressional desire to overrule a disfavored pre-Code case. See generally In re 
Federal’s, Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977). Because the IRS never “extends 
credit,” but rather charges a tax, the trustee can never imagine that she has a tax 
lien. Schlossberg, 380 F.3d at 180–81. 
Yet Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(3) does indicate that this tenancy is at least 
partly exempt. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3). It is exempt “to the extent that such 
interest . . . is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” Id. 
§ 522(b)(3)(B). 
  Because the tenancy by the entirety is usually in real estate, account 
should be taken of § 544(a)(3), which provides that the trustee: 
[A]s of the commencement of the case, . . . the rights and powers of . . .  
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the 
debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be 
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The trustee’s interest in property is quantified by the amount 
of claims against the bankruptcy estate.667 For our purposes, the 
trustee, in part, subrogates to the individual creditors and, in part, 
to the joint creditors. Because the trustee subrogates to whatever 
joint creditors there are, she has a judicial lien on all the tenancy 
by the entirety.668 On this theory, the whole thing can be sold, even 
without any reference to § 363(h), which authorizes partition sales 
in preemption of state law.669 Just as the joint creditors can sell the 
whole outside the bankruptcy, when they get a lien, so the trustee 
can sell the whole inside the bankruptcy.670 
                                                                                                     
perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has 
perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, 
whether or not such a purchaser exists.  
Id. § 544(a)(3).  
In Michigan-like jurisdictions, a bona fide purchaser from the individual debtor 
spouse takes no part of the tenancy by the entirety, because the individual debtor 
owns no part of it. Supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. The marital owner, 
not the debtor spouse, is the owner of it. Supra notes 623–624 and accompanying 
text. But, if the nondebtor spouse were to join in the deed, the marital entity 
successfully conveys the tenancy. Supra notes 623–624 and accompanying text. 
May the trustee pretend to be a bona fide purchaser from both spouses? If so, 
the exemption disappears, since exemptions are good against creditors and are 
never good against purchasers such as mortgagees. Here, such an imaginary 
move is prohibited on the face of § 544(a)(3)—the trustee may only imagine 
herself to be a purchaser of real estate “from the debtor,” not from the debtor and 
a third person. Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Rodriguez), 402 
B.R. 299, 311 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2009); see also In re Sivley, 14 B.R. 905 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. 1981) (noting that where the debtor did not claim her tenancy by the 
entirety was exempt, the debtor could still claim the homestead even though the 
trustee was deemed a bona fide purchaser under § 544(a)(3)). 
 667. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (providing that the “estate is comprised of . . . all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property” (emphasis added)). 
 668. See In re Clifton, No. 09-02379-8-RDD, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2930, at *31–
32 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 19, 2013) (“Based on the solid Fourth Circuit precedents 
of Sumy and Bondurant, the Net Proceeds shall go to the sole joint creditor . . . .”). 
 669. See In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 815 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004) (“What is 
important to recognize about Section 363(b)(1) is that the authority granted to 
the bankruptcy trustee under that subsection is entirely independent of any 
authority granted to the trustee under Section 363(h).”), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 B.R. 212 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004). 
 670. A case that “has it backwards” is Grant v. Himmelstein (In re 
Himmelstein), 203 B.R. 1009 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996). See Olson v. Parker (In re 
Parker), 395 B.R. 12, 18 n.6 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008) (“Himmelstein, however, 
has it backwards.”). In Himmelstein, the debtor claimed personal property as a 
Florida tenancy by the entirety. Himmelstein, 203 B.R. at 1009. The husband filed 
for bankruptcy and the wife did not. Id. The husband’s trustee sought permission 
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to sell this stock on behalf of a joint creditor but was denied. Id. The Himmelstein 
court ruled that the trustee is only subrogated to joint creditors who already have 
judgments against both spouses. Id. Said the court, “because Florida law allows 
for a joint creditor holding a judgment to pursue entireties property, the Code will 
not shield the debtor who wishes to claim an exemption for such property.” Id. at 
1013. This is a confusion. Yes, a joint creditor must get a judgment as a 
pre-condition to getting a lien. See Lockwood v. Exch. Bank of Fort Valley, 190 
U.S. 294, 294 (1903) (holding that the “[j]udgment of the District Court reversed 
and proceedings remanded, with direction to sustain the exemption and to 
withhold discharge to permit proceedings to be taken in the state court to subject 
the exempt property to the claims of the creditors” (emphasis added)). The trustee 
represents unsecured creditors in general, whether they have judgments or not. 
So, the trustee is likewise subrogated to any unsecured joint creditor, whether 
reduced to judgment or not. See In re Sefren, 41 B.R. 747, 748 (Bankr. D. Md. 
1984) (concluding that “[t]he debtor need not have joint, judgment creditors for 
the trustee to defeat his claim of entireties exemptions”). 
The Himmelstein court misconceived the trustee’s strong arm power. According 
to the court, “the trustee is given the powers of a creditor who holds a judgment 
at the time of the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).” Himmelstein, 203 B.R. 
at 1013. The citation to § 544(b) seems to be a scrivener’s error. According to 
§ 544(b)(1): “[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in 
property . . . that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an 
unsecured claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2012). Nothing here requires the creditor 
in question to have a judgment. Id. Surely the court meant to cite § 544(a), which 
gives to the trustee: 
the rights and powers of . . .  
(1) a creditor . . . that obtains, at such time . . . a judicial lien on all 
property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained 
such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists . . . .  
Id. § 544(a)(1). If I am right about the slip of the pen, the court misstates the 
trustee’s power under § 544(a)(1). Under that provision, the trustee is deemed to 
have a judicial lien. Id. This lien is quantified by the amount of individual and 
joint claims, whether or not they have been reduced to judgment. Id. 
The Himmelstein result (no sale for the benefit of joint creditors allowed) is in 
fact a disaster for the joint creditors. If the trustee in Himmelstein is unable to 
sell the tenancy by the entirety at all, then presumably the property will be 
abandoned by the trustee. See id. § 554(a) (“After notice and hearing, the trustee 
may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that 
is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.”). Once abandoned, being at 
least partly exempt, § 522(c) prevents the joint creditors from pursuing this 
property, and so the debtor obtains more exemption than she deserved. See id. 
§ 522(c) (explaining that “property exempt under this section is not liable during 
or after the case”). 
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6. The Debtor’s Interest in the Proceeds of the Trustee’s Sale 
Where joint creditors exist, the trustee may, within the 
bankruptcy proceeding, sell the whole of the tenancy by the 
entirety.671 What is controversial is disposition of the proceeds. 
First, to the extent the proceeds equate with the individual 
creditors of the debtor spouse, these proceeds are exempt and 
belong to the debtor alone.672 This is so in spite of Justice Brennan’s 
dam-bursting theory in United States v. Rodgers.673 It will be 
recalled that Joerene Ingram’s home was community property 
liable for her ex-husband individual debts, but she also had a right 
to veto a sale that would benefit of those creditors.674 Joerene 
herself owed a small tax, which authorized the IRS to sell her half 
of the property.675 Justice Brennan ruled the IRS could have all the 
proceeds: “Moreover, once the dam is broken, there is no 
reason . . . not to allow the Government also to collect on the 
individual debt of Donald Ingram out of that portion of the proceeds 
of the sale representing property interests properly liable for the 
debt.”676 
Does this dam-bursting theory mean that the trustee may 
retain 100% of the proceeds from the sale, thereby depriving the 
debtor spouse of any benefit from the exemption? After all, many 
states hold that the tenancy by the entirety may not be reached by 
the individual creditor, but once the tenancy by the entirety is sold, 
the cash proceeds are not held in the entirety and are the 
individual property of the debtor.677 In general, cash is not exempt 
                                                                                                     
 671. See Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re Sumy), 777 F.2d 921, 932 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that, “to the extent the debtor and the nonfiling spouse are indebted 
jointly, property owned as tenant by the entireties may not be exempted from an 
individual debtor’s bankruptcy estate under § 522(b)(2)(B) and the trustee may 
administer such property for the benefit of the joint creditors”). 
 672. See id. at 928 (explaining that “entireties property is not exempt from 
process to satisfy joint claims in Maryland”). 
 673. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983); see also supra note 290 
and accompanying text (referencing and discussing Justice Brennan’s dam 
theory). 
 674. Supra notes 275–282 and accompanying text. 
 675. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 688 (“In addition, in 1973, the Service made an 
assessment against both Donald and Joerene in the amount of $283.33 plus 
interest, relating to their joint income tax liability for 1971.”). 
 676. Id. at 712.  
 677. Such a result would follow in any jurisdiction where the tenancy by the 
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property under state law.678 Other states hold that, unless the 
spouses intend otherwise, the cash proceeds are held by the 
entireties, just as the real property was.679 But where a trustee sells 
pursuant to a hypothetical judicial lien, it should be apparent that 
the trustee never intends that the tenancy by the entirety be 
perpetuated in cash form. The trustee’s fiduciary duty to the 
unsecured creditors requires that the trustee favors them over the 
welfare of the spouses. 
Ultimately, the dam-bursting theory fails because the 
parameters of exemptibility are set as of the day of the bankruptcy 
petition. Recall that § 522(b)(3)(B) exempts a tenancy by the 
entirety “in which the debtor had, immediately before the 
commencement of the case . . . to the extent such interest . . . is 
exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.”680 
Post-bankruptcy changes of status cannot be considered.681 
True it may be that cash proceeds of exempt property are not 
necessarily exempt under state law.682 The debtor, however, 
obtains the proceeds from a bankruptcy sale regardless of state 
law. The cash measured by total value minus the joint claims is 
proceeds of the entireties, but not proceeds of the bankruptcy 
                                                                                                     
entireties is not permitted for personal property. See Phipps, supra note 263, at 
25 (stating that a minority of states do not permit personal property to be held by 
the entireties). On whether a cash surplus from a foreclosure sale is held by the 
entireties, see infra notes 1168–1184 and accompanying text. 
 678. For example, although income streams are mentioned in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
§ 5205, cash as such is not mentioned. Often cash proceeds of other exempt 
property is protected. See generally David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money 
Judgment (Part Two: Judicial Liens on New York Personal Property), 83 ST. 
JOHNS L. REV. 43, 207–26 (2009) [hereinafter Carlson, Critique of Money Part 
Two]; Darrell W. Dunham, Tracing the Proceeds of Exempt Assets in Bankruptcy 
and Nonbankruptcy Cases, 3 S. ILL. U. L.J. 317 (1978). 
 679. See Ross v. Maryland (In re Ross), 475 B.R. 279, 286 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2012) 
(noting that “[i]n the District of Columbia, proceeds of a sale of entirety real 
property retain that entirety character (unless both spouses agree otherwise”); 
Oliver v. Givens, 129 S.E.2d 661, 663 (Va. 1963) (same). 
 680. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 681. See id. (explaining that the exemption applies to “any interest in 
property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the 
case”). 
 682. See Carlson, Critique of Money Part Two, supra note 678, at 208–09 
(noting that, in New York, the real estate provision, but not the personal property 
provision, “safeguards the cash proceeds of real estate”). 
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estate.683 Prior to the imagined sale, the property has already been 
exempted—partially expelled from the bankruptcy estate.684 What 
gets expelled is the quantitative share measured by total value 
minus the joint claims. What is not exempted is the part of the 
entireties equating with the joint claims. The trustee has a lien on 
the whole for the joint claims—that is why there was a sale in the 
first place.685 When the trustee sells the whole, only part of the 
cash received is proceeds of property of the bankruptcy estate.686 
This is the amount associated with the joint claims, to which the 
trustee is subrogated.687 Part of the cash, however, is proceeds of 
the debtor’s individual property.688 That is, the debtor has already 
exempted part of the bankruptcy estate and the cash generated 
from the sale of this property is not proceeds of property of the 
bankruptcy estate, but is rather proceeds of individual property 
outside the bankruptcy estate.689 For this reason, the dam-bursting 
theory of Rodgers is inapplicable in bankruptcy. 
7. Priority for the Joint Creditors 
The trustee may subrogate herself to the claims of the joint 
creditors.690 Does this subrogation translate into a priority for the 
joint creditors when the tenancy by the entirety is sold? I think the 
answer is yes, but before I say why, I will acknowledge some 
seemingly powerful reasons suggesting otherwise. 
                                                                                                     
 683. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (providing that proceeds of the bankruptcy 
estate are part of the bankruptcy estate). 
 684. See id. § 522(b) (“[A]n individual debtor may exempt from property of the 
estate . . . before the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the 
entirety . . . to the extent such interest . . . is exempt from process under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law . . . .”). 
 685. Supra note 670 and accompanying text. 
 686. See In re Ginn, 186 B.R. 898, 903 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (explaining that 
the proceeds from the “sale of Debtors’ entireties property” is given to “the joint 
creditors, but any remaining equity would be retained by Debtors as entireties 
property”). 
 687. Supra note 670 and accompanying text. 
 688. See In re Ginn, 186 B.R. at 903 (stating that “such proceeds may be 
exempted from the bankruptcy estate”). 
 689. See id. at 903 (explaining that “any remaining equity would be retained 
by Debtors as entireties property”). 
 690. Supra note 670 and accompanying text. 
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It may be protested that, by reserving within the bankruptcy 
proceeding the tenancy by the entirety for the joint creditors alone, 
courts in effect treat the joint creditors as secured creditors (junior, 
of course, to any perfected mortgage against the tenancy by the 
entirety).691 One may complain that this preference is nowhere 
sanctioned by the Bankruptcy Code.692 
One may also complain that subrogation to a claim is 
unrelated to the priority of the claimant. Witness the 
much-overlooked Bankruptcy Code § 507(d): “An entity that is 
subrogated to the rights of a holder of a claim of a kind specified in 
subsection (a)(1), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(7), (a)(8) or (a)(9) of this section 
is not subrogated to the right of the holder of such claim to priority 
under such subsection.”693 The section indicates that a subrogee 
cannot use priority status to leap over the unsecured nonpriority 
creditors in the distribution process. That is precisely what the 
trustee hopes to do when she subrogates to the joint creditors and 
produces for them a high priority. 
Furthermore, the situation has been compared to a famous 
subrogation case—Moore v. Bay (In re Estate of Sassard & 
Kimball, Inc.).694 To illustrate the concept of Moore v. Bay, suppose 
a debtor conveys property worth $1 million to X. Under state law, 
a creditor, C, claims $50, as to which the $1 million conveyance is 
fraudulent. No other creditor has an avoidance right. Under 
Bankruptcy Code § 544(b)(1),695 the trustee may subrogate to C’s 
                                                                                                     
 691. For example, in Monzon, joint creditors were preferred even though they 
never filed proofs of claim. Secured creditors don’t have to file proofs of claims. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d)(2) (2012) (providing that for a “secured claim,” “failure of 
any entity to file a proof of such claim” does not destroy the claim). So the joint 
creditors were being treated as secured creditors. 
 692. See Lawrence Kalevitch, Some Thoughts on Entireties in Bankruptcy, 60 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 141, 148 (1986) (“[T]he Code section granting the exemption says 
nothing about the proceeds distribution where the exemption is properly 
denied. . . . [T]he Code explicitly passes non-exempt property into the estate and 
explicitly lays forth distribution rules nowhere specially providing for the joint 
creditor.”). 
 693. 11 U.S.C. § 507(d). For a case applying § 507(d), see Aetna Cas. & Surety 
Co. v. Clerk, U.S. Bankr. Court (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 89 F.3d 942, 951 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (providing an “interpretation of § 507(d)”). 
 694. Moore v. Bay (In re Estate of Sassard & Kimball, Inc.), 284 U.S. 4 (1931). 
 695. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (providing that “the trustee may avoid any of 
an interest of the debtor in property . . . that is voidable under applicable law by 
a creditor holding an unsecured claim”). 
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right to avoid the conveyance.696 But the trustee’s recovery is not 
limited to $50. The trustee may recover the entire $1 million 
conveyance. Furthermore, C has no special priority as to this 
recovery. Rather, the entire $1 million is tossed into the 
bankruptcy estate where C has a mere pro rata share of the 
creditor, the same as all the creditors who had no avoidance 
right.697 
Moore v. Bay roughly supports the idea that the proceeds of 
the claim to which the trustee is subrogated do not belong to the 
subrogee. Rather, they belong to the bankruptcy estate. In Chapter 
7, distribution is governed by § 726(a).698 According to § 726(a)(2), 
unsecured creditors who have timely filed proofs of claim share 
equally.699 Therefore, it is maintained, an amount equal to the joint 
claims can be taken from the tenancy by the entirety and put into 
the bankruptcy estate where individual and joint creditors (who 
have timely filed proofs of claim) share on a pro rata basis.700 
In addition, it has been noted that, in § 726(c), Congress 
enacted a special distribution rule concerning community property 
                                                                                                     
 696. See id. § 544(b)(1) (providing that “the trustee may avoid any transfer of 
an interest of the debtor in property . . . that is voidable under applicable law by 
a creditor holding an unsecured claim”). 
 697. David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Conveyances 
and Equitable Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 162 (2003). Moore v. 
Bay is related to the idea that a fraudulent conveyance is no conveyance, and so 
the world should be remade as if the conveyance never occurred. See Moore v. Bay, 
284 U.S. at 4 (explaining that “[t]he trustee in bankruptcy gets the title to all 
property which has been transferred by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors”). In 
fact, a fraudulent conveyance is a conveyance to a third party, and fraudulent 
conveyance law invites creditors of the debtor to place judicial liens on third party 
property. Carlson, Fraudulent Transfers, supra note 443, at 162. 
 698. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2012). 
 699. See id. § 726(a)(2) (providing the procedure for “payment of any allowed 
unsecured claim”). 
 700. See In re Owens, 400 B.R. 447, 455 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009) (“To the 
extent that the law of Pennsylvania concerning tenancies by the entirety does 
apply, however, it is preempted by the distribution scheme set forth in the 
Bankruptcy Code.”); In re Boyd, 121 B.R. 622, 625 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) 
(applying this concept), rev’d sub nom. Boyd v. Strickland, TCA 90-40132-WS 
(N.D. Fla, Nov. 1, 1991); Julio E. Castro III, Note, Florida’s Treatment of Entirety 
Property: Do Unsecured Joint Creditors Lose the Benefit of Their Bargain or 
Achieve a Higher Status than Specifically Provided by the Bankruptcy Code?, 45 
FLA. L. REV. 275, 298–300 (1993) (claiming that “if a joint creditor exists, the 
debtor’s whole interest in entireties property becomes available to satisfy all 
creditors’ claims”). 
124 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2018) 
between married persons. That it did not do so in connection with 
the tenancy by the entirety arguably proves that Congress 
intended equality of distribution between joint and individual 
creditor.701 This is what is called a “knew how to” argument702: Our 
omnicompetent Congress knew how to write a special distribution 
rule for community property and so it must have knowingly 
intended no special rule for tenancies by the entirety. 
Also, as Judge Hughes learnedly wrote in In re Raynard,703 
suppose in a Michigan case the debtor eschews the entireties 
exemption, but instead chooses the federal exemptions, which give 
a monetarily limited exemption on residences.704 As a result, the 
trustee would sell the residence if the price received exceeded the 
monetary limit. “As for the remainder of the proceeds, it is clear 
that the trustee would distribute the remainder to all creditors, not 
just joint creditors.”705 This point serves to remind us that the joint 
creditors are not secured creditors claiming the tenancy by the 
entirety as collateral.706 
                                                                                                     
 701. In re Raynard, 327 B.R. 623, 636 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005)  
The detailed procedure set forth in § 726(c) establishes not only that 
Congress was aware of the special issues raised in connection with 
marital property, but also that Congress was capable of enacting 
special procedures to address these issues when it determined that 
such procedures were necessary. Consequently, it is fair to ask why 
Congress did not adopt another set of special procedures with respect 
to non-exempt entireties property under § 522(b)(2)(B), if in fact 
Congress intended that result.  
Rev’d sub nom. Raynard v. Rogers (In re Raynard), 354 B.R. 834 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 
2006); see also In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 824 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004) (noting 
the same), rev’d sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 
2004). 
 702. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Supreme 
Court, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 574 (1988) (explaining the “knew how to” theory). 
 703. 327 B.R. 623 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Raynard v. Rogers 
(In re Raynard), 354 B.R. 834 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2006). 
 704. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2012) (providing an exemption of a maximum 
“$23,675” for “real property”). 
 705. In re Raynard, 327 B.R. at 637. But see generally In re Clifton, No. 
09-02379-8-RDD, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2930 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 19, 2013) 
(favoring the joint creditors over priority tax claim under these circumstances). 
 706. Later, Judge Hughes would deny that Butner dictates the priority for 
joint creditors because joint creditors have no “property rights” in the tenancy by 
the entirety. See In re Raynard, 327 B.R. at 638 (“The reason why joint creditors 
enjoy the position that they do with respect to entireties property is not because 
they themselves have an interest in the entireties estate. Rather, it is unique 
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In spite of these reasons, the correct answer is that the trustee 
takes that proceeds for the exclusive benefit of the joint claims. 
This follows from a heretofore unacknowledged allocation decision 
that any sale of the entireties implies. If the wrong allocation 
decision is made, then the nondebtor spouse is forced to subsidize 
the creditors of the debtor spouse. Presumably, we should not rob 
Peter to pay the creditors of Paul. 
To illustrate, suppose the tenancy by the entirety is worth 
$100. Only one spouse is bankrupt. The debtor owes $80 to joint 
creditors and $80 to individual creditors. Suppose also that there 
are $10 in non-exempt assets in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. 
Because she is subrogated to the joint creditors, the trustee is 
entitled to sell the whole. The following allocation decisions arise. 
Once the sale is accomplished and $100 is realized, shall we give 
the nondebtor spouse 50% off the top and give the other 50% to the 
joint creditors? If so, the joint creditors are short $30 and must 
compete with the individual creditors of the debtor for the 
non-exempt assets. This view assumes the Ford holding, that only 
the debtor’s 50% interest is in the bankruptcy estate.707 Or shall 
we give $80 off the top to the joint creditors (because the nondebtor 
spouse owes $40 of this) in which case the nondebtor spouse 
obtains $10 and the debtor receives $10, because this comports 
with his exemption? The individual creditors of the debtor now do 
not compete with the joint creditors, and so the individual creditors 
are better off. The nondebtor spouse is not harmed because, after, 
all the nondebtor spouse owes $40 to those creditors, and we have 
just given the nondebtor’s $40 to the joint creditors. This view 
depends upon the 100% of the entireties coming in the bankruptcy 
                                                                                                     
character of the debtor’s property in the entireties estate that gives a joint creditor 
its advantage.”). Judge Hughes also asserted that it cannot be: 
Seriously believed that a joint creditor’s ability to levy is in fact a 
property right. Otherwise, [one is] compelled to explain why unsecured 
creditors generally should not be treated as having property rights [in 
a fee simple absolute] simply because each of those creditors had the 
ability to levy . . . prepetition. Moreover, the court would have to 
explain why a joint creditor should not be able to demand the 
establishment of a similar separate estate for the administration of its 
supposed property rights when the debtor with an interest in entireties 
property chooses the federal exempts under Section 522(b)(1) instead.  
Id. at 639. 
 707. Supra notes 565–576 and accompanying text. 
126 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2018) 
estate for the benefit of the joint claims, contrary to what the Ford 
court assumed. 
Within each branch of the above-described decision tree we 
have a sub-issue. Shall we prefer the joint creditors to the extent 
of the tenancy by the entirety, or, in the style of Moore v. Bay, deny 
any priority to the joint creditors and put the money into the 
bankruptcy estate where § 726(a)(2) imposes equality of 
distribution between the joint and individual creditors?708 
Because of the allocation decision described above, the trustee 
must pay all proceeds to the joint creditors, even though this 
allocation prefers the joint claims over the individual claims. 
Otherwise, the nondebtor spouse will be forced to subsidize a 
recovery for the debtor’s individual creditor—an anomalous result. 
Individual creditors are supposed to gain no benefit from the 
tenancy by the entirety. Yet the Moore v. Bay position implies that 
they will benefit. 
The following example shows why the nondebtor spouse 
subsidizes the individual creditors if the joint claim is not 
preferred. As before, the spouses own a tenancy by the entirety 
worth $100, against which there are $80 in joint claims (JC). The 
debtor spouse (D) files for bankruptcy and claims the tenancy by 
the entirety as exempt. Given the $80 in joint claims, the 
exemption is worth $10 (50% of the surplus) to the debtor D. 
Imagine further that D owes $80 in individual claims (IC) and also 
has $10 in nonexempt assets. Assume that the nondebtor spouse 
(W) is solvent. Assume, heroically, a world of no transaction costs. 
Finally, assume that the trustee has sold the tenancy by the 
entirety for $100. 
How shall the proceeds be allocated? There are four logical 
possibilities. 
1. Give $50 to W off the top. Give $40 to the JCs, $10 to D and 
$10 to W. Here, we assume that only the debtor’s interest in the 
entireties (not the whole of it) goes into the bankruptcy estate. The 
whole is nevertheless sold under authority of Bankruptcy Code 
§ 363(h).709 W is not bankrupt and so deserves 50% of the proceeds 
                                                                                                     
 708. See Carlson, Fraudulent Transfers, supra note 443, at 162 (noting that, 
“[a]ccording to Moore v. Bay, a bankruptcy trustee is subrogated to an individual 
creditor’s fraudulent transfer rights, but these rights must be used for the benefit 
of all creditors equally”). 
 709. 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (2012). 
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off the top.710 If this is done, the JCs will be short $40. This they 
collect immediately from W, who is liable on this debt.711 Because 
the JCs have collected $40 from D’s share of the tenancy by the 
entirety and $40 from W’s assets, the JCs are paid $80. Meanwhile, 
the ICs receive the $10 in non-exempt assets. The nondebtor W 
receives $50 - $40 = $10. 
2. Give $80 to the JCs off the top, $10 to D and $10 to W. Here, 
we assume that all of the tenancy by the entirety goes into the 
bankruptcy estate, against which the joint creditors have a 
priority. The JCs receive all $80. D gets the exemption amount of 
$10 and W gets $10 under § 363(j). This disposes of the tenancy by 
the entirety proceeds. Shut out from the tenancy proceeds, the ICs 
receive the $10 in nonexempt “other” assets. 
Note that, in the first and second scenarios, where the JCs 
receive the proceeds of the non-exempt portion of the entireties, 
the results are exactly the same. The ICs get $10 and the 
nondebtor W gets $10. It does not matter whether W gets $50 or 
$10 from the proceeds of the sale. The JCs successfully collect from 
W if they do not receive the money directly from D’s trustee. 
3. Give W $50 off the top. Give the bankruptcy estate $40, 
representing the amount of D’s share of liability to the JCs. All 
creditors of D share equally in the bankruptcy estate.712 In this case, 
the JCs have not been paid. The JCs, in our cost-free universe, do 
not wait around for a dividend from D’s bankruptcy. They 
                                                                                                     
 710. See id. § 363(j) (“After a sale of property to which subsection . . . (h) of 
this section applies, the trustee shall distribute to the debtor’s spouse . . . and to 
the estate, the proceeds of such sale, . . . according to the interests of such 
spouse.”); Garner v. Strauss (In re Garner), 952 F.2d 232, 245 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(calling for a 50% payment “of the cash received” to comply with the intent of the 
Code”); In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 822, 831 n.42 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004) (noting 
that “the Chapter 7 trustee would reduce gross value of the subject property by 
the amount of liens and encumbrances and divide the remainder in half” 
(emphasis added)), rev’d sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 B.R. 212 
(W.D. Mich. 2004). 
 711. See In re Spears, 308 B.R. at 827 (“[A] creditor’s effort to proceed in this 
manner would not be impeded by the automatic stay imposed by the debtor’s 
bankruptcy.”). 
 712. See Van Der Heide v. LaBarge (In re Van Der Heide), 164 F.3d 1183, 
1185 (8th Cir. 1999) (providing an analogous fact pattern); In re Garner, 952 F.2d 
at 236 (noting that “[s]ubsection (h) of Section 363 . . . permits the sale of both the 
bankrupt estate’s interest and the interest of any co-owner in tenancy by the 
entirety property”); Brown v. Eads (In re Eads), 271 B.R. 371, 376 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 2002) (applying the analysis of In re Garner). 
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immediately collect $80 from W. W therefore has a $40 contribution 
claim in D’s bankruptcy.713 The bankruptcy estate now totals $50—
the extraneous $10 in other assets and the $40 that was not paid 
to the JCs. The ICs, who claim 2/3 of this, get $33.33. This is a 
$23.33 improvement over scenarios 1 and 2. W, who gets 1/3, takes 
$16.66 from the bankruptcy estate. Thus, W has subsidized the 
ICs. W’s situation is $50 - $80 + $16.67 = - $13.33. W received $10 
in scenarios 1 and 2, but now W is $23.33 worse off. The sum $23.33 
equates exactly with the subsidy that the ICs received. 
4. Give the bankruptcy estate $80, representing the amount of 
JCs. Give $10 to D as an exemption and $10 to W. All creditors of 
D share equally in the bankruptcy estate. In this case, we honor the 
“equal distribution” rule of § 726(a)(2).714 First, because W is liable 
to the JCs for $80, W pays the JCs in full. W thereafter has a $40 
contribution claim against D and so is now a creditor in W’s 
bankruptcy.715 The claims against the $90 bankruptcy estate are 
the ICs ($80) and W ($40). The ICs obtain 2/3 of $90, or $60. The 
ICs therefore have gained $50, compared to scenarios 1 and 2. The 
gain comes at the expense of W. W’s bankruptcy dividend is 1/3 of 
$90, or $30. So, W’s situation is $10 - $80 + $30 = - $40. This is $50 
worse than the scenarios 1 and 2 provided.716 
These examples prove the counter-intuitive result that failing 
to pay the joint creditors 100 cents on the dollar from the sale of 
the tenancy by the entirety forces the nondebtor spouse to 
subsidize the recovery of the debtor’s individual creditors. This 
subsidy comes about because the nondebtor spouse is 100% liable 
to the joint creditor, but is entitled only to claim 50% in 
contribution. The joint creditors would have claimed $80 in D’s 
bankruptcy, but W can only claim $40 in reimbursement from D’s 
bankruptcy estate.717 
                                                                                                     
 713. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(2) (providing that “[a] claim for reimbursement or 
contribution of such an entity . . . shall be allowed”). 
 714. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2). 
 715. Id. § 502(e)(1). 
 716. The court in McRae, 308 B.R. 572 (N.D. Fla. 2003), favored priority for 
the joint creditors because otherwise they would have to share with the individual 
creditors who had no access to the tenancy by the entirety. Id. at 578. But, this 
overlooks the fact that the joint creditors have ready access to the nondebtor’s 
spouse other assets. If these exist, it is the nondebtor spouse who subsidizes the 
individual creditors, not the joint creditors. 
 717. The court in Monzon comes close to articulating this point: “Granting an 
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8. The Paradox of an Over-Encumbered Tenancy by the Entirety 
Courts have generally administered the entireties for the sole 
benefit of the joint creditors.718 Doing so prevents a wealth transfer 
from the nondebtor spouse to the individual creditors of the debtor 
spouse.719 Because such administration favors the nondebtor 
                                                                                                     
individual creditor the opportunity to reap the assets of entireties property in 
bankruptcy diminishes the nondebtor spouse’s interest in such property since the 
debtor spouse would not have been able to subject the entireties property to the 
reach of individual creditors under Florida law.” In re Monzon, 214 B.R. 38, 47 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997); see also In re Raynard, 327 B.R. 623, 641 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2005) (distinguishing this case from Monzon, because the Monzon court 
“was concerned that the non-filing spouse might otherwise unfairly shoulder the 
burden of the joint obligation”), rev’d sub nom. Raynard v. Rogers (In re Raynard), 
354 B.R. 834 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2006); Grant v. Himmelstein (In re Himmelstein), 
203 B.R. 1009, 1015–16 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (recognizing that individual 
creditors get more than they are entitled to if the joint creditors do not have a 
preference). 
At one point in his opinion in the original In re Raynard, Judge Hughes also 
noted that the nondebtor spouse subsidizes the individual creditors of the debtor 
spouse: 
My interpretation of Section 522(b)(2)(B) does create an issue when 
only one spouse files a petition for relief. If, as I have concluded, the 
debtor’s undivided interest in entireties property is to be liquidated for 
the benefit of all his creditors, and not just his joint creditors . . . then 
it is very unlikely that his joint creditors will be paid in full. 
In re Raynard, 327 B.R. at 641 n.23. Not paid in full from the bankruptcy, 
perhaps, but paid in full eventually because the nondebtor spouse is fully liable 
to the joint creditors. In the case, two spouses filed jointly in Chapter 13 and wrote 
a plan discriminating in favor of the joint creditors over the individual creditors. 
Id. at 626. They justified this discrimination on the ground that, in a Chapter 7 
case, the joint creditor would be preferred when the tenancy by the entirety was 
sold. Id. at 630. Judge Hughes denied confirmation of the plan, but admitted that, 
if only one of the spouses filed individually, discrimination would be justified 
because of the above-documented wealth effects. Id. at 641 n.23. On appeal, the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ruled that discrimination was permissible, even in a 
joint case. In re Raynard, 354 B.R. at 839. See generally In re Chandler, 148 B.R. 
13 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1992). In fact, it is mandatory, because in a Chapter 13 case, 
every creditor is entitled to receive at least as much as that creditor would have 
received in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2012). As 
joint creditors are entitled to a preference in a Chapter 7 case, the joint creditors 
must also receive a preference in a Chapter 13 case. 
 718. See In re Droumtsekas, 269 B.R. 463, 467 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) 
(finding “that only debts owed to joint creditors should be satisfied from the 
proceeds of entireties property”). 
 719. See id. at 469 (concluding that “the individual creditors of the Debtor are 
not entitled to share in the proceeds”). 
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spouse, we can assume that the nondebtor spouse consents 
(hypothetically) to the sale of the entireties.720 
Two circumstances prevent this administration from 
occurring. First, if there are no joint creditors, then the 
Michigan-style tenancy by the entirety is absolutely exempt. 
Therefore, the tenancy is absolutely expelled from the bankruptcy 
estate. The trustee no longer has a lien on it, and administration 
becomes impossible. 
The opposite situation also prevents an administration for the 
benefit of the joint creditors. Suppose the amount of the joint 
claims exceeds the debtor’s equity in the tenancy by the entirety. 
Then none of the tenancy is exempt.721 It is purely part of the 
bankruptcy estate. But in that case, the joint creditors lose their 
preference and must share equally with the individual creditors. 
For example, imagine that the tenancy by the entirety is worth 
$100 and the joint creditors claim $101. Imagine further that the 
bankruptcy is paying one cent on the dollar. Because the tenancy 
by the entirety is not exempt, the joint creditors lose their right to 
the proceeds of the tenancy. Oddly, if they had limited their claims 
to $99, they would have received 99.1 cents on the dollar. But 
because they claimed $101, the exemption disappears entirely and 
the joint creditors get $1.01, the same as the individual 
creditors.722 What a difference $2 makes!723 
When the marital entity is insolvent, debtors benefit by 
asserting a homestead right under the federal exemption (if that is 
                                                                                                     
 720. See infra note 736 (discussing the jurisdiction over the nondebtor 
spouse). 
 721. See, e.g., Jennings v. Royal (In re Jennings), No. WY-17-002, 2017 Bankr. 
LEXIS 4006, at *1 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Nov. 21, 2017); In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 
822 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004), rev’d sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 
B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 2004); United States Trustee v. Duncan (In re Duncan), 201 
B.R. 889, 897–98 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that, “even if this Chapter 7 
case were permitted to go forward . . . none of respondent’s interest in the 
residence, held with his wife as tenants by the entirety, could be exempted under 
§ 522(b)(2)(B)”); In re Wenande, 107 B.R. 770, 775 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1989) (finding 
that the entireties property held by the spouses was not exempt). 
 722. If the debtor is discharged, the joint creditors may also lose their ability 
to lien the entireties, as they are no longer joint creditors. Supra notes 585–595 
and accompanying text. 
 723. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. 1995, 2001 (2015) 
(“[S]ometimes a dollar’s difference will have a significant impact on bankruptcy 
proceedings.”). 
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available) or under a state statute. In such a case, the tenancy by 
the entirety plays no conceptual role, and one looks solely to the 
homesteading rules.724 
9. The Shadow Bankruptcy 
Hidden assumptions underlie the bankruptcy administration 
of the Michigan-style entireties for the exclusive benefit of the joint 
creditors. First, we must recognize that 100% of the entireties 
enters the bankruptcy estate. This accords with the ancient 
Blackstonian adage that the debtor spouse owns the tenancy by 
the entirety per tout et non per my.725 It is not the case that only 
50% interest in the tenancy by the entirety enters the bankruptcy 
estate (as per the Ford opinion).726 If we say that only the debtor’s 
50% is in the bankruptcy estate, we violate the premise of United 
States v. Rodgers,727 and United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,728 
both of which imply that “property” means Blackacre, not the 
debtor’s interest in Blackacre. 
If we admit that 100% of the entireties goes into the 
bankruptcy estate, we could recognize that the trustee’s judicial 
lien (per § 544(a)(1))729 encumbers the tenancy by the entirety, just 
as the tax lien did in Craft.730 Beyond the trustee’s lien (just as 
beyond the tax lien in Craft), the marital entity continues to own 
the tenancy by the entirety. If later the bankrupt debtor chooses to 
exempt the tenancy by the entirety, the trustee’s hypothetical 
judicial lien on it (to the extent of the exemption) is erased (i.e., the 
tenancy by the entirety is partially expelled from the bankruptcy 
                                                                                                     
 724. But see In re Clifton, No. 09-02379-8-RDD, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2930, at 
*6 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 19, 2013) (“The issue before the Court is the proper 
disbursement of sale proceeds of tenants by the entirety property.”); supra notes 
668–670 and accompanying text. 
 725. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *182 
(1753). 
 726. Supra notes 565–576 and accompanying text. 
 727. 461 U.S. 677, 685–86 (1983). 
 728. 462 U.S. 198, 206 (1983). 
 729. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2012) (“The trustee shall have . . . a judicial 
lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained 
such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists . . . .”). 
 730. Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 288 (2002). 
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estate under § 522(l)).731 The tenancy by the entirety does not 
magically reconstitute itself; rather, it always existed and the 
trustee’s lien is erased to the extent of the exemption.  
So, what is going on when the trustee liquidates entireties for 
the sole benefit of the joint creditors? Following the lead of Judge 
Hughes in In re Raynard,732 we should recognize that, when a 
debtor files an individual bankruptcy petition, she implicitly 
creates a shadow bankruptcy proceeding for the entireties. In this 
shadow bankruptcy proceeding, the trustee is a hypothetical 
judicial lien creditor representing the joint creditors only. In the 
main bankruptcy case, the trustee is a hypothetical judicial lien 
creditor representing the individual creditors only. This is the 
logical consequence of permitting bankruptcy trustees to liquidate 
tenancies by the entirety for the exclusive benefit of the joint 
creditors. 
Judge Hughes, who opposed this concept in In re Raynard733 
(at least when both spouses have filed jointly) and who for his 
troubles was reversed, nevertheless describes the shadow 
bankruptcy perfectly: 
These courts in effect create a separate bankruptcy estate to 
administer the entireties property in which the debtor has 
claimed a Section 522(b)(2)(A) exemption. Unless an 
accommodation can be reached with the debtor, the trustee 
administers this second estate by disposing of the entireties 
property pursuant to Section 363(b) and (h) and then 
distributing the proceeds to the two spouses’ joint creditors 
based upon a procedure that parallels that which a trustee 
would normally follow when distributing other proceeds to a 
debtor’s individual creditors.734 
                                                                                                     
 731. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (inviting the debtor to “file a list of property that 
the debtor claims as exempt . . . . Unless a party in interest objects, the property 
claimed as exempt on such list is exempt”). 
 732. See In re Raynard, 327 B.R. 623, 641 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005) 
(concluding that “the Raynards’ Chapter 13 plan . . . cannot be confirmed because 
it unfairly discriminates in favor of their joint unsecured creditors and to the 
detriment of their individual unsecured creditors”), rev’d sub nom. Raynard v. 
Rogers (In re Raynard), 354 B.R. 834 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2006). 
 733. In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 829 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004), rev’d sub nom. 
Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 2004). 
 734. In re Raynard, 327 B.R. at 630. Judge Hughes calls this “speculation, not 
statutory interpretation.” Id. at 636. 
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Thus, we should recognize that there is a bankruptcy within 
the bankruptcy—a wheel within a wheel735—whenever a spouse 
files for bankruptcy with joint creditors claiming the entireties.736 
What are the rules of the shadow bankruptcy? Here is what has 
emerged so far. 
a. Creditor Claims 
We may start with the premise that, where the only joint 
creditor is an over-secured mortgage lender, the bankruptcy 
trustee (who works for the unsecured creditors only)737 should not 
administer the tenancy by the entirety for the mortgagee.738 Only 
where there is a joint unsecured creditor can there be any question 
of the shadow bankruptcy. 
In the shadow bankruptcy, only joint unsecured creditors have 
claims against the shadow estate. The individual creditors do not. 
In fact, the individual creditors stand for that part of the entireties 
                                                                                                     
 735. See Ezekiel 1:16 (King James) (“[T]heir appearance and their work was 
as it were a wheel in the middle of a wheel.”). 
 736. Presumably, this could be accomplished in the course of the § 363(h) 
motion, which implies that the nondebtor spouse has been made a party to the 
action. See In re Romano, 378 B.R. 454, 472–73 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (arguing 
that a nondebtor spouse has a right to notice on a § 363(h) motion). This raises 
jurisdiction questions. According to Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), a bankruptcy judge without life 
tenure is not supposed to entertain a debtor’s cause of action based purely on state 
law against a nondebtor. See id. at 87 (determining that “the broad grant of 
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts contained in [the Bankruptcy Reform Act] 
is unconstitutional”). Here, it is even worse. The court would entertain a creditor’s 
state-law cause of action against a nondebtor. The late Professor Kalevitch has 
assured us that Marathon is no obstacle to this process: “The salient difference 
[with the cause of action in Marathon] is the nexus between questions of 
exemption and bankruptcy so lacking in the simple state law claim made in 
Marathon.” Kalevitch, supra note 692, at 152. 
 737. See Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a 
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147, 168 (2006) (“[I]t is clear 
that the duty of maximization focuses upon maximizing distributions to 
unsecured creditors.”). 
 738. See In re Droumtsekas, 269 B.R. 463, 466–67 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) 
(agreeing that a trustee should abandon the tenancy by the entirety where the 
only joint creditor is fully secured); In re Monzon, 214 B.R. 38, 42 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1997) (stating that “this Court adopts the simple and sensible rule that a 
Trustee should not and may not seek to administer TBE property if the only joint 
debt is the secured debt against that property”).  
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which is exempt. Accordingly, the individual creditors cannot 
claim any surplus from the shadow bankruptcy.739 By definition, 
the surplus is exempt and belongs to the non-debtor spouse (under 
Bankruptcy Code § 363(j)) and to the debtor (as proceeds of exempt 
property). 
On the other hand, the joint creditors do simultaneously have 
a claim against the regular bankruptcy estate. This raises a 
“marshaling of assets” issue. Shall the joint creditors first take the 
tenancy by the entirety in order to maximize the dividend of the 
individual creditors? 
One of the earliest cases to advocate the shadow bankruptcy 
is Michigan National Bank Michiana v. Chrystler (In re 
Trickett).740 There, Judge David Nims ruled that the joint creditors 
first had to take a dividend from the individual cases before they 
had access to the tenancy by the entirety.741 This marshaling rule 
serves to increase the exemption for the debtors. Such a rule seems 
questionable, in that the debtor is not entitled to an exemption to 
the extent of the joint claims. If the joint creditors have received a 
share of the regular bankruptcy estate, the joint claims diminish 
in size, and the debtor obtains more than the amount that equates 
with the individual claims.742 The better view is to require 
judgment creditors to take the 100% dividend from the tenancy by 
the entirety first, to prevent expansion of the exemption at the 
expense of the individual creditors. 
                                                                                                     
 739. See Monzon, 214 B.R. at 41 (explaining that “the surplus equity in 
entireties property is exempt from the trustee’s reach”). 
 740. Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett), 14 B.R. 85 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 1981). 
 741. See id. at 92 (ruling “that the joint debtors should first proceed to obtain 
their distribution out of the general estate and then proceed against the entirety 
estate”). 
 742. Judge Nims thought he was compelled to such a rule by Meyer v. United 
States, 375 U.S. 233 (1963). In Meyer, an IRS tax lien could reach the cash 
surrender value of a life insurance policy. Id. at 234. A consensually created 
security interest encumbered this and also encumbered the payout to the widow. 
Id. The IRS demanded marshaling to the prejudice of the widow. Id. at 235. The 
Supreme Court held that marshaling should not be ordered where to do so would 
deprive the widow of a state-law exemption on life insurance proceeds. Id. at 239–
40. Meyer can be distinguished, however. In Meyer, the widow of the deceased was 
entitled to an exemption that marshaling would deny her. Id. But, in Trickett, 
marshaling would actually increase the exemption, which would seem well 
beyond what the Meyer opinion demands. In support of the Trickett reasoning, see 
Vukowich, supra note 561, at 798–99. 
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In Trickett, Judge Nims also proposed a procedure for the 
shadow bankruptcy to follow.743 Judge Nims ordered the 
bankruptcy trustee for the regular case to notify joint creditors 
that they had to file a proof of joint claim and, once filed, the debtor 
would have 120 days to object.744 
Does this imply that joint creditors who do not file proofs of 
claim by whatever bar date is set are thereafter disentitled to a 
distribution in the shadow bankruptcy?745 Failure to file a proof of 
claim would certainly prevent a distribution in the main case. 
According to § 726(a), only “allowed secured claims” are entitled to 
distributions.746 “Allowed claim” is a bankruptcy code-word, 
meaning that a proof of claim has been filed.747 This may be 
compared with distributions to secured creditors under § 725, 
where the phrase “allowed claim” never appears. Secured creditors 
need not file proofs of claim to receive distributions under § 725.748 
The mysterious case of Grosslight v. Grosslight749 assumes 
that the proof of claim is necessary if a joint creditor is going to 
collect. In Grosslight, a joint creditor had not filed a proof of claim; 
rather, it filed an adversary proceeding to lift the automatic stay750 
                                                                                                     
 743. Trickett, 14 B.R. at 90–91. 
 744. Id. 
 745. Judge Hughes, for one, reads Trickett as absolutely requiring the proof 
of claim as a sine qua non of obtaining a distribution. See In re Raynard, 327 B.R. 
623, 641 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005) (“If the bankruptcy estate’s portion of the 
proceeds is greater than the amount of the allowed joint claims, the surplus is 
distributed to the debtor.”), rev’d sub nom. Raynard v. Rogers (In re Raynard), 
354 B.R. 834 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2006); see also In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 822 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004) (“[A] Michigan debtor’s allowed exemption pursuant to 
Section 522(b)(2)(B) is inversely related to the amount of the valid claims that 
creditors have against both the debtor and his non-filing spouse.”), rev’d sub nom. 
Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 2004). 
 746. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2012). 
 747. See id. § 502(a) (“A claim . . . proof of which is filed under section 
501 . . . is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.”); but see 11 
U.S.C. § 1111(a) (in chapter 11 a “proof of claim . . . is deemed filed [unless] 
scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated”). 
 748. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d)(2) (voiding a lien if it “secures [a disallowed 
secured] claim against the debtor” unless disallowance is “due only to the failure 
of any entity to file . . .  proof . . .  under section 501”); see also id. § 725 (omitting 
any mention of allowed claims). 
 749. 757 F.2d 773 (6th Cir. 1985).  
 750. This should have been filed as a motion rather than as an adversary 
proceeding. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(a)(1) (requiring “[a] motion for relief from 
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so that it might obtain a lien under Michigan law. The bankruptcy 
court denied the relief and ordered the debtor discharged.751 The 
creditor appealed the ruling as to the automatic stay, but 
apparently did not object to the discharge or to the exemption of 
the tenancy by the entirety.752 Properly, the discharge had the 
effect of making the joint creditor into an individual creditor of the 
non-debtor spouse.753 As such the creditor was no longer entitled 
to obtain a lien on the entireties, if the automatic stay were to be 
lifted.754 As a result, the whole appeal was moot.755 Nevertheless, 
the court reversed and remanded.756 It treated the adversary 
proceeding to lift the stay as the equivalent of a timely objection to 
the exemption.757 Significantly, for present purposes, the court 
ordered that the joint creditor file a proof of claim.758 We may 
presume, then, that in the Sixth Circuit, a proof of claim is required 
for a joint creditor in the shadow bankruptcy. 
A few other cases, without much discussion, assert that joint 
creditors with no proof of claim are not entitled to a distribution in 
the bankruptcy case.759 At least one case seems to permit 
distributions to joint creditors who have not filed proofs of claim.760 
                                                                                                     
an automatic stay provided by the Code”). 
 751. Grosslight, 757 F.2d at 77. 
 752. See id. (detailing Liberty State Bank and Trust’s appeal). 
 753. See id. at 777 (explaining the applicable bankruptcy statutes and case 
law). 
 754. Id.  
 755. See id. (noting this consequence). 
 756. Id.  
 757. See id. (“We therefore treat this adversary proceeding as an objection to 
the claim of exemptions. Taken as such, it was not untimely.” (citation omitted)). 
 758. Id. 
 759. See In re Kim, No. 08-12266-SSM, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 914, at *11 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2009) (finding that, in a Chapter 13 case, a joint creditor 
who did not file a proof of claim was entitled to no distribution under the 
confirmed plan); In re Cerreta, 116 B.R. 402, 406 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990) (denying 
the “Trustee’s objection to exemption and request to sell jointly owned property” 
because the “creditor has not filed a proof of claim”). In Schlossberg v. Fischer (In 
re Fischer), 411 B.R. 247 (Bankr. D. Md. 2009), the trustee tried to file proofs of 
claim over the opposition of the joint creditors (who were “insiders” of the debtor). 
Id. at 251–52. The court held that the trustee could not do this. Id. at 263. But see 
11 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012) (“If a creditor does not timely file a proof of such 
creditor’s claim, . . . the trustee may file a proof of such claim.”). 
 760. See generally In re Monzon, 214 B.R. 38, 40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997). 
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If joint creditors are required to file proofs of claim but do not, 
this would seem to increase the exemption of the debtor spouse. 
Furthermore, the discharge (if it ensues) will render the joint 
creditors into individual creditors with no right to pursue the 
entireties. Trustees may object that § 522(b)(3) permits the debtor 
“to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety . . . is 
exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.”761 A 
creditor who files no proof of claim is entitled to “process” as a 
matter of state law.762 Therefore, the exemption should not 
increase for the debtor just because the joint creditor did not meet 
some post-petition bureaucratic requirement. But, if the debtor 
cannot get an expanded exemption, who then profits from the 
failure of a joint creditor to file a proof of claim? 
It might be possible for a trustee to subrogate to the disallowed 
claim of a joint creditor for the purpose of pursuing the tenancy by 
the entirety. We have already drawn parallels between the 
trustee’s subrogation to joint creditors and the trustee’s 
subrogation to unsecured creditors’ right to avoid fraudulent 
conveyances (à la Moore v. Bay).763 When it comes to subrogation 
under § 544(b)(1), some cases hold that the trustee may subrogate 
to a creditor with avoidance rights even though the creditor never 
filed a proof of claim.764 Similarly, a trustee might subrogate to a 
                                                                                                     
 761. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3). 
 762. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 36 (1989) (“The 
question presented is whether a person who has not submitted a claim against a 
bankruptcy estate has a right to a jury trial when sued by the trustee in 
bankruptcy . . . . We hold that the Seventh Amendment entitles such a person to 
a trial by jury . . . .”). 
 763. Supra notes 693–695 and accompanying text. 
 764. See Finkel v. Polichuk (In re Polichuk), 506 B.R. 405, 426 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 2014) (allowing the trustee “to assert that the Debtor owed pre-petition taxes” 
when the IRS had not filed a proof of claim). Two courts have disagreed with this 
and would limit subrogation to a creditor that filed a proof of claim. See, e.g., 
Levey v. Gillman (In re Republic Window & Doors, LLC), No. 08-34113, 2011 
Bankr. LEXIS 3936, at *33 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2011) (finding that “[t]he 
generous IRS limitation provision is not available unless the IRS files its own 
claim or the Trustee files a claim on behalf of the IRS”); Campbell v. Wellman (In 
re Wellman), No. 97-01350-W, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 2097, at *9 (Bankr. D.S.C., 
June 2, 1998) (deciding that “as Robert McKittrick was the only creditor . . . to file 
a proof of claim, he is the only one with an allowable claim into whose shoes the 
Trustee may step pursuant to § 544(b)”). Furthermore, § 544(b)(1) refers to “a 
creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable.” In re Wellman, 1998 
Bankr. LEXIS 2097, at *5. 
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joint creditor without a proof of claim and recover, not for the 
benefit of the joint creditor (who is barred from a distribution), but 
rather for the benefit of the main bankruptcy. This would be odd. 
The purpose of the proof of claim requirement is to relieve the 
trustee of having to investigate who the creditors are.765 But, 
where the trustee knows who a joint creditor is and how much the 
claim is, it seems perverse for the trustee to use the failure to 
follow a bureaucratic rule to enrich the individual creditors in the 
main case. 
It is clear that the debtor is not entitled to the windfall, 
because the amount that accords with the joint claim is not 
exempt. By default, this sum must go into the main bankruptcy 
estate where the individual creditors benefit. But, the joint 
creditor who failed to file the proof of claim collects from the 
nondebtor spouse, who (as has been emphasized)766 then subsidizes 
the individual creditors in the main case. This too seems unfair. 
There seems to be no right answer. Probably the best solution is 
for courts to waive the proof of claim for joint creditors, in order to 
prevent the subsidy of the individual creditors by the nondebtor 
spouse. 
On this point, it may be noted that the trustee herself is 
empowered to file proofs of claim for those joint creditors who have 
neglected to file.767 Or, a joint creditor can file a late proof of 
claim.768 Late filed claims are subordinated to timely filed 
claims.769 But, by definition, the marital entity is solvent. Hence, 
all the joint creditors receive 100% distributions; therefore, 
lateness of filing is immaterial. Because the trustee ought to file 
for a joint creditor, a court may well deem the deed already done.770 
                                                                                                     
 765. See In re R.H. Macy & Co., 161 B.R. 355, 360 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(“Adherence to the bar date furthers the policy of promptly reconciling claims 
against the estate . . . because it allows parties in interest to determine ‘the 
identity of those making claims against the estate and the general amount of the 
claims.’” (citations omitted)). 
 766. Supra notes 714–717 and accompanying text. 
 767. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012) (“If a creditor does not timely file a proof of 
such creditor’s claim, the debtor or the trustee may file a proof of such claim.”). 
 768. See id. (permitting the opposite to occur, as well). 
 769. Compare id. (allowing a trustee to file a proof of a claim when a joint 
creditor has not), with id. § 726(a)(2)–(3) (prioritizing timely filed claims over 
tardy claims). 
 770. See Walker v. Brown, 165 U.S. 654, 665 (1897) (“Equity regards as done 
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As for costs of administration, Bankruptcy Code § 363(j) 
indicates that the trustee is to distribute proceeds of the sale, “less 
the costs and expenses, not including any compensation of the 
trustee, of such sale.”771 The case may arise that the tenancy by the 
entirety is “administratively insolvent.” That is, the cost of selling 
the tenancy by the entirety exceeds the proceeds received. In In re 
Eads,772 the trustee asked that the court invade the exempt 
proceeds to cover the overdraft, claiming that the debtor had been 
supremely litigious against the trustee. The court, however, 
refused to surcharge the debtor: 
The conclusion reached herein is distasteful to the Court and 
unfair to creditors. By all rights, Tina and David should be 
required to pay the Trustee’s attorney’s fees and expenses out 
of their separate (though exempt) funds, particularly since 
those fees and expenses were largely incurred as a result of the 
debtors’ continued marital squabbles. . . . Requiring that the 
fees and expenses be paid out of the monies that would 
otherwise be paid to the joint creditors of the Eadses is unfair 
to those creditors and seems to reward the Eadses for their 
intransigence. Not paying [attorneys’] fees and expenses in full 
is likewise unfair. Nevertheless, the Court has concluded that 
the Bankruptcy Code dictates the result reached.773 
In this respect, the Eads court anticipated Law v. Siegal,774 where 
the Supreme Court barred administrative surcharges on exempt 
property in general, even in cases where the debtor’s behavior has 
been irritating.775 
                                                                                                     
that which ought to be done.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 771. 11 U.S.C. § 363(j). The Trickett opinion awarded the trustee his 
attorney’s fees. See Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett), 14 B.R. 85, 91 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981) (deciding the distribution of the proceeds from sales). 
More controversially, attorneys for the joint creditors were also held entitled to 
fees from the tenancy by the entirety. Id. 
 772. 307 B.R. 219 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004). 
 773. Id. at 225. 
 774. 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014). 
 775. See id. at 1195–97 (finding that the surcharges violated § 522); see also 
Holley v. Corcoran (In re Holley), No. 16-1081, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 19425, at 
*396 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 2016) (denying a charge on proceeds of tenancy by the 
entirety to cover general administrative expenses). 
140 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2018) 
b. Surplus and Subrogation 
Any surplus from the shadow estate does not go into the 
regular bankruptcy estate. The surplus, by definition, constitutes 
the debtor’s exempt property, so only the debtor has access to the 
surplus. 
In In re McRae,776 a debtor with a tenancy by the entirety filed 
for bankruptcy and then paid his only joint creditor in the 
post-petition period. This post-petition event was held irrelevant—
post-petition payment could not increase the size of the exemption 
because the situation was to be judged as it stood on the day of the 
bankruptcy petition.777 At that time, the debtor had not yet paid 
the joint creditor.778 But surely the debtor who paid is subrogated 
to the claim of the joint creditor in the shadow bankruptcy. The 
debtor then takes the joint creditor’s distribution, which is the 
same as saying the debtor may increase the exemption by paying 
joint creditors in the post-petition period. In any case, the McRae 
court ruled that the trustee should not administer the tenancy by 
the entirety.779 As a practical matter, the trustee had to abandon 
the tenancy, and because the only joint creditor who could pursue 
the tenancy has been paid, the debtor had a de facto total 
exemption. 
In In re Oberlies,780 the spouses had jointly guaranteed a 
non-debtor vendee who, after bankruptcy, paid his debt.781 When 
the vendee paid up, the joint guaranty creditor disappeared.782 The 
court held that such a post-petition event could not increase the 
debtor’s exemption.783 But, as in McRae, the court ruled that any 
surplus after joint creditors have been paid belongs to the debtor, 
                                                                                                     
 776. 308 B.R. 572 (N.D. Fla. 2003). 
 777. See id. at 575 (“The fact that a debtor’s non-petitioning spouse has paid 
off a joint obligation after a petition in bankruptcy has been find does not 
retroactively make the entireties property exempt from process immediately 
before the case was filed.”). 
 778. Id. at 574; accord In re Sefren, 41 B.R. 747, 748 (Bankr. D. Md. 1984) 
(acknowledging the debt that the debtor owed at the time the case was filed). 
 779. McRae, 308 B.R. at 579. 
 780. 94 B.R. 916 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988). 
 781. Id. at 917. 
 782. Id. 
 783. Id. at 919. 
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and if all joint creditors have disappeared through payment, there 
should be no sale at all and the entireties should be viewed as 
entirely exempt.784 
Inconsistently, it has been held that post-petition 
reaffirmation of all the joint claims makes the shadow bankruptcy 
case disappear.785 Reaffirmation, however, only means that the 
debt will not be discharged.786 The reaffirmed debt remains a joint 
claim in the shadow bankruptcy, justifying a sale of the entireties 
in the shadow bankruptcy. 
c. Double Dipping 
Suppose a debtor owns a Michigan-style entireties property, 
but joint creditors exist. May the debtor (i) against the individual 
creditors choose the entireties exemption under § 522(b)(2)(B) and 
(ii) against the joint creditors choose a monetary homestead 
exemption under § 522(b)(2)(A)? Can the same house be exempted 
twice? 
The answer seems to be yes,787 but it turns out that, 
mathematically, the homestead exemption against the joint 
creditors entirely duplicates the entireties exemption against the 
individual creditor. Nevertheless, debtors have the opportunity to 
visit malicious injury on the non-debtor spouse. Three examples 
will prove this. 
First, we replicate our earlier example, in which no limited 
homestead against the joint creditors is claimed. 
                                                                                                     
 784. Id. at 924. 
 785. See In re Rentfro, 234 B.R. 97, 100 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1999) (“If the debtor 
rescinds the reaffirmation agreement with the joint creditor . . . the Trustee may 
renew his objection to the exemption in entireties property . . . .”); see also In re 
Boyd, 121 B.R. 622, 625 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) (“Thus it is apparent that the 
trustee standing in the debtor’s shoes could alienate the joint property and hence 
it would not be immune from process . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Boyd v. Strickland, 
TCA 90-40132-WS (N.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 1991); In re McRae, 308 B.R. 572, 576–77 
(N.D. Fla. 2003) (noting that Boyd had been reversed “with respect to the 
bankruptcy court’s discussion of the proper distribution scheme for entireties 
property”). 
 786. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(3)(J)(i) (2012) (“A reaffirmed debt remains your 
personal legal obligation. It is not discharged in your bankruptcy case.”). 
 787. See generally Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett), 14 B.R. 85, 
89–90 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981). 
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JC = $80 
TE = $100 
H = $0 
W = $10 
D = $10 
First Example788 
In this first example, D obtains $10 from the entireties exemption 
and has no homestead exemption at all. 
We now increase the homestead exemption slightly. 
JC = $80 
TE = $100 
H = $5 
W = $5 + $5 = $10 
D = $5 + $5 = $10 
Second Example 
In the second example, both D and W have a homestead right 
against the joint creditors. In administering the entireties, D’s 
trustee must honor both the exemptions of D and the exemption of 
W. Each is entitled to assert the $5 homestead right. Thus, W gets 
$10. Of this, $5 is attributable to the homestead right and $5 is 
attributable to the fact that individual creditors cannot reach W’s 
share of the entireties. We reach the same conclusion as to D’s 
share. In each case, the homestead right does not increase the cash 
that each spouse takes from the trustee’s sale. This example shows 
that the homestead right simply replicates the entireties right. 
JC = $80 
TE = $100 
H ≥ $10 
W = $10 
D = $10 
Third Example 
                                                                                                     
 788. In my examples, JC is the amount of joint claims; TE is the total value 
of the tenancy by the entirety; H is the amount of the homestead exemption; W is 
the nondebtor spouse’s share; and D is the debtor’s share, in light of the entireties 
exemption. 
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In the third example, we increase the homestead right to $10 
or more. Assume the right is exactly $10. At this point, the trustee 
liquidates for $100. Of this, the trustee distributes $10 to D for the 
homestead right and $10 to W on the same basis. The remaining 
$80 equates with the amount of joint claims. In this example, we 
observe that the shadow bankruptcy is insolvent. In light of the 
homestead rights of D and W, the non-exempt proceeds go entirely 
to JC. This means that the entireties exemption has been 
displaced. The entireties is “not exempt” from an entireties 
viewpoint. The property therefore does not belong to the shadow 
bankruptcy but to the main bankruptcy estate. The $80 is 
therefore not distributed to the joint creditors but to all the 
creditors pursuant to § 726(a). In short, we have the paradox  that 
denies the joint creditors their priority over the individual 
creditors. 
In the third example, the assertion of the homestead 
exemption means that the non-debtor W contributes wealth to the 
individual creditors of D. That is, where the JC are not paid, they 
collect from W, and W is entitled only to a 50% contribution from 
D’s bankruptcy estate. The individual creditors are enriched when 
W is limited to a claim for contribution. D, however, can prevent 
this from occurring by renouncing the homestead exemption and 
relying solely on the entireties exemption. In any case, it once 
again shows that, from D’s perspective, the homestead exemption 
simply replicates the entireties exemption. 
If, however, the debtor spitefully insists on the homestead 
exemption, the non-debtor spouse may avail herself of the 
invitation in § 522(l): “[A] dependent of the debtor may . . . claim 
property as exempt from property of the estate on behalf of the 
debtor.”789 The non-debtor spouse is a dependent under 
Bankruptcy Code § 522(a)(1).790 
These issues arose in In re Capelli,791 where the debtor owned 
a Virginia entireties with his estranged spouse, but resided in 
West Virginia. The debtor fell afoul of the domicile restriction in 
                                                                                                     
 789. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (2012). 
 790. See In re Crouch, 33 B.R. 271, 274 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983) (“When a 
debtor who has not met obligations to support a spouse has claimed inadequate 
exemptions, the spouse should be permitted to claim additional exemptions as 
long as the additional exemptions do not unduly prejudice the debtor.”). 
 791. 518 B.R. 873 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2014). 
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Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(3)(A), but this restriction does not apply 
to entireties claims under § 522(b)(3)(B).792 
The debtor did not wish to claim the entireties as exempt, 
however; instead, he wished to claim a homestead exemption, 
which would result in his spouse’s loss of wealth to his individual 
creditors.793 The trouble was that the debtor, residing in West 
Virginia, was not entitled to the West Virginia exemption because 
his real property was located in Virginia.794 He could not have the 
Virginia homestead exemption because he resided in West 
Virginia.795 But he could claim a federal exemption of $21,625, 
because “a dependent of the debtor” used the property “as a 
residence.”796 
Virginia was the choice of law under § 522(b)(3)(A) because 
Virginia was: 
[T]he place in which the debtor’s domicile had been located for 
the 730 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the 
petition or if the debtor’s domicile has not been located in a 
single State for such 730-day period, the place in which the 
debtor’s domicile was located for 180 days immediately 
preceding the 730-day period . . . .797 
The debtor had not resided in West Virginia for the 730 days prior 
to his bankruptcy petition.798 But he had been in Virginia for the 
180-day period referenced in § 522(b)(3)(A).799 
Virginia, however, is an “opt-out” state that does not permit 
its citizens to choose the federal exemption.800 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                     
 792. See id. at 876–77 (distinguishing these claims). 
 793. Id. at 875. 
 794. Id. at 877. 
 795. See id. at 875 (“During the 730-day period before the petition date, the 
Debtor lived in both Virginia and West Virginia.”); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 34-24 
(2012) (“When any person . . . removes from this Commonwealth, his right to 
claim or hold any estate as exempt under the provisions of this chapter, shall 
cease . . . .”). 
 796. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2012). 
 797. Id. § 522(b)(3)(A). 
 798. In re Capelli, 518 B.R. at 875. 
 799. See id. (“For the 180-day period preceding the 730-day period prepetition, 
the Debtor lived in Virginia.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (referencing the 
180-day period). 
 800. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (2017) (“No individual may exempt from the 
property of the estate in any bankruptcy proceeding the property specified in 
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opt-out legislation is overridden by the hanging paragraph at the 
end of § 522(b)(3): 
If the effect of the domiciliary requirement under subparagraph 
(A) is to render the debtor ineligible for any exemption, the 
debtor may elect to exempt property that is specified under 
subsection (d).801 
That is, because the domiciliary rule denied the debtor the West 
Virginia exemption and because the Virginia exemptions did not 
apply to nonresidents,802 the debtor thought he was entitled to the 
federal exemption, in spite of the fact that Virginia has “opted out” 
of the federal exemption.803 
The non-debtor spouse intervened to prevent the use of the 
federal exemption on the Virginia property, under the theory that 
the debtor had not been denied every Virginia exemption.804 The 
debtor still had the entireties exemption because the domiciliary 
restriction applied only to the exemptions under § 522(b)(2) and 
not to the entireties exemption under § 522(b)(3).805 In light of 
this, the debtor had some Virginia exemptions and so could not 
take the federal exemption in West Virginia.806 
The court, however, ruled that the debtor could have both 
the Virginia entireties exemption and the federal homestead 
                                                                                                     
[§ 522(d)] . . . .”). 
 801. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 802. See In re Capelli, 518 B.R. 873, 875–78 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2014) 
(describing the relevant law). This denial extends to exemptions of any kind. See 
id. at 877 n.4 (“[A] nonresident of Virginia is not entitled to take any of the other 
exemptions in property that are afforded by Virginia law.” (internal quotation 
omitted)). 
 803. Id. at 875. 
 804. See id. (“Ms. Capelli objects to the Debtor’s claimed exemptions based 
upon her belief that the Debtor cannot claim as exempt property listed in § 522(d) 
given his ability to exempt property that he holds with her as a tenancy by the 
entireties.”). 
 805. See id. (“The Debtor argues that although he holds such property with 
Ms. Capelli, he may claim as exempt property listed in § 522(d) because he cannot 
claim exemptions under Virginia law such that the concluding sentence of 
§ 522(b)(3) permits his claimed exemptions.”). 
 806. See id. at 877 (“[T]he parties agree that the Debtor . . . is ineligible to 
claim West Virginia exemptions, and . . . the Debtor has an exemptible interest 
in real property, which he holds as a tenancy by the entirety with Ms. Capelli, 
located in Virginia.”). 
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exemption.807 The word “any,” ruled the court, applied to 
subparagraph (b)(2) and not to subparagraph (b)(3).808 
It is not clear, however, that the debtor won anything 
valuable because the homestead exemption entirely replicates 
the entireties exemption. Possibly, if the case is illustrated by 
the third example, the debtor could deprive the nondebtor 
spouse of wealth, which would be transferred to the individual 
creditors of the debtor. Given the spiteful nature of this result, 
the court might permit the nondebtor spouse to choose the 
entireties exemption over the opposition of the debtor pursuant 
to Bankruptcy Code § 522(l). 
d. Avoidance Actions 
The shadow bankruptcy for the entireties engenders its own 
avoidance actions. Avoidance in this environment is theoretically 
complex and often basically useless. 
i. Voidable Preferences 
If we take the concept of the shadow bankruptcy seriously, 
avoidance should be judged from within the bounds of the shadow 
case. For example, suppose the debtor’s tenancy by the entirety is 
worth $100 and the joint creditors together claim $80. The marital 
entity is therefore solvent. One of the joint creditors (JC) obtains a 
judicial lien for $60 against the tenancy by the entirety just before 
bankruptcy. Judicial liens that attach just before bankruptcy are 
ordinarily the quintessential voidable preference, but not this one! 
Bankruptcy Code § 547(b)(5) provides that a transfer is a voidable 
preference if it is a transfer:  
                                                                                                     
 807. See id. at 880 (ruling that debtors could “claim as exempt both property 
according to the exemption scheme of their domicile and property held as a 
tenancy by the entirety, which may be located outside their domicile”). 
 808. See id. (“[T]he triggering feature of the [hanging] sentence is the failure 
of ‘any exemption’ based upon a domiciliary requirement. [Subparagraph (3)(B) 
is] not domicile dependent and thus cannot fail based upon the effect of a 
domiciliary requirement under subparagraph (A).”). 
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(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor 
would receive if— 
 (A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; 
 (B) the transfer had not been made; and 
 (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the 
extent provided by the provisions of this title.809  
Applying this test, JC has received a lien worth $60. We are to 
imagine that the “transfer had not been made.”810 As a result, JC 
enters the Chapter 7 liquidation as an unsecured creditor with a 
claim against the entireties. But as an unsecured joint creditor, JC 
receives the full $60 in the shadow bankruptcy. Therefore, JC has 
not received more from the $60 judicial lien because $60 is the 
amount of the hypothetical bankruptcy dividend. Accordingly, the 
judicial lien is no voidable preference.811 
It is important to emphasize that the lien in question is only 
$60, less than the $100 value of the entireties. If the joint creditor 
claimed, say, $120 against a $100 entireties, then the entireties 
would not be exemptable in the first place. In that case, the 
tenancy is part of the main case, where the $120 lien would be a 
voidable preference.812 
                                                                                                     
 809. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (2012). 
 810. Id. § 547(b)(5)(B).  
 811. See Shapiro v. Homecomings Fin. Network, Inc. (In re Davis), 319 B.R. 
532, 537 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005) (“If the mortgage is avoided, the [mortgagee] 
will become the only joint creditor of the Debtor and his non-debtor spouse, and 
proceeds from the same of the entireties property could be applied only to satisfy 
that joint debt.”). In Shapiro v. First Franklin Financial Corp. (In re Rechis), 339 
B.R. 643, 647 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006), the debtor did not claim the entireties as 
exempt. The trustee sought to void a tardily recorded mortgage as a voidable 
preference. The debtor then tried to amend Schedule C to claim the property was 
exempt as a tenancy by the entirety. The court found that the debtor was estopped 
from amending Schedule C because it would have ruined the trustee’s preference 
action in which the trystee had invested. By so ruling, the court implied that the 
joint creditor’s mortgage would not have been voidable in the shadow bankruptcy. 
 812. Infra notes 718–724 and accompanying text.  In Shapiro, 319 B.R. at 537, 
it is important that there was debtor equity above the mortgage. If the property 
was “under water,” then avoidance of the mortgage implies the presence of a joint 
unsecured creditor whose claim exceeds the value of the entireties. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 502(h) (“A claim arising from the recovery of property under 
section . . . 550 . . . shall be allowed . . . .”). In that case, the entireties is not 
exemptible in the first place, and shadow bankruptcy disappears. The mortgage 
would be voidable after all. 
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This point may be applied to the facts of Ross v. Maryland (In 
re Ross),813 where a debtor and his spouse guaranteed a third-party 
obligation and granted a second mortgage on their District of 
Columbia entireties.814 The debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
two years later.815 As debtor-in-possession, he commenced an 
adversary proceeding claiming that the mortgage was a voidable 
preference.816 It should be apparent that this voidable preference 
action is useless. Suppose the mortgage is avoided. The mortgage 
lender still has a joint claim, and the very possibility that the 
tenancy by the entirety is partially exempt means that, logically, 
the lender has not received a voidable preference by grace of 
§ 547(b)(5). 
Nevertheless, Judge Martin Teel awarded summary judgment 
to the debtor-in-possession.817 Now, this decision is very short on 
facts. For instance, how could a mortgage that was two years old 
at the time of the bankruptcy petition be a voidable preference, 
when Bankruptcy Code § 547(b)(4) requires that the transfer to a 
non-insider be within ninety days before bankruptcy?818 The case 
does not appear to involve delayed perfection.819 It is also clear that 
the marital entity was solvent.820 Voidable preference law requires 
the debtor to be insolvent at the time of the transfer;821 the debtor’s 
insolvency in the regular bankruptcy case should be irrelevant. 
                                                                                                     
 813. 475 B.R. 279 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2012). 
 814. Id. at 280–81. 
 815. Id. at 281. 
 816. Id. at 280–81. 
 817. Id. at 286. 
 818. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (2012) (giving the ninety-day requirement). 
 819. The decision hints that the mortgage was in fact recorded against the 
nondebtor spouse. See Ross, 475 B.R. at 283 (quoting the debtor as saying that 
“[t]he deed of trust is deemed to have been recorded as a lien against her interest 
(but not against Mr. Ross’s)”). So it probably would have been recorded against 
the debtor as well. Perfection of a mortgage within ninety days of bankruptcy 
could result in voidable preference liability. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B) (stating 
that “a transfer is made . . . at the time such transfer is perfected, if the transfer 
is perfected after such 30 days”); see also David Gray Carlson, Security Interests 
in the Crucible of Voidable Preference Law, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 221–25 
(describing the rules regarding the timing of transfers). 
 820. See Ross, 475 B.R. at 285 (“Mr. Ross’s chapter 11 plan calls for the sale 
of the property, with proceeds to be distributed to joint creditors, or alternatively 
for a refinancing.”). 
 821. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3). 
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What matters is the marital entity’s insolvency in the shadow 
bankruptcy. All these issues seemed to have been improvidently 
waived by the state of Maryland.822 
What the case does decide is that the mortgage constituted a 
transfer of debtor property, even though District of Columbia law 
holds that the debtor had no interest in the tenancy by the 
entirety.823 This straightforward superegoic moment is well 
justified by the legislative history of and holdings under 
§ 541(a)(1).824 Judge Teel also held that, because the debtor 
transferred his own property when he joined in the mortgage on 
the tenancy by the entirety, his 50% share of the conveyance was 
void.825 And, because the debtor’s conveyance was void, the 
nondebtor spouse was deemed to have made an individual 
conveyance, not a joint conveyance.826 Therefore, the mortgage was 
invalid not only against the debtor’s 50% share but also void 
against the nondebtor spouse’s share.827 Judge Teel, however, went 
on to hold that, as a matter of District of Columbia law, the 
mortgagee would continue to have a mortgage lien on the 
nondebtor spouse’s contingent remainder.828 As such, Judge Teel 
                                                                                                     
 822. See Ross v. Maryland (In re Ross), 475 B.R. 279, 281 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2012) 
(discussing how, at a pretrial conference, “the Department conceded that, but for 
legal arguments next discussed, Ross had shown that his transfer, pursuant to 
the deed of trust of his interest in Swann House was an avoidable preference”). 
 823. See id. at 281–82 (ruling that the transfer of the interest at issue was “a 
transfer of property of the debtor” under § 547 (internal quotation omitted)). 
 824. Supra notes 515–533 and accompanying text. 
 825. See Ross, 475 B.R. at 283 (“An avoidance under § 544 . . . is only as to Mr. 
Ross’s interest in the property, not Ms. Ross’s interest.”). 
 826. See id. (“The deed of trust is deemed to have been recorded as a lien 
against [Ms. Ross’s] interest (but not against Mr. Ross’s). Ms. Ross’s transfer 
remains intact.”). 
 827. See id. at 282  
The lien on the non-debtor’s spouse’s interest remains intact, but 
without the debtor’s transfer remaining intact, only Ms. Ross (the 
non-debtor spouse) made a transfer, and that transfer by one spouse 
alone was inadequate to transfer an interest that is enforceable against 
the entirety property so long as the property remains entirety property. 
 828. See id. (explaining that, under D.C. law, the lien on Ms. Ross’s interest 
continued). If that is so, then, by implication, the debtor’s contingent remainder 
was his own individual property and, therefore, within the bankruptcy estate in 
the main case. The mortgage on this contingent remainder would seem to be a 
voidable preference in the main case. 
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imagined the District of Columbia to follow the Kentucky pattern 
for the tenancy by the entirety. 
At least theoretically, § 522(g) complicates this issue: 
[T]he debtor may exempt . . . property that the trustee recovers 
under section . . . 550 . . . to the extent that the debtor could 
have exempted such property . . . if such property had not been 
transferred, if— 
(1)(A) such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such 
property by the debtor; and 
 (B) the debtor did not conceal such property . . . .829 
Section 550 references a grab bag of avoidance theories, including 
voidable preference and fraudulent conveyance.830 Where the 
conveyance avoided is the debtor’s voluntary transfer, the recovery 
negates the exemption and so benefits the individual creditors and 
the joint creditors equally.831 
Section 522(g) makes no difference to the analysis in Ross, 
however. The debtor there voluntarily conveyed a mortgage,832 but 
the equity retained is still exemptible in spite of § 522(g). “Equity” 
is, by definition, that which remains after the mortgage lien is 
conveyed. In any case, if the marital entity is solvent, the creditor, 
deprived of the mortgage, still recovers 100% as a joint creditor in 
the shadow bankruptcy. 
Section 522(g) can make a difference in cases like Boyd v. 
Petrie (In re Tompkins),833 where the spouses granted an 
unrecorded mortgage to a lender. At least one other joint creditor 
was present in the case. The spouses then tendered an “asset 
                                                                                                     
 829. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) (2012). 
 830. See id. § 550(a) (“[T]o the extent that a transfer is avoided under [§§] 
544, . . . 547, [or] . . . 548, . . . the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, 
the property transferred . . . .”). 
 831. See generally Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2001); In re 
Lawson, No. 10-11001, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1154 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 
2011); McCarthy v. Fin. Freedom Senior Funding Corp. (In re Early), 
No. 05-01354, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1605 (Bankr. D.D.C. May 12, 2008). The 
Lawson court erroneously assumes that the contingent remainder is exempt 
under Tennessee law but that the attempt to convey a voidable mortgage on it 
means a forfeiture of the exemption. Because the contingent remainder was 
property of the bankruptcy estate in any event, the error must be considered 
harmless. 
 832. Ross v. Maryland (In re Ross), 475 B.R. 279, 280 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2012). 
 833. 428 B.R. 713 (W.D. Mich. 2010). 
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payment”—a deed in lieu of foreclosure—that made the mortgage 
lender a fee simple owner. The voluntary nature of the transfer 
meant that no part of the recovered property could be exempt.834 If 
there is no exemption, there is no shadow bankruptcy. Although 
the unperfected lender would be a joint creditor, there is no 
exemptible entireties against which the joint claim might be 
asserted. Therefore, the recovery is one in which all the creditors—
joint and individual—share in equally.  
In Tompkins, the conveyance diminished the estate of the 
debtor, because the joint creditor’s only recourse was to share pro 
rata in the assets of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Therefore, 
unlike in Ross, voidable preference analysis could be applied to the 
case. Accordingly, the court in Tompkins reversed the bankruptcy 
court’s dismissal of the voidable preference action which had found 
no diminution of the bankruptcy estate.835 
ii. Fraudulent Conveyances 
In the context of inheritance disclaimers, a distinction was 
made between the trustee’s avoidance power under § 548(a) (which 
was superegoic) and the trustee’s subrogation right under 
§ 544(b)(1) (which was not superegoic).836 This distinction holds in 
fraudulent conveyance cases involving the entireties. Under Begier 
v. Internal Revenue Service,837 “property of the debtor” must be 
considered “property that would have been part of the estate had 
it not been transferred before the commencement of the 
bankruptcy proceeding.”838 Any entireties property voluntarily 
conveyed away would have been property of the bankruptcy estate 
                                                                                                     
 834. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1)(A) (exempting “property that the trustee 
recovers” where the “transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such property by 
the debtor”). 
 835. See generally Barbera v. Nathan (In re Barbera), No. 97-1459, 1998 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 13171 (6th Cir. June 17, 1998); Tardif v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. (In 
re Kepley), No. 2:06-cv-532-FtM-29, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66657 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 
10, 2007) (showing that the check from the bank account was owned by the 
entireties); Lasich v. Estate of Wickstrom (In re Wickstrom), 113 B.R. 339, 347 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990). 
 836. Supra notes 449–451 and accompanying text. 
 837. 496 U.S. 53 (1990). 
 838. Id. at 58–59.  
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had it not been conveyed away.839 And, because it was voluntarily 
conveyed, such property is not exemptible thanks to § 522(g). 
Therefore, the trustee can sustain a § 548(a) action for a voluntary 
fraudulent conveyance of exempt property.840 On the other hand, if 
the trustee has no § 548(a) theory (because the conveyance was 
more than two years old by the time of the conveyance), then the 
trustee must rely solely on state law where the doctrine of “no 
harm no foul”841 implies that it is impossible for a debtor to 
fraudulently convey the entireties.842 Under pure state law, such 
property cannot be recovered. 
A voluntary fraudulent conveyance of entireties property 
(otherwise exempt from creditors under state law) results in a 
forfeiture of the exemption when and if the trustee avoids the 
conveyance. When fraudulent conveyances are made with “intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate,”843 
such a fraudulent conveyance has another serious effect. It results 
in a denial of a discharge to the debtor (where the conveyance was 
made within a year of the bankruptcy petition).844 It is hard to 
imagine that a conveyance of the entireties was intended to harm 
individual creditors when they had no access to the entireties 
under state law. And it is certainly odd to think that the 
conveyance was intended to defraud a bankruptcy trustee, when 
                                                                                                     
 839. See id. at 58 (discussing how “the purpose of the avoidance provision is 
to preserve the property includable within the bankruptcy estate”). 
 840. See generally Fox v. Smoker (In re Noblit), 72 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(stating that it is a voidable preference case involving exempt funds); Hitt v. Glass 
(In re Glass), 164 B.R. 759 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994); In re Wickstrom, 113 B.R. at 
339. For contrary cases, see generally Jarboe v. Treiber (In re Treiber), 92 B.R. 
930 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988) (stating that the transfer of homestead is not a 
voidable preference, but § 522(g) was never cited); Tavormina v. Robinett (In re 
Robinett), 47 B.R. 591 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985). 
 841. Supra notes 227, 462–463 and accompanying text. 
 842. See Noland v. Turner (In re Turner), 45 B.R. 649, 650 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1985) (trustee relied on § 544(b)). This distinction was overlooked in Jensen v. 
Montemoino (In re Montemoino), 491 B.R. 580 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (New 
Jersey law), where cash was held in the entireties. Id. at 583–84. Even though 
§ 548(a) applied, the court permitted the debtor to plead “no harm no foul” as a 
defense. In contrast, in Maxwell v. Barounis (In re Swiontek), 376 B.R. 851 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), § 522(g) was applied in a § 544(b) case to permit the 
trustees to recover. Id. at 864. 
 843. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (2012). 
 844. Id. 
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the conveyance itself is the reason the exemption is forfeit. Absent 
the fraudulent conveyance, the trustee has no right to recover, and 
so the fraudulent conveyance is, at best, a positive boon to the 
trustee—not a hindrance. Accordingly, the court in T.R. Press, Inc. 
v. Whitcomb (In re Whitcomb)845 refused to quash the debtor’s 
discharge for such a conveyance.846 Nowhere does the Whitcomb 
opinion refer to § 522(g). 
On the other hand, if such a conveyance was made in a fraud 
on joint creditors, it would appear that the discharge is indeed 
forfeit. Paradoxically, § 522(g) destroys the exemption, which 
destroys the priority joint creditors obtain from the administration 
of the entireties. The recovery then goes into the bankruptcy estate 
in the main case, where the joint creditors must share equally with 
the individual creditors. Oddly, the intent to defraud the joint 
creditors results in a windfall for the individual creditors. 
iii. Post-Petition Conveyances 
The principle of § 522(g) must be applied with care when the 
debtor makes a post-petition conveyance of her entireties interest. 
In Olson v. Parker (In re Parker),847 a debtor filed for 
bankruptcy and thereafter purported to convey her share of the 
tenancy by the entirety to her soon-to-be ex-husband. The trustee 
claimed that this “conveyance” could be avoided under Bankruptcy 
Code § 549(a) as a post-petition transfer for the benefit of the 
bankruptcy estate.848 The debtor had not yet claimed the tenancy 
as an exemption.849 (Later, she would claim the federal homestead 
                                                                                                     
 845. 140 B.R. 396 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992). 
 846. Id. at 399–400. 
 847. 395 B.R. 12 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008). 
 848. Id. at 15. According to § 549(a): 
[T]he trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate— 
 (1) made after the commencement of the case; and 
(2)(A) that is authorized only under section 303(f) or 542(c) of this title; 
or 
 (B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court. 
11 U.S.C. § 549(a). 
 849. In re Parker, 395 B.R. at 15. 
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exemption, not the state exemptions.)850 Now, if the bankruptcy 
estate owned the debtor’s interest in the tenancy by the entirety 
and the debtor did not, the debtor’s quitclaim deed conveys nothing 
to her husband, and so there is nothing to avoid.851 Nevertheless, 
Judge Jeffrey Hughes ruled that the trustee had avoidance 
rights.852 This had the effect of canceling the debtor’s exemption 
right under § 552(g). Section 550(a) references § 549, and the 
debtor made a voluntary conveyance. Under § 552(g), the debtor 
could not exempt the property that the trustee “recovered.”853 If, 
however, it is observed that the debtor’s deed conveyed nothing 
and avoidance was not even necessary, the debtor could still have 
her exemption because Bankruptcy Code § 522(g) would not apply. 
All we observe is that the debtor wrote an inefficacious deed. In 
any case, assuming § 549(a) was a valid theory, this recovery 
would benefit the individual creditors, because it portended the 
end of the exemption. Oddly, if the debtor had delayed the deed 
until after the deadline for objecting to Schedule C had passed, the 
quitclaim deed she wrote would have been entirely lawful. Once 
exempt property is expelled from the bankruptcy estate, nothing 
in the Bankruptcy Code brings it back in.854 
iv. Lien Stripping 
The idea of a shadow bankruptcy is denied in Alvarez v. HSBC 
Bank USA, National Ass’n (In re Alvarez).855 Arguably, the Alvarez 
                                                                                                     
 850. Id. at 22. 
 851. I have argued for the superfluity of § 549(a) in most alleged cases of 
post-petition transfer. Carlson, Bankruptcy’s Acephalous Moment, supra note 
488, at 115–22. Technically, it could be said that the debtor does have a property 
interest in the tenancy by the entirety after bankruptcy—the right to receive a 
surplus under Bankruptcy Code § 726(a)(6). But, this property is precisely not 
property of the estate, and so any conveyance of this right to a surplus would not 
be avoidable under § 549. 
 852. See In re Parker, 395 B.R. at 23 (finding no “issue of fact regarding 
Trustee’s ability to avoid the subject transfer under Section 549”). 
 853. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2012). 
 854. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992) (denying the trustee 
the right to undo an effectuated exemption); Birney v. Smith (In re Birney), 200 
F.3d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1999) (“There must also be some applicable statutory 
mechanism by which the estate ‘captures’ the post-petition property.”). 
 855. Alvarez v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n (In re Alvarez), 733 F.3d 136 
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decision contradicts Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re Sumy),856 which 
invented the idea of the shadow bankruptcy.857 
In Alvarez, a debtor moved to “strip off” a second mortgage 
that was entirely out of money.858 This is a practice that is 
universally recognized in Chapter 13 cases.859 According to 
§ 1322(b)(2), a home mortgage may not be modified.860 But courts 
have found that, when a second mortgage is entirely underwater, 
it has a market value of zero.861 And what has a market value of 
zero must not be a property interest at all.862 Lien stripping can be 
accomplished by plan confirmation, where the underwater second 
mortgagee is simply treated as an unsecured creditor.863 
                                                                                                     
(4th Cir. 2013). 
 856. Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re Sumy), 777 F.2d 921, 930 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 857. Supra notes 647–648 and accompanying text. 
 858. Alvarez, 733 F.3d at 138. 
 859. See id. (noting that “every other circuit to have considered the question” 
has concluded that a bankruptcy court has the authority to strip off a completely 
valueless lien). 
 860. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012) (explaining that a plan may not modify 
the rights of holders of “a claim secured only by a security interest in real property 
that is the debtor’s principal residence”). 
 861. See Alvarez, 733 F.3d at 139 (discussing how “the value of the property 
when the petition was filed was less than the full amount owed on the 
first-priority lien, rendering the second-priority lien valueless”). 
 862. See Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1223 
(9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the status of a claim depends on the valuation of the 
property”); Lane v. W. Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 
2002) (distinguishing between the creditor  whose mortgage has some “value” and 
the creditor  whose mortgage is “valueless”); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners 
Ass’n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 284 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing how “a claim is 
secured only to the extent of the value of the property on which the lien is fixed”); 
McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 610 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(holding that a creditor is not secured if the lien attaches to property with no 
value); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 
2001) (holding that a claim was not “secured” because there was “insufficient 
equity in the property to cover any portion of that lien”); Griffey v. U.S. Bank (In 
re Griffey), 335 B.R. 166, 169 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2005) (noting that “valuation will 
control the determination of the mortgagee’s security interest”). 
 863. Many courts also thought that § 506(d) or § 506(a) independently support 
lien stripping. See, e.g., Hunter v. Citifinancial, Inc., (In re Hunter), 284 B.R. 806, 
809 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002) (discussing the application of § 506(d) in bankruptcy 
proceedings). In fact, these theories are unnecessary. Plan confirmation is 
ultimately what sustains lien stripping without any reference to § 506(a) or 
§ 506(d). In any case, the Supreme Court, in Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, 
135 S. Ct. 1995 (2015), has ruled that § 506(d) cannot be used to void an 
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In Alvarez, the debtor wished a pre-confirmation declaration 
that the underwater claim was not a lien.864 He wished to do so by 
reference to § 506(a).865 Although not bankrupt, the non-debtor 
spouse joined in the complaint.866 The court ruled that the debtor 
was entitled to no such declaration because such a declaration 
would eliminate the creditor’s rights against the non-debtor 
spouse.867 In asserting the right to eliminate the joint mortgage 
lien entirely, the debtor argued that, when he filed for bankruptcy, 
the tenancy by the entirety entered into the bankruptcy estate in 
the guise of a shadow bankruptcy.868 Because the entireties was 
within the bankruptcy estate, the plan could value the lien at 
zero—a valuation that would be binding outside of bankruptcy if 
the second mortgage lender ever attempted to foreclose against the 
non-debtor spouse.869 
The Alvarez court denied the very concept of a shadow 
bankruptcy: 
The Alvarezes nevertheless contend that Mrs. Alvarez and her 
interest in the entireties property are properly before the 
bankruptcy court, because Mr. and Mrs. Alvarez filed a joint 
complaint seeking to strip off the lien. The Alvarezes maintain 
that their act of jointly filing the complaint satisfied the 
requirement of Maryland law that tenant by the entirety act 
together to alter their interests in their entireties property . . . . 
Here, however, the Alvarezes’ complaint did not bring Mrs. 
Alvarez’s interest in the property before the court. The filing of 
the complaint did not alter the property rights contained in Mr. 
Alvarez’s bankruptcy estate or the power of the court to bind 
only the debtor and his creditors in any reorganization plan. 
Thus, the Alvarezes were not entitled to obtain the removal of 
                                                                                                     
underwater lien. Id. at 1997. 
 864. Alvarez v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n (In re Alvarez), 733 F.3d 136, 
138 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 865. Id. at 139. 
 866. Id. 
 867. See id. at 138 (affirming the district court’s judgment upholding a 
bankruptcy court’s refusal to “strip off” a “valueless lien” against certain real 
property that a debtor owned with his non-debtor spouse). 
 868. Id.  
 869. Id. at 139. 
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the lien against their entireties property without submitting 
both parties to the burden of a bankruptcy filing.870 
In denying the concept of the shadow bankruptcy, the Alvarez 
court contradicts Sumy v. Schlossberg (In re Sumy),871 the early 
Fourth Circuit case that established that concept in the first place. 
Therefore, in the Fourth Circuit, which gave birth to the concept, 
the shadow bankruptcy is currently in doubt. 
Perhaps, however, Alvarez and Sumy can be reconciled. In 
Alvarez, the underwater mortgagee must have been a joint 
creditor, as only a joint conveyance to a mortgage lender by both 
spouses is capable of encumbering the entireties in the first 
place.872 Since the underwater lender had to be treated in the 
Chapter 13 case as a joint unsecured creditor, the entireties was 
not exemptible in the first place. If there is no exemption, there 
can be no shadow bankruptcy.873 On this analysis, the Fourth 
Circuit rule is that the shadow bankruptcy disappears only when 
the spouse’s equity in the entireties (in light of valid mortgages) 
falls to zero. 
e. Disclaiming the Tenancy as an Exemption 
Does the shadow bankruptcy depend upon the debtor’s 
election to exempt the entireties under Bankruptcy Code 
§ 522(b)(3)(B)? What if the debtor makes no such claim but instead 
claims a monetarily limited homestead under § 552(b)(3)(B) (state 
homestead) or § 522(b)(2) (federal homestead option)? A debtor will 
wish to do this when the joint creditors are so numerous that 
exempting the entireties would be useless or not even possible. 
Van Der Heide v. LaBarge (In re Van Der Heide)874 implies that 
no shadow bankruptcy exists where the debtor claims only the 
homestead under § 522(b)(2). In the case, the debtor claimed a 
$9,900 homestead exemption against the entireties property.875 He 
                                                                                                     
 870. Id. at 142; accord In re Hunter, 284 B.R. at 806 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002). 
 871. 777 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 872. Infra notes 176–184 and accompanying text. 
 873. Infra notes 718–724 and accompanying text. 
 874. 164 F.3d 1183 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 875. Id. at 1185. 
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did not claim that the entireties as such was exempt (probably 
because the joint creditors claimed more than 100% of the equity 
in the property).876 He then filed a Chapter 13 plan, which required 
that he show that each creditor would get at least what he or she 
would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation.877 The debtor 
claimed that this would be 50% of the homestead minus $9,900.878 
The trustee asserted that the case included a shadow bankruptcy 
in which the joint creditors would receive 100% of the tenancy by 
the entirety (minus the $9,900 exemption).879 The court thought 
50% minus $9,900 was the right answer, which denied the 
existence of the shadow bankruptcy.880 
Similarly, in In re Raynard,881 Judge Hughes said in dictum 
that, in the absence of the exemption claim, the shadow 
bankruptcy is out of the question. He imagined an individual 
debtor claiming a monetarily limited homestead exemption,882 
which implies that a trustee may sell when the sales price exceeds 
the monetary exemption. The debtor obtains the exemption 
amount, of course.883 “As for the remainder of the proceeds, it is 
clear that the trustee would distribute the remainder to all 
creditors, not just joint creditors.”884 
To the contrary is In re Clifton,885 where the court implied that 
the shadow bankruptcy does not turn on the tenancy by the 
entirety being claimed as exempt. In Clifton, a debtor had a joint 
creditor with so large a claim that it exceeded the debtor’s equity 
                                                                                                     
 876. Id. at 1186. 
 877. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2012) (requiring the court to confirm a plan if 
“the value . . . of property to be distributed . . . is not less than the amount that 
would be paid . . . if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7”). 
 878. Van Der Heide, 164 F.3d at 1184. 
 879. Id. 
 880. Id. 
 881. 327 B.R. 623 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Raynard v. Rogers (In re Raynard), 354 B.R. 834 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2006). 
 882. See id. at 637–38 (assuming that the imagined debtor “chooses the 
so-called federal exemptions . . . instead of the . . . state exemptions”). 
 883. See Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 792 (2010) (“[T]he debtor will be 
guaranteed a payment in the dollar amount of the exemption.”). 
 884. In re Raynard, 327 B.R. at 637.  
 885. No. 09-02379-8-RDD, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2930 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 
19, 2013). 
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entirely.886 Based on the paradox described earlier,887 the marital 
entity was insolvent. There was no exemption for the tenancy by 
the entirety in this case and so there could be no shadow 
bankruptcy.888 
Nevertheless, in Clifton, the debtor also had a sizable tax 
liability to the IRS, which was not dischargeable in the debtor’s 
bankruptcy.889 Every dollar diverted from the main case to the 
shadow case was a dollar that would not go to the IRS as a priority 
creditor in the main case,890 and was a dollar for which the debtor 
would remain liable after the close of the bankruptcy proceeding. 
On the other hand, if the shadow bankruptcy could be dissolved 
and the tenancy by the entirety could be thrown in the main case, 
the joint creditor would lose greatly, but the IRS (and hence the 
debtor) would be enriched. Accordingly, the debtor hit upon the 
plan of amending Schedule C891 (where he had previously claimed 
the entireties as exempt) to renounce the exemption.892 Judge 
Doub ruled that, even though the tenancy by the entirety was not 
exempt, the joint creditor took priority in the shadow 
bankruptcy.893 In this shadow bankruptcy, the IRS had no claim at 
all and could not therefore assert its priority.894 Such a holding is 
untenable. Priority for joint claims presupposes that an exemption 
exists and has been selected for the entireties. In effect, Clifton 
                                                                                                     
 886. See id. at *2–3 (noting that a creditor “holds a joint claim against the 
Debtor and her non-filing spouse . . . in excess of $600,000.00”). 
 887. See supra notes 718–723 and accompanying text (demonstrating how a 
two-dollar difference can have a significant impact on bankruptcy proceedings). 
 888. Clifton, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2930, at *32. 
 889. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2012). 
 890. See id. § 507(a)(8) (placing the claim of “allowed unsecured claims of 
governmental units” eighth in priority for creditors). 
 891. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1009(a) (stating that Schedule C “may be amended 
by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed”). 
 892. See In re Romano, 378 B.R. 454, 463 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (noting that 
the court has discretion to prevent this amendment if prejudicial to the trustee); 
Shapiro v. First Franklin Fin. Corp. (In re Rechis), 339 B.R. 643, 644 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 2006) (same). In Ray v. Dawson (In re Dawson), 10 B.R. 680 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 1981), aff’d 14 B.R. 822 (E.D. Tenn. 1981), the debtor claimed a homestead 
only but was permitted to claim the tenancy by the entirety as exempt for the 
purposes of successfully opposing a § 363(h) sale of the whole. Id. at 684–85. 
 893. In re Clifton, No. 09-02379-8-RDD, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2930, at *30 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 19, 2013). 
 894. Id.  
160 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2018) 
awards a super-priority to joint creditors even when the tenancy 
by the entirety is not exemptible at all, due to marital 
insolvency.895 
We have said that the Bankruptcy Code presages Craft by 
empowering the trustee with a hypothetical judicial lien on the 
debtor’s 50% interest in the tenancy by the entirety. The only 
difference between Craft and the Bankruptcy Code is that the 
Bankruptcy Code invites an entireties exemption and the IRC does 
not.896 Suppose a debtor, seeing that the entireties exemption is 
useless, deliberately does not claim the entireties as exempt 
(perhaps by choosing the federal exemption, which has a limited 
homestead provision but no entireties provision). Cases like Van 
Der Heide897 assume that the bankruptcy trustee (like the IRS in 
Craft) may sell a 50% tenancy in common, subject to any monetary 
homestead right. Basically, only the debtor’s 50% interest goes into 
the bankruptcy estate. The non-debtor spouse’s 50% does not come 
into the bankruptcy estate because (where the debtor does not 
choose the entireties exemption) there is no shadow bankruptcy. 
Some cases, however, are inconsistent with this assumption 
and hold that 100% of the tenancy enters the bankruptcy estate, 
                                                                                                     
 895. In Clifton, the IRS intervened to point out that, even though the IRS 
never filed notice of its lien pursuant to I.R.C. § 6323, it nevertheless had a lien 
under § 6321, and this unperfected lien took priority over the joint creditor, which 
had no lien at all. Id. at *30–31. Judge Doub was able to counteract this point by 
asserting the bankruptcy trustee’s status as hypothetical judicial lien creditor for 
the benefit of the joint creditors. Id. at *31. Thus, the joint creditors had a lien, 
via the trustee, and, under I.R.C. § 6323(a), the joint creditors took priority over 
the unperfected tax lien. Id. at *31–32. For a similar result, see In re Surles, 
No. 01-13070C-7G, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 2455, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. May 1, 
2003). In Surles, two spouses (both bankrupt) did not claim their tenancy by the 
entirety as exempt. Id. at *2. The trustee sold the house and was about to 
distribute the proceeds when one of the spouses died. Id. The court gave priority 
to the joint creditors over the individual creditors of the two spouses. Id. at *6. 
Ironically, if the debtor had not filed for bankruptcy, then the IRS tax lien, albeit 
unperfected, would have taken priority over the unsecured joint creditors, by the 
direct application of Craft. But, because the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the 
trustee’s status as a hypothetical judicial lien creditor made the joint creditors 
into secured creditors with a better claim to the tenancy by the entirety than the 
IRS’s unperfected tax lien. See id. at *12 (concluding that “the proceeds may be 
used to pay the claims for which only the male Debtor is liable as well as joint 
claims”). 
 896. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 897. Van Der Heide v. LaBarge (In re Van Der Heide), 164 F.3d 1183, 1184 
(8th Cir. 1999). 
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even though the debtor renounces the entireties exemption.898 
Although correct when the debtor chooses the entireties 
exemption, it is incorrect when the exemption is not chosen. This 
being said, it is still true that Bankruptcy Code § 363(h) empowers 
the sale of the non-debtor spouse’s 50% share.899 
One case where the court assumes incorrectly that the debtor 
is 100% owner is In re Brannon,900 where the debtors in an 
unconsolidated joint case owned a stock portfolio valued at 
$15,796.901 The wife’s 50% share of this portfolio was $7,898.902 The 
wife, however, claimed to own $10,200 of the portfolio, against 
which she applied her available federal exemption amount of 
$10,200.903 The husband claimed to own the rest, as to which he 
claimed an available $1,150 in exemptions.904 The debtors 
admitted that the bankruptcy estate owned $4,446 worth of the 
portfolio.905 The lower courts held that the wife owned only 50% of 
the portfolio, meaning that she could exempt only $7,898.906 This 
ruling increased the size of the share that was in the bankruptcy 
estate. On appeal, however, the Third Circuit reversed on per tout 
et non per my grounds—that is, the wife was assumed to be a 100% 
owner of the entireties.907 
The Brannon court relied on Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & 
Trust Co.,908 a joint bank account case. In Madden, spouses had a 
                                                                                                     
 898. See In re Brannon, 476 F.3d 170, 172 (3d Cir. 2007) (assuming incorrectly 
that the debtor is 100% owner); Madden v. Gosztonyi Sav. & Tr. Co., 200 A. 624, 
630 (Pa. 1938) (arguing that “either spouse presumptively has the power to act 
for both”). 
 899. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (explaining that “the trustee may sell both the 
estate’s interest . . . and the interest of any co-owner in property in which the 
debtor had . . . an undivided interest as a . . . tenant by the entirety”). 
 900. 476 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 901. Id. at 172. 
 902. Id. 
 903. Id. 
 904. Id. 
 905. Id. 
 906. See id. (quoting the bankruptcy judge’s reasoning that “[t]he 
presumption is that each spouse is a one-half owner of the tenancy by the entirety 
asset”). 
 907. See id. at 173 (relying on “relevant tenancy by the entireties principles”). 
 908. 200 A. 624 (Pa. 1938). 
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bank account in the entireties.909 The husband unilaterally agreed 
to take a haircut on the account in a bank reorganization.910 Later, 
the spouses sued for the original amount of the account.911 They 
claimed that the unilateral release by the husband could not bind 
the wife, just as a unilateral deed of real estate could not have any 
effect.912 The bank prevailed because the husband was the agent of 
the wife for purposes of agreeing to the haircut.913 In the course of 
deciding for the spouses against the bank, the Madden court made 
the following remark about ordinary withdrawals from the bank 
account: “[E]ither spouse presumptively has the power to act for 
both, so long as the marriage subsists, in matters of entireties, 
without any specific authorization, provided the fruits or proceeds 
of such action inures to the benefit of both that the estate is not 
terminated.”914 Using this idea, the Third Circuit observed that: 
[E]ach of the debtors identified unequal parts of the entireties 
property that they wished to exempt. . . . [T]he spouses agreed 
to the respective allocations. We hold these uses were 
permissible under the Bankruptcy Code. The trustee’s attempt 
to limit exemptions at 50% of the total allowed through the 
bankruptcy system is a restriction of each spouse’s rights to act 
with respect to the portion of the entireties property eligible for 
exemption.915 
Brannon can be criticized on the following ground: At the time 
of the bankruptcy petition, the husband and wife had not yet 
agreed that the wife owned 2/3 of the stock portfolio, so, 
presumptively, 50% of the portfolio went into the husband’s 
bankruptcy estate, where the husband deliberately eschewed the 
entireties exemption. Accordingly, the trustee’s hypothetical 
judicial lien attached to 50% of the portfolio. Later, by means of 
Schedule C, the husband transferred 1/6 of this property to his 
                                                                                                     
 909. Id. at 626. 
 910. That is, the spouse agreed that the account would be deemed 50% of its 
proper amount, pursuant to a plan of reorganization. Id. 
 911. Id. 
 912. Id. 
 913. See id. at 630 (noting that “there is nothing in the law relating to the 
entireties that would prevent the wife from giving the husband express authority 
to sign for her as her agent”). 
 914. Id. at 630–31. 
 915. In re Brannon, 476 F.3d 170, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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wife. But this could not be done in derogation of the trustee’s lien. 
In short, the Third Circuit acquiesced to a post-petition transfer of 
estate property that is nowhere authorized by the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
If we applied Craft to the case, we could say that the trustee 
(in analogy to the IRS) has a lien on the husband’s 50%. True, in 
bankruptcy the husband Kenneth Brannon could have elected the 
entireties exemption.916 (In comparison, Don Craft had no 
exemption under the IRC.) But Kenneth did not choose this 
exemption. Therefore, Craft directly applies, and Kenneth could 
not make a post-petition conveyance of 1/6 of the portfolio to his 
spouse. 
The Brannon court wrongfully rejected any Craft analysis, 
because Craft is a monster. Craft “was concerned with the power 
of the [IRS] under a statute authorizing a lien on all ‘property’ or 
‘rights to property’ of a delinquent taxpayer.”917 Its principle 
cannot be extended to bankruptcy cases because that would 
unleash the monster. In fact, the bankruptcy trustee also has “the 
rights and powers of . . . (1) a creditor [who] obtains . . . a judicial 
lien on all property [of the debtor].”918 The Bankruptcy Code uses 
the same word as the IRC—property! And for that reason (where 
the debtor eschews the entireties exemption), the Craft opinion is 
directly applicable. The Brannon result should be rejected because 
it fails to honor the Supreme Court’s holding in Craft. 
Other courts affirm what the Brannon court illegitimately 
assumed: When a spouse with an entireties interest files for 
bankruptcy, she brings 100% of the property into the estate even 
when she eschews the entireties exemption. 
In In re Snyder,919 a debtor chose the federal exemption, not 
the entireties exemption, and so the case is congruent with 
Brannon.920 A pre-existing lien of $65,000 existed.921 This was the 
lien of an individual creditor, but Massachusetts permits 
                                                                                                     
 916. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 917. Brannon, 476 F.3d at 177. 
 918. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (emphasis added).  
 919. 231 B.R. 437 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Snyder v. Rockland 
Tr. Co. (In re Snyder), 249 B.R. 40 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 2000), aff’d, No. 00-9009, 2001 
U.S. App. LEXIS 16685 (1st Cir. Mar. 2, 2001). 
 920. Id. at 440. 
 921. Id. at 439. 
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individual creditors of a spouse to obtain a present judicial lien.922 
The lien, however, may not be presently enforced.923 It may be 
enforced only if and when the individual spouse survives her 
non-debtor spouse.924 
Under the formula of Bankruptcy Code § 522(f)(2), 
impairment of the exemption is defined by: 














Examining this formula, avoidance (column E) is maximized if the 
value of the debtor’s interest in the property (column A) is minimized. 
Therefore, the debtor benefits—more lien is avoided—if the debtor 
claims only 50% of the total value of Blackacre.925 (To compensate for 
this assumption, only 50% of the valid mortgages may be subtracted 
in Column C.)926 The creditor benefits if the debtor is considered the 
100% owner per tout et non per my. In Snyder, the court concluded that 
the debtor was the 100% owner, hereby limiting avoidance to 
$8,286.82.927 Had the debtor been a 50% owner, avoidance would  
                                                                                                     
 922. See id. (stating that Rockland Trust Company held the $65,000 judicial 
lien on the debtor’s interest alone). 
 923. See id. at 444 (noting that “Rockland cannot enforce its lien until either 
the tenancy is terminated or the nondebtor spouse ceases to occupy the property 
as her primary residence”). 
 924. See infra Part III.B.11.c (summarizing Massachusetts law regarding 
tenancy by the entirety). 
 925. The debtor in fact argued for less than 50% based on actuarial concerns—
he was older than his spouse and, as a male, not likely to live as long. Snyder, 249 
B.R. at 45–46. The court rejected the use of actuarial data. Id. 
 926. See Janitor v. Fid. Bank (In re Janitor), No. 10-22594-JAD, 2011 Bankr. 
LEXIS 5285, at *16 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011) (holding that 100% should 
apply in both Columns A and C). 
 927. See In re Snyder, 231 B.R. 437, 441 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999), aff’d sub 
nom. Snyder v. Rockland Tr. Co. (In re Snyder), 249 B.R. 40 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 2000), 
aff’d, No. 00-9009, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16685 (1st Cir. Mar. 2, 2001); see also 
In re Nichol, No. 08 B 19054, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 370, at *17 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 6, 2009); In re Levinson, 372 B.R. 582, 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007) (applying 
incorrectly per tout, et non per my in a New York case). In Brinley v. LPP 
Mortgage, Ltd. (In re Brinley), 403 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2005), a debtor with an 
entireties interest filed for bankruptcy, but did not choose the entireties 
exemption. Id. at 418. The court imposed 100% value on the debtor on per tout et 
THE FEDERAL LAW OF PROPERTY 165 
                                                                                                     
non per my grounds. Id. at 423. Here are the relevant data: 
$280,000 The 100% value of Blackacre as unencumbered 
$180,000 The amount of a senior mortgage 
$112,418.35 The junior judicial lien 
$ 80,345.09 Another mortgage (third in priority) 
$  6,000 The Kentucky homestead exemption 
 
Here are the § 522(f)(2) calculations, where, as in the text, column A is the value 
of the property, column B is the targeted lien, column C is the valid liens to be 
deducted, D is the homestead exemption, and E is the avoidance amount: 
The Debtor’s Calculation 
A  B  C  D  E 
140,000 -112,418.35 -180,000 -6,000 = -158,418.35 
The Bankruptcy Court’s Calculation 
A B C D E 
280,000 -112,418.35 -180,000 -6,000 = -8,418.35 
The District Court’s Calculation 
A B C D E 
280,000 -112,418.35 -180,000 
-80,345.09 
-6,000 = Total 
Avoidance 
The Court of Appeals’ Calculation 
A B C D E 
280,000.00 -112,418.35 -180,000 
-80,345.09 
-6,000 = -98,763.44 
The Correct Calculation 
A B C D E 
140,000 -112,418.35 -90,000 -6,000 = -68,418.35 
The debtor’s calculation may be faulted for not halving the deduction for the 
senior mortgage in C. The bankruptcy court may be faulted for treating the debtor 
as the 100% owner in A (instead of the 50% owner, as Craft requires). The district 
court may be faulted for counting the third mortgage in the calculation (as a 
literal reading of § 522(f)(2) requires). Using the $80,345.09 in C “may give a 
debtor contemplating bankruptcy the ability to wipe out judicial liens by 
persuading a lender to take an otherwise junior consensual lien that renders the 
exempt property over-encumbered and therefore ripe for impairment.” See Kolich 
v. Antioch Laurel Veterinary Hosp. (In re Kolich), 328 F.3d 406, 410 (8th Cir. 
2003) (adding a third mortgage per the literal words of § 522(f)(2)). The district 
court can be further faulted by declaring the judicial lien utterly void, when 
arithmetic shows otherwise. The court of appeals is to be commended for actually 
doing the math, but it should not have added the $80,345.09. Adding this number 
rewrites § 522(f)(1) by prohibiting impairment of the exemption or impairing a 
third mortgage junior to the judicial lien. Why should the judicial lien be avoided 
because it impaired a third mortgage? 
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have been complete.928 
Treating the individual entireties owner as the 100% owner 
overlooks the congressional intent to pierce the marital veil in the 
Craft style. It may be true that, under state law, the marital entity 
owns 100% of the property, but Congress has decided that the 
debtor is the owner (not the marital entity) for the purposes of 
§ 541(a).929 And what the debtor owns is a 50% share.930 It is true 
that 100% of the entireties goes into the bankruptcy estate, where 
a shadow bankruptcy might possibly administer it. In the shadow 
bankruptcy, the marital entity owns 100%. But it is still true that 
the debtor’s share of the entireties is only 50%. 
In Snyder, the court felt that it should issue a “provisional 
order” in light of the fact that the post-bankruptcy lien was 
embargoed.931 It favored the creditor by using the 100% value.932 
After bankruptcy, the lien would continue to be embargoed, but if 
the debtor survived his wife, the lien would be presently 
enforceable. If, however, the tenancy by the entirety ended earlier 
by sale or divorce, the court would entertain, in a re-opened 
bankruptcy, a recalculation of the § 522(f)(2) formula based on the 
debtor’s 50% share.933 Thus, the lien would continue to be mostly 
                                                                                                     
 928. Accord In re Brumbaugh, 250 B.R. 605 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2000) 
(presumably overruled by Brinley); In re Coley, 437 B.R. 779 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2010). 
 929. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012) (including “all legal or equitable interests 
of the debtor in property”). 
 930. Supra notes 498–510 and accompanying text. 
 931. See Snyder, 231 B.R. at 445 (discussing how the “more reasonable option 
is to enter a provisional order that resolves the motion in such a way that both 
parties’ rights . . . are preserved until the tenancy is terminated”). 
 932. Id.  
 933. See id. (explaining that “the order shall be subject to reconsideration for 
changed circumstances”). 
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valid but could be downgraded later.934 In the long run, no harm 
was done.935 
10. Fraudulent Tenancies by the Entireties 
Suppose a debtor and her spouse own real property as tenants 
in common, not by the entireties. May the couple convey a 
Michigan-style tenancy by the entirety to the marital entity on the 
eve of bankruptcy? If so, nonexempt property has been 
transformed into exempt property. Major wealth has been 
transferred from the debtor’s unsecured creditors to the marital 
entity. 
Properly, a fraudulent tenancy by the entirety is not 
exemptible. According to Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(3)(B), a debtor 
may exempt an entireties “to the extent that such interest as a 
tenants by the entirety . . . is exempt from process under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.”936 A fraudulently conveyed entireties is 
subject to process under applicable nonbankruptcy law. In Newlove 
v. Callaghan,937 creditors of a debtor who fraudulently conveyed a 
tenancy by the entirety to a marital entity successfully brought a 
creditor’s bill in equity in aid of a levy on the entireties. That meant 
the entireties was not exempt from process. In the bankruptcy 
                                                                                                     
 934. According to Judge Carol Kenner: 
I use this assumption not because I have an opinion as to how things 
will turn out but because the result it dictates better preserves [the 
creditor’s] lien rights pending termination of the tenancy and, if 
necessary, reconsideration of this order at that time. This way, [the] 
lien will remain of record until the tenancy is terminated. This serves 
two purposes: it preserves the priority of [the] lien pending termination 
of the tenancy and possible reconsideration; and it places the onus on 
the Debtor—the party who is more familiar with the ongoing status of 
the tenancy by the entirety and of the extent of his interest if and when 
it is terminated—to seek reconsideration if it is warranted. 
Id. at 445 n.6. 
 935. This solution resembles the Tennessee solution deferring the decision 
until the moment when the debtor establishes herself as the surviving spouse. 
Infra notes 995–999 and accompanying text. For a similar invitation to reopen 
the case to vindicate the homestead exemption in the case the debtor survived his 
spouse, see In re Dick, 136 B.R. 1000, 1005 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992).  
  936. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 937. 48 N.W. 1096 (Mich. 1891). 
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context, this means that a fraudulent entireties is not 
exemptible.938 
The transfer from cotenant spouses to the spouses as tenants 
by the entirety would seem, at first glance, to be a fraudulent 
transfer. According to Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1): 
The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . if the debtor . . .  
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for such transfer . . . ; and 
(ii)(I) was insolvent . . . .939  
The marital entity is the transferee. The marital entity gave no 
reasonably equivalent value for this transfer. If the spouses were 
insolvent, does not the trustee have a fraudulent transfer theory 
to recover the conveyance to the marital entity? 
The superegoic nature of the bankruptcy estate throws the 
matter into doubt. Even without any reference to fraudulent 
transfer theory, the tenancy by the entirety comes into the 
bankruptcy estate via § 541(a)(1).940 By its entry into the estate, 
the tenancy by the entirety is transformed into a tenancy in 
common. This transformation occurs because the debtor is unable 
to exempt her share of the marital property as a tenancy by the 
entirety. In that case, the trustee may sell the debtor’s share as if 
it were a tenancy in common. Once that sale occurs, the entireties 
is severed. The nonbankrupt spouse suddenly finds herself a 
tenant in common.941 All this occurs without any reference to 
fraudulent transfer law. 
The consequence of this observation for fraudulent transfer 
theory is profound. Before bankruptcy the debtors had tenancies 
in common. These they conveyed to the marital entity. By virtue of 
the bankruptcy, the marital entity is deprived of the entireties and 
the bankruptcy estate has a tenancy in common. The tenancy 
remains “in common” because the debtor cannot exempt an 
entireties share by claiming the § 522(b)(2)(B) entireties 
exemption. Given that the entireties is stuck in the bankruptcy 
estate as a tenancy in common, it is impossible to say there has 
                                                                                                     
 938. Accord In re Elkins, 94 B.R. 932 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988). 
 939. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012). 
 940. Supra notes 495–516 and accompanying text. 
 941. Supra notes 518–542. 
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been a fraudulent transfer prejudicial to the unsecured creditors. 
The debtor started with a tenancy in common and the bankruptcy 
estate ends up with a tenancy in common. 
In In re Mickens,942 the debtors owned Michigan real property 
as joint tenants with the right of survivorship—tenancies that 
creditors could reach (unless the homestead laws were to apply).943 
On advice of counsel, the debtors, on the eve of their joint 
bankruptcy, conveyed to themselves a tenancy by the entirety. In 
the bankruptcy, the trustee sued the debtors as recipients of a 
fraudulent conveyance,944 and the debtors claimed their entireties 
shares as exempt.945 
The trustee objected to the exemption on the theory that its 
exercise interfered with the trustee’s right to recover the 
fraudulent transfer.946 More directly, the trustee could have noted 
simply that, because a fraudulent tenancy by the entirety is subject 
to process under state law, it is not exemptible.947 Be that as it 
may, the Mickens court disallowed the exemption.948 
Accepting defeat, the debtors in Mickens amended their 
Schedules C to claim the Michigan homestead right.949 The trustee 
objected to this exemption too. The trustee figured, under § 522(g), 
the debtors had forfeited the homestead exemption. According to 
§ 522(g): 
[T]he debtor may exempt under subsection (b) of this section 
property that the trustee recovers under section . . . 550 . . . to 
the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property 
                                                                                                     
  942. 575 B.R. 797 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2017). 
 943. See id. at 802 (contrasting joint tenancies with tenancies by the entirety). 
 944. The trustee won summary judgment on this claim. Id. at 800. 
  945. The exemption claim was pursuant to MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 600.5451(1)(n) (West 2018). Mickens, 575 B.R. at 801. 
 946. See Mickens, 575 B.R. at 800 (“[T]he court characterized the Trustee’s 
objection as essentially seeking ‘conditional relief’ in the event that the Trustee 
was successful in avoiding the transfer and recovering the Property in the 
adversary proceeding.”). 
 947. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 948. Mickens, 575 B.R. at 805. 
 949. Id. at 801. Although the amendment was based on a failure to put over 
a fraud, the debtors had an absolute right to amend Schedule C. See Ellman v. 
Baker (In re Baker), 791 F.3d 677, 683 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[B]ankruptcy courts do 
not have authority to use their equitable powers to disallow exemptions or 
amendments to exemptions due to bad faith or misconduct.”). 
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under subsection (b) of this section if such property had not been 
transferred, if 
(1)(A) such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such 
property by the debtor . . . .950 
Section 550, in turn, is the omnibus remedial section that 
incorporates all fraudulent transfer recoveries.951 
The trustee’s theory was that, prior to bankruptcy, the debtors 
had joint tenancies that could have been homesteaded. But these 
tenancies were voluntarily conveyed away and so could no longer 
be homesteaded under § 522(g)(1)(A). 
The Mickens court, however, permitted the homestead 
exemption. The trustee, said the court, had not recovered a 
fraudulent transfer pursuant to § 550. All that the trustee did was 
block the entireties exemption.952 
This seems to be correct. A few days prior to bankruptcy, the 
debtors had nonexempt cotenancies that creditors could reach but 
that could be homesteaded. These cotenancies were conveyed to 
the marital entity. Five days later, the marital entity lost these 
cotenancies to the bankruptcy estate, and they entered the 
bankruptcy estate as cotenancies, not as tenancies by the entirety. 
In short, the superegoic effect of federal property law completely 
undercut the trustee’s recovery of a fraudulent transfer. As a 
consequence, § 522(g)(1)(A) was no impediment to the homestead 
claim. 
As we are soon to learn, an exemption claimed on Schedule C 
is valid unless a party in interest objects, even if nonexempt 
property listed on Schedule C is exempt.953 If the trustee permitted 
the entireties exemption to proceed, might the trustee recover the 
exempted entireties shares as fraudulent transfers? If so, 
                                                                                                     
 950. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g). 
  951. Id. § 550(a) (“[T]o the extent that a transfer is avoided under [§§] 544 [or] 
548 . . . , the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property 
transferred . . . .”). 
 952. In re Mickens, 575 B.R. 797, 810 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2017) (“Here, the 
avoidance of the prepetition transfer did not result in new property coming into 
the estate. It simply, but importantly, restricted the Debtors’ ability to claim an 
entireties exemption in Property that was unquestionably property of the estate 
both before and after the transfer.”). 
 953. Infra notes 972–1004 and accompanying text. 
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§ 522(g)(1)(A) prevents the homestead exemption from being 
asserted. 
In In re Page,954 the debtor was permitted to exempt a 
fraudulent entireties share in corporate stock because the 
creditors’ objection to the exemption was too late. Nevertheless, 
lateness of the objection was “without prejudice to any action by 
the trustee to recover property, e.g., by using his strong arm 
powers under section 544.”955 The trustee, however, cannot get 
past Bankruptcy Code § 522(c), which provides: 
[P]roperty exempted under this section is not liable during or 
after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose . . . before the 
commencement of the case . . . .956 
Perhaps the trustee is entitled to the exception in § 522(c)(2)—“a 
debt secured by a lien.”957 The trustee is subrogated to all the 
unsecured claims that arose before the commencement of the case 
and has a hypothetical judicial lien by virtue of § 544(a)(1).958 In 
that case, the trustee could “recover” the entireties and the debtors 
could not then claim the recovered property as a homestead. But 
this overlooks the fact that exemption in bankruptcy is the 
renunciation of the trustee’s hypothetical judicial lien. It would be 
contradictory to read § 522(c) to mean that the trustee can always 
take back exempted property because the trustee’s lien still 
encumbers it, when exemption is renunciation of the hypothetical 
lien by definition. Therefore, if the entireties is successfully 
exempted, the trustee’s future cause of action is blocked by 
§ 522(c). 
One last thought on this topic. Suppose a husband (H) owns a 
100% fee simple absolute interest in real property. Shortly before 
filing for bankruptcy, H, seeking to flummox the creditors,  conveys 
the fee simple to the marital entity in the entireties. In H’s 
bankruptcy, H has a cotenancy for 50% on the terms just described. 
                                                                                                     
 954. 240 B.R. 548 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1999). 
  955. Id. at 553. 
  956. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (2012). 
 957. Id. § 522(c)(2). 
 958. Id. § 544(a) (“The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the 
case . . . the rights and powers of . . . (1) a creditor that [has] a judicial lien on all 
property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a 
judicial lien . . . .”). 
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His wife (W), however, holds the other cotenancy, and this has been 
fraudulently conveyed to W. Accordingly, the trustee can recover 
W’s 50%. But this does not interfere with H’s homestead 
exemption. H’s homestead applies to H’s 50% share. H is not trying 
to exempt W’s share, and so § 522(g) is no impediment to H’s 
exemption. 
The marital entity has liability for having received W’s 50% 
share in a fraudulent transfer. But if W also files for bankruptcy, 
a surprising result ensues. W’s bankruptcy trustee takes a tenancy 
in common from the marital entity free and clear of H’s bankruptcy 
trustee. W, therefore, can homestead her share, which she could 
not have done outside bankruptcy. 
The key to this result is to see that bankruptcy constitutes a 
transfer of W’s prepetition property to W’s bankruptcy estate. 
Bankruptcy Code § 541(a) provides: 
The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 
303 . . . creates an estate, Such estate is comprised of all the 
following property, wherever located and by whomever held: 
(1) . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property 
as of the commencement of the case.959 
Why is commencement of the case a “transfer?” It suffices to 
observe that, a few minutes before the bankruptcy petition, W had 
power to possess the marital property. Pending avoidance, W had 
power960 to convey a good title to a subsequent good faith 
transferee.961 After the bankruptcy petition, at least some of these 
powers have disappeared and have been created in the bankruptcy 
trustee. The simultaneous disappearance of power in W and the 
                                                                                                     
 959. Id. § 541(a)(1). 
 960. Recall that H’s bankruptcy made W a cotenant, not a tenant by the 
entirety. Therefore, W has a unilateral right to convey. 
 961. Under Michigan’s newly-enacted Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, see 
2016 Mich. Pub. Acts. 552 (effective April 10, 2017), W’s power can be located in 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 566.38(2)(b) (West 2017) (“Recovery pursuant to section 
7(1)(a) or (2) of or from the asset transferred or its proceeds, by levy or otherwise, 
is available only against a person described in subdivision (a)(i) or (ii).” (emphasis 
omitted)). Since a good faith transferee is not described in § 566.38(a)(ii), W has 
the power described in the text. Section 7(1)(a) would seem to be a reference to 
§ 566.37(1)(a) and deals with “[a]voidance of the transfer.” Id. § 566.37(1)(a). 
Section (2) seems to be a reference to § 566.37(c)(2): “If a creditor has obtained a 
judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may 
levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds.” Id. § 566.37(c)(2). 
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appearance of the same power in W’s trustee means that 
bankruptcy consists of a transfer from W to the bankruptcy 
trustee. According to Judge Jeffrey Hughes: 
Ironically, the creation of a separate bankruptcy estate and the 
immediate transfer of the debtor’s property into that newly 
created estate are so basic to bankruptcy law that they have 
become virtually transparent to the critical observer. While 
court after court will incant that a bankruptcy proceeding 
creates an estate and that all of the debtor’s property becomes 
property of the estate, it is seldom that a court has actually 
paused to appreciate the profound effect these principles have 
upon property law.962 
What kind of transfer? This question is answered by 
Bankruptcy Code § 544(a). With regard to personal property (and, 
for that matter, real property), the Bankruptcy Code creates a 
judicial lien in favor of the trustee.963 Creation of a lien is always a 
transfer from the debtor to a creditor (in this case, the bankruptcy 
trustee, a fiduciary representative of creditors).964 A special rule 
makes the trustee a bona fide purchaser (who has recorded) of the 
debtor’s prepetition realty.965 
Thus, W’s bankruptcy trustee is a transferee of a transferee of 
H’s fraudulent transfer. W was the initial transferee and W’s 
trustee is the second-order transferee. W is liable for H’s 
fraudulent transfer as “the initial transferee of such transfer.”966 
But now she is bankrupt and protected by the automatic stay.967 
W’s trustee is liable as an “immediate . . . transferee of such initial 
transferee.”968 As a transferee of a transferee, W’s bankruptcy 
trustee is entitled to a defense against H’s bankruptcy trustee. 
According to this defense: 
                                                                                                     
 962. In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 800–01 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 
2004). 
  963. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 964. See id. § 101(54) (“The term ‘transfer’ means—(A) the creation of a 
lien . . . .”). 
  965. Id. § 544(a)(3). 
 966. Id. § 550(a)(1). 
   967. See id. § 362(a)(2) (prohibiting postpetition commencement of collection 
actions). 
  968. Id. § 550(a)(2). 
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The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section 
from— 
(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or 
securing of a present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and 
without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided 
. . . .969 
As creditor representative for W’s unsecured creditors, the trustee 
takes title to W’s 50% as a “securing of [the] antecedent debt,” 
which W’s trustee represents.970 Furthermore, W’s trustee takes 
the transfer “without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of 
any creditor.”971 Thus, W’s bankruptcy defeats H’s bankruptcy. W 
may therefore claim the entireties share as a homestead (but not 
as an entirety). 
11. Deadline for Objecting 
In bankruptcy, the exempt property goes into the bankruptcy 
estate and the debtor must fetch it out under Bankruptcy Code 
§ 522(l) by filing Schedule C.972 Once this is done, the creditors are 
subject to a thirty-day deadline under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 4003(b)(1).973 After 2008, the deadline has been 
softened:  “The trustee may file an objection to a claim of exemption 
at any time prior to one year after the closing of the case if the 
debtor fraudulently asserted the claim of exemption.”974 The 
Supreme Court has twice visited this deadline in its pre-2008 
version.975 
                                                                                                     
  969. Id. § 550(b). 
 970. Id. 
  971. Id. § 544(a). 
 972. See id. § 522(l) (explaining that “[t]he debtor shall file a list of property 
that the debtor claims as exempt”). 
 973. According to Rule 4003(b)(1): 
[A] party in interest may file an objection to the list of property claimed 
as exempt within 30 days after the meeting of creditors held under 
§ 341(a) is concluded or within 30 days after any amendment to the list 
or supplemental schedules is filed, which is later. 
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b)(1). 
 974. Id. 4003(b)(2). 
 975. See Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 791 (2010) (finding the objection 
deadline inapplicable because Reilly’s exemptions were unobjectionable under the 
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As of December 1, 2015, a new Form B-106(C) governs the 
debtor’s claim of an exemption, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code 
§ 522(l).976 But, at the time the Supreme Court decided Schwab v. 
Reilly,977 the debtor had to list every exempt item on Schedule C.  
Schedule C had four columns in it. Here are the column headings 
and here is how a New York debtor must account for a pet dog 















Fido N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
§ 5205(a)(4) 
$1,000   $1,100 
If the trustee or a creditor wishes to object to this exemption, she 
has thirty days after the first scheduled-creditors meeting to do it 
(where the debtor has not been fraudulent).980 What if the trustee 
fails to object to the debtor’s Schedule C by this deadline? Is there 
any practical effect on Fido? According to the Supreme Court in 
Schwab, the answer is no.981 Fido is exempt only to the extent that 
New York C.P.L.R. § 5205(a)(4) says he is. Beyond that, the trustee 
has a hypothetical judicial lien on the whole of Fido, and this the 
                                                                                                     
Code); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992) (discussing how 
“[d]eadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and 
they produce finality”). 
 976. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) advisory committee’s note to 2015 revision of Form 
B-106(C) (making the schedules “easier to read and, as a result, likely to generate 
more complete and accurate responses”). 
 977. 560 U.S. 770 (2010). 
 978. Supra notes 660–665 and accompanying text. 
 979. Under new Form B-106(C), the four columns have become: 
Brief description of 
the property and 
line on Schedule 
A/B that lists this 
property 
Current value 
of the portion 
you own 







 980.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) (setting the deadline for objecting to an 
exemption as “30 days after the meeting of creditors”). 
 981. Schwab, 560 U.S. at 770. 
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trustee may sell under Bankruptcy Code § 363(b).982 In the sale, 
the trustee sells both the exempt portion and the nonexempt 
portion of Fido. The trustee may retain $100 and must remit 
$1,000 of the proceeds to the debtor, as the $1,000 are not proceeds 
of the bankruptcy estate. In effect, a monetarily-limited exemption 
is not immune from the sale of the whole. It is merely a charge in 
the debtor’s favor on the cash proceeds obtained by the trustee 
upon sale of the whole. 
Translating these points to the tenancy by the entirety, 
suppose a debtor spouse files individually for bankruptcy and lists 
on Schedule C a Michigan-style entireties. We would expect to see 
















by the entirety) 
Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 600.5451(1)(o)983  
Total value 




Suppose neither the bankruptcy trustee nor any other creditor 
objects to this exemption. Where does the matter stand? 
The bankruptcy trustee has a lien on the entireties to the 
extent of the joint claims. Schedule C (as we have filled it out) does 
not set forth the amount of joint claims (if any). Must the trustee 
object to this exemption by the Rule 4003(b) deadline? Schwab 
indicates that no objection is needed. The debtor is not trying to 
claim anything more than what the law allows. If it turns out there 
are joint claims, the trustee has a lien on the entireties 
representing the joint claims in the shadow bankruptcy of the 
marital entity. The trustee has the leisure to investigate the 
jointness of claims free and clear of any deadline at all.985 Leisure 
                                                                                                     
 982. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012) (permitting sale out of the ordinary course 
of business with court approval). 
 983. Judge Hughes thinks that this entry should refer to Bankruptcy Code 
§ 522(b)(3). In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 835 n.47 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004), rev’d 
sub nom. Spears v. Boyd (In re Spears), 313 B.R. 212 (W.D. Mich. 2004). Michigan 
itself has now codified the common law version of its tenancy by the entirety. 
 984. This would be the debtor equity in light of outstanding valid mortgages. 
 985. Indeed, the trustee may close a case and reopen it later to sell the 
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to investigate is needed because the Bankruptcy Code nowhere 
requires that the individual debtor schedule a creditor as a joint 
creditor with his spouse. Indeed, unscheduled joint creditors might 
be discovered who would benefit from a shadow bankruptcy and 
whose existence reduces the size of the debtor’s exemption. 
Years before Schwab, the Fourth Circuit in Williams v. Peyton 
(In re Williams)986 anticipated what the Supreme Court would 
later hold: 
[S]ince Williams never claimed that her interest in the real 
estate was exempt from the claims of her joint creditors, [the 
trustee] is free to administer the real estate for the benefit of 
those creditors.987 
This holding admirably anticipates Schwab if in fact the debtor in 
Williams filled out Schedule C in the manner set forth above.988 





















Is the debtor now claiming joint creditors do not exist and that 
therefore Blackacre is entirely exempt? And must the trustee or 
                                                                                                     
entireties if it later turns out that there were some joint claims. This is so even if 
the debtor has received a discharge and the joint claims are joint no longer. 
Because the trustee is subrogated to the joint claims, the discharge is no 
impediment to administering the entireties at a later time. See generally In re 
Shelton, 201 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996). 
 986. 104 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 987. Id. at 690. 
 988. What did Schedule C in the Williams case look like? All we learn from 
the opinion is this: 
On her schedule of property claimed as exempt (Schedule C), Williams 
listed a parcel of real estate that she owned as a “tenant by the 
entirety” with her husband. She claimed that $48,600 of this value of 
this real estate was exempt from the bankruptcy estate under 11 
U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B).  
Id. at 689. 
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the joint creditors come forth before the Rule 4003(b) deadline to 
preserve their right to a shadow bankruptcy?989  
In Schwab, the Supreme Court was very specific about what 
debtors must do to flummox the bankruptcy trustee with regard to 
a monetarily-limited exemption: 
Where, as here, it is important to the debtor to exempt [illegally] 
the full market value of the asset or the asset itself, our decision 
will encourage the debtor to declare the value of her claimed 
exemption in a manner that makes the scope of the exemption 
clear, for example, by listing the exempt value as “full fair 
market value (FMV)” or “100% of FMV.” Such a declaration will 
encourage the trustee to object promptly to the exemption if he 
wishes to challenge it . . . . If the trustee fails to object, . . . the 
debtor will be entitled to exclude the full value of the asset.990 
The Schwab majority also insisted that this claim be made in 
Column 3 of Schedule C, over a heated dissent to the effect that 
disclosure in column 4 suffices to cheat the trustee.991 
 In a pre-Schwab case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
assumed that the joint creditors lose if they or the trustee do not 
file an objection to the exemption within the deadline. In 
Grosslight v. Grosslight,992 the debtor spouse had a joint creditor. 
The joint creditor moved to lift the automatic stay so that it might 
obtain a lien under Michigan law.993 Apparently, the joint creditor 
did not file a proof of claim. The bankruptcy court denied the relief 
and ordered the debtor discharged.994 The creditor appealed the 
ruling as to the automatic stay,995 but apparently did not object to 
the discharge or to the exemption of the tenancy by the entirety. 
Properly, the discharge had the effect of making the joint creditor 
an individual creditor of the non-debtor spouse. As such, the 
creditor was no longer entitled to a lien on the entireties.996 As a 
                                                                                                     
 989. Judge Hughes implies that the answer is “yes” here. Spears, 308 B.R. at 
835 n.47. 
 990. Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 792–93 (2010). 
 991. See id. at 801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s account . . . shuts 
from sight the vital part played by the fourth entry on Schedule C . . . .”). 
 992. 757 F.2d 773 (6th Cir. 1985).  
 993. Id. at 775. 
 994. Id. 
 995. Id. 
 996. Id. 
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result, the whole appeal was moot. Nevertheless, the court 
reversed and remanded for the purpose of allowing the creditor to 
file a proof of claim.997 (What good this would do is the mystery we 
referenced earlier.)998 No order was given to lift the stay. And 
indeed, lifting the stay was useless in that, because of the 
discharge, the creditor was no longer a joint creditor. Nevertheless, 
the court worried about a failure to object to the exemption. The 
court implied that an objection to the exemption was required to 
preserve the creditor’s ability to lien the entireties after 
bankruptcy.999 It elected to treat the adversary proceeding 
concerning the automatic stay to be an ersatz objection to the 
exemption.1000 But, we may observe, objecting to the exemption 
was useless because the discharge made the creditor into an 
individual creditor, as to whom the tenancy by the entirety was 
exempt.1001 
                                                                                                     
 997. See id. (ruling that the creditor “is entitled to file a proof of claim on 
remand” because of an “excusable uncertainty as to the proper procedure”). 
 998. See supra notes 754–764 and accompanying text (arguing that “the whole 
appeal was moot”). 
 999.  See Grosslight, 757 F.2d at 777 (discussing how the proper procedure “is 
to file an objection to the claim of exemptions”); see also Spears v. Boyd (In re 
Spears), 313 B.R. 212, 218–19 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (directing the Bankruptcy Court 
to apply the procedure specified in Grosslight); Frederick Cty. Nat’l Bank v. 
Lazerow (In re Lazerow), 119 B.R. 74, 76 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990) (discussing the 
time to object to the exemptions). 
 1000. See In re James, 498 B.R. 813, 825 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2013) (reading 
Grosslight accordingly); see also Lee v. Field (In re Lee), No. 15-00278 SOM/RLP, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155403, at *1–2 (D. Haw. Nov. 17, 2015) (challenging the 
debtor’s conveyance to himself and spouse as tenants by the entireties constituted 
a timely objection to the exemption). 
 1001. The mystery of Grosslight dissipates if the Sixth Circuit indulged in the 
unspoken assumption that bankruptcy court would sell the entireties for the 
benefit of the joint creditors. In that case, the discharge would be no impediment 
to the trustee’s subrogation to the claims of the joint creditors. See In re Oberlies, 
94 B.R. 916, 922 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) (stating that Grosslight made the “use 
of the bankruptcy estate itself as a vehicle to vindicate the claims of joint 
creditors” the “preferred vehicle”). The debtors so read the case in In re Raynard, 
327 B.R. 623, 636 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Raynard v. Rogers 
(In re Raynard), 354 B.R. 834 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2006). Judge Hughes refused to go 
along:  
I recognize that Grosslight can be interpreted as an implicit (and 
prophetic) adoption of the position later taken by other 
courts. . . . Nonetheless, my conscience does not permit me in this 
instance to accept as controlling law yet another implication of 
Grosslight when there is no evidence that the Sixth Circuit even 
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In re James,1002 like Grosslight, imposes the short Rule 4003(b) 
deadline on the creditors.1003 In James, a husband (H) filed for 
bankruptcy and his wife (W) filed seven and a half months later.1004 
Though apparently residents of Tennessee, they owned a Florida 
condominium by the entireties.1005 In his schedules, H listed the 
Florida pleasure dome as having a value of $260,000.1006 This 
seems to have been the unencumbered value.1007 We are not told if 
this number was in all-important Column 3 or in the meaningless 
Column 4. We shall assume the entry was in Column 3. In fact, 
there was a (joint) $160,000 mortgage on the property, so that the 
equity was only $100,000.1008 Furthermore, H could only claim 50% 
of this amount.1009 Nevertheless, H listed the value of the 
exemption as $260,000.1010 The trustee never objected to the 
exemption.1011 The court ruled that H could claim $260,000 in 
                                                                                                     
deliberated on the issue at hand.  
Id. at 634. Judge Hughes would be reversed by a panel that implied the debtors 
had read Grosslight correctly. In re Raynard, 354 B.R. at 89–40. 
 1002. 498 B.R. 813 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2013). 
 1003. Id. at 822. 
 1004. Id. at 817. 
 1005. Although § 522(b)(3)(A) has stringent choice of law rules tied to the 
domicile of the debtors, § 522(b)(3)(B), covering the tenancy by the entirety does 
not. Therefore, the court was correct in applying Florida law to the Florida 
exemption. See Holland v. Sofanda (In re Holland), 366 B.R. 825, 830 (N.D. Ill. 
2007) (finding that, even though Illinois limits the tenancy by the entirety to 
principal residences, the debtor could claim a nonresidence under Florida law); 
In re Zolnierowicz, 380 B.R. 84, 87 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (applying Florida law 
to determine a claim of property as exempt entireties property under 
§ 522(b)(3)(B) when the debtor was an Illinois domiciliary). 
 1006. See James, 498 B.R. at 817 (describing the condominium as worth 
$260,000 according to Mr. James’s schedule). 
 1007. See id. (stating that the husband “listed the Condominium with a value 
of $260,000”). 
 1008. See id. at 823 (explaining that the value of the condominium is $260,000 
and the debt mortgage on the condominium is $160,000). 
 1009. The court never makes this limiting assumption explicit. It is possible 
the court thought that H could claim 100%, thereby snatching bread from the 
mouths of W’s creditors. 
 1010. In re James, 498 B.R. 813, 818 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2013). 
 1011. Id. at 816. In James, the trustee tried to claim that H’s claim of the 
exemption was fraudulent. James, 498 B.R. at 816; FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(2). 
If so, the trustee can file an objection to the exemption up to a year after the case 
closes. It is clear that, after Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992), 
it is not fraudulent to claim illegal exemptions on Schedule C. The trustee tried 
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exemptions, even though joint creditors claimed far more than 
this.1012 
Confusingly, in her own subsequent bankruptcy, W also 
claimed the house was exempt.1013 Her trustee timely objected to 
the exemption.1014 So, in her case, the house was not exempt—the 
joint claims exceeded the value of her 50% share.1015 Ultimately, 
then, the joint creditors obtained only 50% of the equity in the 
                                                                                                     
to claim that any attempt to seek both a discharge from joint claims and the 
tenancy by the entirety exempt was an inherent fraud, as some courts have 
suggested. See In re Hunter, 970 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that 
there was a potential for fraud when a married couple sheltered their assets as 
unencumbered entirety property and then sought a discharge from joint claims); 
Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351, 354–55 (4th Cir. 1962) (finding that a fraud 
occurs when the rules of law “allow the tenants by the entireties to keep the 
entireties property secure from the claims of their creditors even though that 
property was never available in bankruptcy for the satisfaction of those claims”); 
Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765 (4th Cir. 1931) (determining that “the 
effectual withdrawing of the property from the reach of those entitled to subject 
it to their claims, for the beneficial ownership and possession of those who created 
the claims against it” would result in fraud). The court declined to find that H had 
acted in bad faith: 
Although Mr. James did not have a right to claim his whole entirety 
interest in light of the existence of joint creditors, he never claimed that 
(a) he did not own the property, (b) his exemption had no value or (c) 
joint creditors did not exist. Based on the holding in Taylor, the lack of 
a timely objection by any creditor or the trustee, and insufficient 
evidence that Mr. James’ filing was an abuse of the bankruptcy 
process, the court declines to use any equitable remedy or its power 
under 11 U.S.C. § 105 to allow the trustee to extend the deadline to 
object to Mr. James’ exemption. 
James, 498 B.R. at 827. 
 1012. See James, 498 B.R. at 828 (discussing how the condo’s “listing 
agreement for $449,500 raises the question of whether the value of the 
Condominium is substantially more than the amount of the exemption claimed”). 
 1013. Id. at 818. 
 1014. Id. at 828. 
 1015. Id. W’s trustee, representing the joint creditors, could sell the entire 
condominium for $290,000. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3), (h) (2012). Of this, $190,000 
must be given to the secured creditor with a mortgage on the Florida entireties. 
The $100,000 surplus would go into the bankruptcy estate where joint and 
individual creditors share alike. The bankruptcy court, however, seems 
committed to the view that proceeds of H’s exempt property are themselves 
exempt. So, on this view, H’s $50,000 falls under the exemption he won when the 
trustee tardily objected to H’s exemption on behalf of the joint creditors. 
Meanwhile, since W had no exemption, the creditors (joint and individual) shared 
her 50%. 
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Florida property H’s share, in contrast, was successfully and 
illegally claimed on his Schedule C. 
It is unclear what a debtor must enter onto Schedule C in order 
to claim more from the tenancy by the entirety than the law allows. 
Trustees had better be aware that any representation of the 
amount of joint claims might be binding on the trustee if the 
trustee or the joint creditors do not timely object to Schedule 
B-106(C).1016 
But, whatever unlawful claim the debtor makes on Schedule 
C, a failure to object should not affect the secured status of a joint 
creditor who has already obtained a lien on the tenancy by the 
entirety.1017 At least, if we are dealing with state-law exemptions, 
a judicial lien will attach generally to property only when the 
property is in fact not exempt.1018 Suppose a debtor wrongfully 
claims an encumbered item is exempt. The purpose of Schedule C 
is to expel part of the tenancy by the entirety from the bankruptcy 
estate.1019 A judicial lien creditor does not really care whether the 
property is expelled or not, because the creditor has already 
established a lien. Such liens survive the exemption process.1020 If 
the debtor wishes to avoid the lien under § 522(f)(1), the debtor 
must prove that the property really would have been exempt if 
there had been no lien.1021 The debtor may not make a false claim 
                                                                                                     
 1016. See In re Bois, 191 B.R. 279, 281 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996) (explaining that, 
in states where the contingent remainder is not exempt, trustees should be aware 
that a general claim to all the entireties (not just the present possessory interest) 
triggers the duty of the trustee to object to the exemption).  
 1017. See In re Schoonover, 331 F.3d 575, 577–78 (7th Cir. 2003) (determining 
that a judicial lien allows a creditor who has not objected in a timely manner to 
“wait out the bankruptcy and enforce the lien at its conclusion”). 
 1018. At least insofar as state law is concerned, exempt property is defined as 
that property to which no judicial lien may attach. In re Marriage of Logston, 496 
N.E.2d 167, 171 (Ill. 1984). 
 1019. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). 
 1020. Id. § 522(c). 
 1021. According to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003(d) (as amended 
in 2008): 
A proceeding by the debtor to avoid a lien . . . exempt under 
§ 522(f) . . . shall be made by motion in accordance with Rule 9-14. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (b), a creditor may object 
to a motion filed under § 522(f) by challenging the validity of the 
exemption asserted to be impaired by the lien. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(d). 
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made on Schedule C and then expect to avoid an existing lien, if 
the lien creditor forgets to protest Schedule C by the Rule 4003(b) 
deadline.1022 
12. Future Interests 
Whether or not joint creditors exist, a baffling issue is how to 
administer a contingent remainder of the debtor spouse if, as is 
true in Kentucky or Tennessee, this future interest is the debtor’s 
individual nonexempt property. That is, the marital entity has the 
present right of possession, but the individual spouse has a 
presently alienable future interest to which a judicial lien may 
attach. Indeed, I went so far as to speculate that, even in Michigan, 
the Kentucky pattern holds as a matter of federal common law—
perhaps as a matter of state law, if the Michigan Supreme Court 
really confronted the issue—especially if so ruling protects 
Michiganders from the monstrosity of Craft1023 in tax cases.1024 
Under pure state law, the question rarely matters.1025 But, 
bankruptcy courts deal with future interests frequently.1026 In 
particular, Tennessee bankruptcy courts have often pondered 
administration of the contingent remainder in the bankruptcy 
estate. 
                                                                                                     
 1022. Id. 
 1023. Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 297 (2002).  
 1024. Supra notes 310–347 and accompanying text. 
 1025. The question arises under state law when an individual creditor has 
docketed a judgment and the two spouses are under contract to convey 
marketable title to a buyer. Marketable title requires that there be no lien on the 
debtor spouse’s contingent remainder. In Pennsylvania, for example, there is a 
lien, but the spouses may nevertheless convey marketable title. See supra notes 
329–335 and accompanying text (explaining how the Pennsylvania tenancy 
begins to resemble that of Kentucky after all). 
 1026. See In re Arwood, 289 B.R. 889, 895 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2003) (discussing 
future interests in the context of homestead rights); Nunley v. Paty Co. (In re 
Nunley), 109 B.R. 784, 786 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990) (discussing a dispute 
regarding a future interest between two debtors). 
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a. Tennessee 
In Tennessee, the debtor’s contingent remainder goes into the 
bankruptcy estate as nonexempt property.1027 Debtors have tried 
to apply a monetary homestead against this contingent remainder 
in the hopes of exempting the contingent remainder.1028 Such 
attempts have been properly rejected in Tennessee cases.1029 The 
homestead is connected with a present right of possession.1030 By 
definition, the contingent remainder is not a present right of 
                                                                                                     
 1027. See Arango v. Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville (In re Arango), 992 F.2d 611, 
615–16 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that a pre-existing judicial lien on the contingent 
remainder cannot be avoided because the contingent remainder is not exempt in 
bankruptcy). 
 1028. See In re Arwood, 289 B.R. at 895 (explaining that a homestead right is 
a right of occupancy and not an estate in land); In re Walls, 45 B.R. 145, 147 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (“[T]he homestead right is a right of occupancy, not an 
estate in land . . . .”); Carey v. Carey, 43 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tenn. 1931) (stating 
that the homestead right “does not constitute an estate in the lands, but is merely 
a right of occupancy and use”). A contrary case is Nunley. In a joint case, two 
debtors claimed a $7,500 homestead in a tenancy by the entirety worth $7,298 
after senior mortgages were accounted for. Nunley, 109 B.R. at 785. The husband 
had an individual creditor with a large docketed judgment. Id. He sought to avoid 
this judicial lien because it impaired his homestead exemption. Id. Because it was 
a joint case, the court reasoned that the bankruptcy trustee could sell a fee simple 
absolute estate. Id. at 787–88. This is not so if there were no joint creditors. The 
two unconsolidated bankruptcy estates each had a contingent remainder in it, 
and the two contingent remainders were all that could be sold. Infra notes 1168–
1193. 
Based on its false assumption, the court figured that, if the trustee were to sell, 
the spouses would be entitled to take $7,500 of the proceeds because of the 
homestead right. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-301 (2007) (providing that a couple 
jointly may claim $7,500 as a homestead right). In other words, the trustee’s sale 
would “burst the dam” and end the tenancy by the entirety. The existing judicial 
lien would then encumber the proceeds of Daniel’s 50% share of the tenancy. In 
this event, the judicial lien would impinge on the homestead right. Accordingly, 
the judgment lien was avoided. Nunley, 109 B.R. at 789. Properly, the judgment 
lien encumbered only the future interest, which was not presently homesteadable. 
 1029. See In re Arwood, 289 B.R. at 895 (explaining that homestead rights are 
a right of occupancy and not an estate in land); Walls, 45 B.R. at 147 (explaining 
that the homestead right is not an estate in land but a right of occupancy); Carey, 
43 S.W.2d at 499 (stating that the homestead right is not an estate in the lands, 
but merely a right of occupancy). 
 1030. See Carey v. Carey, 43 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tenn. 1931) (“But being a mere 
exemption of a right of occupancy, the right of present occupancy is essential to 
the existence of the homestead.”). 
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possession, and, therefore, may not be made subject to the 
homestead right—for the moment! 
The contingent remainder is therefore not presently 
homesteadable, and so the trustee may presently sell it. Because 
the future interest is not exempt property, the trustee may keep 
all the proceeds1031 and need give none of them to the debtor.1032 
A present homestead right applied to the future interest is a 
comparison of apples and oranges. For example, in In re Walls,1033 
the debtor had a 50% entireties share worth $27,000.1034 If this 
equity could be presently liquidated for the benefit of joint creditors 
claiming more than that amount, the debtor could justly and 
presently claim a $5,000 homestead right. But, the debtor’s 
contingent remainder in this equity was worth far less than 
$27,000 because this amount could only be realized in the future, 
and is therefore subject to discount—both for the time value of 
money and for the considerable risk that the debtor may not 
survive the nondebtor spouse.1035 For example, let’s suppose there 
is a 10% chance that the debtor will be the surviving spouse. The 
remainder is thus worth only $2,700, and even this figure must be 
further discounted because survivorship might not be determined 
for many years. But, if we are going to impose these discounts on 
the value of the real property, it follows that we should also 
discount the $5,000 homestead for the same contingencies.1036 
                                                                                                     
 1031. See In re Dick, 136 B.R. 1000, 1004 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992) (explaining 
that “the debtor may not claim any proceeds from the sale of that survivorship 
interest”). 
 1032. See In re Elsea, 47 B.R. 142, 144 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) 
There is no good practical reason to allow the homestead exemption 
from the proceeds of a sale of the right of survivorship. Sale of the right 
of survivorship will not deprive the debtor of the use of the property. 
That will occur only if the debtor is the survivor. Then the purchaser 
will be entitled to the property. . . . The better approach is to sell the 
survivorship interest subject to the debtor’s right to a homestead 
exemption if and when he is the survivor. 
 1033. 45 B.R. 145 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984). 
 1034. Id. at 145. 
 1035. See id. at 147–48 (explaining how courts will postpone the sale until the 
debtor’s homestead right has expired). 
 1036. See In re Dick, 136 B.R. at 1004 (“If the debtor were allowed to receive 
his homestead exemption when the survivorship interest was sold, then the 
debtor would have received a windfall in the event that he did not survive his 
wife.”). 
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In Walls, the trustee already had received a bid of $500 for the 
remainder and proposed to auction it off to a higher bidder, if 
any.1037 The debtor claimed that there could be no sale unless the 
bid exceeded $5,000—enough to fund his homestead exemption.1038 
The court properly rejected the debtor’s claim.1039 The debtor was 
seeking to apply an undiscounted $5,000 charge against the 
present sale of a deeply contingent future interest.1040 
Just as a Tennessee judicial lien creditor could sell,1041 the 
Walls court thought that the “trustee may sell the debtor’s 
                                                                                                     
 1037. Walls, 45 B.R. at 145.  
 1038. Id. 
 1039. See id. at 149 (“The trustee may sell the debtor’s survivorship interest in 
his marital residence subject to the debtor’s homestead right upon notice in 
accordance with Bankruptcy Rules 2002 and 6004.”). 
 1040. Id. at 145. This point was missed in a Rhode Island case, where the 
tenancy by the entirety resembled the Tennessee pattern. See generally In re 
Ryan, 282 B.R. 742 (D.R.I. 2002). In In re Ryan, the debtor attempted to assert 
the Rhode Island homestead exemption to prevent the sale of the contingent 
remainder. Id. at 746. Under the Walls reasoning (soon to be explained), the sale 
should go forward, and the homestead exemption would apply only if the debtor 
spouse survived the nondebtor spouse. Instead, the district court entertained the 
possibility that the homestead amount might prevent the present sale of the 
remainder. Id. at 748. According to the facts of the case, the debtor’s house had 
$150,000 in equity in it, given a first mortgage. Id. at 746. The debtor’s share of 
this was 50% or $75,000 (if we ignore the comparative life expectancies between 
the spouses). Id. The Rhode Island homestead limitation was $100,000. Id. The 
debtor argued that the homestead amount could protect the contingent remainder 
if there was an excess homestead right after it was applied to the debtor’s present 
right of possession. Id. That is, the debtor’s share of the house was worth $75,000, 
the homestead amount was $100,000 and so (argued the debtor) no sale of the 
contingent remainder could occur unless the trustee obtained a price of better 
than $25,000. Id. The trustee was permitted to sell the contingent remainder for 
only $5,000. Id. The court erroneously treated the debtor as the 100% owner of 
the property, not a 50% owner. Id. at 750. Therefore, the $100,000 homestead 
right was exhausted against the total equity of $150,000. Id. Being exhausted, 
the homestead right could not be invoked to prevent the present sale of the 
contingent remainder. 
 1041. See Waddy v. Waddy, 291 S.W.2d 581, 581 (Tenn. 1956) (finding that it 
was proper for the “defendant’s interest in the property be sold subject to the 
defendant’s homestead rights”). A confusing statement is made in Walls: “A 
judgment creditor may levy on the survivorship interest of a tenant by the 
entirety, but the creditor succeeds to the estate only in the event his debtor 
outlives the other tenant by the entirety.” In re Walls, 45 B.R. 145, 146 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. 1984). The creditor, in fact, has a present right of sale to a buyer, and 
it is the buyer who would succeed to the (fee simple) estate if the debtor is the 
survivor. The Walls statement is right only if the judgment creditor bids in the 
judgment presently and becomes the buyer of the contingent remainder. 
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survivorship interest in his marital residence subject to the debtor’s 
homestead right.”1042 Now what may that mean? The idea in Walls 
is that, later, should the debtor survive the nondebtor spouse, the 
buyer has a present right of possession and the debtor has a present 
homestead right of $5,000 (or $7,500 in a joint case).1043 While the 
nondebtor spouse lived, the contingent remainder did not 
represent a present right of possession, but only a future one. But, 
once the nondebtor spouse is predeceased, the debtor spouse has a 
present right of possession and therefore a present homestead 
right. Of course, knowing this, the buyer discounts her present bid 
by the future expected value of the homestead obligation. 
Ultimately, the present creditors effectively pay for the debtor’s 
future homestead right. 
Metaphysically, this is odd. The homestead right is usually in 
conflict with liens, not with a right of possession. Typically, where 
a sale of exempt property occurs, the buyer takes complete title 
and the exemption is, at best, a charge against the proceeds of the 
sale.1044 A conflict between the new possessor-buyer and the old 
possessor never comes into view. The Walls solution, therefore, 
engenders the conflict between two possessors—the debtor and the 
buyer who bought the contingent remainder. 
How shall one adjudicate this conflict? The Tennessee courts 
have yet to provide any guidance, so one must indulge in pure 
speculation. For instance, the buyer has a present right of 
possession, once the nondebtor spouse has died. As present 
possessor, the buyer is entitled to a writ ejecting the debtor from 
the premises. Perhaps the homestead right is a defense to this 
ejectment action. That is to say, the price of an ejectment is 
payment by the buyer of the $5,000. Or, alternatively, suppose the 
buyer uses self-help to take possession away from the debtor. 
Perhaps the debtor has an equitable lien on the premises in order 
to realize the $5,000. What if the buyer has a purchase money 
lender with a mortgage on the contingent remainder? What 
                                                                                                     
Alternatively, the creditor could defer enforcing the lien until the husband was 
the fee simple owner. At that point, the creditor could force the sale of a fee simple 
estate to a buyer. 
 1042. Walls, 45 B.R. at 149 (emphasis added).  
 1043. Id.  
 1044. Often proceeds of exempt property are not themselves exempt. Dunham, 
supra note 677, at 317. 
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priority does that mortgage have once the debtor is established as 
the survivor of his spouse? One can imagine that, because the 
debtor’s homestead right is “prior” to the buyer’s ownership of the 
contingent remainder, the buyer cannot possibly give a senior 
mortgage to block the homestead right. In other words, under these 
circumstances, the homestead right is a lien—not something 
usually conceived when one contemplates a monetarily limited 
exemption. Exemptions are an immunity from a lien and not 
usually thought to be a lien (i.e., a power of sale) as such.1045 
b. Illinois 
The question of administering the future interest has 
challenged bankruptcy courts in Illinois. In 1990, Illinois revived 
the tenancy by the entirety after having abolished it in 1861 as a 
medieval barbarism.1046 According to 765 ILCS § 1005/1c: 
Whenever a . . . conveyance . . . of property . . . maintained or 
intended for maintenance as a homestead by both husband and 
wife together during coverture shall be made and 
the . . . conveyance . . . expressly declares that 
the . . . conveyance is made to tenant by the entirety, . . . the 
                                                                                                     
 1045. A strange and questionable vision of the Tennessee situation is 
presented in Dick. In re Dick, 136 B.R. 1000, 1004 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992). A 
creditor had recorded a judgment against the debtor spouse. Id. at 1001. In 
bankruptcy, the debtor claimed that the creditor’s judicial lien impaired the 
homestead exemption and thus should be avoided under Bankruptcy Code 
§ 522(f)(1). Id. The court found that the judicial lien on the debtor’s contingent 
remainder did not impair the $5,000 homestead exemption because the 
homestead exemption could not be applied to the contingent remainder. Id. at 
1006. So far so good. The court went on to speculate that the trustee might sell 
the contingent remainder to a buyer, even though the creditor had a judicial lien 
on the remainder. Id. at 1004. In the court’s view, the trustee could sell the 
remainder free and clear of the judicial lien. Id. at 1005. The cash received would 
be escrowed to bankroll the debtor’s homestead exemption. Id. The trustee would 
receive a sales expense (presumably pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 506(c)), and 
the judgment creditor would receive only proceeds beyond this amount. Id. This 
vision, however, asserts that the debtor does have a homestead in the contingent 
remainder, when earlier in the opinion this very proposition was denied. 
 1046. See In re Tolson, 338 B.R. 359, 365 n.3 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2005) (explaining 
how the Illinois General Assembly “reinstituted in Illinois the form of ownership 
known as tenancy by the entirety, ending a 129 year hiatus”); In re Chinosorn, 
243 B.R. 688, 692–93 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (discussing the revival of the tenancy 
by the entirety estate in Illinois). 
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estate created shall be deemed to be in tenancy by the 
entirety.1047 
Note that Illinois limits the tenancy by the entirety to real property 
used as the debtor’s principal residence—a limitation not generally 
present in the Michigan-style tenancy by the entirety.1048 
According to 735 ILCS 5/12-112: 
All the lands . . . (except such as is by law declared to be exempt) 
of every person against whom any judgment has 
been . . . entered in any court, for any debt . . . shall be liable to 
be sold upon such judgment. Any real property, any beneficial 
interest in a land trust, or any interest in real property held in 
a revocable inter vivos trust or revocable inter vivos trusts 
created for estate planning purposes, held in tenancy by the 
entirety shall not be liable to be sold upon judgment entered on 
or after October 1, 1990 against only one of the tenants . . . .1049 
Several bankruptcy courts in Illinois have wondered whether 
or not this language exempts the contingent remainder of the 
debtor spouse. The result is a string of challenging lower court 
cases on the question, many of which misread the cases that 
preceded. I shall consider four of them in chronological order. All 
of these cases involve § 522(f)(1), avoidance of judicial lien obtained 
by individual creditors. 
                                                                                                     
 1047. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1005/1c (2011) (emphasis added). “Coverture” 
simply means “during the marriage.” Chinosorn, 243 B.R. at 693 n.3. 
 1048. See Planas v. Feltman (In re Planas), No. 98-0506-CIV-NESBITT, 1998 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20524, at *4–13 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 1998) (noting that 
warehouses were held by the entireties). 
 1049. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-112. Because of this reference to trusts, an 
equitable interest in trust property can be held in the entireties. See Loventhal v. 
Edelson, 844 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2016) (“So the tenancy by the entirety will 
perdure no matter what changes Mr. Edelson makes in the trust.”). See generally 
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1005/1c. Elsewhere, ownership by a trustee for the benefit 
of spouses is thought to be inconsistent with the entireties form. See Jensen v. 
Anderson (In re Anderson), 561 B.R. 230, 238 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016) (finding 
that a trustee is not protected by the tenancy by the entireties); Lewiston v. Kohut 
(In re Lewiston), 539 B.R. 154, 159 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (finding that the trustee 
could not hold by the entireties); In re Brewer, 544 B.R. 177, 181 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 2015) (same). But see In re Bellingroehr, 403 B.R. 818, 821 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
2009) (stating that the trust property could be held in the entireties). 
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The first in our quartet of confusion is In re Allard,1050 where 
the debtor and his nondebtor spouse held by the entireties.1051 
Thereafter, a creditor filed a memorandum of judgment with the 
Recorder of Deeds in the local county.1052 If the debtor had 
non-exempt real property, this filing would have created a 
judgment lien on such property.1053 
The debtor responded with a bankruptcy petition and, on 
Schedule C, claimed the tenancy by the entirety was exempt.1054 
He likewise claimed a $7,500 homestead exemption.1055 Neither 
the trustee nor any unsecured creditor objected to Schedule C.1056 
Thirty days after the first scheduled creditor meeting, any such 
objection was barred by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 
4003(b).1057 The debtor then sought to avoid the creditor’s alleged 
lien under § 522(b)(1).1058 
Judge John Squires ruled that the creditor “cannot now object 
to the Debtor’s claims of exemption, and the inquiry could end at 
this point.”1059 Why this should be so is a mystery. The issue in the 
case is not whether the tenancy by the entirety was exempt.1060 The 
issue was whether a lien attached to it in a way that impaired the 
exemption. In any case, Judge Squires waived this alleged point 
and gave advice on the nature to the tenancy by the entirety.1061 
                                                                                                     
 1050. 196 B.R. 402, 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 202 B.R. 938 (N.D. Ill. 
1996). 
 1051. Id. at 408. 
 1052. Id. at 406. 
 1053. See generally 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-101 (2014). 
 1054. Allard, 196 B.R. at 408. 
 1055. Id.  
 1056. Id. 
 1057. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). 
 1058. In re Allard, 196 B.R. 402, 408 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 202 B.R. 938 
(N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 1059. Id. 
 1060. Suppose a debtor were to list land as a tenancy by the entirety which was 
in fact not held in that capacity. In In re Mukhi, 246 B.R. 859 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2000), the court ruled that the Rule 2003(b) deadline precluded a challenge to the 
status of ownership—a position now reversed by the 2008 amendment to Rule 
4003(d). Id. at 866. But Allard was a different case. In Allard, no one disputed 
that the land was held by the entirety. Allard, 196 B.R. at 405. The only question 
was whether, under Illinois law, any judicial lien attached to it. Id. 
 1061. See Allard, 196 B.R. at 408 (“Due to the lack of any bankruptcy case law 
in the area of Illinois entireties homestead property, however, the Court will 
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Judge Squires noted that, whereas 735 ILCS 5/12-101 states 
generally that judgments memorialized by the recorder of deeds 
are liens on local property, 735 ILCS 5/12-112 states that “tenancy 
by the entirety shall not be liable to be sold.”1062 Judge Squires 
interpreted this to mean that there was a lien on the tenancy by 
the entirety, but there was also a moratorium on sale.1063 
Meanwhile, Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(3)(B) holds that the 
entireties must be “exempt from process under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.”1064 Judge Squire figured that the debtor’s 
tenancy was partially exempt from process.1065 
This notion of partial exemption is metaphysically complex. 
On the one hand, the individual creditor has a lien,1066 which 
cannot be enforced, for the moment. Presumably, it can be enforced 
later, when the tenancy by the entirety is transformed by death, 
divorce, sale, or cessation of principal residency.1067 So the lien 
begins to resemble a lien on the debtor’s contingent remainder. 
But, not quite. A true lien on a contingent remainder could result 
in a present sale of this right.1068 In Judge Squire’s view, there 
could be no sale until the contingent remainder became 
possessory.1069 Meanwhile, should the debtor and his spouse try to 
sell the residence, a buyer would receive an estate encumbered by 
                                                                                                     
further discuss the issues surrounding . . . the Debtor’s motion” to avoid the 
creditor’s alleged judicial lien under § 522(f)(1)). 
 1062. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-112 (2016)). 
 1063. See id. at 410 (explaining that “Great Southern’s lien will remain on the 
Property” and that “under the Illinois statute the Debtor’s Property cannot be 
sold upon Great Southern’s judgment, it is exempt from the forced sale process”). 
 1064. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 1065. See Allard, 196 B.R. at 410 (holding that “the language of the Illinois 
statute, ‘shall not be liable to be sold upon judgment’ is akin to property being 
partially ‘exempt from process’ as provided in § 522(b)(2)(B)”).   
 1066. Judge Squires concluded that, under Illinois law, “where the right of sale 
cannot be asserted, the existence of the lien must be denied.” Id. at 410. But he 
does not really do anything with this observation, in that he assumes that the 
creditor in Allard did have a lien (though no right of sale). 
 1067. This vision somewhat resembles the result in Fleek v. Zillhaver, 12 A. 
420 (Pa. 1887). Supra notes 330–335 and accompanying text. 
 1068. Such a lien exists in Tennessee and Rhode Island. See generally 
Stephenson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Stephenson), 19 B.R. 185, 189 
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Ryan 282 B.R. 742, 748 (D.R.I. 2002). 
 1069. In re Allard, 196 B.R. 402, 415 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 202 B.R. 938 
(N.D. Ill. 1996). 
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the creditor’s judicial lien.1070 The marital entity would not be in a 
position to deliver a marketable title, as the Pennsylvania marital 
entity was able to do in Beihl v. Martin.1071 
On the other hand, the tenancy by the entirety is exempt. The 
nature of the exemption is immunity from any present sale, 
whether a sale of the present right of possession or of the 
contingent remainder. So, “partial” exemption accommodates both 
the creditor’s existing lien and the temporary immunity from sale. 
On this analysis, it is hard to see how the lien impairs an 
exemption, under § 522(f)(1). The exemption is limited to an 
immunity from sale. The tenancy by the entirety is not wholly 
exempt from the lien. 
Nevertheless, Judge Squires avoided the lien by applying the 
test for impairment which (since 1994)1072 is set forth in 
§ 522(f)(2)(A): 
For the purposes of this subsection, a lien shall be considered to 
impair an exemption to the extent that the sum of— 
 (i) the lien; 
 (ii) all other liens on the property; and 
(iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could 
claim if there were no liens on the property exceeds the 
value that the debtor’s interest in the property would have 
in the absence of any liens.1073 
According to Judge Squires, the lien: 
[I]mpairs the Debtor’s exemptions claimed in the Property 
because that lien ($140,441.04), which is the only lien on the 
Property, and the amount of the exemptions ($120,000 and 
$7,500) that the Debtor could and did claim if there were no 
liens on the Property, exceeds the value that the Debtor’s 
                                                                                                     
 1070. For a similar holding under Vermont law, see In re Cerreta, 116 B.R. 402, 
405 n.5 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990) (“In effect, what happens is the [individual] judgment 
creditor must play a vulture’s waiting game.”). 
 1071. See generally Beihl v. Martin, 84 A. 953 (Pa. 1912); supra notes 335–336 
and accompanying text. 
 1072. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-394, § 303, 108 Stat. 
4106, 4132. 
 1073. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (2012). 
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interest in the Property would have in the absence of any 
liens.1074 
That is, the § 522(f)(2)(A) formula yielded $147,941.04 worth of 
avoidance, more than enough to destroy the creditor’s (allegedly) 
secured claim of $140,441.04.1075 
In this interpretation, Judge Squires changed horses 
midstream. Although the debtor was entitled only to an immunity 
from sale (the partial exemption), Judge Squires assumed a total 
exemption for the purpose of applying § 522(f)(2)(A).1076 That is, as 
a matter of state law, the debtor enjoyed an immunity from sale, 
which would end when the property was no longer a principal 
residence or a tenancy by the entirety. But in bankruptcy, the 
tenancy by the entirety was viewed as wholly exempt for the 
purpose of the § 522(f)(2)(A) calculation.1077 This makes no sense. 
This view of the Illinois judicial lien wreaks havoc on 
subsequent joint creditors seeking enforcement under state law. 
Recall that joint creditors may obtain liens on the tenancy by the 
entirety as a matter of state law.1078 If the individual creditor in 
Allard really had a lien, this lien would be senior to any 
                                                                                                     
 1074. Allard, 196 B.R. at 411. The $120,000, representing the estimated 
unencumbered value of the residence, should have been $60,000 because the 
debtor’s share of the value was only a 50% share. The $7,500 exemption 
represents the Illinois homestead exemption. Id. at 407. 
 1075. That is, $267,941.04 - $120,000 = $147,941.04. This calculation can be 
challenged. First, Judge Squires allowed the debtor to exempt the whole value 
$120,000 and to claim $7,500 to boot. Id. at 411. This overtaxed the creditor by 
$7,500. The minuend should have been $260,941.04. Much mitigating this error, 
however, Judge Squires valued the property at $120,000, whereas the debtor only 
owned 50% of the property. Id. Judge Squires should have listed the subtrahend 
as $60,000, which actually increases the avoiding effect of the formula. Id. For a 
similar calculation resulting in total obliteration of a lien on a tenancy by the 
entirety (if it existed at all), see In re Mukhi, 246 B.R. 859, 866 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2000). 
 1076. See Allard, 196 B.R. at 411 (holding that “Great Southern’s lien impairs 
the Debtor’s exemptions claimed in the Property because that lien 
($140,441.04) . . . and the amount of the exemptions ($120,000 and 
$7,500) . . . exceeds the value that the Debtor’s interest in the Property would 
have in the absence of any liens”); 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A). 
 1077. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (including the full amount of the exemptions 
($120,000 and $7,500) in the calculation). 
 1078. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-112 (2016) (“Any real property . . . [held] 
in tenancy by the entirety shall not be liable to be sold upon judgment . . . against 
only one of the tenants . . . .”). 
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subsequent joint creditor’s lien. If a subsequent joint creditor were 
to attempt a sale, the lien of the individual creditor would survive 
the execution sale. If the individual creditor’s lien is large enough, 
the joint creditor will realize on only the non-debtor spouse’s 50%. 
The sale bursts the dam, so that the buyer takes only the subject 
to a presently enforceable lien on a 50% cotenancy. In effect, the 
joint creditor is squeezed out of the debtor’s 50% share and the 
individual creditor. 
Inside the bankruptcy proceeding, however, all is well, 
because the individual creditor’s lien is entirely avoided. 
Subrogatin to the claims of the joint creditors, the trustee can sell 
free and clear of the individual creditors’ liens.1079 Thus, the 
bankruptcy result exalts the unsecured joint creditors over the 
secured individual creditors, whereas the state result (implied by 
Judge Squires’ ruling) subordinates the joint creditors to the 
individual creditors. Thus, the bankruptcy result and the state 
result are out of kilter. 
In re Chinosorn1080 was the next case to puzzle out whether 
liens attach to any part of the Illinois tenancy by the entirety. In 
his decision, Judge Eugene Wedoff skillfully evaded the issue of 
the contingent remainder, reasoning that, if a judicial lien 
attached to no part of the tenancy by the entirety, a § 522(f)(1) was 
out of order because there was no lien.1081 On the other hand, if a 
lien attached to the debtor’s contingent remainder, that lien did 
not impair an exemption because the future interest was not 
                                                                                                     
 1079. That is the judicial liens have been avoided via 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A) 
(2012) and supra notes 1053–1056 and accompanying text. 
 1080. 243 B.R. 688 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 1081. Id. at 700–01; accord Giles v. Chevy Chase Bank FSB (In re Giles), 222 
B.R. 766, 768–70 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998). But see CRP Holdings, A-1, LLC v. 
O’Sullivan (In re O’Sullivan), 544 B.R. 407 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2016), where the court 
upheld an avoidance action against an individual creditor with a judgment 
against a debtor spouse, even though the lien did not attach to the tenancy by the 
entirety. Id. at 413–14. The mere fact that the docketed judgment existed was a 
“cloud on the title” meriting avoidance. Id. There seems to be an unwarranted 
assumption in the case law that, where an individual creditor has docketed a 
judgment, its “lien” on the tenancy by the entirety (which never did exist) should 
be “avoided.” See generally Massie v. Yamrose, 169 B.R. 585 (W.D. Va. 1994); In 
re Holler, 463 B.R. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011); Allan v. Putnam Cty. Nat’l Bank, 
431 B.R. 580 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2010). Such cases ignore the language of 
§ 522(f)(1), which requires the fixing of a lien. 
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exempt.1082 The proof of non-exempt status was the very fact that 
the lien attached in the first place. Once again, § 522(f)(1) 
avoidance was out of order.1083 In the course of this reasoning, 
Judge Wedoff conceded that the existence of a lien on the 
contingent remainder was possible but not certain.1084 It was 
simply an Erie guess1085 he did not have to make. 
The Chinosorn vision differs from that in Allard. In 
Chinosorn, the present right of possession would be exempt. If the 
lien on the contingent remainder exists, it is fully enforceable after 
bankruptcy. It would not (at least in Judge Wedoff’s imagination) 
be an embargoed lien, as in Allard.1086 Of this possible lien on the 
contingent remainder, Judge Wedoff wrote: 
Moreover, recognizing such a lien may be the most reasonable 
method of balancing the interests involved in tenancy by the 
entirety. On one hand, since the lien would only apply to 
contingent future interests of an individual tenant, the 
interests of the other tenant would be protected. Thus, for 
example, a wife’s interest in the family home held in tenancy by 
the entirety would not be alienable as a result of her husband’s 
debts. On the other hand, where one tenant did incur individual 
debt, judgments recorded against that tenant’s interest would 
provide for an orderly priority of . . . tenancy . . . .1087 
On appeal, Judge Wedoff was reversed based on a 
misunderstanding. Here is what the district court thought Judge 
Wedoff had ruled: 
                                                                                                     
 1082. Accord Arango v. Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville (In re Arango), 992 F.2d 
611, 615 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that the debtor could not avoid a lien on his 
contingent remainder under § 522(f)(1)). 
 1083. One court has implied that, even if a judicial lien never affixes to the 
exemption, the debtor is nevertheless entitled to avoidance. See generally In re 
Moreno, 352 B.R. 455 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); In re Allard, 196 B.R. 402, 410 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 202 B.R. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 1084. See Chinosorn, 243 B.R. at 696 (explaining that “a judgment against an 
individual owning property as a tenant by the entirety, when properly recorded, 
appears to give rise to a lien, not against the entirety property itself, but rather 
against the individual tenant's contingent future interests”). 
 1085. See Haley N. Schaffer & David F. Herr, Why Guess? Erie Guesses and the 
Eighth Circuit, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1625, 1626 (2010) (“An ‘Erie guess’ is an 
attempt to predict what a state’s highest court would decide if it were to address 
the issue itself.”). 
 1086. Chinosorn, 243 B.R. at 698. 
 1087. Id. at 696. 
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The bankruptcy judge [found] . . . that in order to avoid a lien 
under § 522(f)(1)(A), Chinosorn must have substantive 
entitlement to the claimed exemption. Thus, under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(f)(1)(A), Chinosorn could not avoid the judicial lien, 
regardless of the fact that [the creditor] failed to timely object. 
In essence, the bankruptcy judge found that the exemption by 
default provision set forth in § 522(l) does not apply to lien 
avoidance motions.1088 
In other words, the district court thought that Judge Wedoff should 
have recognized the supposed efficacy of the Rule 4003(b) deadline 
for objecting to Schedule C. The missed deadline should have 
implied total lien avoidance. In fact, what Judge Wedoff had ruled 
is that, whether or not the property was exempt, § 522(f)(1) did not 
apply. Be that as it may, the case was remanded where presumably 
Judge Wedoff could simply reissue his opinion, because failure to 
object under Rule 4003(b) was entirely immaterial.1089 In any case, 
the Seventh Circuit, in In re Schoonover,1090 would soon rule that 
the 4003(b) deadline cannot be used to avoid judicial liens on 
property wrongly claimed to be exempt.1091 In the course of so 
doing, the Schoonover court went out of its way to disapprove of 
the Chinosorn reversal.1092 Meanwhile, the Advisory Committee 
for the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure has confirmed the 
Schoonover conclusion in a 2008 amendment to Rule 4003(d).1093 
We get another interpretation of the Illinois tenancy by the 
entirety in In re Tolson.1094 Again, the case concerns § 522(f)(1) 
avoidance.1095 The decision is post-Schoonover, so happily there is 
nothing in Tolson about the lien creditor’s failure to object to the 
                                                                                                     
 1088. Chinosorn v. Fleet Bus. Credit Corp. (In re Chinosorn), 248 B.R. 324, 325 
(N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 1089. See id. at 328 (“Therefore, the bankruptcy court should have granted 
Chinosorn’s motion to avoid the lien on the basis that Fleet’s failure to timely 
object to the claimed exemption prevented Fleet from later objecting to the 
validity of the exemption.”). 
 1090. 331 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 1091. Id. at 577–78. 
 1092. See id. at 578 (“To the extent that [Chinosorn] reaches a different 
conclusion, it is disapproved.”). 
 1093. Supra notes 972–973 and accompanying text. 
 1094. In re Tolson, 338 B.R. 359 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2005). 
 1095. See id. at 363 (explaining that the case involved a debtor who moved to 
avoid a judicial lien pursuant to § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code). 
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exemption under Rule 4003(b). Indeed, Tolson makes clear that 
the Rule 4003(b) deadline always was a red herring, entirely 
irrelevant to the analysis of any of the foregoing cases.1096 
In Tolson, Judge Thomas Perkins declared that the contingent 
remainder in the tenancy by the entirety is the individual property 
of the debtor.1097 As to this a lien could attach.1098 Without more, 
one would say that the contingent remainder is not exempt 
property, and the lien that attaches to it impairs no exemption. 
But, Judge Perkins found otherwise. Avoidance was permitted.1099 
If indeed there were a lien on the contingent remainder, the 
sheriff could hold a present execution sale where the future 
interest could be liquidated. But Judge Perkins also stated that 
“the judgment creditor’s ability to enforce a lien is suspended.”1100 
“Construing the lien as attaching to the judgment debtor’s future 
interest, though presently unenforceable, in this Court’s view, does 
not diminish the special protection afforded the marital unity by 
the entireties estate.”1101 
Judge Perkins’ vision is that the individual creditors have 
present liens that cannot be enforced: 
Moreover, because the primary purpose of the tenancy by the 
entirety law is to protect the ability of a married couple to retain 
occupancy of the marital homestead against the creditors of 
only one spouse while the marriage is intact, there is no 
apparent reason to upset the traditional lien priority scheme of 
first in time, first in right. That purpose is fully served by 
restricting the enforceability of single-tenant judgments so long 
as the entireties tenancy remains in place while still permitting 
the lien to attach to the judgment debtor’s interest. Once the 
tenancy is broken, however, and the property becomes fair game 
for all creditors, judgment lienors should be permitted to queue 
                                                                                                     
 1096. Id.  
 1097. Id. at 367. 
 1098. See id. (“[T]he contingent right of survivorship of each entireties tenant 
is a present property right to which a judicial lien extends.”). For this proposition, 
Judge Perkins finds inspiration in Beihl. See supra notes 324–329 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Beihl case and its finding that, after a spouse 
dies, the estate stays the same, but the estate holder becomes the individuality of 
the survivor). 
 1099. See Tolson, 338 B.R. at 371 (“Since he is entitled to the full exemption, 
the DEBTOR may avoid the fixing of HEIGHTS BANK’S judicial lien.”). 
 1100. Id. at 366. 
 1101. Id. at 369 n.8. 
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up in the order in which they recorded their liens regardless of 
whether they hold a judgment against both or only one tenant. 
There is no reason to deprive the holder of a judgment against 
only one tenant of the priority obtained by winning the face to 
the recorder’s office notwithstanding that enforceability of the 
judgment was temporarily stayed.1102 
This particular vision has the negative side effect, noted earlier,1103 
on the lien of a joint creditor, which (outside bankruptcy) is 
presently enforceable. In bankruptcy, this vision does not seriously 
interfere with the administration of the tenancy by the entirety 
where joint creditors are present for the simple reason that the lien 
of the individual creditor is entirely avoided. 
 Judge Jack Schmetterer went a step further in In re Yotis1104 
to predict that the Illinois Supreme Court would, if asked, hold 
that a present lien attaches to the contingent remainder of the 
debtor spouse.1105 As a result, the contingent remainder is not 
exempt property.1106 The lien against it is not subject to 
avoidance.1107 As to the lien on the possessory interest of the 
marital entity, Judge Schmetterer affirmed that no lien exists.1108 
Confusingly, Judge Schemetterer also referred to the need to avoid 
the nonexistent lien on the possessory right.1109 That which does 
not exist need not be avoided. Indeed, the need to avoid implies 
that, outside of bankruptcy, the lien exists, which is surely not 
what Judge Schmetterer meant to imply. 
                                                                                                     
 1102. Id. at 368–69. 
 1103. Supra notes 1033–1040 and accompanying text. 
 1104. 518 B.R. 481 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). 
 1105. See id. at 488–89 (“Thus, under the reasoning in Chinosorn, which is the 
reasoning likely to be adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court if it is squarely 
presented with the issue, the judgment lien involved here does not attach to the 
fee interest presently held in tenancy by the entirety . . . .”). 
 1106. See id. at 489 (finding that, for contingent future interests, “the 
exemption under § 522(b)(2)(B) has been held not to apply”). 
 1107. Id. at 490. 
 1108. See id. at 488 (“When a creditor obtains a judgment against either spouse 
of a married couple but not both jointly, the resulting judicial lien does not attach 
to the fee interest in property held by the married couple as tenants by the 
entirety.”). 
 1109. See id. at 485 (explaining that a lien must be avoided when a right of sale 
cannot be asserted). 
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c. Massachusetts 
A flaw with at least two of the four Illinois cases discussed is 
that § 522(b)(3)(B) requires that the tenancy by the entirety be 
“exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.”1110 
But, if under Illinois law, the individual creditor may obtain an 
embargoed lien on the whole, then is not the entireties subject to 
process under applicable law? In that case, the tenancy by the 
entirety is not exempt property at all. Rather, the individual debtor 
can only claim the homestead (quantitatively limited in amount) 
on the principal residence.  
This was the conclusion reached in In re Smither.1111 
Massachusetts has a statutory tenancy by the entirety that exactly 
matches that of Illinois.1112 In Smither, the debtor maintained a 
revolving equity home loan facility to cover business expenses.1113 
On his Schedule C, the debtor listed his rather monumental 
home1114 as an exempt tenancy by the entirety, and also exempt for 
$500,000 under Massachusetts law as a homestead of an aged or 
disabled person.1115 Before bankruptcy, the debtor reduced the 
amount of the outstanding revolving credit, thereby increasing the 
exemption value of the house for the debtor.1116 
The Chapter 7 trustee in the case wished to reduce exemption 
by the amount of the revolving credit paydown. Section 522(o) 
provides that: 
For [the] purposes of subsection (b)(3)(A), and notwithstanding 
subsection (a), the value of an interest in— 
                                                                                                     
 1110. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 1111. In re Smither, 542 B.R. 39 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2015). 
 1112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209 § 1 (2011); see also generally supra Part 
III.B.12.b. 
 1113. Smither, 542 B.R. at 42. 
 1114. Google Maps, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/maps/place/13+ 
Presidential+Dr,+Southborough,+MA+01772/@42.3238588,-71.5466083,17z/data 
=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x89e38b1ec0e09f9f:0xe24d9d5a0a148af5!8m2!3d42.323
8588!4d-71.5444196 (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 1115. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 2(a) (protecting the homestead of a 
disabled person against attachment). 
 1116. Smither, 542 B.R. at 44. 
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(1) real or personal property that the debtor . . . uses as a 
residence . . .   
shall be reduced to the extent that such value is 
attributable to any portion of any property that the debtor 
disposed of in the 10-year period ending on the date of the 
filing of the petition with the intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud a creditor and that the debtor could not exempt, or 
that portion that the debtor could not exempt, under 
subsection (b), if on such date the debtor had held the 
property so disposed of.1117 
The debtor argued that his exemption was based (in the 
alternative) on the tenancy by the entirety, which is exempt under 
subsection (b)(3)(B), not (b)(3)(A).1118 Therefore, the debtor figured, 
§ 522(o) did not apply1119 and so he was privileged to pay down his 
mortgage in fraud of the creditors.1120 The court ruled that, under 
Massachusetts law, the tenancy by the entirety was not exempt 
from process. According to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209, § 1: 
The interest of a debtor spouse in property held as tenants by 
the entirety shall not be subject to seizure or execution by a 
creditor of such debtor spouse so long as such property is the 
principal residence of the nondebtor spouse; provided, however, 
both spouses shall be liable jointly or severally for debts 
incurred on account of necessaries furnished to either spouse or 
to a member of their family.1121 
As interpreted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
Peebles v. Minnis,1122 this statute permits an individual creditor to 
obtain a lien on the tenancy by the entirety. The lien, however, is 
presently unenforceable: 
                                                                                                     
 1117. 11 U.S.C. § 522(o) (2012). 
 1118. Smither, 542 B.R. at 44. 
 1119. See Dillworth v. Hinton (In re Hinton), 378 B.R. 371, 379 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 2007) (“[F]inding that Section 522(o) does not limit a debtor’s ability to claim 
as exempt property owned as tenants by the entireties . . . .”). On the loophole 
that exists for tenancies by the entirety from § 522(o) avoidance, see Leigh J. 
Francis, Calling All Debtors, Want to Defraud Your Creditors? Here is How: The 
Tenancy by the Entirety Loophole and the Nullification of Section 522(o), (p) and 
(q) of the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 18 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 35 (2010). 
 1120. Ultimately, the court would acquit the debtor of any fraudulent intent in 
the paydown. 
 1121. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209, § 1 (2017). 
 1122. 521 N.E.2d 1372 (Mass. 1988). 
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By its terms, G.L. c. 209 § 1, protects a nondebtor spouse’s 
principal resident from “seizure or execution.” It does not 
exempt such property from attachment. It would be an 
unwarranted extension of the protections afforded by the 
statute to construe it as also prohibiting attachment of the 
debtor-spouse’s interest in such property. The purpose of the 
protections afforded is to safeguard the nondebtor-spouse’s 
right to continued possession of his principal residence. This 
right is unaffected by a creditor’s attaching the debtor-spouse’s 
interest in the property. The attachment is simply a security 
device which protects the creditor’s interest in the property as 
against the debtor’s other creditors. . . . The defendants are 
entitled to the attachment to establish, among other things, the 
priority of their security interest in the Peebles’ residence as 
against the claims of other creditors. This interest may be a 
subject of execution at some future time if, for example the 
nondebtor predeceases the debtor spouse, or the parties are 
divorced. These possibilities are sufficient to support 
attachment.1123 
On the basis of Peebles, the Smithers court ruled that tenancies by 
the entirety are not exempt in Massachusetts.1124 On this 
reasoning, they are not exempt in Illinois either.1125 
                                                                                                     
 1123. Id. at 1373. 
 1124. In re Smithers, 542 B.R. 39, 50 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2015); accord In re 
Weza, 248 B.R. 470, 474 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000) (applying Massachusetts law). For 
a contrary case, see In re Patenaude, 259 B.R. 481, 483 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) 
(rejecting the notion “that the interest of an individual owner in property held as 
a tenancy by the entirety is so ephemeral that a continuing lien thereon impairs 
no exemption therein”). 
 1125. Rhode Island has a similar state-court precedent. See Cull v. Vadnais, 
406 A.2d 1241, 1245 (R.I. 1979) (“[A] spouse’s interest in real property held by the 
entirety is legally sufficient to sustain a prejudgment attachment 
notwithstanding the fact that interest is not subject to levy and sale on 
execution.”). On the basis of this opinion, one bankruptcy court long ago declared 
that tenancies by the entirety were not exempt in Rhode Island. See In re Gibbons, 
52 B.R. 861, 868 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985) (“Until Rhode Island legislators or courts 
go further than they have in insulating tenancy by the entirety property . . . we 
are not inclined to hold that Rhode Island law shields a debtor’s interest from 
‘process’ sufficiently to enable . . . property to qualify as exempt . . . .”). This case 
seems to have been forgotten. Subsequent Rhode Island cases assume that the 
tenancy by the entirety is exempt. See In re Ryan 282 B.R. 742, 748 (D.R.I. 2002) 
(“In bankruptcy, the protection afforded to the estate during the tenancy prevents 
the debtor’s interests from being alienated from the estate without the non-debtor 
spouse’s consent.”); In re Strandberg, 253 B.R. 584, 588 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2000) 
(questioning whether a debtor would have any present interest in a property held 
by tenants by the entirety). 
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Assuming Smithers is correct, lien avoidance in 
Massachusetts becomes inscrutable. Assuming that 
Massachusetts residents can only choose the federal or state 
homestead exemption (in lieu of the tenancy by the entirety), there 
is still the fact that, under state law, the tenancy by the entirety 
continues to exist.1126 Any lien on it is embargoed. Even though the 
Smithers exemption was based on the homestead, the lien 
surviving the bankruptcy is still limited with respect to the 
entireties.1127 In a sense, the debtor has the best of both worlds—
avoidance in the bankruptcy proceeding (where the debtor chooses 
the monetary homestead exemption) and the continuing embargo 
after bankruptcy, because under state law the debtor owns a 
tenancy by the entirety after all.1128 
13. Divorce and Death 
According to Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(3), a debtor may 
exempt “any interest in property in which the debtor had, 
immediately before the commencement of the case, an interest as a 
tenancy by the entirety . . . to the extent such interest . . . is 
exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.”1129 The 
meaning of this provision is that the exemptibility is assessed as 
the matter stands on the day of the bankruptcy petition.1130 
                                                                                                     
 1126. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209, § 1 (“The interest of a debtor spouse in 
property held as tenants by the entirety shall not be subject to seizure or 
execution by a creditor of such debtor spouse so long as such property is the 
principal residence of the nondebtor spouse . . . .”). 
 1127. See In re Patenaude, 259 B.R. at 483 (“[I]n Massachusetts . . . the 
creditor may attach (but not execute upon) one owner’s interest in property held 
as a tenancy by the entirety.” (citing Peebles, 521 B.R. at 1372)).  
 1128. See Vukowich, supra note 561, at 808 (criticizing the invitation to a 
“double exemption”). 
 1129. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 1130. See Pasquina v. Cunningham (In re Cunningham), 513 F.3d 318, 324 (1st 
Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is a basic principle of bankruptcy law that exemptions are 
determined when a petition is filed.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2) (“‘[V]alue’ 
means fair market value as of the date of the filing of the petition or, with respect 
to property that becomes property of the estate after such date, as of the date such 
property becomes property of the estate.”). This instruction to value as of the day 
of bankruptcy suggests that post-bankruptcy events are not to be considered. By 
way of confession, I have argued that the Supreme Court, in Schwab, has read 
§ 522(a)(2) out of the Bankruptcy Code. Carlson, Role of Valuation, supra note 
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Exempt property is expelled from the bankruptcy estate when the 
debtor files Schedule C and no one objects.1131 After expulsion, 
§ 522(c) applies, “[u]nless the case is dismissed, property exempted 
under this section is not liable during or after the case for any debt 
of the debtor that arose . . . before the commencement of the 
case.”1132 Once the exempt property is out of the bankruptcy estate, 
nothing in the Bankruptcy Code brings it back in.1133 Nevertheless, 
when it comes to the tenancy by the entirety, courts have 
illegitimately considered post-bankruptcy events. 
Cordova v. Mayer (In re Cordova)1134 bursts the dam in case of 
divorce. In Cordova, a debtor claimed the entireties as exempt.1135 
Five months later, divorce terminated the entireties and made the 
ex-spouses tenants in common.1136 The divorce decree awarded the 
debtor a fee simple absolute in the house, and the ex-husband had 
a “monetary lien” on the house for 25% of its value.1137 The court 
ruled the house, at first exempt, was exempt no longer.1138 Back 
into the estate it went. 
                                                                                                     
517, at 476–81. 
 1131. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (“Unless a party in interest objects, the property 
claimed as exempt on such list [of property that the debtor claims as exempt] is 
exempt.”). 
 1132. Id. § 522(c). There are three exceptions for certain sacred debts as to 
which a creditor is  permitted to pursue the exempt property. Most important of 
these are debts secured by an unavoidable lien on the exempt item. Id. § 522(c)(2).  
 1133. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643–44 (1992) (rejecting 
an argument that exempt property could be included in the bankruptcy estate 
after the period for appeals had passed); Birney v. Smith (In re Birney), 200 F.3d 
225, 228 (4th Cir. 1999) (“There must also be some applicable statutory 
mechanism by which the estate ‘captures’ the post-petition property.”); In re 
Hamacher, 535 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2015) (noting in a tenancy by 
the entirety case that no provision of the Bankruptcy Code could properly bring 
back exempt property into the estate (citing In re Alderton, 179 B.R. 63, 66 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995))). 
 1134. 73 F.3d 38 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 1135. Id. at 39. 
 1136. Id. 
 1137. See id. (“Moreover, the divorce decree awarded Cordova sole ownership 
of the fee simple interest in the marital home; her ex-husband received a 
monetary lien on the home representing twenty-five percent of the equity.”). 
 1138. See id. at 43 (noting that the property became a part of the bankruptcy 
estate because it was received as a result of divorce within 180 days of filing the 
bankruptcy petition). 
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This result is half-wrong. With regard to the debtor’s tenancy 
by the entirety, the debtor had successfully claimed her 50% share 
of the tenancy by the entirety as exempt. Once exempt, the 
expulsion of this 50% could not be recaptured for the bankruptcy 
estate. After bankruptcy, divorce converted her 50% into a tenancy 
in common. But, although the exempted 50% converted in its form, 
the debtor did not receive a new estate.1139 So, 50% of the debtor’s 
real property should have been considered exempt. The 50% 
received from the nondebtor husband is postpetition property 
conveyed to the debtor by the divorce decree, but it does enter the 
bankruptcy estate, nevertheless, under Bankruptcy Code 
§ 541(a)(5), which states that “property of the estate” includes: 
Any interest in property that would have been property of the 
estate if such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the 
date of the filing of the petition, and that the debtor 
acquires . . . within 180 days of such date— 
 . . .  
 (B) as a result of a . . . final divorce decree . . . .1140 
The court also implied that the 100% result it reached turned 
on the divorce occurring within six months of the bankruptcy 
petition.1141 Properly, the debtor was entitled to exempt “any 
interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before 
the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the 
entirety.”1142 Furthermore, “[n]otwithstanding section 541 . . . an 
individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the 
                                                                                                     
 1139. See In re Bradby, 455 B.R. 476, 484 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011) (noting that 
the debtor “did not acquire any new interest that she did not possess upon 
commencement of the case”); Zebley v. Davis (In re Davis), 356 B.R. 385, 387–88 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that the debtor only owned the property that he 
already owned as of the bankruptcy filing); In re Martin, 269 B.R. 119, 122–23 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2001) (“The majority of courts . . . hold that a postpetition 
change in the character of property properly claimed as exempt will not change 
the status of that property, . . . once property is exempt, it is exempt forever and 
nothing occurring postpetition can change that fact.”); In re Lowery, 203 B.R. 587, 
588 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (noting that the severance of a tenancy by the entirety 
does not create any new property interest). 
 1140. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (2012). 
 1141. See Cordova, 73 F.3d at 43 (“Because she acquired the fee simple interest 
as a result of the entry of a divorce decree within 180 days of the filing of her 
petition, it became part of the bankruptcy estate.”). 
 1142. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). 
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property listed in . . . paragraph (3) of this subsection.”1143 
Therefore, the debtor was entitled to exempt the tenancy by the 
entirety notwithstanding anything found in § 541(a)(5).1144 The 
wife’s 50% share of the tenancy by the entirety should have 
continued on as exempt property. It was successfully expelled from 
the estate and should not have been dragged back into the estate 
under § 541(a)(5). 
The Fourth Circuit itself had previously used this 
“notwithstanding” language from § 522(b)(1) to hold that a 
post-bankruptcy change in the predicates of exempt property could 
not be considered. In BancOhio National Bank v. Walters (In re 
Walters),1145 a debtor had life insurance policies on his son.1146 
These he could exempt under Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(7).1147 
Within 180 days, his son died and the insurance policies paid 
out.1148 The debtor was permitted to keep the proceeds 
“notwithstanding” § 541(a)(5), which brings in property received 
within 180 days after the bankruptcy petition “as a beneficiary of 
a life insurance policy.”1149 Under Walters, post-bankruptcy events 
                                                                                                     
 1143. Id. § 522(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 1144. See In re Martin, 269 B.R. at 123 (reading the statute as stating that 
§ 522 trumps § 541). 
 1145. 724 F.2d 1081 (4th Cir. 1984).  
 1146. See id. at 1082 (noting that the original joint petition did not disclose 
several of the debtor’s life insurance policies, including eleven policies on the life 
of his son). 
 1147. Id. at 1083. 
 1148. Id. at 1082. 
 1149. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(C) (2012). The Cordova court was disingenuous in 
distinguishing Walters: 
Contrary to Cordova’s reading of In re Walters, our holding in that case 
was not a sweeping statement that subsequent events never affect the 
applicability of exemptions under the bankruptcy code. Rather, we 
stated that “[t]he proceeds derived from [life insurance] policies ‘owned 
by the debtor and claimed by him as exempt . . . flow as an incident of 
ownership of the contract to the debtor rather than to the estate.’” 
Cordova v. Mayer (In re Cordova), 73 F.3d 38, 40–41 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations 
omitted). Here, the court troubled to add emphasis to the word “contract,” which 
was not emphasized in the original. In other words, the law supposedly is that 
exemptions are “notwithstanding” § 541(a)(5) only when the debtor is paying 
under a contract, but where there is no contract, we are to ignore 
“notwithstanding” and apply § 541(a)(5) straight out. This overlooks the fact that 
Cordova presumably paid for a tenancy by the entirety granted by some vendor 
and (if so) was just as much enjoying something that flowed from the avails of a 
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cannot alter the exemptibility of property that qualified on the day 
of the bankruptcy petition.1150 This was a point the Cordova court 
ignored. 
In applying § 541(a)(5), the Cordova court also supposed that 
the debtor obtained a fee simple absolute upon divorce, which then 
came into the estate via § 541(a)(5). A comparison of what the 
debtor had at the time of the bankruptcy petition and at the time 
of the divorce shows that, as a matter of Virginia law, the debtor 
had nothing on bankruptcy day. Rather, the marital entity had 
property and the debtor had none. On divorce day, the debtor had 
fee simple absolute minus a lien for a cash award to her 
ex-husband.1151 So conceived, the Cordova court followed Virginia 
law.1152 But, Virginia law had already been preempted by the 
Bankruptcy Code on this score.1153 Section 541(a)(1) assumes that 
                                                                                                     
real estate contract. 
 1150. Accord Dioguardi v. Curran (In re Dioguardi), 35 F.2d 431, 431 (4th Cir. 
1929) (noting that, when the nondebtor spouse died two days after bankruptcy 
petition, the tenancy by the entirety never came into the estate and the trustee 
could not claim the debtor’s fee simple absolute). Congress would later add 
§ 70(a)(3):  
All property, wherever located, except insofar as it is property which is 
held to be exempt, in which the bankrupt has at the date of bankruptcy 
an estate or interest by the entirety and which within six months after 
bankruptcy becomes transferable in whole or in part solely by the 
bankrupt shall, to the extent it becomes so transferable, vest in the 
trustee . . . as of the date of bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(8), 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–598, 82 Stat. 2549. The meaning of this 
sentence is that the tenancy by the entirety did not come into the estate, but, if a 
post-bankruptcy event occurred within six months to make the debtor fee simple 
absolute owner, such fee simple absolute (unless exempt) would become property 
of the bankruptcy estate. See Craig, supra note 606, at 264 (detailing the effect of 
§ 703(a)(3) on post-bankruptcy events and exemptions); Richard G. Huber, 
Creditors’ Rights in Tenancies by the Entireties, 1 B.C. L. REV. 197, 205 (1960) 
(“The virtually complete immunity from claims of creditors given to tenants by 
the entireties in a majority of states retaining the tenancy is an expression of 
policy generally favoring marital property and property interests over commercial 
and creditor interests.”). 
 1151. See Cordova, 73 F.3d at 39 (“Under Virginia law, the [divorce] decree 
automatically extinguished the tenancy by the entirety and all contingent rights 
in the home, including the right of survivorship, by operation of law.”). 
 1152. See id. (noting that the tenancy by the entirety was extinguished upon 
divorce under Virginia law (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111 (West 2017)). 
 1153. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111 (West 2017) (providing that a tenancy 
by the entirety is converted into a tenancy in common upon divorce), with 11 
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the debtor had a 50% individual interest,1154 the same assumption 
that the Craft Court made.1155 Thereafter, this individual interest 
was exempted out of the bankruptcy estate. So, as far as the 
Bankruptcy Code is concerned, the debtor already had an exempt 
50% fee simple absolute estate at the time of divorce. What she 
acquired by the divorce was an extra encumbered 50% share.1156 
Therefore, the Cordova court should have laid claim to the 
encumbered 50% cotenancy, not the whole thing, if we are to follow 
the logic of § 541(a)(5). 
Divorce within 180 days of bankruptcy should be compared to 
death of the nondebtor spouse within 180 days of bankruptcy. 
Different rules apply, depending on whether the jurisdiction 
follows the Michigan or the Tennessee pattern. 
In Michigan, where the nondebtor spouse dies, “the survivor 
does not take as a new acquisition, but under the original 
limitation, his estate being simply freed from participation by the 
other.”1157 Accordingly, survivorship does not fall within the scope 
                                                                                                     
U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (providing that “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property” are included in the bankruptcy estate). 
 1154. In re Bradby, 455 B.R. 476, 479 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011). 
 1155. Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 282 (2002).  
 1156. The “new” vs. half-new controversy arose in Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 
U.S. 291, 299–300 (1991). In that case, a husband and wife owned real property 
as cotenants. Id. at 292. The couple divorced, and at the end of that proceeding, 
the husband owned fee simple absolute and the wife had a lien on the fee for a 
cash award designed to balance out the division of marital property. Id. at 293. 
The husband then sought to avoid the wife’s “judicial lien” under Bankruptcy 
Code § 522(f)(1) because it impaired his homestead exemption. Id. at 293–94. This 
the Supreme Court would not allow, for reasons beyond the scope of our present 
inquiry. See generally Laura B. Bartell, Extinguishment and Creation of Property 
Interests Encumbered by Liens—The Strange Legacy of Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 87 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 375 (2013). In Farrey, the Supreme Court assumed that the 
divorce terminated the cotenancy and created a fee simple absolute that was 
disjoint and separate from the husband’s prior cotenancy. Farrey, 500 U.S. at 
299–300. As a result, the fee simple absolute was entirely new. Id. But, the 
Supreme Court had accepted the debtor’s own reading of the divorce decree as 
accomplishing this result. See id. at 299 (“[S]he concludes, the decree created new 
interests . . . for Sanderfoot, ownership in fee simple of the house and real estate; 
for Farrey, various assets and a debt . . . secured by a lien on Sanderfoot’s new fee 
simple interest. . . . Sanderfoot agreed on each point.” (emphasis added)); see also 
id. at 303 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that half of the debtor’s property was 
not “new”). Professor Bartell argues, convincingly, that a reading of the divorce 
record does not support the debtor’s disastrous concession and that, in fact, the 
husband’s acquisition was only half-new. Bartell, supra, at 392. 
 1157. Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 109, 111 (1933); accord Birney v. Smith 
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and compass of § 541(a)(5).1158 A postpetition death of the 
nondebtor spouse does not turn the previously exempt tenancy by 
the entirety into non-exempt fee simple absolute.1159 
This is so even in Chapter 13 cases, where § 1306(a) expands 
the bankruptcy estate to include “all property . . . that the debtor 
acquires after commencement of the case.”1160 In In re Bradby,1161 
the court explained that, because the debtor takes by survivorship, 
                                                                                                     
(In re Birney), 200 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1999) (“A tenant by the 
entireties . . . does not ‘inherit’ his co-tenant’s interest in the property. Rather, he 
continues his full ownership of the property alone.”); In re Alderton, 179 B.R. 63, 
65 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (“When parties own property as tenants by the 
entirety and one of the tenants dies, ‘title falls to the survivor, but by operation 
of law, not by the statutes of descent.’” (citations omitted)). Writing of joint 
tenancies (which, like tenancies by the entirety, imply the right of survivorship), 
Professor Laura Bartell writes: 
When spouses hold property in joint tenancy, upon the death of one 
spouse, the estate automatically vests in the survivor by operation of 
law. The interest of the decedent does not pass to the surviving tenant; 
rather, the interest of the decedent is extinguished, and the survivor’s 
interest spreads to encompass the entire fee simple interest in the 
property. The survivor’s interest is deemed to be “a continuation, or 
extension, of his/her existing interest.” This means that the decedent’s 
interest is not subject to probate. 
Bartell, supra note 1156, at 395–96 (quoting Toma v. Toma, 163 P.3d 540, 544 
(Okla. 2007)). 
 1158. See In re Hamacher, 535 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2015); accord 
In re Buckley, No. 16-17946-JS, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4502, at *4 (Bankr. D. Md. 
Dec. 29, 2016) (noting that property of the estate is determined as of the petition 
date, unless provided for elsewhere in the Code), aff’d sub nom. Bellinger v. 
Buckley, 577 B.R. 193 (D. Md. 2017). The matter was otherwise under the 1898 
Act. According to Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(8): 
All property . . . in which the bankrupt has at the date of bankruptcy 
an estate . . . by the entirety and which within six months after 
bankruptcy becomes transferable in whole or in part solely by the 
bankrupt shall, to the extent it becomes so transferable, vest in the 
trustee and his successor . . . upon his . . . appointment and 
qualification, as of the date of bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §70(a)(8), 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–598, 82 Stat. 2549. According to an old 
commentary, this rule “destroys the accuracy of the debtor’s calculations [of the 
spouse’s death] and removes the possibilities of a possible [sic] ‘racket.’” Note, 
Effect of Bankruptcy on Estates by Entireties, supra note 606, at 1077. 
 1159. See In re Hamacher, 535 B.R. at 182 (finding that a tenancy by the 
entireties exemption is determined as of the petition date). 
 1160. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (2012). 
 1161. 455 B.R. 476 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011). 
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no “new” property is “acquired” when the nondebtor spouse 
dies.1162 The Chapter 13 trustee also objected that the debtor was 
not paying the unsecured creditors at least as much as they would 
have received in a Chapter 7 case, as required by § 1325(a)(4).1163 
The trustee reasoned that the hypothetical “liquidation test” of 
§ 1325(a)(4) had to be performed on the day of the confirmation 
hearing.1164 By that time, the nondebtor spouse had already died 
and, the trustee reasoned, the debtor owned a fee simple interest 
that was part of the bankruptcy estate.1165 In fact, the entireties 
had been expelled from the estate as exempt and never comes back 
in due to the death of the nondebtor spouse.1166 
In Tennessee, however, the contingent remainder is property 
of the estate. The debtor is able to exempt only the present 
possessory interest. When the nondebtor spouse does, the fee 
simple absolute does enter the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of 
the debtor’s unsecured creditors.1167 
A deceptive case indeed is Fairfield v. United States (In re 
Ballard).1168 There, two spouses owned a Virginia tenancy by the 
entirety.1169 They filed a joint (unconsolidated) bankruptcy petition 
                                                                                                     
 1162. Id. at 484. 
 1163. See id. at 479–80 (“The value of the property that a Chapter 13 trustee 
distributes . . . cannot be less than the amount that a Chapter 7 trustee would 
distribute if the estate were to be liquidated.”). 
 1164. Id. at 483–84. 
 1165. Id. at 484. 
 1166. See id. at 483 (noting that, once the property is exempt from the 
bankruptcy estate, “upon the death of the non-debtor spouse, the property 
maintains its exempted status because § 522(b)(3)(B) provides that the property 
that is exempt is the interest that the debtor had ‘immediately before the 
commencement of the case.’”). For this reason, § 541(a)(7) (“Any interest in 
property that the estate acquires after commencement of the case.”) did not apply. 
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) (2012). 
 1167. For cases ruling that death of the nondebtor spouse does bring the 
Michigan-style entireties into the bankruptcy estate, see In re Tharp, 237 B.R. 
213, 216 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (noting that courts have uniformly held that 
“when the debtor’s spouse died post-petition, the deceased spouse’s interest in the 
property was extinguished, and the bankruptcy estate became the owner of the 
property in fee simple”); In re Taylor, No. 6:10-bk-11111-ABB, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 
14, at *5 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2011) (same). Such holdings illegitimately 
presuppose a Kentucky-style tenancy by the entirety where the debtor’s 
contingent remainder is part of the bankruptcy estate. 
 1168. Fairfield v. United States (In re Ballard), 65 F.3d 367 (4th Cir. 1995).  
 1169. Id. at 368. 
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in Chapter 11.1170 Significantly, the debtors did not claim that the 
tenancy by the entirety was exempt.1171 As such, Craft applies: 
each bankruptcy estate obtained a 50% non-entireties share of the 
property.1172 
The spouses, as debtors-in-possession, obtained bankruptcy 
court permission to sell the house.1173 The majority held that this 
sale did not terminate the entireties because, under Virginia law, 
absent contrary intent, proceeds of a tenancy by the entirety are 
themselves held by the entirety.1174 
Later, however, the wife died.1175 The majority of the panel 
held that, as a result, all of the money went to the husband’s estate 
where joint and individual creditors shared pro rata.1176 The 
individual creditors of the wife lost out.1177 In short, death of the 
wife brought 50% of the cash into the estate of the husband. 
This was doubly incorrect. First, the couple never claimed an 
exemption for the entireties.1178 Therefore, as a matter of federal 
property law, the property, while in the bankruptcy estate, was 
subject to the trustee’s power to sell a tenancy in common to a 
buyer. Sale by the trustee severs the entireties.1179 The surviving 
husband had no interest at all in the cash proceeds of his wife’s 
                                                                                                     
 1170. Id. 
 1171. Id. at 373 n.2. 
 1172. Supra notes 518–542 and accompanying text. 
 1173. See Ballard, 65 F.3d at 369 (“On December 28, 1990, the bankruptcy 
court entered an order authorizing the debtors to sell their residential real 
property.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2012) (requiring court permission for use, 
sale or lease of estate property out of the ordinary course of business). 
 1174. See Ballard, 65 F.3d at 370 (“[L]ooking to Virginia law, absent ‘an 
agreement or understanding to the contrary, the proceeds derived from a 
voluntary sale of real estate held by the entireties are likewise held by the 
entireties.’” (quoting Oliver v. Givens, 129 S.E.2d 661, 663 (Va. 1963))). For a 
similar dictum under District of Columbia law, see Ross v. Maryland (In re Ross), 
475 B.R. 279, 286 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2012) (“In the District of Columbia, proceeds of 
a sale of entirety real property retain that entirety character (unless both spouses 
agree otherwise).”). 
 1175. Ballard, 65 F.3d at 369. 
 1176. See id. at 372 (“Although no doubt disappointing to the Trustee and the 
joint creditors . . . it should come as no surprise that upon the destruction of the 
tenancy by the entireties . . . their status as joint creditors would accord them no 
greater priority than that enjoyed by any non-point creditor.”). 
 1177. Id. 
 1178. Id. at 373 n.2. 
 1179. Supra notes 534–559 and accompanying text. 
THE FEDERAL LAW OF PROPERTY 211 
share.1180 At best, the husband had a monetary homestead charge 
on his 50% share. Furthermore, if Virginia entireties law did 
apply, the court erred in assuming that a post-bankruptcy event 
could bring back into the husband’s bankruptcy estate property 
that had been (for the sake of argument) expelled.1181 
And even if the debtor spouses had relied on Virginia 
entireties exemption, they cannot have sold with the selfish intent 
to perpetuate the entireties in cash form. They were selling as 
debtors-in-possession—fiduciaries for their creditors. Any such 
private intent to perpetuate the tenancy into cash form positively 
impoverishes the creditors for whom the spouses were fiduciaries. 
Had the case been a Chapter 7 liquidation and a sale by an 
independent trustee had occurred, can there be any doubt that the 
cash would have instantly gone into the separate estates of each 
spouse?1182 The dissent in Ballard was well justified in noting that 
“the majority [lost] sight of the bankruptcy context in which the 
sale took place.”1183 
Ballard should not be read to mean that, where the entireties 
is claimed as exempt, a postpetition death of the nondebtor spouse 
brings the fee simple absolute into the bankruptcy estate. In such 
a case, the tenancy by the entirety had been expelled from the 
bankruptcy estate. When the tenancy ends with the death of a 
spouse, the survivor owns the fee simple free and clear of any claim 
by a bankruptcy trustee. 
                                                                                                     
 1180. The Fourth Circuit would later read Ballard in an incomprehensible 
way: “In In re Ballard, we found that the bankruptcy estate acquired the property 
‘after the commencement of the case’ under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7).” Cordova v. 
Mayer (In re Cordova), 73 F.3d 38, 41 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996). According to § 541(a)(7), 
the bankruptcy estate includes “[a]ny interest in property that the estate acquires 
after the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) (2012). But this 
announces the result rather than explaining it. What section of the Bankruptcy 
Code provides that the husband’s bankruptcy estate obtains cash from the wife’s 
bankruptcy estate when the husband had renounced the tenancy by the entirety? 
 1181. Recall that § 522(b)(3) exempts a tenancy by the entirety “in which the 
debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the case, . . . to the extent 
such interest . . . is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). 
 1182. See In re Raynard, 327 B.R. 623, 637 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005) (“As for 
the remainder of the proceeds, it is clear that the trustee would distribute the 
remainder to all creditors, not just joint creditors.”), rev’d sub nom. Raynard v. 
Rogers (In re Raynard), 354 B.R. 834 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2006). 
 1183. Fairfield v. United States (In re Ballard), 65 F.3d 367, 373 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(Hall, J., dissenting).  
212 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2018) 
Any contrary interpretation raises the specter that the 
exemption lasts only so long as the spouses survive without 
divorcing. Suppose a debtor spouse exempts a Michigan-style 
tenancy by the entirety. The case is closed. Forty years later, the 
non-debtor spouse dies. May the bankruptcy trustee reopen the 
closed case to recapture the fee simple absolute estate that the 
debtor spouse takes by survivorship? According to § 350(b), “[a] 
case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to 
administer assets.”1184 Such a result is precluded by the 
proposition that exemptability is to be computed as of the day of 
the bankruptcy petition; postpetition events may not be 
considered. 
To summarize, because Ballard involved non-exempt 
property, it cannot be read as permitting postpetition events to 
determine exemptibility. Exemptibility must be decided on criteria 
that existed on the day of the bankruptcy petition.1185 
                                                                                                     
 1184. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). There is no time limit on the ability to reopen a case, 
though courts are apt to apply the concept of laches—prejudicial delay as a reason 
for equity to deny relief. See In re Bianucci, 4 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The 
leading approach is permissive but incorporates an equitable defense akin to 
laches, so that a debtor may reopen the bankruptcy case at any time to avoid a 
lien absent a finding of prejudice to the creditor. Passage of time in itself does not 
constitute prejudice.” (citations omitted)); Albuquerque Chem. Co. v. Arneson 
Prods., Inc., No. 98-2336, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 30733, at *6 (10th Cir. Nov. 30, 
1999) (noting that an eleven-year delay was not prejudicial); Waldschmidt v. 
Shaw (In re Shaw), 5 B.R. 107, 112 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (noting that, 
“[a]lthough the staggered filings of bankruptcy petitions that are calculated to 
frustrate the interest of creditors of both spouses is troublesome,” it was not 
prejudicial). 
 1185. Incidentally, the Cordova court illegitimately cited Ballard for the 
proposition that, when a tenancy by the entirety terminates, the exemption is 
lost. See Cordova, 73 F.3d at 41 (“[In Ballard,] [w]e announced that once a tenancy 
by the entirety terminates, the debtor—and the bankruptcy estate—are released 
‘from all conditions of the tenancy conceived to preserve the unity of entireties 
property’ . . . .” (quoting Ballard, 65 F.3d at 371–72)). A rather different approach 
was taken in Tamecki v. Frank (In re Tamecki), 229 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2000). In 
that case, a debtor owned a 50% interest in a tenancy by the entirety, which 
dwarfed the amount of debt he owed. Id. at 207. The court dismissed the case 
altogether for bad faith under § 707(a) because the debtor’s divorce was “right 
around the corner,” to mix a spatial and temporal metaphor. Id. Tamecki implies 
that, in Cordova, the court might dismiss the bankruptcy after the divorce (if bad 
faith is found), thereby allowing for creditors to obtain the full value of the 
debtor’s real property in light of the divorce. 
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Ballard has been overruled in Birney v. Smith (In re 
Birney),1186 where the nondebtor spouse died within six months of 
bankruptcy.1187 Subsequently, the debtor received a general 
discharge.1188 The trustee did not claim that the exemption was 
terminated.1189 A prepetition creditor, however, had the 
bankruptcy case reopened to claim that he had a judicial lien from 
a prepetition judgment that attached to the debtor’s fee simple 
upon the death of the nondebtor spouse.1190 The court held that 
bankruptcy’s automatic stay prevented this during the bankruptcy 
case1191 and the discharge injunction1192 prevented this after the 
case was closed. Therefore, the creditor had no lien.1193 In addition, 
the court ruled that § 541(a)(5) did not apply: “A tenant by the 
entireties . . . does not ‘inherit’ his co-tenant’s interest in the 
property. Rather, he continues his full ownership of the property 
alone.”1194 The case, therefore, affirms that postpetition death of 
the nondebtor spouse cannot be considered in assessing the 
validity of the exemption. 
The premises of Birney are inconsistent with the premises of 
Ballard. As a result, it is fair to consider Ballard overruled. Birney 
reinstates the rule that the predicates of exemptibility must be 
assessed from the perspective of the day on which the bankruptcy 
petition was filed. Any subsequent sale, death, or divorce does not 
bring the exempt property back into the bankruptcy estate. 
                                                                                                     
 1186. 200 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1999).  
 1187. Id. at 227. 
 1188. Id. 
 1189. Id.  
 1190. See id. (noting that the creditor attempted to foreclose on the property 
following the debtor’s wife’s death, claiming a judicial lien). 
 1191. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (2012) (barring “any act to create . . . against 
property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that 
arose before the commencement of the case”). 
 1192. Id. § 524(a)(2) (stating that discharge “operates as [an] . . . injunction 
against . . . an act to collect any [discharged] debt . . . .”). 
 1193. See Birney, 200 F.3d at 228 (“Smith’s lien could not attach from the time 
Birney filed his bankruptcy petition until the time he was granted a discharge.”). 
 1194. Id. at 229; see also In re Alderton, 179 B.R. 63, 66 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1995) (“The debtor did not acquire his wife’s interest in the property by way of 
inheritance, devise, or descent. Therefore, section 541(a)(5)(A) does not apply to 
bring the property into the estate.”). 
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14. Joint Cases 
Heretofore, we usually have assumed that only one spouse 
files for bankruptcy (though joint cases have been cited, where the 
jointness of the filing was immaterial to the point at hand). We now 
consider the tenancy by the entirety in cases where both spouses 
file jointly under Bankruptcy Code § 302.1195 
Joint cases in ancient times operated on a different basis than 
they do today. Under the 1898 Act, joint cases by spouses were 
substantively consolidated, which meant that all creditors were 
joint creditors. The spouses therefore lost any ability to exempt the 
tenancy by the entirety. According to a practitioner under the 1898 
Act: 
If . . . both spouses were in bankruptcy, then their proceedings 
were consolidated for purposes of administering the tenancy by 
the entirety property; thus, the trustee took the spouses’ 
aggregate interest in the entirety property into the joint estate. 
In such a consolidated case, three estates were created: the 
husband’s, the wife’s, and the joint estate. The trustee then 
would sell the entirety property and the proceeds from the sale 
would be placed into the joint estate to pay the joint 
creditors.1196 
Where the joint claims exceeded the value of the equity in the 
tenancy by the entirety, the joint creditors received no priority 
under this system. It is not clear, however, what happened to the 
proceeds where the joint creditors were “fully secured.”1197  
                                                                                                     
 1195. According to that provision: 
A joint case . . . is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court 
of a single petition . . . by an individual that may be a debtor . . . and 
such individual’s spouse. The commencement of a joint 
case . . . constitutes an order for relief . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
 1196. Ackerly, supra note 640, at 705–06; see also Craig, supra note 606, at 
267; Note, Effect of Bankruptcy on Estates by Entireties, supra note 606, at 1074 
(“From a logical point of view, this appears to be an inevitable conclusion.”). 
 1197. The cases cited by Ackerly are opaque. In In re Reid, we get the 
statement: “[T]he property in question [should be] sold for the benefit of the joint 
creditors.” 198 F. Supp. 689, 691 (W.D. Va. 1961), aff’d sub nom. Reid v. 
Richardson, 304 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1962). No further details are given as to the 
fate of surplus proceeds once the joint creditors were paid out. In In re Pennell, 
15 F. Supp. 743, 744 (W.D. Pa. 1935), and In re Utz, 7 F. Supp. 612, 612 (D. Md. 
1934), a joint creditor with a voidable judicial lien had commenced an execution 
sale of the tenancy by the entirety. Where the lien was voidable in the bankruptcy, 
THE FEDERAL LAW OF PROPERTY 215 
                                                                                                     
the court enjoined the execution sale so that the property could be administered 
in a consolidated bankruptcy. See Pennell, 15 F. Supp. at 744 (“[W]hen the estate 
of the husband and wife came into court on separate adjudications in bankruptcy, 
the trustee takes the estate held by them by entireties, but for convenience in 
administration, the two bankruptcy estates should be consolidated.”); Utz, 7 
F. Supp. at 613 (noting that “the judgment obtained by the petitioning creditor 
within four months of the adjudications in bankruptcy and the consolidation of 
the proceedings is void as against the trustee”). 
In re Hallenbeck was what we would call an “automatic stay” case: So long as 
the husband was the only bankrupt, the referee could not prevent a mortgage 
foreclosure under state law (as the tenancy by the entirety was not property of 
the bankruptcy estate). 211 F. Supp. 604, 604 (W.D. Va. 1962), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 
1963). But, the wife had since also filed. Id. at 605. “Since my decision on that 
point Mrs. Hallenbeck has filed a petition in bankruptcy and her case has been 
consolidated with that of her husband so that under well settled principles the 
tenancy by the entirety has become an asset of the joint estates in bankruptcy.” 
Id. (citing Roberts v. Henry V. Dick & Co., 275 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1960)). 
Concluding that the apparently undersecured creditor had no “claim” within the 
meaning of old Chapter XIII, the court continued to maintain that the mortgage 
foreclosure sale should continue without federal interference. Id. at 607. No 
information is given as to creditor priorities. 
In Wetteroff v. Grand, the issue was whether a tax refund was held by the 
entireties. 453 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Wetteroff v. 
Grand, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). The answer being no, the court had no occasion to 
consider administration. Id. at 547–48. 
In Roberts v. Henry V. Dick & Co., Inc., spouses conveyed away their tenancy 
by the entirety and soon thereafter each filed a bankruptcy petition. 275 F.2d 943, 
944 (4th Cir. 1960). In those days, there was no such thing as a joint petition as 
there is today under Bankruptcy Code § 302(a). See id. at 945 (“It would be 
unreasonable to attach . . . significance . . . to the fact that the husband and wife 
filed separate petitions, since the Bankruptcy Act . . . does not provide ordinarily 
for joint petitions or discharges of husband and wife.”). A creditor objected to the 
discharge because the conveyance was fraudulent and within a year of the 
bankruptcy petition. Id.; cf. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (2012) (stating that a court 
should grant a discharge unless the debtor has transferred property within one 
year of the date of filing with the intent to hinder or delay). The debtors responded 
that none of the creditors was truly a joint creditor and so, under the “no harm no 
foul” rule, the conveyance was not fraudulent. Roberts, 275 F.2d at 945. The court 
thought that, if there were joint creditors, the conveyance was fraudulent, and it 
remanded for further findings. Id. The case did not have occasion to visit the 
procedural niceties of property administration. Roberts thus follows the advice of: 
Recent Case, Bankruptcy—Fraudulent Conveyances—Conveyance by Husband 
and Wife of Land Held As Tenants by the Entirety, 43 HARV. L. REV. 312, 312 
(1929) (“Where a creditor holds a joint claim, there would seem to be no reason 
why the trustee of both spouses should not be deemed vested with the rights of a 
joint-judgment creditor.”). 
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It will be recalled that the courts viewed the individual case 
as a “legal fraud.”1198 This was because the individual debtor’s 
discharge transformed the unsecured joint claim into an individual 
claim against the nonbankrupt spouse, thereby depriving the joint 
creditor of the ability to put a judicial lien on the tenancy by the 
entirety. One reaction to this was for the joint creditor to petition 
the nondebtor spouse into bankruptcy. The cases were then 
consolidated and the exemption disappeared.1199 
Thus, in Reid v. Richardson,1200 a husband with a tenancy by 
the entirety and with joint creditors filed a bankruptcy petition.1201 
The tenancy did not enter the bankruptcy estate,1202 as it later 
would under the Bankruptcy Code. The husband obtained a 
discharge.1203 One of the joint creditors brought suit against the 
wife.1204 Actually, the joint creditor was now an individual creditor 
by virtue of the husband’s discharge.1205 Its suit had no merit. The 
wife unwisely filed for bankruptcy.1206 The referee (as bankruptcy 
judges were then called) granted a motion to reopen the husband’s 
case and to consolidate the husband’s bankruptcy with the wife’s 
bankruptcy, thus depriving the couple of their home.1207 On appeal, 
the Fourth Circuit ruled, “in view of the ‘legal fraud’ that would 
occur if this estate were not re-opened, we cannot say that the 
Court below abused its discretion in re-opening the estate.”1208 
                                                                                                     
 1198. Supra notes 609–616 and accompanying text. 
 1199. Some older cases assumed that pre-Code practice in joint cases survived 
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Blum, 39 B.R. 897, 900 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1984) (holding that “11 U.S.C. § 522(2)(B) does not exempt 
non-homestead entireties property in a joint case, at least where there are joint 
obligations of the debtors exceeding the value of the non-homestead entireties 
property”). 
 1200. 304 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1962).  
 1201. See id. at 352 (noting that the petition listed the property at issue as the 
only realty interest, and that at the time of filing the property did not accrue as 
an asset of the estate). 
 1202. Id. at 353. 
 1203. Id. at 352. 
 1204. Id. 
 1205. Supra notes 585–593 and accompanying text. 
 1206. Reid, 304 F.2d at 352. 
 1207. Id. at 353. 
 1208. Id. at 355. 
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The Bankruptcy Code completely obliterates this practice. 
Today, the exemption exists in joint cases, even if the cases are 
substantively consolidated.1209 
The Bankruptcy Code invites spouses to file a single 
bankruptcy petition that commences a joint case.1210 The two cases 
imply separate administrations of the two estates. This, in turn, 
implies that all the rules in the individual cases apply to the two 
estates in the joint case without revision.1211 Section 302(b), 
however, provides that “[a]fter the commencement of a joint case, 
the court shall determine the extent, if any, to which the debtors’ 
estates shall be consolidated.”1212 There is: 
[A] dramatic difference between the joint administration 
contemplated by Rule 1015(b) and substantive consolidation. 
Joint administration is a creature of procedural convenience. It 
is justified by the laudable desire to avoid the wasting of 
resources, which would result through the duplication of effort 
if cases involving related debtors were to proceed entirely 
separately. Thus, rather than having two of everything, there 
need only be one trustee, one docket, and duplicate pleadings or 
claims can be avoided. The estates of each debtor, however, 
remain separate. In this way, the desire for administrative 
efficiency can be fulfilled without altering the substantive 
rights of the parties. 
Unlike joint administration, substantive consolidation has a 
dramatic impact on the rights of the parties to a bankruptcy 
proceeding. When cases are substantively consolidated, the 
debtors loose [sic] their separateness and are treated as one 
entity. Their individual estates are combined to create a single 
pool, out of which the claims of all creditors can be paid. The 
ultimate result is the same as if there were only one debtor.1213 
                                                                                                     
 1209. See Bunker v. Peyton (In re Bunker), 312 F.3d 145, 148–49 (4th Cir. 
2002) (“The [two] spouses may take the exemption notwithstanding the joint 
administration or substantive consolidation of their individual bankruptcy 
estates.”). 
 1210. See 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (noting the procedure for commencing a 
joint bankruptcy case); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015 (same). 
 1211. See In re Brannon, 476 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A] joint filing in 
bankruptcy does not sever a tenancy by the entireties so as to make the property 
available to creditors of either husband or wife individually.”). 
 1212. 11 U.S.C. § 302(b). 
 1213. In re Steury, 94 B.R. 553, 553–54 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988). 
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The grounds for consolidating the bankruptcy estates of 
spouses is the same for the substantive consolidation of 
bankruptcy estates in the corporate context. Basically, if it is too 
complicated to account for the assets and claims, consolidation is 
justified.1214 But, consolidation is not justified if its purpose is to 
affect the politics of distribution.1215 Translated to the context of 
spouses, the desire to deprive the spouses of their exemption in the 
tenancy by the entirety should never justify the consolidation.1216 
If the case is consolidated, the creditors of the wife are 
creditors of the husband and vice versa. Given consolidation, it 
would appear logical that the exemption disappears, because every 
creditor is a joint creditor.1217 But it is only the federal law of 
consolidation that makes them joint creditors. The exemption itself 
is governed by § 522(b)(3)(B), which, once again, provides that the 
debtors may exempt: 
[A]ny interest in property in which the debtor had, 
immediately before the commencement of the case, an 
interest as a tenancy by the entirety . . . to the extent 
such interest as a tenant by the entirety . . . is exempt 
from process under applicable nonbankruptcy 
law . . . .1218 
Because jointness is established by bankruptcy law (not by 
nonbankruptcy law), such jointness cannot serve to destroy the 
exemption, even in a consolidated case.1219 For good measure, the 
                                                                                                     
 1214. See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (permitting  
substantive consolidation when “assets and liabilities are so scrambled that 
separating them is prohibitive and hurts all creditors”). 
 1215. See Thomas v. Peyton, 274 B.R. 450, 455–56 (E.D. Va. 2001) (ruling that 
a joint case does not justify the the override of the debtors’ exemption right), aff’d 
sub nom. In re Bunker, 312 F.3d at 145. 
 1216. See Reider v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Reider), 31 F.3d 1102, 1109–
10 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that substantive consolidation is inappropriate where 
creditors of one spouse gain at the expense of the creditors of the other spouse). 
 1217. See Steury, 94 B.R. at 556 (“Given the restrictions surrounding the 
exemption in question, if the estates are consolidated, it will be lost. . . . [A]ll 
creditors, regardless of the nature of their claim, would become joint creditors.”). 
The Steury court thought that substantive consolidation was needed in any case 
where unsecured joint creditors could exist. But where the concept of the shadow 
bankruptcy is recognized, a sale can be conducted in an individual case as well as 
in a joint case, and consolidation is then superfluous. 
 1218. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 1219. See Thomas, 274 B.R. at 456 (noting that a trustee’s status as a 
hypothetical judicial lien creditor cannot override debtor’s exemption right under 
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predicates of exemption are established as of the day of the 
bankruptcy petition. An order for substantive consolidation is a 
postpetition event that may not be considered. Thus, substantive 
consolidation may not serve to deprive the individual spouses of 
their right to exempt the tenancy by the entirety from the 
individual creditors. 
A recent case to the contrary is In re Stewart,1220 where the 
court held that jointness of the case destroys the entireties 
exemption. According to the court, “when the spouses file a joint 
bankruptcy petition, ‘they, in essence, ‘convey’ the property to the 
trustee, which destroys the unities and makes it [the property] 
held as tenants in common and subject to division and sale by the 
trustee.’”1221 In other words, the Stewart court viewed the spouses 
as having voluntarily conveyed their entireties to a bankruptcy 
trustee. In fact, they have separately and individually conveyed 
their shares to different bankruptcy estates. Under state law, each 
of these individual transfers is incapable of conveying any part of 
the Florida entireties.1222 Their individual shares initially go into 
their individual estates, but each spouse is entitled to exempt 
entireties as existent “immediately before the commencement of the 
case.”1223 In other words, the Stewart court inappropriately 
considered the bankruptcy petition a joint conveyance when it 
should have considered the state of affairs as it existed 
“‘immediately before’” this conveyance.1224 Whereas other courts 
have been guilty of considering postpetition events in assessing 
exemptibity,1225 the Stewart court considered the bankruptcy 
petition itself as the reason why the exemption was forfeited.1226 
                                                                                                     
“applicable nonbankruptcy law”).  
 1220. 373 B.R. 736 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007). 
 1221. Id. at 740 (quoting Grant v. Himmelstein (In re Himmelstein), 203 B.R. 
1009, 1014 n.6 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996)). 
 1222. See In re Pyatte, 440 B.R. 893, 900 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (noting that 
“[u]nder Florida law, each spouse’s interest in entireties property consists of the 
whole of the property, and not a divisible part,” and, in the event of bankruptcy, 
the debtors “are not required to allocate their interests . . . equally”).  
 1223. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). 
 1224. Stewart, 373 B.R. at 740 (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(b)(3)(B) (2012)). 
 1225. Supra notes 1138–1159 and accompanying text. 
 1226. For similarly wrongly decided cases, see generally Nunley v. Paty Co. (In 
re Nunley), 109 B.R. 784 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990) and Dickenson v. Penland (In 
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To be distinguished are cases like In re Shelton,1227 where a 
husband filed for bankruptcy and the trustee somehow never 
administered the entireties on behalf of the joint creditors.1228 
Later, the wife filed for bankruptcy.1229 The court permitted the 
husband’s case to be reopened1230 so that the shadow bankruptcy 
could be pursued for the joint creditors.1231 Although the Shelton 
court made much of the wife’s bankruptcy being so close to the 
husband’s petition that it should be considered a joint proceeding, 
in fact, the wife’s petition is a red herring. Even if the wife never 
filed for bankruptcy, the husband’s bankruptcy could be reopened 
to administer an asset. The issue has nothing to do with the 
jointness of the bankruptcy petitions. The power to administer the 
joint asset in an individual case justifies reopening a closed case to 
achieve this end. 
IV. Conclusion 
This Article has argued that there is a federal common law of 
property that preempts state law whenever a federal statute uses 
the word “property.” Tax law contains two prominent examples in 
which the United States Supreme Court has smashed the fictions 
proffered by state law. The first example, Drye v. United States,1232 
had to do with the power of an heir to renounce the inheritance. 
                                                                                                     
re Penland), 34 B.R. 536 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983). In In re Smith, 200 B.R. 213, 
214 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1996), a husband and wife filed separate Chapter 13 
petitions and then claimed a tenancy by the entirety exemption against individual 
creditors. The court seemed to think that, had they filed a joint petition, the 
exemption would be forfeit. Id. at 215. Therefore, their separate Chapter 13 plans 
were rejected as being filed in bad faith under § 1325(a)(3). Id. at 214. 
 1227. 201 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996).  
 1228. Id. at 149–50; see also In re Tyler, 27 B.R. 289, 293 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1983) (finding, in a case with similar facts, that the debtors would be allowed to 
retain any equity in their real estate that they had claimed as exempt). 
 1229. Shelton, 201 B.R. at 150. 
 1230. See id. at 156–57 (finding that it was permissible to reopen the husband’s 
case in order to investigate any potential joint debts); 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2012) 
(“A case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer 
assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.”). 
 1231. Shelton, 201 B.R. at 153. 
 1232. See Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 61 (1999) (holding that the control 
rein that the heir held under state law “rendered the inheritance ‘property’ or 
‘rights to property’ belonging to him within the meaning of § 6321”). 
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The second, United States v. Craft,1233 concerned the tenancy by 
the entirety, which, in many states, is owned by a separate marital 
entity, not by the debtor. 
Although many would say that the Supreme Court tax 
opinions are monsters which cannot be permitted to escape the 
confines of tax law, I have argued that these same principles that 
inspired the Supreme Court in the tax context already inhabit 
federal bankruptcy law. 
In the case of inheritance disclaimers, courts have denied that 
federal law preempts state law when the disclaimer is made prior 
to the bankruptcy petition. But courts also admit that the 
Bankruptcy Code prevents a postpetition disclaimer. The logic of 
this admission directly undercuts the logic of the denial. If logic is 
to have any purchase, we must acknowledge that the Bankruptcy 
Code in general preempts state inheritance disclaimer law. 
In the case of the tenancy by the entirety, the Bankruptcy 
Code has always preempted the state law of the entireties, in 
anticipation of Craft. Although, in many states, the marital entity 
owns the entireties, the Bankruptcy Code anticipates the Craft 
holding in tax. It pierces the marital veil and brings the tenancy 
into the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, even though the debtor 
supposedly owns nothing, according to state law. The only 
difference between tax law and bankruptcy law is that, the 
Internal Revenue Code does not invite exemption of the entireties. 
The Bankruptcy Code invites it without requiring it. 
Meanwhile, this federal preemption has made the law of 
administering the entireties extraordinarily complex—as complex 
as any bankruptcy issue I have ever encountered. This Article has 
contained a thorough review of the administrative problems that 
this strange property form has engendered. Most notably, 
administration of the entireties engenders a strange “bankruptcy 
within a bankruptcy” for the benefit of joint creditors against 
whom the Michigan-style entireties is not exempt. 
                                                                                                     
 1233. See Craft V, 535 U.S. 274, 276 (2002) (concluding that each tenant by the 
entirety has individual rights in the “estate sufficient to constitute ‘property’ or 
‘rights to property’ for the purpose of [the] lien”). 
